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The global advent of assisted human reproduction has brought with it an upheaval in social, cultural 
and legal norms of the family. The centrality of biological reproduction to the traditional heterosexual 
family has been challenged by reproductive intervention, further destabilizing nuclear family norms 
already unmoored by same-sex marriage, single mothers, unwed fathers, and increased access to 
divorce, contraceptives and abortion. As these challenges have shifted EuroAmerican social norms of 
family, the law has increasingly been called upon to preside over the re-organization of intimate life, 
operating as a central vehicle to reframe the relationship of the family to the state. This relationship 
remains critical, as the family remains the preeminent social institution and the conduit through 
which both biological and social reproduction are performed. The traditional family has thus become 
the site of considerable anxiety, and perhaps nowhere more so than in regard to assisted human 
reproduction (AHR).  
This dissertation argues that the complex outcomes of blood, genetics, sociality and affiliation 
created through reproductive technology, and the legal struggles they engender, cannot be understood 
as mere deviations from the heterosexually reproductive family. Instead, it invites exploration of the 
sociality and legal bonds created by the inherently non-reproductive family as a locus to understand 
the decoupling of sex from reproduction that is being produced through AHR. It draws from more 
than 1200 pages of interview transcripts with lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, two-spirit and queer 
[LGBTQ] Canadians who have used or considered using reproductive assistance, and reflects upon 
this data to examine the assumptions of law, nature, technology and kinship that drive the conceptual 
vocabularies of AHR. Its central contention is for the utility of a queer perspective on reproductive 
law and technology, as a way to pry open cognate issues around kinship, biology, sociality and the 
order of family. By placing LGBTQ participant voices at the fore, this dissertation offers a fresh 
analysis on complex questions of parentage, child-rearing and the legal regulation of intimacy.  
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SECTION I 
Chapter One: Introduction 
	

The global advent of assisted human reproduction has brought with it an upheaval in 
social, cultural and legal norms of the family. Innovations in reproductive technology have 
emerged in step with other popular and scholarly developments in late modernity, unsettling the 
foundational binaries in EuroAmerican thought and working to destabilize an Enlightenment 
worldview fixed upon the Cartesian separation of mind and body. The epistemologically certain 
dualities of nature/culture, biological/social, male/female, local/global, human/nonhuman have 
been blurred, diversified and denaturalized in recent decades, with these changes perhaps most 
powerfully evident in the constellation of effects that cluster around assisted reproduction. Such 
developments strike at the heart of multiple scholarly and disciplinary fields, encompassing 
concerns of gender, the body, technology, science, kinship, marriage, the family, religion, ethics, 
law, justice and biomedicine.  
Assisted reproduction thus provides a critical lens into rapid social and cultural change, 
and a useful avenue through which feminist scholars might explore the shifting terrain of 
foundational epistemic and ontological concerns. For feminist legal scholarship in particular, 
assisted reproduction offers an unparalleled window through which to view the regulation of 
intimacy and the gendered forms of sex, family, intimacy and kinship that may emerge, dissolve 
and be reformulated. This involves a process of reiteration and the reinstantiation of old norms 
upon fractured or reshaped modes of family, an often ambivalent process that both unsettles and 
stabilizes existing kinship relations. As medical anthropologist Marcia Inhorn suggests, in 
discussing the rapid proliferation of scholarship on reproductive technology in the past two 
2 
decades the widespread application of technologies of reproduction “have diversified, globalized, 
and denaturalized the taken-for-granted divisions between, inter alia, sex-procreation, nature-
culture, gift-commodity, informal-formal labor, biology-sociality, heterosexuality-homosexuality, 
local-global, secular-sacred, and human-nonhuman.”1 Thus, as she rightfully concludes, there is 
much to consider in thinking through what is “new” about the so-called new reproductive 
technologies.2 
The Canadian setting offers an instructive perspective on the history and application of 
assisted human reproduction [AHR]3 in the Western world, and in particular the feminist struggle 
to legislate emerging forms of biotechnology. The genesis of Canada’s federal attempt to regulate 
all forms of assisted reproduction and related research – the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
[AHRA]4 – has been deeply marked by feminist conflict over proper modes of intervention and 
ideological commitments, reflecting the need for updated responses to the dispersed kinship 
forms created through reproductive technology.5 
In the wake of the December 2010 Supreme Court decision on the constitutional 
legitimacy of the AHRA,6 Canada finds itself facing continued regulatory uncertainty in the area 
                                            
1
 Marcia C. Inhorn & Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, "Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Culture Change" 
(2008) 37 Annual Review of Anthropology 177 at 178. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 While the abbreviation of ‘ART’ for assisted reproductive technology is more common in international scholarship, 
this definition is more limited. In general, ART describes procedures that involve surgically removing eggs from a 
woman’s ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the woman’s body or 
donating them to another woman. They generally do not include treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., 
intrauterine—or artificial—insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine only to stimulate egg 
production without the intention of having eggs retrieved. I am interested in all forms of technological mediation of 
human reproduction, and therefore prefer the more inclusive AHR. However when reproducing original quotations 
that make reference to ART, I will use the form selected by the author. For a standard definition of AHR see: The 
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-493, 42 U.S.C. 263a-1 et seq.) 
4
 Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA]. This conflict over feminist goals forms the bulk of 
Chapter Five.  
5
 There are a handful of cases from Ontario in particular which reflect this creative approach. The language of 
“dispersed kinship” is inherited from Marilyn Strathern, whose shadow over the field of ART research and analysis 
looms large. Strathern, infra note 131. 
6
 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457 [AHRA Reference]. 
3 
of assisted reproduction. For those who have followed the history of the AHRA, this will perhaps 
come as little surprise; the long and tortuous journey of this piece of legislation is a story which 
continues to be written. While many have weighed in on the merits and failures of the AHRA 
over its more than twenty-year history, few have looked at its impact upon a specific sector of the 
population: lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, two-spirit and queer [LGBTQ] people.7 
This dissertation aims to address this scholarly gap, and explore the ways in which 
LGBTQ people are and have been using the technologies of assisted human reproduction [AHR] 
in Canada.8 It draws from more than 1200 pages of interview transcripts with LGBTQ Canadians 
                                            
7
 Lesbian is a term for a female whose primary sexual orientation is to other women. Gay is a term for a male whose 
primarily sexual orientation is to other men. This term is sometimes used by lesbians (i.e., gay woman). Bisexual is a 
term for a person whose sexual orientation is directed towards individuals of more than one sex or gender, though 
not necessarily at the same time.Trans is an umbrella term referring to people who do not embrace traditional binary 
gender norms of masculine and feminine and/or whose gender identity or expression does not fit with the one they 
were assigned at birth; it can refer to transgender, transitioned, transsexual, and genderqueer people, as well as some 
two-spirit people. Transgender is a term used by individuals who falls outside of traditional gender categories or 
norms. It literally means “across gender,” and conveys the idea of transcending the boundaries of the gender binary 
system. It however is not necessarily a desire to be of the “opposite” sex. A transsexual is someone who feels their 
gender identity does not match the sex that they were assigned at birth. Many transsexual people choose to go 
through sex reassignment, including hormone treatment and surgeries, so that their sex and gender identity match. 
Transition refers to the process of changing from the sex one was assigned at birth to one’s self-perceived gender. It 
may involve dressing in the manner of the self-perceived gender, changing one’s name and identification, and 
undergoing hormone therapy and/or sex reassignment surgeries to change one’s secondary sex characteristics to 
reflect the self-perceived gender. Two-Spirit is an English language term used to reflect specific cultural words used 
by First Nations people who have both a masculine and a feminine spirit or to describe their sexual, gender and/or 
spiritual identity. Queer is a term that has traditionally been used as a derogatory and offensive word for LGBTQ 
people. Many have reclaimed this word and use it proudly to describe their identity and/or as an umbrella term for 
LGBTQ people or communities. Some people use ‘queer’ as a way of identifying their non-heterosexual orientation 
yet avoiding the sometimes strict boundaries that surround lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans identities. ‘Queer’ can 
also signify one’s rejection of heteronormative sexual identities, normative gender constructions, or essentialist 
identity politics. Please note that because ideas and attitudes are constantly changing within LGBTQ communities 
and among society at-large, these definitions may be used differently by different people and in different regions.  
See: datejie green, Lesley A. Tarasoff & Rachel Epstein, “Meeting the Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR) Needs 
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Queer (LGBTQ) People in Canada: A Fact Sheet for AHR Service Providers” 
LGBTQ Parenting Network, (Toronto: Sherbourne Health Centre, 2012). 
8
 While the abbreviation of ‘ART’ for assisted reproductive technology is more common in international scholarship, 
this definition is more limited. In general, ART describes procedures that involve surgically removing eggs from a 
woman’s ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the woman’s body or 
donating them to another woman. They do not include treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine 
insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine to stimulate egg production without the intention of 
having eggs retrieved. I am interested in all forms of technological mediation of human reproduction, and therefore 
prefer the more inclusive AHR. (For a standard definition of ART see: The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and 
Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-493, 42 U.S.C. 263a-1 et seq., which defines the term as “all treatments or 
procedures which include the handling of human oocytes or embryos, including in vitro fertilization, gamete 
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who have used or considered using reproductive assistance, and reflects upon this data to 
examine the assumptions of law, nature, technology and kinship that drive the conceptual 
vocabularies of AHR. Its central theoretical contention is for the utility of a queer lens on 
reproductive law and technology, as a way to pry open cognate issues around kinship, biology, 
sociality and the order of family. This argument will be fleshed out in the chapters to follow, but 
in a nutshell: AHR, for the first time in human history, has decoupled sex from reproduction, 
allowing a child to be produced without the need for sexual intercourse. Same-sex relations, for 
their part, are inherently non-reproductive, and when procreation happens it is actively and 
intentionally decoupled from sexual intercourse. LGBTQ families thus offer a tremendously 
useful vantage on the workings of ART, representing in some ways the ideal client for an 
industry built upon baby-making without sex (although this is not the case in practice, as will be 
seen). Queer families offer a fascinating combination of sociality and biology; traditional and 
disruptive; conventional and strange – that, I think, provide useful passage for scholars interested 
in the workings of technology and kinship.  
This theoretical project also carries a normative weight, as reflected in the empirical 
components of this dissertation and the urgency of participant voices that inform the analysis. In 
step with the conceptual rethinking of AHR, then, is argued a need for the greater incorporation 
of LGBTQ people in policy-making and judicial reasoning around AHR. Yet rather than 
enfolding queer folks into existing models of heterosexual family, as has been the overwhelming 
response to techno-mediated kinships, I argue instead for a revamped perspective on the medical 
and juridical frames which advance AHR family projects. By placing queer voices at the fore, I 
believe that a refreshed analysis may be gained on thorny questions of parentage, child-rearing 
and the legal regulation of intimacy.   
                                                                                                                                            
intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, and such other specific technologies.” ) 
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As will be explored over the coming chapters, this contention puts two main theses in 
play. The first is fairly straightforward, and will be demonstrated through an examination of 
empirical data, federal regulations and recent case law. This dissertation argues that current 
Canadian legal and clinical models are failing LGBTQ people seeking reproductive assistance, 
and this represents a grave matter requiring immediate remedy. This is queer as a politic and a 
tool for justice. 
The current medico-juridical system of assisted human reproduction is profoundly 
heteronormative, and remains geared toward ameliorating the infertility experienced by ever-
larger numbers of heterosexual couples.9 LGBTQ families are either shoehorned into the same 
model as their heterosexual counterparts, or are simply not being adequately served by a system 
unable to recognize their specific needs (this is particularly the case with trans* people).10 The 
chapters on the ‘infertility trap’ as well as the history and law of reproductive technology in 
Canada set the stage for first-person accounts of study participants, and their experiences with a 
system ill-designed to meet their needs. All too often queer families pose an exceptional case in 
the clinic and in law, and one that serves to highlight the larger failings of a for-profit industry 
constructed around the business of human reproduction.   
This leads to the second main thesis of this dissertation, which contends that queer 
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 There are a variety of reasons why infertility is on the rise among heterosexuals, both in Canada and 
internationally. These will be explored in detail in Chapter Seven with the discussion of medical infertility and the 
natural order of family. 
10
 The term “cisgender” marks congruence between the gender one is assigned at birth, one’s body, and one’s lived 
experience of that gender; cisgendered people experience a match with societal expectations around their physical 
and mental expressions of gender identity. A person who is transgendered experiences a gender identity that does not 
match up with the gender assigned at birth. Recent usage has favored the term “trans*” to describe the broadest 
range of identities that fall outside the cisgender norm. This includes people who identify as transgender, 
transsexual, transvestite, genderqueer, genderless, two-spirit, and others. Usage without the asterisk generally refers 
explicitly to transgender men and women. The struggle for self-definition has been an important part of the trans* 
movement, with focus placed on the use of proper terminology as a symbol of respect and inclusivity. Being trans* 
does not imply any specific sexual orientation, and may involve identification as straight, gay, lesbian, or bisexual 
(or something else entirely). See: Stu Marvel & Martha Ertman, “Sexual Orientation and the Law” in N. J. Smelser 
& P. B. Baltes, eds., International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences, 2ed, (Oxford, United Kingdom: 
Elsevier Science. 2014). 
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families and their experiences are not a mere aberration from the heterosexual norm, but offer a 
distinct theoretical frame through which to examine the complexities of AHR for all manner of 
families. This is queer as a theoretical tool.  Again, for most of human history, reproduction has 
been dependent on sexual coupling to produce offspring. The social norms and family ties that 
bound resultant children to their caretakers would, of course, vary according to each culture’s 
kinship structure and legal code. The meanings ascribed to this act of ‘nature’ also shifted 
according to context and interpretation, even as the mechanics of reproductive alignment 
remained a necessary proposition.11 This is no longer the case, with children regularly created via 
AHR without reliance upon sexual intercourse or a biological tie between parent and child. 
Despite this seismic shift in reproductive modes, the law and culture of reproduction has 
remained strangely fixed on the need to replicate the workings of ‘nature’. As Sarah Franklin has 
termed it, AHR is often framed as simply there to “give a helping hand” to Nature and allow 
each heterosexual couple to fulfill their biological destiny.12 
At the same time, legal scholars such as Janet Dolgin have mapped the convoluted routes 
that law has taken to assign the value of ‘natural’ parenthood to children produced through 
surrogacy arrangements. Dolgin has shown how courts use both traditional notions of biological 
kinship and intended social parentage to recreate a vision of the idealized ‘natural’ family for the 
purposes of parentage and custody determination.13 While Dolgin does not frame her analysis in 
precisely these terms, what the courts actually mean by ‘natural’ in these cases is ‘as close to a 
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 This is not to minimize the complex ways in which kinships have been produced, or call into being a pre-cultural 
‘nature’ which has been practiced since time immemorial. As will be argued, the use of AHR actually draws 
attention to the cultural fiction of unassisted reproduction and the legal family as a naturalized model of ideal 
kinship construction. Dion Farqhuar has written provocatively about this process at infra note 426. 
12
 Sarah Franklin has remarked upon the tendency of clinics to produce promotional material that represents IVF as 
a simple, natural procedure through the use of phrases such as “giving Nature a helping hand”. Franklin, Sarah 
(1997) Embodied Progress: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception (London: Routledge) at 103. 
13
 Janet L. Dolgin, Defining the Family: Law, Technology, and Reproduction in an Uneasy Age (New York: New 
York University Press, 1997). See also infra notes 680 to 687. 
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heterosexual reproductive ideal as possible.’  
Indeed, despite the oceans of ink spilled on the social and legal ramifications of new 
reproductive technologies, few scholars have incorporated the robust language of 
heteronormativity and queer critique in their analysis. Fewer still have read the workings of the 
clinic through a queer lens. However I believe the inherently non-reproductive modalities of 
queer sexuality have much to tell us about children produced without sex.  
This dissertation takes AHR’s variations from ‘the natural’ not as an aberration, but as a 
starting point. It seeks to use this queer terrain as a launching pad to ask the following questions: 
What might happen to our understanding of AHR if gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans* parents 
were placed at the fore? Can a queer perspective help us destabilize ‘the natural’? And how can it 
help us think more carefully about the ways in which reproductive power and privilege are 
distributed to some and not others? How might the legal landscape cant differently when the 
presumed male-female link between genetic and social parenting was never in play? Does the 
same-sex family resist assignment under the ‘natural’ model of heterosexual blood kin? What 
role does technology play in producing social and legal outcomes of family in the midst of all 
this shifting terrain? In sum, might queer uses of AHR, and the families which result, allow us to 
think through problems such as infertility, filiation and fertility law from a fresh perspective? 
With the queer family, we start from a location wherein it is assumed that a child will not 
have biological ties to both her parents.14 Nor must it be assumed that only two parents will 
constitute the family. Reliance upon AHR to create one’s family is not viewed as a failed mode 
of heterosexual infertility, but a mandatory intervention due to the inherent non-reproductivity of 
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 An evident exception to this would be a lesbian couple in which a transwoman is partnered with a cisgendered 
woman who intends to gestate their biological child. Exactly such partnership arrangement is chronicled in later 
chapters. While the gamete contributions might match heterosexual expectations for biological reproduction, the 
couple describes how their social reality was in fact very much at odds with clinical norms.   
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same-sex relationships.  
From the seat of such queer vantage, therefore, this dissertation seeks to explore the 
conceptual narrowing effected by a specific set of normative presumptions about reproduction. It 
consciously places the queer user of assisted reproduction at the forefront with the aim of 
opening new conceptual vistas on AHR. It relies upon critical theory as well as first-person 
narratives to evaluate the medico-juridical frame of reproductive technology and family law in 
Canada, and outlines the heterosexist presumptions that continue to undergird both clinic and 
courtroom. While other scholars have of course written a great deal on reproductive technology 
from each of these disciplinary locations, this dissertation aims to use an interdisciplinary 
approach to bring previously siloed perspectives into conversation. This project will reflect on 
the structural underpinnings of family law, using a lens of queer legal theory, feminist science 
studies and new kinship theory to understand the exclusions produced by heteronormative 
models of reproduction. In this way, it is hoped, the queerly reproductive family may open access 
to explanatory power for all manner of reproductive projects conducted beyond sexual 
intercourse. 
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 The dissertation is structured into three main sections. Section One aims to ‘set the scene’ 
and lay out the foundational discourses required to understand the unique ways in which queer 
people approach AHR. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two outlines the changing 
models of family and kinship upon which the ‘new reproductive family’ is located. It looks to 
jurisprudence that has sought to find parental rights outside the traditional family form, and 
analyzes the relationship between biological facts and social relations as played out in a recent 
appellate decision from Saskatchewan. After this broad framing of the themes of the dissertation, 
9 
Chapter Three provides the theoretical frameworks upon which the rest of the project are 
constructed. It offers a range of feminist critiques of the nature/culture divide as a foundational 
binary in supporting both biological determinism and the systems of medico-juridical regulation 
in play around AHR. It draws from Foucauldian analysis, science and technology studies and 
corporeal feminism to explore this binary, before looking to the new kinship theory and its 
questioning of ‘nature’ in the alignment of human intimacy. Chapter Three then offers an 
overview of queer theory, and moves to explore the ways in which queer scholarship has talked 
about futurity and reproduction. It suggests a queer legal analytic through which we can engage 
the complexities of reproductive technology use by queer subjects, and concludes with an 
application of queer legal theory toward a techno-marxist-feminist analysis of the queerly 
reproductive family. Parts of Chapter Three have been published in a special two-part collection 
of the Jindal Global Law Review on the topic ‘Rethinking Queer Sexualities, Law, and Cultural 
Economies of Desire’.15 
Section Two then moves to foreground the queer subject and analyze the experience of 
LGBTQ people seeking AHR in Canada. It explores the history and present of fertility law in 
Canada with an eye to how this is experienced by queer people with a reproductive plan. Chapter 
Four outlines the research methodology used by the empirical aspects of this project, and 
describes the Creating Our Families study carried out in Ontario, on which the author was a co-
investigator. Parts of Chapter Four have been published in the Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology Canada and were co-authored by the Creating Our Families research team.16 
Chapter Five develops the historical background to the project, and lays out a queer genealogy of 
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 Stu Marvel, “Polymorphous Reproductivity and the Critique of Futurity: Toward a Queer Legal Analytic for 
Fertility Law” (2013) 4(2) Jindal Global Law Review 294. 
16
 Lori E. Ross, Lesley A. Tarasoff, Scott Anderson, Datejie Green, Rachel Epstein, Stu Marvel, & Leah S. Steele. 
“Sexual and gender minority peoples’ recommendations for assisted human reproduction services.” (2014) 36:2 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 146-153. 
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the Assisted Human Reproduction Act. As the guiding piece of legislation around reproductive 
technology and research in Canada, the AHRA has seen a fraught history that will be traced 
through to the present day. This chapter traces the competing ideologies in play in Canadian 
feminist movements as they grappled with AHR and state regulation, spanning from the early 
1980s to the release of the report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies. 
Chapter Six then picks up after the publication of the report, and looks to the passing of the 
AHRA and the related Supreme Court reference case in 2010. The particular impact of this 
discourse on queer people will inform this chapter, as it explores how the legislation that 
emerged over decades of public consultations, government-sponsored commissions and explicit 
feminist intervention has led to today’s legal order. This frames the discussion in the two 
attachments to this dissertation, both of which have been published elsewhere. Attachment One 
is being published within an anthology on Assisted Human Reproduction Law by the University 
of Toronto, and has been co-authored with the Creating Our Families research team.17 It looks at 
how LGBTQ access to reproductive material, services and facilities has been constrained by the 
AHRA and supportive legislation, and incorporates empirical data and the specific concerns 
expressed by LGBTQ Canadians. 
Attachment Two extends this empirical analysis with a case study of a lesbian couple 
using an anonymous sperm donor. The experience of these women frames the investigation of 
semen regulations, lateral kinships, ‘donor sibs,’ and the particular concerns of queer people of 
colour as they create families from known and anonymous donor sperm in Canada and abroad. 
Attachment Two ends with a postscript from one of the women in the case study, describing the 
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 Stu Marvel, Lesley A. Tarasoff, Rachel Epstein, datejie green, Leah S. Steele & Lori E. Ross17 Stu Marvel et al 
(forthcoming), “Listening to LGBTQ People on Assisted Human Reproduction: Access to Reproductive Material, 
Services, and Facilities” in Trudo Lemmens, Cheryl Milne & Ian Lee, eds, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 
2015). 
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new forms of kinship their family has created with other lesbian couples who used the same 
anonymous donor. This Attachment exists in a slightly varied form in a volume of the Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law.18 
The dissertation continues with Section Three, which takes up the notion of ‘infertility’ as 
a central rubric. It unpacks this term as a structuring discourse of the fertility industry and 
(increasingly) a distinct legal category demanding state response. This section uses ‘infertility’ to 
demonstrate the ways in which narrow conceptions of nature, technology and kinship explored in 
the previous chapters are enacted in the space of the reproductive clinic. It overviews the history 
and definition of infertility, and unpacks the heterosexist and gendered presumptions which are 
foundational to its pathology. Section Three then argues that these normative presumptions lay 
an ‘infertility trap’ for prospective parents, queer and otherwise, who encounter a conceptually 
narrow set of reproductive ideals upon entering the space of the clinic. Such ideals hinge upon a 
misleading characterization of reproductive potential and a privileging of biology above other 
forms of kinship. This dissertation will argue powerfully against the “infertility trap” as a cluster 
of normalizing regimes which people seeking out AHR must inevitably encounter. 
As will be explored in Chapter Seven, the infertility trap is laid by antiquated categories 
which embrace medieval concepts of sexuality, place an undue burden on female bodies, foster 
stigma by promoting blunt polarities of normalcy and failure, presume a high degree of sexual 
availability, and ignore the lived realities of single people and queers. It is also created by the 
definitional inconsistencies of the term infertility itself, which has drastically limited the ways in 
which clinical and demographic researchers can think about adult procreation. The infertility trap 
is based upon a misleading characterization of reproductive potential and a privileging of biology 
                                            
18
 Stu Marvel, “Tony Danza is my Sperm Donor?: Queer Kinship and the Impact of Canadian Regulations Around 
Sperm Donation” (2013) 25(2) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 221. 
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above all other forms of kinship.  
The prism of infertility is thus used in the text to critically examine a range of diagnostic 
assumptions about gender, sexuality, genetics, pathology and regimes of the normal. This in turn 
illuminates a series of cognate legal issues, laying bare a medico-juridical order that is broadly 
unable to account for all manner of bodies beyond the realms of ‘natural’ reproduction. Chapter 
Eight will particularly explore this relationship between medicalization, failure, reproductive 
trauma, infertility and queer subjectivity.   
Chapter Nine develops a response to the infertility trap, suggesting the creation of new 
models that reject the wounded heterosexuality of the fertility clinic. It distinguishes between 
two forms of kinship structures: intra-reproductive (where the biological tie is contained within 
the parenting dyad); and extra-reproductive (where the biological tie is not contained with the 
parenting dyad). It then tracks their location in both medicine and law, and considers the role of 
the heterosexual dyad in closing down broader frameworks for family formation. This 
exploration is pushed into the fresh neologisms and conceptual frames of Chapter Ten, which 
offer a range of novel categories to think through the rupture of ‘traditional’ family frames that 
has occurred through AHR. Finally, the substantive explorations of the dissertation are 
concluded in Chapter Eleven, which uses these new conceptual frames to think through 
intentional parenthood, contracts, the bioethical implications of state funding for AHR and legal 
challenges to infertility as a category of disability. Using the frame of queer legal theory 
developed across the dissertation, this chapter offers suggestions to emerge from the infertility 
trap and offers new models for family law and reproductive justice able to account for the 
subjectivity of LGBTQ parents and other families being created outside the heterosexual norm. 
Chapter Twelve offers a review and conclusion to the dissertation.   
13 
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It is not difficult to grasp why LGBTQ people may find themselves uniquely dependent 
on assisted human reproduction to create their families. While an earlier generation of gays and 
lesbians might have had children in heterosexual relationships before ‘coming out,’ the 
increasing acceptance of LGBTQ identities in Canada has made this social trajectory less 
common. Certainly some queer people may choose to engage in potentially reproductive sex, 
either for pleasure or for the aim of pregnancy, although this is not the norm – popular media 
representations notwithstanding.19 Instead, most people in same-sex relationships will look either 
to adoption or to reproductive assistance to create their families. The institution of civil rights 
and constitutional protections for same-sex relationships has meant that more queer people than 
ever are seeking clinical assistance to have children. The layering of a possibility for genetic 
connection atop historic queer modes of social kinship has led to an explosion of interest in 
AHR; indeed, recent estimates from Toronto suggest that LGBTQ people may represent up to 
15-25% of clientele at urban fertility clinics.20 Lesbians, bisexuals and transpeople are also the 
largest consumers of donor sperm in Canada, as indicated by a 2010 study which estimated that 
same-sex couples represent 55% of demand for donor insemination.21 The study estimated a 
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 For example in the Showtime series ‘The L Word’ about a group of lesbians living in Los Angeles, two of the 
main characters – Bette and Tina - seduce a straight man with the intention of getting Tina pregnant. When they 
coyly suggest not using a condom during intercourse, the would-be sperm donor reacts with anger and recognition 
of their lesbian pregnancy scheme. This ‘sexy pregnancy threesome’ has become something of a cliché in popular 
culture, but represents male sexual anxiety and phallocentric sexual fantasies far more than it showcases actual 
reproductive strategies devised by lesbian women. This is also, evidently, not a strategy open to gay men.      
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 Rachel Epstein, The Assisted Human Reproduction Act and LGBTQ Communities (Toronto: LGBTQ Parenting 
Network, 2008). 
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 The “same-sex couples” described in the study may include not only lesbian couples, but bisexual women 
partnered in a same-sex relationship as well as transwomen in lesbian relationships and partnered transmen seeking 
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Belgium. The model used in the Canadian report assumed that the demand in Canada would follow a similar ratio of 
request. JM Bowen et al, “Altruistic Sperm Donation in Canada:  an Iterative Population-based Analysis” Submitted 
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further 23% of demand from single women (without orientation specified) and just 22% on the 
part of heterosexual couples.  
Yet these changes come in step with an overall transformation in the understanding and 
recognition of family. Feminist legal scholars have offered sweeping analyses of family law in 
recent decades, tracking the ways in which intimate recognition has become an increasingly 
complex matter.22 As Naomi Cahn writes: 
The future of the family is one of the central cultural and legal obsessions of our 
time. As the courts struggle with the rights to be accorded to same-sex and 
transgendered couples, as potential parents hire surrogates to carry their children, 
as divorcing couples fight over ‘their’ embryos, and as cohabitants successfully 
claim rights against each other, traditional constructions of the family have 
become increasingly subject to challenge.23 
 
The growing presence of same-sex couples bearing children, the widespread use of 
assisted reproductive technology and demographic shifts toward ‘non-traditional’ families have 
reshaped the landscape of family. Canadian census data from the past fifty years has tracked a 
dramatic shift from the end of the baby-boom period (1946 to 1965), when heterosexual couples 
still married young and had relatively large families.24 In 1961, married heterosexual couples 
accounted for 91.6% of census families; by 2011, this proportion had declined to 66.2%.25 Even 
within this married majority of Canadians, the norm is no longer the biologically-related nuclear 
                                                                                                                                            
to Assisted Human Reproduction Canada (AHRC). Programs for Assessment of Technology in Health (PATH) 
Research Institute. Hamilton, ON. [20 May 2010]. 
22
 For a small sampling of this literature, see for example: Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Gary S. Becker, Treatise on the Family (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991); Martha Fineman, The Illusion of Equality (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1991); June Carbone, From Partners to Parents: The Second Revolution in Family Law (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000); Linda Waite & Maggie Gallagher (eds.) The Ties that Bind: Perspectives on Marriage and 
Cohabitation (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2000).   
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 Naomi Cahn, “The New Kinship” (2012) Georgetown Law Journal 100(2) at 368. 
24
 Statistics Canada, Fifty years of families in Canada: 1961 to 2011 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2012), online 
Statistics Canada http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-312-x/2011003/fig/desc/desc3_1-2-
eng.cfm 
25
 Ibid. Note this percentage does not include same-sex married couples. 
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family. Instead we have families structured by re-marriage, stepchildren, and multiple 
generations living under one roof, as well as growing numbers of gay and lesbian couples. 
Between 2006 and 2011 the number of married same-sex couples nearly tripled, soaring by 
181.5%.26 During the same period the number of common-law couples of all sexes rose 13.9%, 
more than four times the 3.1% increase for married couples.27  
These social phenomena have directed important changes in the legal understanding of 
family, and to parentage in particular. A major turn has been away from the primacy of genetic 
affiliation in determining parentage and toward a child-focused approach to the concept of 
“parent” that incorporates a concern for social and psychological ties.28 Of course law’s attempt 
to locate an appropriate child-parent relationship has never been a simple matter of tracking 
biology; in fact the primary relationship between parent and child was hardly an issue of legal 
concern until relatively modern times. Legal historian Jamil Zainaldin has traced this history in 
the English-speaking world, exploring the emergence in the 19th century of childrearing as the 
primary concern of the family, and, by extension, a concern of the courts.29 Zainaldin explains 
how the recognition of ‘childhood’ as a distinct phase in human development, and specifically as 
a period of vulnerability and dependence, created a matching requirement for caretakers to guide 
such children into adulthood. For example, one of the central gendered presumptions in this 
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 Statistics Canada, Portrait of families and living arrangements in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2012), 
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 Ibid. 
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 Nicholas Bala and Christine Ashbourne, “The Widening Concept of Parent in Canada: Step-Parents, Same-Sex 
Partners, & Parents by ART” (2012) American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 20(3). 
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 Jamil Zainaldin, “The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption and the Courts, 
1796-1851” (1979) Northwestern University Law Review 73. 
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history of American family law – the ‘tender years’ doctrine – was reliant both upon notions of 
vulnerable children as well as an idealized vision of mothers as natural caregivers.30   
Economic concerns about the cost of child-rearing, as well as naturalized presumptions 
about the care-taking roles of mothers and fathers, have long been critical for both legislators and 
courts. To this end, Chapter Three will involve a lengthy exploration of the “facts of life” as the 
seemingly natural conduit to kinships forged through sex, birth and genetic connection.31 
However law and society have also recognized non-biological kinship ties when necessary, with 
adoption being perhaps the most evident example of kinship formation that depends on 
intentional social affiliation and a concern for the welfare of children. There have historically 
been a number of ways to achieve legal parenthood, based on genetics as well as intent, social 
relationships, and the best interests of the child.32 As Roxanne Mykitiuk rightly argues, “law 
does not always mirror nature and often it is more representative of the societal values (ie social 
and cultural imperatives) it is employed to protect.”33 Despite these multiple roads to family, 
legal constructs of parentage and filiation have nevertheless tended to shape themselves 
powerfully around the basic “facts of life” in which a mother and father is required to produce a 
child.  
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 For contrasting views on the modern utility of the tender years doctrine, see Allen Roth and Ramsay Laing Klaff. 
Roth locates the doctrine as it stood following the feminist revolutions of the 1970s, making an argument for father’s 
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Until recently, for example, it was presumed that “the act of giving birth necessarily 
resulted in motherhood.”34 Thus, the main challenge facing courts and legislatures has been how 
to determine paternity, amidst either competing or absent claims to the role. The default 
assumption has been to presume the husband of the natural mother as the father of any children 
to the marriage. English common law shares this presumption of ‘pater est quem nuptia 
demonstrant’ with the world’s major legal traditions, including Sharia law and the Napoleonic 
Code, stemming from the very practical matter of indeterminate biological paternity (as 
compared to the physical certainty of childbirth).35 The paternal presumption was rooted in the 
legal bond between husband and wife, ensuring that any resultant children would be legitimated 
by the marriage regardless of actual biological inheritance. This presumption functioned not only 
to avoid conflict between potential male progenitors, but, importantly, awarded legal status to all 
children born into wedlock. Only a legal father could bestow upon his son the patrilineal rights 
claim to inheritance and intergenerational wealth transfer.36 As Lois Harder and Michelle 
Thomarat have explained, “While mothers could create bare life, only husband-fathers could 
confer full humanity and full entry into the social realm.”37  
This patriarchal and resolutely heterosexual model for biological reproduction and social 
identity has functioned as the baseline model for family across centuries and diverse legal orders. 
As Roxanne Mykitiuk has argued: 
What has been construed within our understanding of kinship as "natural," then, is a 
normatively essentialist position having direct bearing upon the way we understand 
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 Ibid at 778.  
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 There have of course been cases where the maternity of a child was concealed or denied after birth. The certainty 
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 Ibid at 782. 
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gender and sexuality within the reproductive context. "Natural" procreation, in this sense, 
occurs only between two heterosexual individuals, without the assistance of technology.38 
 Such a paternal presumption is now easy to refute not only in light of the technology of 
AHR, but thanks to the prevalence and convenience of DNA paternity testing kits.39 Yet its 
power endures. An ancient legal convention aimed at conferring social legitimacy continues to 
operate, taking contemporary form less to uphold the rules of primogeniture and more as a 
method to ensure the privatization of care. Whilst presumptive paternity has always been a ‘legal 
fiction’ unconnected to biological ties, its resilience in the face of contemporary genetic testing 
methods demonstrates the deeply rooted tenets upon which it rests. Fiona Kelly correctly 
identified the foundations of this fiction when she argues that “the law has historically been more 
committed to protecting the traditional patriarchal family than to accurately representing 
biological fact,”40 although one might also wish to question the idea of ‘biological fact’ as a 
socially unconstructed modality. 
Nevertheless, in more recent cases where paternity has been contested due to DNA 
testing, courts have applied traditionalist reasoning to replicate an exclusive, two-parent model of 
heterosexual parentage.41 As Janet Dolgin has argued, even in cases with complex biological and 
social kinship ties at work, the legal protections awarded to fathers “will follow unreservedly 
only to protect traditional family structures.”42 This was famously illustrated in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., a 1989 United States Supreme Court case in which plaintiff Michael H. was not 
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 Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in Maintaining the Traditional Family” (2009) 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 21(2) at 316. 
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 Dolgin, supra note 13 at 78. 
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married to the mother of his biological child. Instead the paternal presumption had favoured the 
woman’s husband Gerald, who despite a lack of biological relation, refused to relinquish his 
claim to legal fatherhood. In Justice Scalia’s majority ruling, which dismissed Michael H.’s suit, 
a defense of patriarchal tradition and the prevailing social order trumped any claims to 
‘biological fact’. As Scalia thundered stentoriously: “Our traditions have protected the marital 
family…against the sort of claim Michael asserts.”43 
Buoyed by the reproductive complexities of AHR, the past few decades have brought 
ever thornier issues of paternity and parentage to the courtroom. As the law has been obliged to 
struggle with complex and conflicting parentage claims it has increasingly recognized multiple 
forms of fatherhood, even as the presumption of paternity has held fast. Kelly describes this 
apparently contradictory phenomenon: 
A review of both statute and case law suggests that the law is open to multiple 
constructions of fatherhood, some based in biology, some in the man’s relationship to the 
child’s mother (which is linked to presumptions about biological paternity), and others 
grounded solely in a social relationship with the child. In fact, at the same time that rights 
and responsibilities associated with biological fatherhood remain deeply entrenched in the 
law (and may even be experiencing a resurgence), there appears to be a simultaneous rise 
in the recognition of social fatherhood.44 
 
Kelly argues that undergirding these diverse responses is a commitment to the privatized 
nuclear family, and a resistance to families without fathers. She identifies these multiple modes 
of paternity recognition as emerging from the desire of courts to reinforce the primacy and 
centrality of fatherhood, thereby ensuring that each family properly has a father at the head. As 
Kelly suggests, “the law does not favour either biological or social paternity” but rather seeks to 
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increase the circumstances under which fatherhood may be assigned, strategically adapting the 
facts of the case to meet the patriarchal goals of dominant ideology.45 
In recent decades the fragmentation of kinship has been effected through the critical and 
material formations of AHR, and law has moved awkwardly in addressing these cultural shifts. 
As Judith Butler has argued in relation to queer sociality, kinship has now been irreversibly 
opened to “a set of community ties that are irreducible to family.”46 But what happens when 
these fragmented forms actively seek out legibility as ‘a family’ within law? Does this 
irreducibility, in Butler’s words, actually depend on the inability of legal authority to read these 
dispersed kinships as family? What if they were brought into legal recognition? Would they 
remain irreducible? Posed another way: Is the family a strictly legal concept, and one which only 
finds culturally legible form through the categorizations of law? If so, might the queer family 
represent not only the breakdown of the symbolic heterosexual order, but also a rupture in the 
ways in which ‘family’ has assumed a coherent legal form? Might the queer family, in its 
material form and inherent non-reproductivity, represent an oxymoron with which the law cannot 
grapple? And ultimately, is it possible for law to adapt, or must it seek to reinstate existing 
heterosexual modes of nature/culture upon the palimpsest of the queer family?  
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Scholars such as Fiona Kelly have argued that the adaptation of law to the queer (or at 
least, lesbian) family is structured through the project of ‘finding fathers’. Family law has 
historically wrestled with non-biological kinship almost exclusively in relationship to 
fatherhood, and she is correct that many lesbian families have had to face the presumption of 
                                            
45
 Ibid at 317. 
46
 Judith Butler, “Is Kinship always already Heterosexual?'” (2002) Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural 
Studies 13: 14–44 . 
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paternity in arguing for the legitimacy of co-motherhood. However this dissertation will argue 
that such operations of family law are clustered far more closely around normative 
heterosexuality than simply a patriarchal interest in ‘finding fathers.’ The multiple strategies that 
courts have applied in carving out space and potential for paternity claims have dominated the 
legal landscape and set the circumstances under which parental rights may be assigned. This has 
dramatically impacted those parents seeking rights outside of the traditional family form, with 
claimants encouraged to operate under patriarchal forms. As Kelly has correctly noted – these 
are diverse strategies, and biological and social tropes have both been liberally applied in the 
service of the patriarchal order.47  
Thus, the lesbian partners of biological mothers have often been compelled to analogize 
themselves to the presumptive paternal rights enjoyed by male heterosexual partners of 
biological mothers. In order to have their parental rights recognized, lesbian co-mothers are 
obliged to wedge themselves into a heterosexual model of kinship that – even when it recognizes 
social and affective bonds – still struggles to place these ties within the framework of biological 
reproduction. Both social and genetic relations come into play as viable juridical strategies when 
courts seek to defend the heterosexual model of family, a patriarchal double-bind that is 
exemplified in the 2005 Saskatchewan case of C.(P.) v. L.(S.).48 
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In this matter, a lesbian couple had been in a five-year spousal relationship, over the 
course of which one of the women had conceived a child through sexual relations with a male 
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friend.49 After the end of the relationship, disagreement arose as to whether the child’s 
conception and birth was a deliberate result of the women’s intention to have a child together (as 
the petitioner alleged), or the unplanned outcome of casual intimacy (as the respondent 
contended). The case arose when the non-biological mother petitioned for access to the child 
under the same presumptive parental rights that a male cohabitating with the mother would have 
enjoyed.50 
The petitioner’s primary request was that the paternity presumption in s.45(1)(a) of the  
Children’s Law Act  of Saskatchewan be similarly extended to a woman cohabiting with the 
mother at the time of the child’s birth or conception.51 The relevant provision holds that:  
“s.45(1). Unless the contrary is proven on a balance of probabilities, there is a 
presumption that a man is, and that a man is to be recognized in law to be, the father of a 
child in any one of the following circumstances: 
(a) at the time of the child’s birth or conception the man was cohabiting with the 
mother, whether or not they were married to each other;”52 
The petitioner challenged this section of the Act as being inconsistent with s. 15 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as the language of s. 2 of the Act, which 
defined the two possible parents of a child in strictly gendered terms as consisting of a male 
“father” and female “mother”.53 Thus, the petitioner argued that this section of the Act was 
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 Note that while this case does not involve assisted reproductive technologies but conception through sexual 
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discriminatory under equal protection grounds on the basis of sex or sexual orientation, because 
a male cohabiting with the mother would be presumed in law to be the father of the child, while a 
same-sex partner is not entitled to the benefit of the same presumption.54  
Justice Wilkinson’s ruling first wound its way through provincial case law involving 
matters of parental recognition, wherein same-sex lesbian partners had requested to be named a 
“mother” in addition to, but not in substitution for, the biological mother. The analytical frame 
Wilkinson J. drew from these cases involved whether the use of the definite article (“the” 
mother) in provincial family law statutes, rather than the indefinite article (“a” mother), indicated 
a legislative intention that there could only be one mother of a child.55 The courts in the cases 
surveyed had found it unnecessary to decide the point, but Wilkinson J. took the ‘definite article’ 
issue as determinative for the present analysis.56 
The court then moved to review the facts of the instant case, acknowledging that “a final 
and binding determination regarding the status of ‘parent’ is not simply an issue of biological 
                                                                                                                                            
 “father” means the father of a child and includes: 
(a) a man declared to be the father pursuant to section 43 or 44; and 
(b) a man recognized as the father pursuant to section 50, 51, 55 or 56; 
“mother” means the mother of a child and includes: 
(a) a woman declared to be the mother pursuant to section 43 or 44; and 
(b) a woman recognized as the mother pursuant to section 50, 51, 55 or 56; 
“parent” means: 
(a) the father or mother of a child, whether born within or outside marriage; or 
(b) the father or mother of a child by adoption. 
54
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mothers in the case of a same-sex adoption. The case JK v. LH and GH, [2002] O.J. 3998 (Ont. S.C.J.) also 
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connection”57 and recognized the importance of acknowledging affective ties – not least because 
of the “extraordinary social issues involved” with advances in reproductive technology.58 
Wilkinson J. drew from the U.S. court ruling Lehr v. Robertson to quote approvingly that: 
“Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and 
child. They require relationships more enduring.”59 This balance between biology and sociality is 
spread clearly across the court’s ruminations, as Wilkinson J. recognized the “emotional 
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association” even as he gives weight to “the 
fact of blood relationship”.60 
After recognizing the validity of claims to social and intentional parenting, however, the 
court ultimately sides with the Attorney General’s defense, agreeing that a presumption of 
parentage cannot extend to a woman, quite “simply because a woman could not have provided 
the seed.”61 Thus Wilkerson J. frames his dismissal of the petitioner’s Charter claim as resting 
upon the primacy of biological ‘truth’ – viewed as a natural realm that exists distinct from the 
social stereotypes deemed impermissible under s.15: 
…the presumption of paternity is not based on societal stereotypes in the ordinary sense. 
Historically, like other rebuttable presumptions, it made certain assumptions about 
ordinary human behaviour in circumstances where direct proof was difficult. It assumed 
that a man and woman cohabiting at a child’s conception or birth were engaging in sexual 
intercourse from which procreation might inevitably result… The Court cannot aspire to 
affect the fundamentals of biology that underlie the presumption purely in the interests of 
equal treatment before the law.62 
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 Ibid at para 20. My emphasis. This form of biological determinism has a long history in English common law. The 
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Wilkinson J. also found the petitioner’s Charter claim flawed because it failed to take 
into account the ‘definite article’ issue raised by courts in Ontario, instead basing its weight 
merely upon the “alleged discriminatory effect of the presumption of paternity arising from 
cohabitation.”63 By the court’s reasoning, then, because the petitioner did not challenge the 
statutory assumption that precludes recognition of more than one mother or one father, she relied 
upon a flawed analysis of available status and parentage declarations under the Act. As such the 
issue was not one of impermissible discrimination, because a woman can never be a male 
progenitor, and social ties are no substitute for ‘biological truth’. Rather, for the court, the issue 
depended not on whether a co-mother can enjoy a parental presumption (she has no ‘seed’ and 
evidently cannot), but whether a finding of more than one female parent is even possible.  
According to the court, a proper constitutional challenge should have been framed in 
relation to “the prohibition against making declaratory orders in favour of multiple parents 
(whether mothers or fathers), rather than the narrower objection to the presumption of paternity 
in favour of male cohabitants”.64 It is irrelevant that this matter was in fact not about the petition 
of multiple parents, but the recognition of a cohabiting lesbian relationship with the same 
presumptions that a heterosexual union would have enjoyed. Instead the court’s reasoning 
maintains the ghostly presence of a father at all costs and despite the presence of an existing co- 
parent, by refusing to foreclose the possibility of a biological progenitor one day emerging to 
claim his natural rights. 
                                                                                                                                            
from enfranchisement to vote: “what was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa cannot be annulled by Act of 
Parliament.” One hundred and sixteen years later, this phrase is quite remarkably echoed by the Court of Queen's 
Bench of Saskatchewan. Infra note 85. 
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In this ruling Wilkinson J. deploys both biological and social reasoning, coming to rest 
ultimately on the germinative authority of the male progenitor. He carefully acknowledges that 
biology is by no means the only determining factor in awarding parental rights, even as he rushes 
to reinstate the presumptions of paternity as natural fact. An elemental vision of male biology, 
blood and nature cements this logic, wherein the primacy of the genetic wellspring – the ‘seed’ –
soundly trumps a lesbian mother’s social claims to parental relation. This is a resolutely 
heterosexual model of biological parentage, wherein no family is complete without the primary 
contribution of the patriarch; it also echoes Biblical scripture that traces family lines to the male 
progenitor, with women merely providing an incubator for the vital ejaculate of life.  
In sum, even though the petitioner’s presumption of parentage had not been rebutted in 
this case, and there was no evidence of any other party’s interest in claiming parental rights, the 
absent figure of the patriarch won out. The fluidity of social versus genetic parenting is here 
strategically employed in the service of fatherhood (and used to deflect competing claims), as an 
operation to protect the institution of the traditional family. Yet while this ruling indeed bent over 
backwards to ‘find a father,’65 such efforts were ultimately aimed at reinstating and securing a 
naturalized vision of the heterosexual nuclear family. Melanie Jacobs has made a similar point in 
the U.S. context, where, as she describes: “The commonality between the biological and social 
paternity approaches is preservation of the unitary, nuclear family: a family predicated on a two-
parent paradigm consisting of one mother and one father.”66 
Ironically, this labour in service of a heterosexist ideal also works to reveal the machismo 
inherent within the paternity presumption itself. Here the presumption clearly rests not upon a 
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legitimate social tie or concern for the constitutional rights of the petitioner, although both were 
contemplated by the court. Rather, the force of the presumption is invested wholly in patriarchal 
tradition, with a woman unable to assume the ideological space of fatherhood regardless of her 
functional family role. Had the petitioner been male and a non-biological parent, she would have 
smoothly assumed parental rights under s. 45(1)(a) of the Act. In the absence of a rebuttal, such 
as with the instant case, the presumption would have been uncontrovertibly hers. Within the 
singular vision of Justice Wilkinson’s court, the only thing able to trump one man’s seed is 
another man’s claim to the household, a reductio ad absurdum wherein sociality, affective ties 
and care are boiled down to a manly struggle over the domestic fruits of the home.  
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In order to more productively interrogate this dynamic it may be helpful to focus on the 
move to privilege biological ‘facts’ over social ties, which in the case of C.(P.) v. L.(S.), 
effectively reinscribed the primacy of (heterosexual) genetic affiliation in constructing the 
family. Legal determinations depend upon the ideology of normative constructions of family, 
which are themselves generated through a particularized social recognition of relationships.67 In 
Canada, as has been discussed, this involves the privileging of both biology and adult sexual 
affiliation in constructing relatedness.68 Yet despite the broadening recognition of social forms of 
parentage, and their regular application in the service of such ends as finding fathers for 
children,69 the importance of blood runs deep. Shared genetics remains a powerful basis for 
awarding legal kinship, for as Angela Campbell argues, “‘blood’-based connections continue to 
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undergird judicial analyses: the presence or absence of a biological link with a child might still 
wield considerable impact on whether parental status, responsibilities or rights are recognized.”70  
This dissertation is interested in the way that ‘the family’ as channeled through blood and 
the heterosexual order continues to hold normative sway upon law and culture, despite the 
dizzying multiplication of new forms of kinship and its challenge to binary ontological and 
epistemic formulations. It is concerned not with the patriarchal rush to find fathers at all costs, as 
has been explored by Kelly and others,71 but with the underlying baseline of heteronormativity 
upon which such an impulse depends. It seeks to explore the models of nature and ‘natural’ 
forms of family that continue to mark the essentialist logics of biological reproductivity, even as 
such mechanics take place in the very ‘unnatural’ realms of assisted reproduction. 
As the lens through which to view these complex ruptures and sutures, this project 
focuses on the experience of queer families within a heterosexual matrix. For example in C.(P.) 
v. L.(S.) the matter was not one of assisted reproduction, but of conception achieved through 
male-female sexual intercourse. Yet the ruling did not look to competing parental claims when a 
child has been conceived through sex with someone other than a cohabiting spouse (of which 
there are many).72 Instead, Wilkinson J. turned to the language of AHR to frame the claims to 
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parentage demanded by the lesbian non-biological mother. C.(P.)’s queer claim to ‘lesbian 
fatherhood’ so disrupted the analytical frame of reproductive heterosexuality, that the primary 
context available to the court was the ‘unnatural’ couplings and triplings of assisted technology 
and the “extraordinary social issues involved”73 – a conceptual rupture that was soon soothed by 
the biological certainty of the male ‘seed’.  
The coming chapters will interrogate this complex and often paradoxical relationship 
between nature, heterosexuality, queer families and assisted reproduction, and the ways in which 
they are configured and reinscribed through law and culture. Queer families represent a 
fascinating combination of sociality and biology; nature and culture; traditional and disruptive; 
conventional and strange – a hybrid inherently-non-reproductive form of union that provides 
useful passage for the examination of many of the anxieties around reproductive technology.74 
                                                                                                                                            
overturned a case in which the custodial relation was not seen as legally binding (Carignan) and approved a decision 
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It may thus be helpful to begin with the overdetermined question of biology, and ask 
upon what precisely the natural tie depends. It appears to take form, at least in C.(P.) v. L.(S.), as 
genetic reification, dependent upon a view of ‘nature’ that reflects a strictly heterosexual mode 
of coitus and reproduction. It seems to require adherence to a nature/culture divide that assumes 
the former is primal and universal, rooted in some pre-cultural mode upon which humans have 
gamely erected our civilizations. How might one then question this duality and understand the 
actualization of such discursive forms in Canadian case law? It proves no simple task to unravel 
these genealogies. As Raymond Williams has argued, “Nature is perhaps the most complex word 
in the [English] language” and “any full history of the uses of nature would be a history of a 
large part of human thought.”75  
Chapter Three will survey the emergence of the nature/culture critique as it developed out 
of Marxist analysis, and the influence it has held upon central strands of feminist thought. From 
these histories, and in step with the spread of postmodern insights across the humanities, a rich 
and complex body of literature has been generated. In order to address the complexities of 
assisted reproductive technologies, it will be helpful to first canvass the intersections between 
materialist feminist analysis, kinship studies, science and technology studies and queer theory. 
These are the foundational scholarships upon which the rest of this project depends. 
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While the nexus between new kinship studies and science and technology studies has 
been well explored, as well as the relationship between materialist (or corporeal) feminism and 
kinship studies, the intersection of these knowledges with queer theory remains 
underdeveloped.76 Critical legal theory, for its part, has occasionally looked to new kinship 
studies as well as various forms of feminist materialist and feminist science studies for 
inspiration. Yet even these projects have been seldom: feminist legal theory in Canada, for 
example, has often sidestepped foundational ontological questions of reproduction and affiliation 
in a preference for the pursuit of normative solutions.77 When queer theory has made an 
appearance in analyzing reproductive technology it has been partial, although certainly queer 
legal scholars have taken up other questions of sexual citizenship, power and privilege within the 
Canadian context.78  
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The approach offered by this dissertation, however, is novel. It draws upon well-founded 
theoretical relationships on AHR forged between kinship studies, materialist feminisms and 
science and technology studies, and weaves through queer theory insights on intimacy, 
heteronormativity and “regimes of the normal”.79 It then brings this theoretical assemblage into 
conversation with critical legal theory in order to explore a body of empirical data gathered on 
the lived reality of LGBTQ families. These diverse theoretical strands are united in a concern for 
interrogating the Enlightenment binaries of nature/culture and biology/sociality, as well as an 
interest in how intimate material worlds are embedded within and shaped by the workings of 
power and knowledge. The framework of ‘the natural’ has profoundly shaped queer 
engagements with reproductive technology and law, and this chapter will spend some time 
exploring this discursive field. 
The chapter begins with an overview of feminist critiques of the nature/culture divide and 
the role of Marxist thought in challenging biological determinism. It then moves to Marxist 
feminism and the ways in which ideas of the ‘natural’ have also worked to buttress the 
sex/gender divide. Science and technology studies is taken up in turn, with its deep analysis of 
nature and culture, before moving on to materialist feminism and the new kinship studies. There 
is then a sustained examination of queer theory and in particular the debates over its figuration of 
reproductive bodies. The chapter concludes with an examination of critical legal thought around 
nature and culture and the development of a queer legal theory. 
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Feminism looms large across this interdisciplinary assemblage. While critiques of the 
nature/culture dualism have emerged from a variety of scholarly traditions, perhaps the most 
sustained and rigorous critique has been developed by a succession of feminist thinkers.80  
If we look at feminist theory from Beauvoir to Butler, a diverse landscape appears. 
But a common denominator is the fight against biological determinism and its 
naturalization and normalization of essential links between biological sex, sexuality, 
reproductive capacities, gendered subjectivity and hierarchical gender systems. The 
history of feminist theorizing is in many ways shaped by the project of de-naturalizing 
the conceptual frameworks of biological determinism.81  
 
A classical position on biological determinism is offered by Sir Patrick Geddes and John 
Arthur Thomson who, in 1889, argued that the social, psychological and behavioural traits of 
men and women were caused by metabolic states.82 According to this view, women conserve 
energy (being ‘anabolic’), which makes them passive, conservative, sluggish, stable and 
uninterested in politics; while men expend their surplus energy (being ‘katabolic’), which 
renders them eager, energetic, passionate, variable and, thereby, interested in political and social 
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matters.83 These biological ‘facts’ about metabolic states were used not only to explain 
differences in temperament between women and men, but – importantly - to justify existing 
social and political arrangements.84 More specifically, they were used to argue for withholding 
from women the political rights accorded to men because (according to Geddes and Thompson) 
“what was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa cannot be annulled by Act of Parliament.”85 
While authors like Simone de Beauvoir and Virginia Woolf vigorously questioned the 
subjugation of women in the decades to come,86 it was not until the 1970s, drawing upon Marxist 
critiques of the human transformation of nature to meet the ideological ends of capitalism, that 
feminists began to challenge in earnest the role of the nature/culture divide in sustaining female 
oppression.  Emerging in force out of Marxist labour debates regarding the nature of production, 
women joined in the argument that class conflict shapes the operation of technology in the 
workplace.87  
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Karl Marx provided critical insight into the process of development, arguing that 
technological innovation did not produce the engineering innovations of (for example) the 
Industrial Revolution; rather, it was the political and economic climate of the time that gave rise 
to the conditions to bring such elements into production. The division of labour and certain forms 
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of commodity fethishization created a social environment in which new machines could be 
produced. In other words, it was not the whiz-kid visionary who dreamt the future, but an 
evolutionary process of capital and accumulation; not the genius of Thomas Edison and 
Alexander Graham Bell, but labour as the driving engine, as “Labour is, in the first place, a 
process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, 
regulates and controls the material re-actions between himself and nature.”88  
This process was dialectical. Even as the social environment gave rise to conditions in 
which new technological forms could be produced, humans in turn were shaped by the presence 
and utilization of such machinery. These tools structured the way in which humans adapted their 
bodies to the mechanized world, and impacted not only the human body but the next iteration of 
the tools themselves. As Sarah Franklin argues, for Marx, “the evolution of technology, must be 
understood as both inherited equipment and as the molding conditions of human existence, 
constantly reshaping what the human is by what it can do, in a dialectical process that extends 
beyond historical time into the mists of human species emergence.”89  
The relationship of humans to Nature was therefore not simply the story of man 
conquering the physical world. Instead Marx suggested that nature was socially ‘produced’ or 
constructed in a materialist sense, and described the transformation effected by human labor in 
reworking the raw matter of nature into material of a second, social nature.90 In turn this second 
nature impacted the ways in which human used such tools, giving rise to a complex system of 
production and exploitation, wherein the workings of labour and capital generated a continuous 
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mode of human adaptation, development and re-adaptation with and through the evolution of 
technological forms. 
Marxist scholars argued that as capitalism continuously applies new technology designed 
to fragment and de-skill labour, so that labour becomes cheaper and subject to greater control. 
Technological revolution was rightly understood to be a trait of capital accumulation processes, 
even as it shaped the realities of the human beings who directed and were directed by 
technological development. This was a complex understanding of the social order and one which 
has been enormously influential on a range of post-Marxist thought.91 Yet feminists questioned 
the notion that this control and adaptation of the labour process could operate independently of 
the gender of the workers who were being controlled, and sought to bring a theory of sex to bear 
on the social relations of production.92  
Feminist sociological work pointed out that the division of labour characterizing 
paid occupations was a sexual hierarchy, and that its gendered nature was not 
incidental. Both employers as employers, and men as men, were shown to have an 
interest in creating and sustaining occupational sex-segregation. Time and time 
again, gender was shown to be an important factor in shaping the organization of 
work that resulted from technological change.93  
From this early form of materialist feminist analysis came a critique of not only the 
technologized workplace, which would mature into feminist science and technology studies, but 
a concern for the economic relations of the domestic sphere as well. Feminist scholars argued 
that Marx’s vision of labour and capital had overlooked a significant aspect of human work - the 
unpaid labour done by women in the home. Attention to the gendered labour of social 
reproduction aimed special vitriol toward the designation of male-female domestic roles as 
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rooted in ‘nature,’ and took up the relational critique of human engagement in the natural world 
to interrogate the cultural expectations that flowed from women’s so-called proper place among 
the home and family. This rejection of the ‘natural’ place of women as mother, caregiver and 
angel of the household allowed for the critique and contestation of all forms of female 
subjugation built upon (now apparently fragile) cultural norms.94 
However an important issue raised by this cultural critique of gender roles, was how to 
distinguish socially constructed norms from differences of a biological nature. Early work held 
that gender might be created by culture, but that sex rested upon an unchanging natural world 
that demarcated men and women into two distinct biological creations.95 This division was itself 
soon challenged by feminist scholars, drawing heavily upon the work of French theorist Michel 
Foucault to argue for the discursive and social construction of ‘sex’ as well. 
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Foucault’s legacy of work drew upon the role of human institutions in constructing and 
disciplining social meaning, and the ways in which medical, social, legal and political discourses 
– as a set of knowledges and practices – are enacted on and through the human body. For 
Foucault, sex had no ontological status; the body only gained cultural legibility through the 
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techniques of power and classification applied by clinical expertise.96 This theory was perhaps 
most carefully illustrated through his close reading of a memoir by a 19th century 
hermaphrodite.97 Foucault demonstrated how there was in fact no ‘pre-cultural’ knowledge of the 
body upon which to draw; the confounding figure of the hermaphrodite demonstrated the 
socially contingent nature of the production of meaning, as medical experts struggled to apply 
sexual boundaries and taxonomies upon a body that troubled categorization. It was by 
foregrounding the queer figure of the hermaphrodite that Foucault was able to draw attention to 
the discursive production of other, apparently settled, forms of categorization, such as the 
boundaries which create static ideals of ‘male’ and ‘female’. 
This expert work of categorization is critical for Foucault. Given that there is no pre-
cultural ontological mode from which to draw, it is through the application of medical and 
juridical systems of knowledge that the subject is actually produced. Individuals are functionally 
created through these technologies of power, with the juridical formation that allows one to 
classify (for example) ‘a woman’ representing her production through discursive effects. This is 
not to say that the body is ephemeral, a location with no relevance – on the contrary Foucault 
“positions the body as the locus of productive forces, the site where the large-scale organization 
of power links up with local practices.”98 The body exists, but it has no social meaning outside of 
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regimes of knowledge and power. As Foucault explains in the final chapter of The History of 
Sexuality (Vol. 1), his aim is certainly not to deny the physical body, but rather to: 
…show how the deployments of power are directly connected to the body—to bodies, 
functions, physiological processes, sensations, and pleasures; far from the body having to 
be effaced, what is needed is to make it visible through an analysis in which the 
biological and the historical are not consecutive to one another . . . but are bound together 
in an increasingly complex fashion in accordance with the development of the modern 
technologies of power that take life as their objective. Hence, I do not envision a “history 
of mentalities” that would take account of bodies only through the manner in which they 
have been perceived and given meaning and value; but a “history of bodies” and the 
manner in which what is most material and most vital in them has been invested.99  
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Judith Butler has taken up these Foucauldian insights and applied them to a particular 
concern for the biological determinism of the sex/gender divide. Butler has famously suggested 
that the (hetero)sexed body does not take shape either naturally or through biology, but is 
performed through the iteration and repetition of gender norms.100 Butler is concerned with how 
the body (and thereby the experience of that body) is embodied through its participation in 
society, and argues that categories such as ‘woman’ or ‘lesbian’ cannot exist prior to their 
specific cultural formation.101 She denies either sex or gender a material ‘reality’ and maintains 
that such taxonomies are discursively constructed according to available social categories.102 
Thus for Butler, both sex and gender are socially constructed: 
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If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ 
is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already 
gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns 
out to be no distinction at all.103 
Under this logic our sexed bodies have no ontological status before they are brought into 
being through the various acts which constitute their reality – the first and primary being 
language. For Butler, sex assignment is constituted through a Foucauldian set of disciplinary 
practices and the discursive power of medical expertise. When a doctor looks between the legs of 
a newly delivered baby and cries out, “It’s a girl!” this represents not a descriptive claim but a 
normative one. As Butler argues, this speech act is what, quite literally, makes infants into girls 
(or boys): the child’s sexual identity is immediately congealed into one of two available options, 
by defining and naturalizing the appropriate gender performance this child is expected to pursue 
over the course of her life.104 As Butler describes: “The naming is at once the setting of a 
boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm.”105 Sexed bodies are not to be understood 
as the objective stuff of nature, but as the discursive and repetitive performance of a set of 
subjective social categories. 
The work of Foucault and Butler has provided scholars with a set of tools to understand 
how the body has acquired the appearance of a natural, stable, unitary individual with a fixed 
form and identity. By interrogating the “disciplinary gaze” of medical and legal professionals, 
Foucault developed a complex understanding of medico-juridical knowledge that permits 
analysis of the normative work performed by social and cultural regulation. These insights have 
deeply impacted critical scholarship across the wide-ranging disciplines at the heart of this 
project: feminist theory, anthropology, science and technology studies and queer theory.  
                                            
103
 Ibid at 10–11. 
104
 Butler, Bodies That Matter. 
105
 Ibid at 8. 
41 
An important strand of feminist thought has taken up this Marxist-Foucauldian-Butlerian 
thread to ask difficult questions of materiality and subjectivity, but more precisely in relation to 
technology and the operations of scientific knowledge. This feminist approach to what is broadly 
termed science and technology studies offers another useful perspective on the bedrock of the 
‘natural’. 
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The tools of postmodern and post-structuralist deconstruction have proved especially 
adept to question the naturalized and gendered basis for culture and the social order in an era of 
scientific rationale. Following from Marxist analyses of the relationships between human labour, 
capital and technology, scholars such as Bruno Latour have explored the role of technology in 
creating the social order. Indeed for Latour, the fabricated world exists “not as mere retro-
projection of human labour onto an object” but as a “sturdier, much more reflexive coproduction 
richly invested within a collective practice.”106 Thus the very binary between nature and culture 
dissolves into a more complex entanglement between production, human labour and 
embodiment. Rather than thinking of nature as a location ‘out there’ from which we might break 
from ‘society’, frameworks such as Latour’s call attention to the ways in which nature and 
culture exist only in and through each other. It demands an upheaval of binary forms in order to 
re-think “the intimate, sensible and hectic bonds through which people and plants; devices and 
creatures; documents and elements take and hold their shape in relation to each other in the 
fabric-ations of everyday life.”107 
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Feminist scholars have also sought to deconstruct the nature/culture binary, with Donna 
Haraway’s work being perhaps the leading contribution to this field. Haraway’s framework of 
“naturecultures” – a cultural theory that intentionally avoids privileging the side of culture in 
thinking through these dualities108 - is exemplary in aiming to contest the oppositional framing 
between nature and culture, matter and mind, the human and the inhuman. Instead, it seeks to 
understand how these dualities are produced through action itself. As Haraway observes: 
…in the West nature has been the key operator in foundational, grounding discourses for 
a very long time…. [N]ature is the zone of constraints, of the given, and of matter as 
resource; nature is the necessary raw material for human action, the field for the 
imposition of choice, and the corollary of mind. Nature has also served as the model for 
human action; nature has been a potent ground for moral discourse.109 
Nature as the raw stuff of matter has played a critical foundation in Western 
epistemologies, as the vital corollary to the civilizing work of human thought and action. Yet as 
Haraway goes on to explain: “If the world exists for us as “nature”, this designates a kind of 
relationship, an achievement among many actors, not all of them human, not all of them organic, 
not all of them technological.”110 Technology for Haraway, as with Marx, is not an inert set of 
tools to which we may apply for instrumental ends, but a relational system of constructed 
meaning. In her work, Haraway calls describes how technology is not a blank screen that may be 
unproblematically inscribed with new subjectivities and identities, but rather a value-laden arena 
of contestation that is constantly under negotiation and re-negotiation. As she famously 
pronounced: “Technology is not neutral. We're inside of what we make, and it's inside of us. 
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We're living in a world of connections - and it matters which ones get made and unmade.”111 
Thus technologies do not simply act as robotic adjuncts to hectic modern lives; instead Haraway 
proposes that we live during an era in which technological expertise increasingly shapes the very 
possibilities for being human.112 
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These human forms are material, and carry deeply inscribed cultural, gendered and sexed 
meanings. The materialist ramifications of the conceptual dualities of Western science have been 
the subject of sustained feminist interrogation, both within feminist science studies and related 
branches of theory. For example, Sandra Harding has located pervasive discourses of masculinity 
and femininity in the construction of scientific reason and logic, explaining how the construction 
of scientific rationale coalesced around the masculine, the modern, the exceptional Western 
intellect aimed at achieving mastery of nature itself.113 At the same time, according to Harding, 
Western modernity remains “haunted by anxieties about the feminine and the primitive, both of 
which are associated with the traditional.”114  
Harding’s work thus belongs to a feminist tradition that aims to theorize beyond the 
problematic binaries of culture/nature, mind/body, sex/gender and reason/passion, not least 
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because these binaries have historically led to the association of men with the privileged terms 
(culture, mind, reason) and women with the devalued (nature, body, passion).115 
These dualities remain deeply ingrained within Western forms of knowledge, even as a 
suspicion of truth claims and scientific rationales of fixity and immutability have given feminist 
scholars room to contest the binary divide. As Haraway has suggested, in relation to feminist 
science studies, the theories of social construction offer a “strong tool for deconstructing the 
truth claims of hostile science by showing the radical historical specificity and so contestability 
of every layer of the onion of scientific and technological constructions”.116  
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Yet the postmodern dissolution of epistemological certainty had led to its own concerns, 
due to the difficulty of recovering an objective stance following the assertion that all knowledge 
is contingent, partial and relative. On the one hand, feminist scholars have sought to dissolve 
nature/culture and object/subject dualisms so as to insist that all knowledge is essentially socially 
situated. On the other hand, many scholars have also longed for a strong notion of objectivity on 
which to base their claims about the reality of women’s oppression in male-dominated 
societies.117 Haraway has referred to these conflicting desires as a variety of “epistemological 
electro-shock therapy, which…lays us out…with self-induced multiple personality disorder.”118 
As a response, Harding and others have articulated a kind of neo-materialism, an attempt to give 
special attention to bodies as the site and locus of power and knowledge. As Rosi Braidotti has 
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framed this project, it is an attempt to provide “a more radical sense of materialism” by framing 
it as “[r]ethinking the embodied structure of human subjectivity after Foucault”.119 
The corporeal feminism of Elizabeth Grosz, for example, has sought to understand the 
sexed body as it is lived and experienced in time, arguing that the body is not a brute, passive, or 
inert object merely inscribed by social forces, but rather that it is actually created through the 
durational operation of social systems of representation, meaning, and signification.120 By 
adopting such an approach, the body may be seen as central site for feminist inquiry – the key to 
understanding women’s experience in a gendered social world. As Grosz puts it, for corporeal 
feminists, “the body can be seen as the crucial term, the site of contestation, in a series of 
economic, political, sexual and intellectual struggles.”121  
Such a feminist approach also materializes as methodology, and in a form that deeply 
influences the investigative approach of this dissertation. For example, Harding has articulated 
the goal of feminist science studies as seeking a variety of ends in relation to the culture of the 
sciences, in providing “systemic empirical accounts of gender politics, in this case in the 
institutions, practices and cultures of nature and the social sciences.”122 This dissertation seeks to 
apply Harding’s call for a systemic empirical account of a certain instantiation of gender politics, 
by understanding the interface of gender, sexuality, law and reproduction as it takes place within 
the technologically-mediated space of the clinic.  
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In the realm of reproductive technology in particular, the disavowal of ‘nature’ (wherein 
technological innovation, rational modernity and intention rule) often occurs directly alongside a 
conscious reinscription of the ‘natural’ links between biology and kinship (wherein ideal families 
are genetically and gestationally related). This contradictory double move is made possible by a 
fascinating multi-faceted engagement with the institutions of law, medicine and family, and its 
interrogation will form a central part of this dissertation. To understand the workings behind 
such a move, however, two more theoretical strands remain vital. The first involves kinship 
studies and its robust analysis of the sociological impact of new reproductive technologies.  
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The ‘multiple personality disorder’ that Haraway diagnosed has been especially 
pronounced in regard to kinship studies and the analysis of new reproductive technologies. As 
Sarah Franklin and Susan McKinnon argue, it was precisely the toppling of a universal category 
of ‘nature’ which led to a renewed interested in kinship studies and the critique of notions of 
biological relatedness.123 This history is usually launched by Schneider’s critique of kinship in 
the field of social anthropology, which challenged the export of a naturalized version of Euro-
American family onto non-Western social forms.124 Schneider argued that the axioms that were 
the foundation of the study of kinship were, in fact, insupportable in the context of all cultures; 
he argued, therefore, that the only basis on which kinship studies could proceed was to take 
kinship as an empirical question, not as a universal fact.125 Thus, Schneider’s A Critique of the 
Study of Kinship offered an approach to studying kinship that did not rely upon assumptions 
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about appropriate gender roles, heterosexuality or the marriage bond, marking an important 
turning point in Euro-American kinship studies. 
.& /	&0
This questioning of the ‘nature’ upon which kinship was thought to be universally 
grounded led to deep reflection in the field upon the cultural origins of meaning, in step with 
similar turns towards linguistics and semiotics in the humanities. Kinship was now to be 
understood as uncertain, flexible, provisional and relationally sited.126 Thus by the 1990s the idea 
of ‘family’ had developed within kinship studies into a subjective and relational concept that 
empirically reflected intimate connections, rather than a formalist model based solely on 
biological or marriage ties.127 As Kath Weston demonstrated in her classic work on gay and 
lesbian kinship in San Francisco, a unitary understanding of ‘family’ has the effect of foreclosing 
(for example) queer modes of affiliation, which have long reached past biology to incorporate 
lovers, friends and other non-biological ties to create “families we choose.”128 Thus for Weston, 
as for other ‘new kinship’ scholars, biology operates as a cultural construct rather than a self-
evident “natural fact.”129  
Kinship studies has devoted substantial ink to destabilizing the ties between nature and 
culture in regard to the construction of human relations,130 and exploring the ways in which 
biology and the social (often simultaneously) reflect, reinscribe, negate, amplify, diminish and 
                                            
126
 Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994). 
127
 For examples of this literature on family see: Jaber F. Gubrium & James A. Holstein. What is Family? (Mountain 
View, CA: Mayfield, 1990); Elizabeth Silva & Carole Smart, eds., The New Family? (London: Sage, 1999);  
Judith Stacey, In the Name of the Family: Rethinking Family Values in a Postmodern Age (Boston: Beacon,1996). 
128
 Kath Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians , Gays , Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 
129
 Ibid at 35. 
130
 See for example Carsten, supra note 123; Janet Edwards et al, eds., Technologies of Procreation: Kinship in the 
Age of Assisted Conception (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). Marilyn Strathern, After Nature: English 
Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Sarah Franklin, Embodied 
Progress: a Cultural Account of Assisted Conception, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997); Sarah Franklin & 
Helena Ragone, Reproducing Reproduction: Kinship, Power and Technological Innovation. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). 
48 
disperse each other.131 
Marilyn Strathern’s work has been particularly instructive in this regard, showing how 
ideas of kinship combine genetics, social bonds and individualism to create a complex matrix of 
belonging and selfhood, offering humans a theory about the relationship of society to the natural 
world.132 Her scholarship has inspired much of the recent anthropological work on kinship and 
AHR in EuroAmerican cultures, and canvasses the central issues at the heart of this project: the 
social construction of scientific knowledge; articulations of gender and sexuality; and new 
reproductive technologies.  
	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Strathern has achieved great intellectual traction by using the lens of new reproductive 
technologies to throw the imbricated structures of biology and sociality into stark relief. As she 
describes in one of her earliest works on AHR, such technological interventions offered an 
opportunity to “ponder upon how to think about experiments being conducted in a real system 
that is both a biological and a social one.”133 By tracking the modes of AHR, Strathern illustrated 
the crisis posed to normative ideals of how the simple acts of “having sex, transmitting genes, 
giving birth” formed the very “facts of life” and thus the basis for human social relations. When 
this dominant model was challenged by reproductive technologies, it opened a window onto a 
baffling and uncertain future where Nature needed a helping hand and human families could no 
longer rely upon a range of suppositions about the connection between natural facts and social 
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constructions.134 As she explains: 
What is in crisis here is the symbolic order, the conceptualisation of the 
relationship between nature and culture such that one can talk about the one 
through the other. Nature as a ground for meaning can no longer be taken for 
granted if Nature itself is regarded as having to be protected and promoted.135 
 
Thus the advent of new reproductive technologies has forced critical attention onto the 
constructed nature of biological and social reproduction alike. Via the medical, commercial and 
legal practices of AHR, Strathern argues that both biology and culture are ‘assisted,’ blurring the 
lines of the unremediated facts of life and demanding a renewed critical engagement on the 
relationship between the natural and the social. As Strathern puts it: “The more facilitation is 
given to the biological reproduction of human persons, the harder it is to think of a domain of 
natural facts independent of social intervention.”136  
1 %'%%%#&	&
The interface between feminist science studies and new kinship studies has produced a 
series of broad theoretical assumptions about the operation of reproductive technologies, guided 
by the understanding that “technologies are socio-technical products, which are shaped by 
human and nonhuman factors, including the technical features of the ARTs themselves, as well as 
by the economic, political, cultural, and moral environs in which they unfold.”137 This 
perspective tracks the development of technology alongside existing social and cultural norms, 
viewing the emergence of new forms of innovation as deeply culturally embedded and 
inextricable from the power relations through which they are produced.  
Society and technology thus co-produce each other, in a mutually constitutive 
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relationship in which the technological apparatus is both a source and a consequence of the 
social order.138 Thus it is impossible to understand the development of AHR in isolation from its 
constitutive networks of power/knowledge, as well as the surrounding cultural and social order.   
This realization has paved the way for rich and complex feminist engagements with the 
kinships produced by new reproductive and genetic technology. For even as the terms ‘nature’ 
and ‘culture’ were being problematized across the social sciences by feminist thinkers from 
multiple disciplinary bounds, the new genetics appeared to reintroduce the importance of genetic 
and blood ties in both popular and scholarly forms. For example in the context of genetic testing 
and risk counseling, Kaja Finkler writes: 
People are compelled to recognize consanguinity even when in the lived world 
they define family by a sense of sameness that may be grounded in friendship or 
sharing of affect and interest rather than in genes.139 
 
So it is that even as ‘the family’ is destabilized as a construct mediated through blood, it 
also comes to be read anew through the centrality of genetics, creating fresh metaphors for the 
relationality of technology to bodies and our social webs.140 It is the contention of this 
dissertation that these new currencies of belonging and connection take up particular resonance 
in the context of assisted reproductive technology, and most specifically, in regard to the queer 
family.  
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The work of Judith Butler, discussed above, has been of central importance in what has 
come to be called ‘queer theory’ in challenging the ontology of gender as well as sexual identity 
categories, and in tracing how subjects are brought into being through the discursive power of 
social regimes. Queer theory has focused sustained inquiry on how power and sexuality operate 
through the foundation of normative heterosexuality, with scholars writing from within a broad 
range of disciplinary bounds.141  This section will trace a brief history of queer theory, discuss 
the use of ‘heteronormativity’ as an operational principle, and then turn to the ways in which 
reproduction and children have been discussed within queer scholarship. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, inspired by developments in poststructuralism and 
psychoanalysis; fueled by a resistance to essentialism and identity politics; and galvanized by 
political mobilization around the AIDS epidemic, diverse strands of activism, scholarship and 
sexual practice came unsteadily together under the rubric of ‘queer’.142  Strongly influenced by 
the work of Foucault, as well as the distaste for binary opposition put forth by continental 
philosophers such as Jacques Derrida, queer theory aimed to destabilize established sexual and 
gender binaries while calling attention to the importance of sexuality in social analysis.143 Queer 
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theorists refused the dichotomous categories of homosexual and heterosexual and insisted that 
such labels were not only reductive but actually imposed in the service of hegemonic 
heterosexuality.144 Thus, ‘queer’ located itself outside and beyond the borders of the straight 
world if not actually in direct opposition (which would, of course, generate yet another 
binary).145  
As a body of work queer scholarship has never hoped to offer a unified whole to readers; 
queer theory is a discipline in permanently self-conscious flux, as “queer itself can have neither a 
fundamental logic, nor a consistent set of characteristics”.146 This self-conscious ephemerality 
has led more than one scholar to declaim that “queer theory is dead!”,147 even as others suggest 
that the playing of funeral elegies might be somewhat premature.148 Amidst these disciplinary 
skirmishes, queer has remained a carefully indefinable set of practices and (political) positions 
with the potential to challenge normative knowledges and identities by working from a 
necessarily unfixed site of engagement and contestation.149 It thus seeks to function as an anti-
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normative signifier as well as a social category.150 Queer is intentionally a provisional, 
contingent and partial reference that may be “necessary as a term of affiliation, but it will not 
fully describe those it purports to represent”.151  By resisting the location of a proper subject or 
object at the center of its critique and insisting that queer has no fixed political referent, space is 
(ideally) opened for a flexible and multi-sited resistance to hegemonic regimes.  
Again following Foucault, this subject-less approach implicates “a wide field of 
normalization”152 in the production of social violence, and is able to embrace a shifting and 
intersectional logic to explore why some subjects are rendered ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ while 
others are cast as ‘deviant’ and ‘perverse’. The project of queer is thus intentionally contested 
terrain, for “if it is to retain its ability to abrade the ‘natural’, queer must be continuously 
denaturalized itself”.153  
2*&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The notion of heteronormativity within queer theory refers not simply to heterosexuality, 
but rather describes how a single type of kinship construction – romantic, monogamous, 
reproductive heterosexual union – has been naturalized as the ideal form of social organization 
within Euro-American and other global cultures. A series of second-wave feminists provided the 
intellectual ground for later queer theorists, with 1970s groups like the Furies Collective, Purple 
September Staff and Redstockings questioning the dominance of a singular male-dominated 
form of social order in which women were subordinated through the heterosexual marriage 
bond.154 Lesbians of colour like Rita Mae Brown rejected both racial and sexual oppression as 
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instantiated through patriarchal power,155 while Charlotte Bunch also drew from lesbian-
feminism and lesbian separatism by refusing to see heterosexuality as ‘natural’ and a reflection 
of the biological world.156  
As the 1980s began, Adrienne Rich published her classic article "On Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," arguing that white heterosexuality actually functioned 
as a patriarchal tool to assure multiple forms of dominance over women.157 While the decade 
wore on, Western scholars of colour, gay and lesbian scholars and women writing from the 
Global South increasingly challenged the central concern of ‘gender’ as the primary axis of 
feminism.158 A complex intersectional feminism emerged that understood a shifting mode of 
white classist hetero-patriarchy as the hegemonic social arrangement which operated to 
subordinate and exclude categories of difference.  
Scholars like Monique Wittig also argued against the totalizing universality wrought by 
heterosexual frames of knowledge, claiming that “the straight mind cannot conceive of a culture, 
a society where heterosexuality would not order not only all human relationships but also its very 
production of concepts and all the processes which escape consciousness, as well.”159 
Heterosexuality was thus understood not only as a model of social organization, but as an 
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epistemic and political form of oppression that supported various forms of subjugation through 
the production of knowledge from the ‘straight mind’. 
2*&1"#
In an early and influential piece on the “heterosexual imaginary,” Chrys Ingraham argued 
that heterosexuality had assumed a near-total dominance in cultural discourse, and through this 
dominance had prevented more complex understandings of the production of oppression and 
exploitation under capitalism.160 Borrowing a term from Louis Althusser (which in turn had been 
borrowed from Jacques Lacan), Ingraham used the idea of the “imaginary” to describe how 
individuals create an idealized relationship to their actual conditions of existence. Althusser had 
used this term in reference to ideology, describing how people maintain an idealized form of the 
political in the face of material evidence which might otherwise contradict their position.161  
Thus, Althusser argued, the imaginary functioned as a representation of social reality that was 
able to mask opposition to its normative terms.162  
Ingraham used this model to draw attention to the heterosexual imaginary, defining it as 
“that way of thinking which conceals the operation of heterosexuality in structuring gender and 
closes off any critical analysis of heterosexuality as an organizing institution.”163 As a result of 
this depiction of reality, even within critical gender studies (the object of Ingraham’s frustration), 
wherein gender is understood as socially constructed and contingent, the grounding frame of 
heterosexuality continues to circulate as natural, unquestioned and invisible. In protest, Ingraham 
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argued for a variety of Marxist lesbian-feminism that could understand how the workings of 
capitalist patriarchal societies actually depended upon institutionalized heterosexuality rather 
than gender subordination, with gender itself inextricably bound up with the production of 
heterosexuality.164 As an antidote, Ingraham recommended the following set of questions to 
feminist scholars interested in understanding the origins of inequality: 
[We] need to ask not only how heterosexuality is imbricated in knowledges, but how 
these knowledges are related to capitalist and patriarchal social arrangements. How does 
heterosexuality carry out their project both ideologically and institutionally? How do so 
many institutions rely on the heterosexual imaginary? Considering the rising levels of 
violence and prejudice in U.S. society, how are we to understand the social and 
ideological controls regulating sexuality? What would a critical analysis of 
institutionalized heterosexuality reveal about its relationship to divisions of labor and 
wealth, national and state interests, and the production of social and economic hierarchies 
of difference?165 
 Thus Ingraham sought to argue for the institution of heterosexuality as a central axis of 
ideological control in society, and a necessary location from which to conduct grounded 
materialist analysis on inequality and the production of hierarchy. By first challenging the 
‘natural’ character of the heterosexual imaginary, Ingraham believed, one can begin to ask 
fundamental questions about the operation of gendered, hierarchical power relations in society. 
This understanding of the heterosexual imaginary will prove useful in later chapters, when 
attention is drawn to the workings of the fertility clinic and the deeply heteronormative frames of 
reproductive assistance in operation.  
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Yet normative forms of heterosexuality, like all hegemonic structures, are elastic and 
mobile; they will shift across time and space and achieve hegemony only through political 
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intervention.166 Heteronormativity is not only ideology, prejudice or homophobia, but “is 
produced in almost every aspect of the forms and arrangements of social life: nationality, the 
state, and the law; commerce; medicine; education; plus the conventions and affects of 
narrativity, romance, and other protected spaces of culture”.167 Its imposition in societal 
institutions and public discourse affects the most intimate aspects of daily life, sense of family 
and security, expressions of identity and identifications with politics and the public sphere.  
While this construction generally excludes sexual and gender minorities, neither does it 
include all heterosexuals. Through legal, social and political mechanisms Western culture 
stigmatizes a range of intimate heterosexualities, including polygyny, single parenthood, 
childless couples, extramarital affairs and even arranged marriage. Speaking in regard to the 
U.S., Cathy Cohen has demonstrated how heteronormative systems of oppression function to 
exclude not only lesbians, but also single mothers, welfare recipients and/or women of colour 
from the category of acceptable ‘normal’ femininity.168 This provides political leverage to an 
understanding of how, for example, young mothers, sex workers, disabled men, people with 
AIDS, widowers  - all of those who fall outside the normalizing ideals of heterosexual femininity 
and masculinity – may be situated in relation to prevailing systems of power and knowledge.  
Heteronormativity aggressively locates the ‘family’ as the key private institution and as 
the idealized site for support, care, and education. The importance of other relationships and 
communities are thereby minimized as “family and heterosexuality merge, tightening any space 
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for kinship to broaden its meaning”169 while the site of biological reproduction assumes pre-
eminence in structuring the social realm. This conceptual framework seeks to account for how 
“[e]ach heterosexual couple ‘does’ heterosexuality as much through divisions of labour and 
distributions of household resources as through specifically sexual and reproductive 
practices”.170  
The fixation on the heterosexual alliance of the ‘household’ – and reluctance to bestow 
other relationships with equal primacy - has been linked by John D’Emilio to the emergence of 
capitalism and rise of wage labour. In his formulation, “the ideology of capitalist society has 
enshrined the family as the source of love, affection, and emotional security, the place where our 
need for stable, intimate human relationships is satisfied”.171 As D’Emilio astutely remarks, 
every society needs structures for reproduction and childbearing but the possibilities are certainly 
not limited to the privatized nuclear family.  
The scope of queer theory thereby offers a helpful set of conceptual tools to approach the 
sex/gender duality, as well as the centrality of the “traditional family” in cultural frameworks of 
meaning, by foregrounding the role of (hetero)sexuality, kinship and discursive forms of power 
in creating what Michael Warner calls “regimes of the normal”.172 Through such work, the 
nature/culture distinction is challenged, providing an explanation of how the dualities of 
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sex/gender (among other binaries) operate as a normalizing technique of power.173 This queerly 
relational approach to ontology has drawn from post-structuralist theory to illustrate the ways in 
which reproductive labour, human sexuality, anatomy, biology, the nature of things – even 
reality itself – is dependent upon social context for meaning.  
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As mentioned, queer scholarship has been greatly influenced by psychoanalysis and 
ideas about the construction of the self, psyche and other. A recurring trope has been the 
psychoanalytic concept of the “polymorphously perverse”, a term which Sigmund Freud coined 
to describe the latent human ability to locate erotic pleasure through any part of the body.174 
Freud argued that while a child may turn to any number of body parts for sexual gratification, 
through the civilising conventions of society the adult erotic field is gradually narrowed to focus 
on the genitals. Yet those adults with a polymorphously perverse disposition – either through a 
persistence of latent potential or through the process of active ‘seduction’ – are able to 
experience a greater range of bodily pleasures and may not obey the rules determining perverse 
behaviour. 
Polymorphous perversity has been notably reinterpreted by a series of 20th century 
scholars. In Eros and Civilization, Herbert Marcuse critiqued Freud’s conservative reading of 
genital sexuality and proposed an active cultivation of non-reproductive forms of sexual 
behaviour, including oral and anal eroticisms, capable of resisting the restriction of eros to 
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procreative sexuality.175 Marcuse envisioned an ideal of radical hedonism where sex for pleasure 
not reproduction was the norm; the homosexual was to be the archetypal form of this new 
hedonist. Dennis Altman then seized upon the utopian elements of this Marcusian strand to 
argue that (male) homosexual sex in particular represented an expression of pleasure and love 
free of any utilitarian ends.176 Altman’s work understood the homosexual libido to have been 
loosed from the imperatives of heterosexual reproduction, allowing a liberatory relation to 
consumer capitalism that was able to sidestep the demands of the modern industrial state.177 
More than thirty years later, Leo Bersani again picked up this utopian strand to trace 
Freud’s understanding of polymorphous perversity to the writing of Michel Foucault. Bersani 
saw in Foucault’s work a grounding in Freudian thought that was able to generate “Foucault’s 
[call] for a degenitalizing of erotic intensities” and underscore Bersani’s own argument for the 
self-shattering pleasures of sadomasochism.178  
While these authors differed on the nature of power, psychic life and sexual repression, 
they were in agreement regarding a deep skepticism of heterosexist models of desire, pleasure 
and the chores of reproduction. Yet their focus was largely (if not exclusively) upon male 
homosexuality and the radical potentials to be found in anonymous anal sex (Bersani) and non-
reproductive sex pursued for the sake of pleasure (Marcuse and Altman). Marcuse summed this 
up nicely in arguing: “Against a society which employs sexuality as a means for a useful end, 
the perversions uphold sexuality as an end itself…and challenge its very foundations.”179  
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Thus while the repudiation of social norms organized around genital heterosexuality and 
biological reproduction has long been advanced in queer scholarship as a broadly liberatory and 
even utopian political aim, it nevertheless finds itself based upon a specifically phallic 
homosexuality. This gleeful sodomy has positioned itself as merrily disinterested in accounting 
for the reproductivity of female-born bodies, and unconcerned with utilitarian drags such as the 
gendered domesticities of childcare.180 
However it was not only the gentlemen who were suspicious of reproduction as a social 
goal. The relationship between procreation and the heterosexual order also infuses Monique 
Wittig’s work The Straight Mind, which understood heterosexuality and the categories of male 
and female as not only social constructions and tools of male domination, but as an actual 
political regime.181 She argued that the category “woman” as well as the category “man” are 
simply political and economic categories, rather than eternal or biological matters grounded on 
natural fact. Thus heterosexuality operated “as a social system which is based on the oppression 
of women by men and which produces the doctrine of the difference between the sexes to justify 
this oppression.”182 
This doctrine of difference was insidiously channeled through biological form, via the 
rendering of the world into two neat sexes of male and female. In rejecting the production of 
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sexual difference, Wittig dismissed even recuperative readings of women’s histories, wherein 
early matriarchal forms were civilized and peaceful (because of a biological predisposition) 
while male-dominated societies were brutish and warlike (because of a biological 
predisposition). Wittig refuted any foundation in biological explanations for the division of 
women and men, outside of social facts, as for her “this could never constitute a lesbian approach 
to women’s oppression, since it assumes that the basis of society or the beginning of society lies 
in heterosexuality. Matriarchy is no less heterosexual than patriarchy: it is only the sex of the 
oppressor that changes.”183  
It is only the process of naturalizing history which allows one to presume that “men” and 
“women” have always existed and always will. This process in turn calls into being “the social 
phenomena which express our oppression,” which for Wittig was most prominently rendered in 
the “forced production” of childbirth.184 For her, the lesbian position offered a liberatory frame in 
which the rejection of childbirth as the creative female act became possible. She approvingly 
cites Andrea Dworkin’s work to reject any “celebration of biological female potential” as merely 
another form of entrapment within the political categories erected by heterosexist society.185 For 
Wittig, it was only by rejecting the binary formulation of sexual difference and refusing the yoke 
of compulsory childbearing that a lesbian could become politically liberated.  
Indeed this direct equivalence of childbirth and reproduction with heteronormativity and 
the enslavements of gender oppression has a long (and continuing) history in queer theory. These 
queer intellectual histories have also been taken up by more recent work, which has been 
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similarly wary of the biological potential of the reproductive body, as lodged within a larger 
critique of futurity. 
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In his much-chewed-over 2004 text, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee 
Edelman makes a case for the rejection of liberal utopianism through a politics of negativity. As 
with other queer scholars who have addressed the subject, the primary fuel for Edelman's thesis 
crackles within a deep suspicion of the procreative imperative. In an early chapter of the book, 
Edelman infamously exhorts all queers to reject the reproductive imperative and “fuck the social 
order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized.”186 The Child is thus 
positioned in antagonism to the Queer (who is read as an unparalleled figure of 
nonproductivity), as Edelman argues that the Child stands in as a marker for the universal value 
attributed to political futurity. Through this move he is able to concretise the Child as a site of 
heterosexist strivings upon which can be layered imperialism, middle-class logics, and a 
manifest destiny channeled through the property values of primogeniture.   
For this is not a living child, a body that requires love and nurture and the gentle 
ministration of sidewalk scrapes but, as Edelman describes, a stand-in for “the whole network of 
Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop.”187 And so the Child is deposited center 
stage as an absurdly affective referent for the maudlin, the vulnerable, the terminally apple-
cheeked, and the decidedly non-queer imperative to secure the well-being of a never-arrived 
future imaginary. Edelman’s ‘reproductive futurism’ thus sardonically locates the redemptive 
hopes of humanity within the small bodies of humans with no material form.   
Perhaps more crucially this creature cannot exist: as the promise of an always-vanishing 
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future horizon it must blink its dewy eyes from the time of the never-here. As Edelman 
continues the passage in his book, he aims approbation toward purely fictional characters, at the 
literary signification of childhood at its most adorable: “fuck the social order and the Child in 
whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the 
poor, innocent kid on the Net.”188 Fuck the damnable Child who holds us all in check, 
demanding adherence to a standard of saintly innocence that ruins our distinctly adult 
enjoyments. This is a trope that finds its apex of abjection in Edelman's work, but it is by no 
means controversial to argue that the Child currently functions across much of queer theory as a 
cypher for the worst kind of normativity. 
Indeed, despite rejecting certain elements of this ferociously antisocial thesis, scholars 
like Judith Halberstam are among many who have found themselves in agreement with 
Edelman's suspicion of reproductive futurity. Halberstam suggests in her book In a Queer Time 
and Place that an alternate vision of queer time must preclude the normative modalities of child-
bearing and rearing; for Halberstam, “[q]ueer uses of time and space develop…in opposition to 
the institutions of family, heterosexuality, and reproduction.”189 She offers instead the idea that 
“[q]ueer time...is…about the potentiality of a life unscripted by the conventions of family”.190 
This notion of a ludic freedom from the bourgeois trappings of reproductive temporality 
underscores much of the writing on queer kinship in recent years, leaving little purchase for the 
centering of intimate parent-child relationships. 
For as the body of the queer-born infant/child slips into a jeremiad against 
heteronormativity, by extension the queer parent also vanishes into the bourgeois mist. If the 
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infant/child can only exist in a relation of heterosexual capital, then neither can a queer parent 
hold bodily integrity within these rigid economies. As Halberstam approvingly characterises the 
crux of Edelman’s queer anti-thesis:  
[W]hile the heteronormative political imagination propels itself forward in time and 
space through the indisputably positive image of the child, and while it projects 
itself back on the past through the dignified image of the parent, the queer subject 
stands between heterosexual optimism and its realization.191  
Thus are queer bodies positioned as a bulwark against the “forward looking, 
reproductive and heteronormative politics of hope that animates all too many political 
projects.”192 This move necessarily excises queer subjects from the category of parent, and 
simultaneously casts those queers who do/have/are engaged in primary relations of child-
focused care as failing to register within an anti-imperialist, queer counter-hegemonic 
imaginary.193 
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Yet not all queer scholars have joined this reification of queer subversion in the face of a 
heteronormative bummer. Judith Butler, for example, has recently analyzed queer sexualities 
and the procreative family, arguing for the importance of kinship as a politically and 
theoretically dense site for analysis precisely as family structures shift increasingly away from 
the heterosexual norm.194 She traces recent scholarship in the new kinship studies to understand 
kinship as a cultural phenomenon interlinked with political, social, economic and forces. 
Through this analysis, she locates the site of the family as a location where anxieties about the 
destabilization of the ‘natural world’ take hold.  
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For example, Butler discusses recent moves against same-sex marriage in France by 
conservative political leaders and intellectuals. She locates the breakdown of the traditional 
married couple as the originary point for a host of repressive measures directed at the intimate 
practices of homosexuals. Queer couples thereby provide a site where the fears of a ‘loss of 
tradition’ can condense, as heterosexual couples invoke the ‘natural’ logics of reproduction and 
biological essentialism to maintain the fiction of a stabilized and hegemonic heterosexuality. For 
Butler: 
…one must understand the invocation of the “symbolic order” that links marriage 
to filiation in a necessary and foundational way as a compensatory response to the 
historical breakup of marriage as a hegemonic institution…in this sense, the opposition to 
[same-sex marriage] is an effort to make the state sustain a certain fantasy of marriage 
and nation whose hegemony is already, and irreversibly, challenged at the level of social 
practice.195 
She notes how this echoes the work of Sarah Franklin and Susan McKinnon, who 
similarly understand kinship as a site where certain displacements are already at work, where 
anxieties about biotechnology and transnational migrations become focused and disavowed.196 
Butler’s analysis sheds light on how the breakdown of traditional family forms through such 
avenues as same-sex marriage, biotechnology, globalization and the transnational movement of 
bodies, has effected what might be called a ‘heterosexual backlash’ – a nostalgia for the 
hegemony of the traditional family that is enacted through a refusal to recognize and validate 
queer intimate ties. This is a process usually effected through law. 
This process also rests closely upon the nature/culture divide and the reinscription of 
‘natural’ sex/gender forms. As Catriona Sandilands has persuasively argued, “the naturalization 
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of heterosexuality has been historically accompanied by the heterosexualization of nature.”197 
Overlaid upon the gendered form of the nature/culture relation itself, and its mapping as 
feminine/masculine, are reinscribed the reproductive and nurturing norms of the natural world. 
Through this dialectical palimpsest, the nature/culture binary is reproduced via dominant 
understandings of sexed and gendered subjectivities, by which the baseline of nature easily 
becomes one of compulsory heterosexuality.198 The heterosexual backlash thus performs a 
dizzying series of naturalizing moves to secure its normalization, in the process allowing queer 
sexualities to be dismissed as being “against nature” due to their failure to replicate the natural 
forms of heterosexuality and, by extension, their failure to perform an idealized model of “the 
‘natural’ [which] is invariably associated with ‘procreative’.”199  
In France and Germany this led to massive public protests against same-sex marriage and 
a refusal to allow LGBTQ people access to reproductive technology.200 In the United States, in 
recent months, this has led to a spate of legislation at the state level seeking religious 
accommodation to avoid serving same-sex individuals and couples – particularly as involves 
same-sex marriage.201 In Canada the effects have been less pronounced, but the judicial impulse 
to reinstantiate a heterosexual family at the core of parentage disputes involving same-sex 
parents remains profound, as seen in the analysis of C.(P.) v. L.(S.) in Chapter Two. Analyzing 
this “compensatory response” to sustain the fantasy of kinship relations bounded by nature, even 
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as cultural and technological change has fundamentally shifted the role of biological and sexual 
relations in reproduction, will animate much of the work of this dissertation.202  
For even as this breakdown of the ‘symbolic order’ has occurred, and the policing of the 
nature/culture divide has made the family a dense location for the coalescing of social anxieties, 
there have also been a series of salutary effects. Along with the rupture of traditional kinship 
forms, and in particular with the opening of kinship outside of the conjugal frame through donor 
insemination and gamete donation, potential has been created for kinship to expand to a broader 
set of community ties. Exploring these new kinship frames and their development by queer 
subjects through AHR will form another main thrust of this dissertation. As Butler concludes, the 
rupture of the nature/culture divide offers an opportunity for new kinship and sexual 
arrangements to compel a rethinking of culture itself, for “when the relations that bind are no 
longer traced to heterosexual procreation, the very homology between nature and culture…tends 
to become undermined.”203 
Fascinatingly, within much of queer theory these same developments have led to a 
different sort of backlash. As was seen in the discussion of Edelman and Halberstam, kinship 
has indeed functioned as the site where anxieties about broad cultural developments take hold. 
Their vocal rejection of child-rearing operates as a condensed site for the expression of fears 
around shifting social realities – but this time in the opposite direction. Thus the anti-social turn 
can be seen as an expression of queer anxieties about homonormativity and the loss of queer 
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hedonic pleasures (mandated first by the AIDS crisis and then by the ‘assimilation’ of gays). It 
also reflects longstanding debates within gay and lesbian movements about the collective goal 
of same-sex marriage,204 fueled by a fear that queer abrasions of the normal may have become 
dulled and flat in the yawning depths of the suburbs.  
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Queer scholars have watched with some dismay as the failure to imagine new marital 
arrangements has collapsed back into the same-sex marriage model, guided by the privatized 
dictates of neoliberalism.205 Similarly, David Eng has asked that we remain attentive to how the 
conditions of late capitalism allow queer subjects to inhabit certain types of conventional family 
and kinship formations, or what he has termed “queer liberalism”.206 These are vital critiques of 
power, and rightly argue that one must not gamely jettison suspicion of how the bourgeois 
family operates via the reproduction of sexed and class privileges.  
What should also be made suspicious, however, is the idea that a singular claim to 
biological reproduction can be held by the naturalized propriety of heterosexual love. I believe 
we must also question the ready equation of procreation with the most galling of normative 
projects, and with an inevitable capitulation to privatized modes of bourgeois subjecthood. The 
landscape of queer biological kinship remains contested by supporters and detractors from 
across the ideological spectrum, and it has been too easy for scholars to abandon these concerns 
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as merely homonormative and misaligned with the transgressive agenda of queer theory and 
politics. Rather than automatically conjuring the spectres of the neoliberal subject, queer family 
projects ask for fresh legal strategies and conceptual frames to understand how LGBTQ subjects 
are navigating the challenging and often hostile privatized landscape of for-profit reproductive 
assistance. 
Thus, my project aims to center the inherently non-reproductive queer user of AHR, with 
the conviction that by reading the reproductive landscape slant-wise, from a perspective not 
already over-burdened with assumptions about the ‘natural’ family, we will be able to survey 
important conceptual vistas that would otherwise have remained obscured. For example, during 
my interviews I encountered the queer spawn of two married and non-monogamous transmen – 
a youngster conceived through the help of a sperm donor who lives in a different city. This child 
literally has no mother but instead can count three fathers, two of whom are biological. Such 
kinships demand a fundamental rethinking of the assumed linkage between compulsory 
heterosexuality, monogamy and the reproductive family, and have the capacity to destabilize the 
hierarchies of sex normativity. Why is it again that queers cannot be non-heterosexual, non-
monogamous and reproductive? Through such stories I learned how family may be refigured by 
queer connections of blood and kin. I learned of people’s struggles with family law, and a 
frustration at reductive formations that assumed a same-sex couple would have similar needs 
and concerns to a straight couple. This mechanism of formal equality chafed for many (though 
not all) of my informants, and I came to see the need for a queer legal analytic that would be 
able to encompass both questions of substantive equality, as well as the wellbeing of queer 
people seeking to create families through AHR. Bringing the queer frame to the foreground 
plainly articulates how supposedly normative heterosexuality and family-making is neither the 
71 
empirical nor the legal reality. As a queer scholar, I suggest that rather than throwing out queer 
spawn with the heterosexual bathwater, we might instead look to question the opposition of 
‘queer’ to ‘reproduction’ and explore the new intimacies being forged. 207 
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The diverse literatures surveyed in this chapter have offered a comprehensive survey of 
the nature/culture divide, and the way that material forms of reproduction, kinship, gender, sex, 
power and labour can be read through the development of new forms of technology. In order to 
understand the workings of heteronormativity and its relation to the reproductive project, it has 
been necessary to gather a complex strand of inquiry through these independent, yet related, 
theoretical trajectories. However ‘the family’ is not merely a social relationship based on 
increasingly fragmented ties; it is also – and crucially – a legal formation, and one which 
requires the operation of juridical power to recognize and legitimate human (and non-human) 
relationality.  
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These concerns track closely to recent work by Marilyn Strathern on the relational 
quality of the new kinship studies.208 According to Strathern, the abstracted forms of family 
                                            
207
 While my queer orientation is perhaps not in question, I would like to make a declaration of not only my sexual 
but also familial orientation and own desire for children via technological intervention. I think this is important not 
only in terms of a feminist standpoint but also the generally narrative approach I am taking toward this legal 
ethnography. The voices I will seek to highlight in this account are necessarily filtered through my authorial screen, 
and I must to some extent keep intact the boundaries between author and subject, private and public, personal and 
professional.  Nevertheless my subjective and self-conscious involvement in this project will intentionally aim for a 
more dialogic relation with research participants, and I intend to argue through form and substance against the 
codification of experience as represented in traditional research practices. Thus I hope that as the reader engages 
with the text and especially with the interview transcripts presented, my own conflicted role as scholar and 
commentator, as well as a queer with a family plan, will be visibly enucleated. For a discussion of the researcher 
dynamic as a dialogical process, see: Leigh Arden Ford and Robbin D. Crabtree “Telling, re-telling, and talking 
about telling: Disclosure and/as surviving incest” (2002) Women's Studies in Communication 25 (1): 35–53.  
208
 As described through this chapter, I am also interested in incorporating other branches of Marxist and feminist 
thought that interrogate relational forms of knowledge and embodiment. 
72 
which are imagined through the concept of ‘relations’ can receive important analytical purchase 
through an introduction to law’s taxonomies. As she explains: 
Indeed, relationality – as an abstract value placed on relationships – is highlighted 
in a recognisable and conventional manner through attention to the law. 
[Threaded through such study] is a commentary on the way modernist legal 
thinking at once opens up and closes down predispositions to think in terms of 
relations. …. There is a particular purchase to bringing in legal thinking. It is a 
discipline and a practice that has to deal with different kinds of relationships.209 
 
Thus she draws attention to the law as a domain of Euro-American institutional life, for 
the very reason that it both illuminates the relations between humans and the subjects and objects 
of our world, and is instrumental in creating the protocols and boundaries that direct those 
relations in the first place. Law is both a window through which to view the operations of human 
relations and a critical tool in structuring those relationships. As Strathern argues, for example, 
through the deployment of such concepts as intellectual property, the law gives categorical 
meaning to the products of people’s activities.210 
Interpersonal relations are also imagined and constructed through legal structures, as 
when the concept of family gives rise to categorical determinations over who and what may 
claim the rights of caretaking, dependency, symbolic recognition and access to state benefits and 
subsidies. The battle over same-sex marriage, for example, has not been about whether the social 
reality of gays and lesbians can include intimate affiliation and cohabitation. Clearly, the lived 
experience of these subjects already involves such intimacy. The struggle has been for legal 
recognition, to claim the conceptual category of family as well as the symbolic and tangible 
benefits that affix to membership in such a category.211  
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Understanding the law in this way – as an apparatus that reifies concepts such as family 
and then creates legal categories which may be policed – will prove helpful to a study of the 
ways in which concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘biology’ continue to circulate as constitutive and 
contradictory categories in Canadian law. For even as law faces new social phenomena and (of 
particular interest here) the complexities of kinship produced through assisted reproduction, it 
will look to existing conceptual and categorical norms to govern its progress. As Roxanne 
Mykitiuk has argued: 
Law, and in particular legal reasoning, is all about categorizing, characterizing, sorting 
and fitting complex social phenomena and relations into pre-existing legal pigeon holes. 
Moreover, while science and medicine strive to find discoveries for the future while 
simultaneously unlocking the secrets of the past, law, with its duty to regulate society, 
looks mainly to the past to interpret the legal position and significance of novel 
developments, arrangements and techniques. Law, which is founded on precedent (at 
Common Law) and basic principles and doctrines, will take analogies from decided cases, 
past and present, wherever possible. Whereas scientific and medical advances create the 
possibility of disrupting our schemas of linguistic and social categorization (for some, our 
conceptions of reality) by fashioning novel material entities, law's impetus is to resist new 
orderings and to attempt to assimilate these new entities into current or past conceptual 
frameworks. Further, law will make authoritative pronouncements to preserve particular 
kinds of legally sanctioned relations even in the face of novel arrangements. There 
appears to be an inevitable incongruence between law's need to preserve stable 
conceptual categories on the one hand, and the scientific impulse toward the discovery 
and creation of novel entities and techniques on the other.212 
 
The drive to taxonomize complex social phenomena into narrow definitional and pre-
existing bounds is one that characterizes the legal project. Thus law finds itself past-oriented, as 
Mykitiuk describes, and structured through the precedents of Common Law toward the 
assimilation of new formations into existing frames. And what is one of the most fundamental 
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conceptual logics and organizing principles for society? As has been discussed at length above, 
Euro-American society has long rested upon the nature/culture divide and the essentialist 
rationales of heteronormativity. 
Of course, like all forms of power/knowledge, neither is the law a unilinear or cohesive 
structure. There will necessarily be ruptures and incoherences in how any system of regulation 
operates. Indeed when the frame is tightened to the relationship between reproductive technology 
and nature in particular, scholars have demonstrated how the law operates through complex and 
often conflicting norms. This was seen in the previous chapter in relation to the balancing act 
between biology and sociality in determining parentage. As Emily Martin has similarly 
maintained in regard to British law, AHR’s dissolution of strictly biological grounds for the 
maternity/paternity divide has often resulted in contradictory effects: 
In the UK the legislation, rather confusingly, both reaffirms and disrupts conventional 
understandings about kinship. At times the status provisions appear to rest upon the 
assumption that parenthood is a non-negotiable and immutable “fact of life”, despite the 
new technologies’ capacity to subvert traditional reproductive norms. So, for example, 
rather than recognise that a child born following oocyte donation has two biological 
mothers, the law instead determines which one shall be considered the only biological 
mother. On the other hand, at other times the rules appear to recognise that the natural 
biological facts of procreation do not accurately reflect the realities of assisted 
reproduction. Hence, for example, although a child born to a single woman treated with 
donor sperm undoubtedly has a biological father, he or she will be legally fatherless.213 
 
 These contradictory formations represent what Mykitiuk has called the “fragmentation” 
of legal categories, wherein novel material and social arrangements are engaged by the 
normalizing logics of legal doctrine. For even as law seeks to privilege those categories 
comfortingly buttressed by precedent and practice, it must nevertheless also confront categorical 
gaps which cannot merely be shoehorned into existing models. These moments of fragmentation 
are also part of the relationship of the legal apparatus to new conceptual paradigms, and are 
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fascinating locations of rupture to track the ways in which law’s operation may privilege and 
abject certain ways of knowing and being.  
.&#
As has been discussed, queer theory offers tools for a critical attention to the knowledges 
and social practices that repress difference in creating what Michael Warner calls “regimes of 
the normal”214 regarding appropriate sexual practice. Queer scholarship has allowed for deep 
scrutiny of the process through which social exclusions are produced. For if difference derives 
specific forms and meanings through its “encounter with existing social relations and material 
social practices in particular places,” then the task is to expose the “tensions, contradictions and 
affiliations” embedded in such encounters.215 This rests nicely with Mykitiuk’s call for attention 
to the fragmentation of law. Extending queer logics to a study of heteronormativity and assisted 
reproduction in the Canadian legal order thus necessitates the reconceptualization of difference 
as constituted, fragmented and (re)configured in relation to place-specific struggles over rights, 
social practices, and relationships—particularly sexual and emotional intimacies.  
 What then might queer theory applied to law teach us about the limits of assisted human 
reproduction legislation and the LGBTQ people seeking to access these technologies? Can it 
offer a robust framework through which to theorise the structural conditions of queer 
intergenerational intimacy? What can queer theory tell us about or contribute to an analysis of 
the legal conditions being faced by queer parenting subjects?  
Unfortunately, queer and legal theory offer a strained disciplinary divide at best. This 
chapter has mapped how queer theory is an unmappable discipline, intentionally inchoate, 
definitionally unstable and in rejection of a substantive project. This stands in contrast to legal 
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scholarship, which even in its most critical formations, nevertheless finds itself oriented toward 
normative questions if not the pursuit of properly substantive remedies. There are exceptions 
within each tradition, of course, but the difficulty of reconciliation remains. As Janet Halley and 
Andrew Parker point out, “the failure of queer theory to engage the critical tradition in legal 
studies (and its resulting failure to grok the critique of rights)” has found itself met by an 
“hostility in centrist legal studies…to theoretical approaches more generally that do not quickly 
produce a ‘policy recommendation’.”216 Such loggerheads, although complicated by 
polyvalences and tensions within both disciplines, have made conversation difficult. 
By focusing attention on the sites of contestation, contradiction, reinstantiation and 
reformulation made possible by assisted reproductive technology, this dissertation uses the 
figure of the queer parent to explore the conceptual power still wielded by the ‘traditional 
family’ in Canadian law. This use of queer legal theory to investigate assisted reproduction and 
the techno-mediated family is a relatively novel approach. As has been seen, queer scholarship 
has been generally quite hostile to the (apparently) homonormative elements of family 
formation and preferred to celebrate the inherently non-reproductive figure of the Queer. For its 
part, feminist scholarship that has explored assisted reproduction and the constructedness of 
‘natural facts’ regarding reproduction – of which there has been a very great deal - has most 
often remained fixed on the heterosexual family as the primary site of contestation.  
My project seeks to bring various theoretical strands into productive tension, through a 
broadly multidisciplinary analysis that refuses a primary focus on the heterosexual family. 
Rather than seeking to understand the legal challenges posed by deviations from the ‘naturally 
reproductive couple’, I disregard the primacy of this couple in the first instance. Through a 
materialist feminist focus on queer reproductive subjects and the medico-juridical terrain upon 
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which they stake their parenting claims, I seek to produce an embodied account of queer lives 
and the ambivalences that frame their experience. 
I am inspired in this goal by Wittig’s project and her rejection the terms of the ‘class 
struggle’ between men and women. Instead she took the organization of lesbian society – a 
society without men – as her analytical model. By foregrounding this mode of social 
organization as baseline, rather than as a deviant or abnormal cluster, Wittig was able to focus 
her lens on the operations of society created by the naturalization of heterosexual life. Wittig 
took the independent character of lesbian society as evidence that the “natural order” of women 
bound to men through social and reproductive functions was an artificial social fact.217 For her, 
“lesbian society pragmatically reveals that the divisions from men of which women have been 
the object is a political one and shows that we have been ideologically rebuilt into a “natural 
group”…We have been compelled in our bodies and our minds to correspond, feature by 
feature, with the idea of nature that has been established for us.”218 
 	
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While Wittig’s work provides inspiration for this dissertation, her project was very much 
against childbearing and the process of reproduction. So where are we now, twenty years on 
from Wittig’s thesis, and amidst the current complaints of Edelman and Halberstam and their 
equation of happy, shiny heteronormativity with the unbearable lameness of childbearing? It 
appears that there are few conceptual locations for the queer parent to exist within critical queer 
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theory; yet this figuration stands very much at odds with the empirical data gathered in this 
dissertation. Neither Wittig’s political rejection of childbearing nor the repudiation of 
reproductive futurity by the anti-social turn can account for the queer parenting lives 
encountered by this research. My critique thus brings to the fore the theoretical terms at stake 
and the importance of centering queer lives in the conceptual models we create.219  
For as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has rightly pointed out, the anti-social thesis follows in 
the wake of queer theory’s emergence in the late 1980s and early 1990s amidst the AIDS crisis 
and the paranoia wrought by widespread and uncertain death. As she describes: “It was not an 
uncommon experience then to be in a room of vibrant young people, conscious that within a 
year or two, all but a few of them would have sickened and died.”220 Such a paranoid reading 
continues to infuse queer scholarship, but it does so increasingly outside of a context that 
reflects lived experience. For example, Edelman offers the following remark in a 1998 article 
that would later come to ground the invective for No Future: 
Choosing to stand, as many of us do, outside the cycles of reproduction, choosing 
to stand, as we also do, by the side of those living and dying each day with the 
complications of AIDS, we know the deception of the societal lie that endlessly 
looks toward a future whose promise is always a day away.221 
 
Edelman’s frame has been rightly impacted by the loss and grieving of the AIDS crisis, 
and seemingly endless waves of death which wrenched away the promise of a future for a 
generation of young gay men. Within this lived materiality, the hope of tomorrow was a 
deception, a lie to be furiously refused.  
Given more than two decades of advances in medical technology, anti-retroviral drugs, 
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and access to assisted reproduction alongside increasing LGBTQ civil rights, however, this is 
simply no longer the experience of many queers. Indeed, it is more likely that queer affiliations 
will produce the following scenario, a vision of multiplied community made possible through 
the lateral forms of kinship discussed in Attachment Two: “It was not an uncommon experience 
to be in a room of vibrant young people, conscious that they are all queer relations, all created 
through reproductive technologies, some even holding biological ties with the same donor.”222 
The material conditions of queer child-making offer abundant reproductivities and multiplied 
kinships as the opposite of wasting death. My feminist materialist analysis tracks the empirical 
realities of queer kinship in developing new conceptual models, and in opposition to much 
scholarship in the queer academy. For even as these lived reproductive projects have grown 
exponentially, the idea of queer parenting has remained eminently unfashionable as a theoretical 
project.223  
In order to approach the empirical as well as discursive artifacts of the queer body in 
law, I believe it is helpful to move away from static categories of naturalised procreation. New 
frameworks are required; some of which may grow out of queer theoretical traditions; others 
which may take inspiration from feminist Marxism, science and technology studies and kinship 
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theory; but that together are able to capture the contemporary reality of childbearing and rearing 
in the shadow of law as experienced by the subjects of this research.  
%(*(!"#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This chapter has surveyed a variety of literatures focused on the analysis of interlocking 
binary frames. It began by using Marxist ideas to explore the Western duality of 
‘biological/social’ and the ‘nature/culture’ upon which this binary depends. It then picked up 
various feminist strands, as woven through Foucauldian and postmodernist thought, to explore 
the divisions of sex/gender and male/female in poststructuralist feminist analysis; queer theory’s 
insights on the natural/unnatural binaries of heteronormativity; and the biological/social 
problematizations of feminist science studies, corporeal feminism and the new kinship studies. 
Taken as a guiding frame, this broad interrogation of nature/culture forms a helpful 
interdisciplinary rubric upon which to build an analysis of the queer reproductive family. For 
example, when queer theory comes to bear specifically upon the natural world, it offers a useful 
hermeneutic to understand how nature has been read not only as female, passive, inert and easily 
manipulated, but as uniquely heterosexual. This is a particularly urgent process, given how AHR 
technologies have revoked the singular claim to genetic reproduction formerly held by the 
heterosexual family. Yet queer theory has allowed itself to cordon off most questions of 
childbearing and rearing as hopelessly heteronormative, and has not developed a robust 
language for reproduction outside of heterosexual models of family. There have instead been 
studies made of the child-as-queer; the nascent queer body for which we warmly anticipate a 
maturity into adulthood.224 And while these works offer a strong foundation for thinking though 
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intergenerationality (by which I mean the vertical child-adult-elder structures of biological 
reproduction which have long typified heterosexual kinship) and queer relations of family, there 
has been far less attention paid to the queer parent and the new reproductive forms through 
which children are produced.   
By the same token, much ink has been spilled on the social and legal ramification of new 
reproductive technologies, with feminist scholars ruminating at length upon the dramatic re-
envisioning of ‘nature’ and ‘family’ that has resulted. These works have explored how existing 
models of kinship have been increasingly ruptured through novel relations of capital and care, 
yet few have used the robust language of heteronormativity and queer critique to bolster their 
analysis. I believe the inherently non-reproductive modalities of queer sexuality may allow a 
recentering of the frame of inquiry in conceptually important ways. When queer reproduction at 
the fertility clinic is foregrounded, it helps to lay bare a medico-juridical order that is broadly 
unable to account for all manner of families created beyond the realms of ‘natural’ reproduction.  
For its part, family law has been woefully unable to account for many of the challenges 
posed by queer people and reproductive technology, in Canada and beyond. Relying instead 
upon existing models of the hetereosexual family, the nature/culture binary and a stubbornly 
patriarchal worldview, law has been roundly criticized for its inability to expand frames of 
kinship and recognize the new forms of intimacy created through AHR. As may be seen in 
Attachments One and Two, family law in Canada is at the point of nearly comical failure, with 
donors who cannot be tracked, sperm banks with no order to disclose, receding pools of sperm 
with deeply racialized implications, and queer families all over encountering lateral kinships 
through online and social media. Clearly the solutions are not to be found in law alone.  
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By bringing these disciplines into conversation, this dissertation seeks to account for the 
lived LGBTQ lives at the heart of this research. As my analysis proceeded, it became evident 
that neither strictly queer nor legal models could map these complex realities; nor could merely 
kinship theory or the singular analysis of biotechnology. In seeking to reconcile these divides in 
accounting for the empirics of this project, then, this dissertation aims to engage queer subjects 
of both law and conception. By utilizing what Janet Halley has phrased “the hedonics of 
critique”225 this analysis employs a wide-ranging theoretical dialectic in hopes of emerging 
finally with a vision of ‘thick life’226 that could not be imagined by one intellectual tradition 
alone. This careful approach to materiality will, it is hoped, show us something about the 
surprising discursive flexibilities of law(s) even as we seek to keep our embodied subjects at 
hand. 
As has been seen, the subjectivating power of law opens certain possibilities for families 
while seeking to foreclose others. Of course the debate over the “future of the family”, as was 
discussed in Chapter Two, swirls not only around the legal battles produced through shifting 
cultural and sexual norms and the increased use of AHR. It also churns through ethical questions 
about test tube babies and the creation of human life in a laboratory. Issues such as stem cell 
research,227 the management of frozen embryos,228 pre-implantation genetic diagnosis,229 and the 
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possibility of genetic conditions or chromosomal issues (especially regarding intracytoplasmic 
sperm injection)230 are bioethical concerns that continue to be hotly contested. These debates are 
indeed important, but they remain beyond the reach of this dissertation. Instead, the aim is to 
tunnel down to the normative bedrock upon which such interventions are predicated in the first 
place, to interrogate the heteronormativity of reproduction, the exclusions it produces, and the 
ways in which queer subjects complicate, challenge, reinforce and reveal such conceptual gaps in 
both law and society. It is these possibilities for being human, a body, a family that interests 
here, as produced through webs of biotechnology and social affiliation. This is, I believe, a queer 
project indeed. 
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This project is greatly indebted to the empirical findings that emerged from a Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research-funded study entitled “Creating Our Families: A pilot study of the 
experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans people accessing assisted human reproduction 
services in Ontario” (FRN-103595). The study was developed in 2009 by Lori E. Ross 
(Re:searching for LGBTQ Health, Centre for Addiction & Mental Health), Leah S. Steele (St. 
Michael’s Hospital), and Rachel Epstein (LGBTQ Parenting Network, Sherbourne Health 
Centre), with the goal of interviewing LGBTQ people about their experiences with fertility 
clinics across the province.231 The author was invited to join the project in 2010 as co-
investigator and legal analyst. It is through the empirical research we conducted, as well as 
meetings with our advisory team, that this queer perspective on assisted reproduction has been 
developed.  
Early versions of this dissertation were shredded almost entirely, as the practical 
knowledges encountered through the Creating Our Families project failed to mesh with the grand 
conceptual fabric that had been knit in the library. The initial intention of this dissertation was to 
track gay men across the globe as they sought out surrogates in the developing world. However it 
soon became clear that gay couples from Canada were not heading overseas to find surrogates; 
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on the contrary, the men interviewed in this project were clear about wanting to stay and find 
surrogates at home, despite frustration with a regulatory scheme that they perceived as 
functioning mainly to baffle their family plans. A great deal was learned in the homes of LGBTQ 
people across the province of Ontario, and it is this grounded knowledge that informs and 
inspires the coming pages. 
The next section explains the background to the study, outlines some methodological 
concerns and challenges, and describes the process of data gathering, coding and analysis. 
%#
The study was developed as a qualitative research project, grounded in the methodology 
of community-based research [CBR].232 In line with CBR principles, the research team 
collaborated with an advisory committee of LGBTQ parenting educators, LGBTQ service users 
and AHR service providers throughout the project. In addition, the research team itself consisted 
of professional peer researchers (LGBTQ people), several of whom have used AHR services in 
the past.233 This project received ethics approval from the Research Ethics Board (REB) of the 
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (protocol #048/2010) and the REB of York University 
(certificate #STU 2010-154). 
Interview participants were recruited between July 2010 and March 2011 through online 
networks (i.e., LGBTQ and health listservs), by mail (flyers) to over 200 service providers and 
organizations (i.e., fertility clinics, HIV/AIDS service organizations, midwifery practices), 
through engagement with LGBTQ community agencies and advocates, and in person at Pride 
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celebrations across Ontario. Interested individuals contacted the study office by telephone or 
email, and were subsequently screened by telephone to determine eligibility. Participants were 
eligible for an interview based on the following criteria: they identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
trans and/or queer; were aged 18 years or older; had used or considered using AHR services 
since 2007; and had lived and/or used health services in Ontario. Purposeful sampling was used 
to select a group of interviewees whose experiences with AHR services were representative of 
those identified by the broader, screened group.234 This included anyone who had begun 
researching reproductive options, visited fertility clinics, sought the services of surrogate 
mothers, and/or accessed donor sperm either known or unknown. Interview participants were 
also selected based on their socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., sexual orientation, gender 
identity, racial/ethnic identity, and geographic location), in an effort to represent the diversity of 
the LGBTQ population in Ontario.235 
Interviews took place between December 2010 and August 2011, with interviews lasting 
60 to 90 minutes. The three trained interviewers, including the author, followed a semi-structured 
guide, with questions addressing each of the objectives.236 Prior to the interview, each participant 
completed a socio-demographic questionnaire.237 Written consent was obtained from all study 
participants prior to the interview.238 
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In crafting the written consent forms, there was a concern that participants engaging in 
illegal trade (including payment to surrogates and payment for human gametes) would be put at 
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risk by speaking openly about their activities.239 There was a long discussion among members of 
the research team about the potential scenario of our research being subpoenaed in evidence, 
thereby prompting us to release the names of our informants. Our ethical mandate was therefore 
strongly based upon a need to ensure the confidentiality of research participants.240 There was 
only one precursor to this type of subpoena in Canadian research history, wherein a graduate 
student at Simon Fraser University named Russell Ogden was subpoenaed to turn over his 
research materials on assisted suicide to a Vancouver coroner.241  
Briefly, in early 1994 Ogden had completed a path breaking and controversial study on 
assisted suicide that received international attention.242 His research relied upon interviews with 
people actively participating with and assisting people to commit suicide, an unlawful act in 
Canada.243 Shortly following his successful Masters defense, Ogden was subpoenaed to appear 
before a coroner's inquest.244 When he appeared at the inquest, the coroner asked him to reveal 
some of his sources. Ogden refused, based on his pledge of confidentiality to the participants of 
                                            
239
 The criminalized provisions of the AHRA will be discussed at length in Chapter Five. For now, it is sufficient to 
say that criminal penalties do apply when making payment to any broker or direct provider of surrogate services, 
and when making payment for human sperm or ova.  
240
 See especially Fogel, C. 2007. Ethical issues in field-based criminological research in Canada. International 
Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 2: 109–118. See also: Palys, T., & Lowman, J. (2002). Anticipating law: 
Research methods, ethics, and the law of privilege. Sociological Methodology, 32: 1-17.; Israel, M. (2004). Strictly 
confidential? Integrity and the disclosure of criminological and socio-legal research. British Journal of Criminology, 
44, 715-740. 
241
 Palys, T., & Lowman, J. (2000). Ethical and legal strategies for protecting confidential research information. 
Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 15(1): 39-80.; Lowman, J., & Palys, T. (2004). Ethics and institutional 
conflict of interest: The research confidentiality controversy at Simon Fraser University. Sociological Practice, 2(4): 
245-264. 
242
 Ogden, R. 1994. "Euthanasia and assisted suicide in persons with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). M.A. Thesis, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University.  See also: 
Mason, B. 1994. "SFU Research on Euthanasia and AIDS Attracts International Media Attention." Simon Fraser 
Week, February 17, pp. 1, 3.  
243
 While suicide has not been a crime in Canada since 1972, aiding or abetting a person to commit suicide is illegal. 
See: Martha Butler et al., Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Canada (2013) Parliamentary Information and 
Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa. 
244
 Inquest of Unknown Female (1994). Oral Reasons for Judgement, the Honourable L.W. Campbell, Vancouver 
Coroner. Case file 91-240-0838. 
88 
the study - a pledge that he maintained was in accordance with University policy.245 After a 
lengthy legal debate, the coroner finally agreed that the costs of disrupting the researcher-
participant privilege did not outweigh the benefits of knowing the privileged information. The 
issue was dismissed and Ogden was not compelled to release any identifying information on his 
research participants. 246 
Despite Ogden’s successful defense of researcher-participant privilege, however, the 
Creating Our Families team was still deeply concerned with protecting the identities of all 
participants when conducting this potentially criminological research. As laid out by Ted Palys 
and John Lowman of the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University, there are two main 
strategies that researchers may adopt to deal with the possibility of subpoena: a) methodological 
precautions, and b) legal strategy.247 
%$%&
The sensitive nature of the Creating Our Families study placed an onus upon the 
researchers to conduct the research according to the highest ethical standards. LGBTQ parents 
and the communities that serve them have been operating within a ‘gray zone’ of legislation 
regarding the reimbursement of surrogacy and ova/sperm donors, and the research team deemed 
it critical to protect participant wellbeing through the safe handling of all data gathered. The 
strict confidentiality of this data was necessary to protect not only the standards upon which 
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academic research at large depends, but also the practitioner and participant communities 
connected to this specific focus of research. 
 A common methodological precaution is to make one’s research materials completely 
anonymous, so that even if they were to be subpoenaed they would be meaningless in terms of 
participant identification. As Palys and Lowman suggest, “in some types of research, one need 
never ask for or know participants' names in the first place; when we must obtain that 
information, any records (e.g. data files, interview transcripts, field notes) should be anonymised 
at the earliest opportunity.”248  
While this research project did require that names were initially needed to tabulate the 
screening form and exchange emails and phone calls, all identifying information was divorced 
from the data at the earliest possible opportunity. The data files, interview transcripts and field 
notes were all stored according to a numerical coding system, with a locked master key to keep 
track of the coding referents. The transcripts were then stripped of all identifiers, and stored both 
as encrypted files and under password in a secure computer system within a locked facility. Only 
team members had access to these records. 
While the anonymization of data did occur at the earliest possible instance, there was 
some concern about the intimate bounds of the LGBTQ community in Ontario, where many of 
the participants may already be known to the research team. Palys and Lowman outline this 
second consideration: 
In some cases, researchers cannot help but know the identity of participants. In this type of 
research, researchers need to anticipate the legal strategy to be used to assert evidentiary 
privilege, and design research in a way that maximises their chances of success.249  
                                            
248
 Ibid at 44. 
249
 Supra note 241 at 44. 
90 
 
Thus, while anonymous record-keeping was believed to provide some degree of 
protection, there was also discussion about the utility of developing a legal strategy as well.  
 
#
The legal strategy suggested by Palys and Lowman was the same one that had been 
successfully applied by Russel Ogden before the Coroner’s Court in British Columbia.250 As the 
only Canadian court case to involve a researcher subpoenaed to release research materials, this 
provided a conceptual model for the Creating Our Families team. Ogden had planned his consent 
form in a manner that appealed to the test outlined by Wigmore's Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law.  This is a common law mechanism used to adjudicate claims of evidentiary privilege on a 
case-by-case basis. The test is based upon four key tenets, all of which must be present to ground 
a successful claim of privilege:  
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously 
fostered. 
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications 
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.251 
 
After reviewing the Ogden case and discussing concerns around pre-existing knowledge 
of the identity of many participants, and the advisement of the author, the Creating Our Families 
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team decided to incorporate a legal strategy in addition to the methodological precautions 
described above. Under the Wigmore test, in order to claim confidential privilege, a researcher 
must demonstrate the intent to provide an absolute guarantee of privilege, and show that the 
promise of that confidence is essential to the research relationship. This intent was evidenced by 
the team through wording in the informed consent form, which contained a written promise of 
“the strictest confidentiality with an absolute guarantee of privacy.” The team’s intent was then 
formalized through the relationship of the researcher and participant with the signing of the 
informed consent form. The informed consent form thus explicitly integrated the conditions of 
the Wigmore test to assert a relationship of confidential privilege found to be valid in Canadian 
jurisprudence.252 
The second part of the Wigmore test holds that the interest in protecting that relationship 
must also outweigh the competing interest in disclosure. Thus, any 'absolute' guarantee is 
necessarily limited by the possibility of unanticipated heinous discovery.253 Research 
confidentiality may also be overridden if a participant's innocence is at stake and one of the 
research team is called to testify in their defense.  
Barring such unlikely scenarios, however, the revised informed consent form met the 
Wigmore criteria and offered an important safeguard of confidentiality to participants. Should 
the Creating Our Families research ever be subpoenaed, it was hoped, the team could argue that 
such an absolute guarantee rests upon a matter of case-by-case evidentiary privilege. It was 
agreed that using the Wigmore criteria as a guide to research design would allow the research 
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team to anticipate the evidentiary concerns of the courts in a way that maximized the protection 
of research participants by creating the best case for recognition of a researcher-participant 
privilege.254 
Unfortunately, the ethics review board of the Center for Addiction and Mental Health 
[CAMH] was concerned with the possibility of a Court Order mandating the release of 
participant information, and proved unwilling to approve the wording. The staff lawyer instead 
suggested the following phrasing, which the Creating Our Families team ultimately deemed too 
weak to support the four necessary parts of the Wigmore test: 
Given full and complete disclosure by research subjects is necessarily for the purposes of 
this investigation, the investigators intend that all information provided to them will 
remain absolutely and strictly confidential.  However, this intention may have legal 
limits, for example, where required to be disclosed by Court Order, or where information 
is disclosed that suggests a person may be a risk to themselves or others etc.255      
 
Rather than use this suggested wording, the team instead decided to adopt a two-part 
option for anonymity. The first option was of the standard variety, wherein all transcripts would 
be de-identified and names changed, but the participants would still be in a data bank for future 
contact, updates and questions. This would allow the team to send updates and research findings 
and keep track of contact information for future projects, although all publications would have 
the names changed and the data stripped of identifying characteristics. The second option was 
designed to protect participants who were engaging in criminalized activities, and offered them a 
more rigorous form of anonymity in which all identifying data – including contact information – 
would be immediately destroyed. This meant they could not be part of updates and publications 
stemming from the data, and would not be available for longitudinal study in the future. All 
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potentially identifying information would be wiped across the system and their transcript key 
would be left blank.  

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In total, 118 individuals or families responded to the study flyer to express interest in 
participating in the study. Of these, the team was able to contact 108 to complete eligibility 
screening, locating 100 participants of whom were eligible (93% of all respondents). The 
primary reason for ineligibility was use of AHR services prior to 2007. 
Since participants often chose to be interviewed as couples, or in one case, together with 
a known sperm donor, a total of 66 individuals participated in the 40 interviews. The majority of 
the sample (72.7%) identified their gender as cisgender (non-trans) women, with a number of 
cisgender men and trans people also participating (13.6% and 13.6% respectively). With respect 
to sexual orientation, the majority of study participants self-identified as either lesbian (32%) or 
queer (33%), with six other sexual identities represented. Approximately half of the sample lived 
in the Toronto region, with the remainder distributed across the province of Ontario.  
The majority of participants were aged 31-40 years, married or in a common-law 
relationship, White, university educated, and with an annual household income of greater than 
$66,000 CAD. Participants typically accessed, or attempted to access AHR for one of two 
primary purposes: family creation (including services such as cycle monitoring, intrauterine 
insemination, in vitro fertilization, and surrogacy), and for some trans participants, fertility 
preservation prior to or during transition (including services such as embryo and sperm storage, 
egg extraction and storage, and ovarian tissue preservation). 
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Interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed verbatim and checked for accuracy. 
Thematic content analysis was undertaken to identify common themes in the data generated from 
this question.256 Three members of the team, including the author, independently analyzed the 
transcripts, and results were compared for consistency. Further data analysis was carried out by 
the targeting of key words with software program QDA Miner 4.  
To the best of our team’s knowledge, this represents the largest study yet conducted to 
focus exclusively on how LGBTQ communities are accessing reproductive technologies. The 
team was mainly comprised of people from the field of public health, and as such the interviews 
focused on issues such as counseling, gatekeeping, and access to sperm, eggs, and known gamete 
donors. The interests of the author was represented in these matters, as well as questions about 
the legal issues faced by LGBTQ people in planning their families, in the reproductive clinic and 
in securing donor gametes and surrogates.  
Based on the empirical knowledge collected through this project, my dissertation aims to 
translate the actual experience of queer Canadians with AHR into a new theoretical framework 
capable of addressing the complexity of family law in the 21st century. These interviews are rich 
in stores of resilience and hope, and articulate a thrilling new vision for reproductive law and 
technology. Study participants raised, for example, pressing concerns around access to gametes, 
surrogates, and the rights of the donor-conceived child. It is contended that such issues must lay 
the ground for urgently-required policy development in Canada, even as attention is maintained 
upon the operations of power that undergird both law and medicine. This dissertation is thereby 
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driven by certainty that the voices within stand as powerful affirmations of how a queer analysis 
can guide Canada toward a more just AHR policy for all.  
4 
Over the long process of analyzing these interviews conducted with queer Canadians 
using AHR, a palpable sense of their frustration with law and policy emerged. The inertia of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act will be discussed in Chapter Five, but in short, this sweeping 
piece of legislation has been of little use in providing guidance to Canadians using reproductive 
technology – and even more so when LGBTQ people were the ones seeking fertility care. Yet 
when looking to the ways in which the courts had begun wrestling with similar issues, it became 
clear that the jurisprudential tools being used to understand queer family-making were also 
hopelessly saturated in a heterosexual modality. It grew evident that queer families and their 
needs pose a substantive challenge to courts and legislators alike. These challenges form the 
substance of Attachments One and Two.  
Another key element of analysis involved the demographics of the study. The Creating 
our Families project made substantial efforts to reach out to racialized, poor and minority 
LGBTQ communities during our screening process, and intentionally chose not to interview 
many of the white women who responded to our study in hopes of gaining a more balanced 
demographic profile. The author personally travelled to remote reaches of Northern Ontario to 
interview people in non-urban settings, visiting townships hundreds of miles from Thunder Bay 
and Sault Ste. Marie. Despite this methodological selection and commitment to a diversity of 
experience, our study was still overwhelmingly white, female, educated and middle-class. 
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Indeed, a full 40.9% of participants reported a combined household income of more than 
$100,000.257 
Despite best efforts, this sampling might to some degree reflect the nature of the urban-
focused networks through which the project solicited participants. It might also reflect the class, 
race, educational background and experience of the Creating Our Families team itself, as 
participants were occasionally familiar to members of the team due to our own membership 
within local queer communities. It is also possible that poor or racialized participants were not 
able to volunteer (at minimum) one hour of their time for the study. Members from immigrant, 
colonized or undocumented communities may have been wary of the purposes and intentions of 
the project, as well as the subjection of their experience to scientific knowledge practices. People 
from transgender communities in particular have reason to be suspicious of medicalized frames 
of research, and CAMH was a leading member of the research team. Finally, this might reflect 
the composition of the Ontario LGBTQ community itself, and in particular those individuals and 
groups prepared to enter into parenting arrangements.  
 Even accounting for these methodological and positional biases, however, the lopsided 
response to our call for participants is notable. I believe that the remarkable concentration of 
privilege among research participants serves primarily to demonstrate the exclusive nature of 
these technologies. Even the white, wealthy families that were interviewed bemoaned the costs 
of AHR, with a substantial financial outlay consistently flagged as a major barrier for these 
households. It is not possible to draw firm quantitative conclusions from a relatively small 
purposeful sample (40 interviewees selected from 108 eligible participants). Nevertheless, this 
analysis squares with the experiences of select lesbian interviewees of colour and from lower 
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socioeconomic groups who had thought about accessing AHR and decided ultimately to go the 
‘low-tech’ route of home insemination with a known donor or sexual intercourse with a male 
friend. These experiences and the racial and class implications for AHR will be explored in more 
depth in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 	

The increasing ubiquity of AHR demands new approaches to evaluate historic categories 
of parental affiliation and caregiving. As Nicholas Bala has argued, “Canadian jurisdictions need 
statutory reform to better address the issues being raised by the growing use of AHRs.”258 This 
was clearly supported by the Creating Our Families study, which canvassed LGBTQ people 
about the many issues they encountered when seeking to access AHRs. Yet judges continue to 
strain at the bounds of existing family law to account for what appear to be novel and confusing 
kinships.259  
The next chapter will explore this legal matrix, canvassing the history of Canada’s 
primary federal regulation around assisted reproduction, and then looking at how this and other 
laws have specifically impacted queer people and their families. It traces the attempt to create an 
overarching legislative structure to regulate AHR research and clinical application in Canada, 
and how this has been informed (or otherwise) by LGBTQ perspectives. 
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Chapter Five: Laws of Conception 
	

 The story of Canadian regulation in the field of assisted human reproduction is a 
remarkable one. It is a history of progress and regress, uniquely inflected by feminist voices and 
involving decades of struggle to develop a clear regulatory framework for the governance of a 
range of biotechnologies. As it stands today, twenty-five years after the first government 
commission was struck to examine the issue of new reproductive technologies, Canada still lacks 
many guidelines for their application. As Francoise Baylis has recently protested in frustration at 
this long series of regulatory failures and disappointments: 
 So it is that more than 30 years of hard work by dedicated Canadians committed to 
promoting and protecting the interests of those who use, and are born of, assisted 
reproduction has come to naught. Since the mid-1980s Canadians have advocated for the 
regulation of reproductive and genetic technologies. In 1993 the final report of the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies recommended federal legislation. In 
2004, after many failed attempts, legislation was passed. And, in 2010 much of that 
legislation was found to be unconstitutional.260 
 
This chapter will canvass these decades of effort to develop and approve a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme to manage all clinical and research activities relating to 
assisted human reproduction and genetic research. This is well-traveled terrain, with many other 
academic and popular commentators having traced this tale across the arcs of a convoluted 
history.261 Chapter Five will instead seek to apply a queer lens to this history, looking to locate 
the ways in which heteronormative frames and binary formulations of nature/culture (and their 
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absences) have underscored its rationale and rhetoric. It will attend to the moments in which 
queer bodies do emerge from the debates, and analyze these spaces of anxiety and inclusion as 
produced within the larger frameworks of both feminist and ‘mainstream’ ideological 
positions.262 Importantly it will also look to the absences of queer perspectives, and analyze how 
this lack of stakeholder recognition may have contributed to the current reproductive landscape 
faced by prospective LGBTQ parents.  
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This genealogy begins with the main challenges faced by early regulators. The first 
problem stemmed from the difficulty of even defining what these new innovations were. When 
biotechnologies began to receive national press, particularly research in assisted reproduction 
and in vitro fertilization (IVF), they were often framed as elements of a strange and frightening 
scientific order. Surrogacy, test tube babies, cloning and other reproductive technologies 
“became a pervasive theme in horror films and science fiction fantasies” as these new 
innovations “appeared to promise both amazing new control over nature and terrifying 
dehumanization.”263  
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Functioning as a site of anxiety for the disruption of the nature/culture binary, these fears 
took vigorous and remarkably international form, and were perhaps most sharply clarified by 
radical feminist movements and their suspicion of the potential for technological domination 
over women’s bodies. There was particular concern about the medicalization of women’s bodies 
and the subjection of female reproductive functions to patriarchal control. 
The concept of medicalization describes a process “in which nonmedical problems 
become defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses or disorders.”264 
The process of diagnosing a pathology requires its marking as deviance from the norm, thereby 
affirming a certain set of bodies and conditions as ‘healthy’ and designating others as ‘unhealthy’ 
and in need of treatment. As Bryan Turner explains, the medicalization of society has involved 
“the growth of medical dominance under the auspices of the state, associated with the 
development of a professional body of knowledge” alongside “a regulation and management of 
populations and bodies in the interests of a discourse which identifies and controls that which is 
normal.”265 The baseline of ‘normal’ which emerges from this professionalization is most often a 
white, heterosexual, middle-class, able bodied male – the standard bearer of the heterosexual 
imaginary.  
The sexist and heterosexist gaze of medicalization has thus resulted in particularized 
control over women and queers, and perhaps nowhere have these bodies been more medically 
managed than in terms of their relationship to reproduction.266 As Marcia Inhorn explains in 
relation to studies of infertility, such projects make clear that “women’s bodies are considered 
                                            
264
 Conrad, P. 1992. “Medicalization and Social Control.” Annual Review of Sociology 18: 209-232 at 209. 
265
 Turner, B. 1995.Medical Power and Social Knowledge. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. At 208-210 
266
 Michelle Walks, “Breaking the Silence, Infertility, Motherhood, and Queer Culture,” Journal of the Association 
for Research on Mothering, Vol 9(2), 2007. 
101 
the locus of ‘disease’, and hence the site of anxious surveillance and intervention.”267 This 
concern over the gendered nature of medicalization and its specific effects on female bodies has 
long been a central feminist concern, and one which animated much of the response to an 
expanded access to reproductive assistance in the early 1980s.  
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%!"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-"
Radical feminists led the early charge against the growing prevalence of AHR. While 
radical feminists were a diverse set of authors without consensus on many issues, their stance 
may roughly be characterized by the presumption of a foundational link between new 
reproductive technology and patriarchal culture.268 Thus, new reproductive technologies were 
viewed as an instantiation of patriarchal culture and an intensification of male scientific rationale 
directed toward dominion over female reproduction.269 From the position of many 
commentators, these were dangerous and untested procedures that were being forced upon 
women’s bodies as guinea pigs of experimental science.270 These technologies were thus a force 
to be resisted and critiqued, and many radical feminists even expressed suspicion of other 
women who willingly undertook procedures such as IVF; as collaborators with the patriarchal 
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reproductive order, such women were brainwashed collaborators who doubted their own 
power.271 
But sometimes women also collude because we have been brainwashed. The information 
and education we get is one-sided and male-centered and the hidden conviction creeps 
into our own minds that men and their technology must be better than our own body and 
our own experiences with it.272 
  This widespread unease with new technologies coalesced into a remarkably global 
feminist movement in the mid-1980s, with the development of a network representing women 
from more than thirty countries.273 FINRRAGE, or the Feminist International Network of 
Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering, consisted of prominent social critics Gena 
Corea, Janice Raymond, Renate Klein, Patricia Spallone and Deborah Steinberg, among others. 
FINRRAGE was perhaps the most vocal wing of a movement concerned with guarding the 
‘natural’ reproductive functions of women from male control, and produced literature, analysis 
and organized conferences to bring these concerns to the fore. As the FINRRAGE manifesto 
states: 
We, women, declare that the female body, with its unique capacity for creating human 
life, is being exploited and dissected as raw material for the technological production of 
human beings. For us women, for nature, and for the exploited peoples of the world, this 
development is a declaration of war. Genetic and reproductive engineering is another 
attempt to end self determination over our own bodies.274 
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Radical feminists such as Corea understood the expansion of reproductive technology 
within a patriarchal order as necessarily leading to women being commodified and exploited for 
their biological capacities. Drawing a parallel with prostitution and the commodification of 
female body parts through sexual labour, Corea envisioned a dystopic future in which the 
reproductive elements of a woman’s body would be stripped away and sold piecemeal: 
Just as the patriarchal state now finds it acceptable to market parts of a woman’s body 
(breast, vagina, buttocks) for sexual purposes in prostitution…so it will soon find it 
reasonable to market other parts of a woman (womb, ovaries, egg) for reproductive 
purposes.275 
 
 Many members of FINRRAGE were also deeply concerned with the issue of surrogate 
motherhood, and predicted that expanded reproductive technology would lead to the 
commodification of women as factories of reproductive labour. This outcome would impact 
women from lower socio-economic brackets, who would be reduced merely to ‘breeders’ in this 
new economy. As impacted by race and nationality, women of colour and those of precarious 
legal status would be unable to resist the patriarchal imperative to reproduce for (someone else’s) 
profit. Yet white women were also seen as cogs in this patriarchal machine, forced to produce 
eggs of ‘superior’ value to be incubated by bodies of colour. Corea again was a powerful oracle 
on the matter, imagining a site of commerce she called the “reproductive brothel” where women 
both white and black would be used as breeding machines for the patriarchy: 
 
As I envision it, most women in a reproductive brothel would be defined as 
“nonvaluable” and sterilized and, in this way, their progeny culled…Certainly women of 
color would be labeled ‘nonvaluable’ and used as breeders for the embryos of ‘valuable’ 
women. The white women judged genetically superior and selected as egg donors would 
be turned into machines for producing embryos. Through superovulation, “valuable” 
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females as young as 2 years and some as old as 50 or 60 could be induced to produce 
eggs.276 
 
There were of course many other feminist positions taken on the subject of new 
reproductive technologies,277 some of which explicitly sought to counterbalance the perceived 
extremism of writers like Corea and Klein. For example Naomi Pfeffer and Anne Woollett  
published an early 1983 account of female infertility that was sympathetic to the issues faced by 
women in response to the oppositional tactics of more radical commentators.278 From the mid-
1980s onward other FINRRAGE members also produced works on how and why women were 
accessing IVF and other reproductive technologies, seeking to moderate the ‘hard line’ of 
feminist opposition to technology “which increasingly, to some, resembled a caricature of radical 
feminist goals.”279 
!"-"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In Canada during this period, the women’s movement had been recently galvanized by 
the 1982 patriation of the Canadian Constitution, including the development of a Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms that had seen sustained lobbying for constitutional reforms from organized 
movements in regard to Aboriginal rights and Québecois distinct society. Emerging from the 
same era was a campaign for women’s rights that drew speakers and leaders from across the 
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country, as “a collective and highly focused campaign, a campaign in which many women who 
were lawyers played some of the key roles as advisors and strategists.”280  
This campaign successfully lobbied for the inclusion of a guarantee of equality in the 
wording of section 15 of the new Charter, entrenching rights to protection of the law free from 
discrimination based on “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability”.281 Sexual orientation was not included in this list of grounds, despite an 
amendment that called for its enumeration proposed by then-MP Svend Robinson.282 Mr. 
Robinson would later come out as Canada’s first openly gay MP in 1988.283 
The wording of section 15 marked an important milestone for the nascent Canadian 
women’s movement.284 Successful organization and activism around the lobbying effort had 
resulted in the establishment of the Women‘s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) - a body 
which has continued to exert a considerable influence on women’s rights in Canada.285 Another 
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central body representing women’s issues at the time was the National Action Committee on the 
Status of Women (NAC), which emerged from the Charter debates as a strong force in dialogue 
with government. 
Issues of women and reproductive technology were already on the Canadian map by the 
time of the Charter discussions. The 1978 birth of Louise Brown in Britain as the world’s first 
successful IVF baby had global impact, indicating the potential for heretofore unseen ethical 
issues in human reproduction. Four years later, there was a much-publicized case of a 
Scarborough, Ontario couple arranging a traditional surrogate contract with a woman from 
Florida, which used the genetic material of the husband to impregnate the American surrogate.286 
The Canadian couple paid $20,000 to the woman, who traveled to Canada to give birth to the 
child and left the country shortly afterward.287 Although the child was initially seized by the 
Metro Toronto Catholic Children’s Aid Society, the baby was eventually returned to the couple, 
with the Ontario Supreme Court ruling that the Scarborough man was the legal and biological 
father.288 
The absence of government regulation over these emerging reproductive technologies 
became a cause of concern for many Canadian women, with local perspectives often impacted by 
the international forum of feminist discussion of how biotechnologies were to be understood. 
Some women echoed FINRRAGE in expressing a range of concerns based primarily on concern 
for the exploitation of women based on race, (dis)ability, and class, as well as the potential loss 
of autonomy over women’s health and their bodies.  
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Nationally-distributed newspaper The Globe and Mail organized a roundtable on the 
issue of what was called ‘new reproductive technology’ (NRT) in 1983, inviting to the debate 
Suzanne Scorsone, Director of the Archdiocesan Office of Catholic Family Life. Scorsone spoke 
forcefully against the surrogate transaction with the woman from Florida, drawing upon radical 
feminist thought and imagery to cast the case within a patriarchal biblical tradition: 
Essentially what we are looking at here is the recreation of concubinage. The idea of a 
childless man, a man whose wife cannot bear children, taking a second-class wife on a 
contract basis of one form or another and using her reproductive services is something as 
old as Abraham and Hagar, and older, and it's not just within the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, it's right across the world. Now one of the evolutions within the Judeo-Christian 
tradition and, I think, one of the really good things about our society generally, at this 
point, is that women have not, any longer, been placed in that secondary class position 
with their reproductive services being used, and the woman herself being treated as an 
object. If we start having surrogate mothers who can be contracted for this, what we are 
doing is re-creating a sanitized form, without the sexual intercourse, of this second-class 
concubine status.289 
 
Scorsone’s rejection of masculine control over women’s reproductivity put her in line 
with Dworkin and other feminists who made a direct link between reproductive technologies and 
prostitution (or in this case, “concubinage”), as sexual or sexualized activities that were 
understood to increase patriarchal power and harm women. Scorsone’s religious tenor also led 
her to oppose assisted insemination and IVF for single women and, presumably, lesbians, 
although the latter were never mentioned during this debate.290 She also evinced a particularly 
vigorous opposition to surrogate contracts on the grounds that “it gives public sanction to the 
notion that child creation is legitimate in a concept or in a situation other than the committed and 
permanently committed love of a husband and a wife."291 
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Despite their ideological differences, Somer Brodribb, in a 1986 paper in the Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law, echoed many of Scorsone’s concerns. Brodribb also expressed 
deep concern about “the ways in which patriarchal jurisprudence is moving to absorb and direct 
medical developments in reproductive technology,”292 rejecting the use of AHR as a patriarchal 
strategy of dominance aimed at removing reproductive autonomy from the hands of women. 
Furthermore, she argued that “the masculinist, racist, and classist nature of scientific rationality, 
and its consequent devastation of women and nature, demonstrates that these technologies are 
not neutral.” 293 Brodribb was particularly concerned that any governmental push to regulate 
AHR would be motivated by the perceived threat to fatherhood, and therefore to patriarchy, and 
would result in a slew of court cases that were likely undermine the future potential of legal 
recognition for gay and lesbian parents.294 
Discourses of commercialization and fears of stratified reproduction were also strongly 
prevalent. The high cost of interventions such as IVF were viewed as a mechanism to keep them 
out of the grasp of anyone but white middle-class women, thereby ensuring the sterility of the 
disabled, non-white and lower classes. There was seen to be real potential for a new eugenics 
movement, with a belief that “NRTs are actually just new ways to reproduce OLD 
inequalities.”295 These voices took up the radical feminist stance of viewing AHR as a patriarchal 
tool, while often understanding this inequality as having international consequences.  
Anthropologist Sari Tudiver, for example, wrote of the negative effects on women and 
children already being wreaked by a global economy.296 She predicted that new reproductive 
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technologies would only exacerbate and expand existing inequalities, with embryos being 
harvested for organs and tissues and women being sold into reproductive slavery.297 Women who 
chose not to have children, or who could not conceive, would be labeled as deviant or selfish as 
the social value of women was narrowed down to their biological capacity to reproduce.Tudiver 
feared that AHR was thereby poised to reinforce a white, middle-class ableist concept of 
motherhood as well as entrenching women’s social role as mother, while threatening to 
legitimize discrimination based on race, gender, class and ability.298 
There were of course other feminist voices which emerged during the 1980s and early 
1990s, which took a positive stance on AHR and saw them as useful tools for women and their 
families. These perspectives emerged powerfully from the infertility community, for example, 
with some women arguing for the coverage of IVF cycles within Canada’s framework of 
socialized medicine.299 However the dominant discourse was strongly inflected by a radical 
feminist critique which remained wary of the harmful effects of commercialization on women’s 
bodies. A concern for inequality as exacerbated by medical expertise, the biotechnology industry 
and scientific research came to the fore, creating an explicitly feminist national discourse that 
“successfully forged an inextricable link…between the profit potential of human reproductive 
technologies and the systemic oppression of women.”300 
For example, by the early 1990s there were some Canadians seeking to draw the 
patriarchal critique into conversation with an intersectional analysis, arguing that these 
technologies would serve to exploit the reproductive services of all women, with particular 
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impact upon racialized, poor and otherwise marginalized women. Scholar Sunera Thobani 
expressed the concern that:  
Reproductive technologies are directed at all women. They serve to increase the control 
by the racist, patriarchal, scientific and medical communities over women’s reproductive 
abilities. The control of women’s reproductive ability and sexuality, the control of 
women’s bodies, is a cornerstone of patriarchal power. We are seeing the extension of 
this patriarchal control over women’s bodies through the development of this 
technology.301 
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Concerns over commodification, oppression and exacerbated inequality thus provided the 
main drivers in the feminist community. By the mid-1980s groups such as NAC had taken up 
Corea’s framework of the reproductive brothel, arguing that new reproductive technologies 
would turn women into “breeders” of the human race. Drawing upon Canadian author Margaret 
Atwood’s dystopian novel, about a future where a fertile underclass of women are compelled to 
act as reproductive servants, or “handmaids,” to a non-fertile elite, this nightmarish scenario was 
brandished as a prophecy of what would come to be if AHR was not adequately regulated.302  
$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The case of the couple from Scarborough who had commissioned an Ontario surrogate, 
and the flurry of media surrounding it, was generally viewed as a driver behind a 1982 request to 
the Ontario Law Reform Commission to develop a report on the legal implications of the new 
reproductive technologies. The next year, the Ontario Law Reform Commission produced their 
Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters to much consternation among 
some members of the Canadian feminist community. According to a 1986 critique by Mary 
Anne Coffey, the Report was not an examination of the technologies, so much as it represented a 
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social prescription for their control.303 She also soundly criticized the document for taking a 
strictly patriarchal and heterosexist worldview, which limited access to AHR to heterosexual and 
heterosexual relationships “while female reproductive and social independence from men is 
penalized or rendered problematic.”304 The Report also left control entirely in the hands of 
medical and legal professionals, without apparent concern for women’s issues of matters of 
class, race, ability or sexuality.305 As Coffey wrote with urgency, these were vital matters that 
needed to be squarely addressed by feminist thinkers and political actors: 
For feminists concerned with the social effects of reproductive technology, this is 
therefore a crucial time: technical knowledge and applications are advancing much more 
rapidly than corresponding social definition and ordering, which means that public policy 
is in a state of flux and is likely to remain so for some time to come. New systems of 
socio-ethical interpretation and legal regulation are currently under construction in many 
jurisdictions or have only recently been formulated in law. Newly enacted statutes may 
be difficult to amend, but the current proposals for Canadian federal and provincial 
legislation are still subject to public debate and as such can be influenced by feminist 
criticism and lobbying efforts.306 
 
Coffey was especially concerned for the inclusion of lesbian perspectives in these critical 
and lobbying efforts, for as she saw it: “If proposed legislation does not meet the material needs 
of all women, including lesbian women, it must be countered with informed dissent and active 
resistance by feminists.”307 However tensions between the material needs of women, including 
lesbians, and radical feminist perspectives which sought a moratorium on access to all NRTs, 
would prove a difficult rift to bridge. 
And so, despite a suspicion of the patriarchal state, the goal swiftly became one of 
additional regulation and engagement as a way to reign in the medicalization of women’s bodies. 
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“Feminist activists feared that scientists and doctors, as the perceived traditional enforcers of 
women’s reproductive roles, would increase their control over women’s reproductive health 
unless the federal government took steps to set national standards over NRTs and impose 
restrictions on certain practices.”308 It was demanded that government, not just the medical and 
research communities, take control of regulation to ensure the safety of women.309 
FINRRAGE had studied a series of governmental reports that had been commissioned to 
provide advice on the management of new reproductive technologies.310 These included the 
aforementioned Ontario Law Reform Commission report, as well as the Warnock Report (1984, 
UK) and the Waller report (1984, Australia). All had been deemed to lack a clear feminist 
research agenda.311 Patricia Spallone, a prominent FINRRAGE member, described these reports 
as capitulations by government to the interests of scientific capital which failed to protect 
women’s needs and integrity.312 
Canadian feminists swiftly concluded that without the participation of their voices and 
perspectives, it was likely that any emergent legislation would simply reinforce patriarchal value 
systems.313 Concerned that a federal study would follow in the footsteps of UK and Australia, 
not to mention the Ontario Law Reform Commission, it was seen as vital that a feminist 
approach be part of any analysis of the emergence of new reproductive technologies.314 Yet the 
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ability to carry out a multidisciplinary study of new reproductive technologies in Canada was 
beyond the means of the women’s movement alone. Thus, a collection of feminist activists, 
academics and health advocates came together in the spring of 1987 to form The Canadian 
Coalition for a Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies under the guidance of 
Canadian sociologist Margrit Eichler, with the goal of heightening public awareness and 
sparking a federal investigation of the impact of NRTs.315 This remained a highly contested goal, 
with some feminist academics and activists speaking against the Commission format as a process 
which would remain inaccessible to feminist influence.316 
A Royal Commission was nevertheless the targeted vehicle for a feminist-led inquiry into 
new reproductive technology, due to its substantial budget, research staff, ability to foster public 
debate and the perceived success of a Royal Commission on the Status of Women which had run 
from 1967-1971.317 The Royal Commission was to be the access point for feminists to the state, 
and they sought to define its mandate from the start.318 As Mavis Jones and Brian Salter 
describe: “By framing the policy problem as one of protecting the vulnerable from exploitation, 
they brought the social and ethical implications of genetic technologies into sharp relief.”319  
After two years of sustained lobbying the Coalition’s efforts were successful. In the 
autumn of 1989, the Mulroney government announced the appointment of a Royal Commission 
on New Reproductive Technologies (RCNRT) which would not consider biotechnology as solely 
a matter of interest to economic policy. Instead the RCNRT would operate on a mandate: 
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[T]o examine current and potential scientific and medical developments related to 
reproductive technologies, but also to go beyond them to consider: 
• the impact of the technologies on society as a whole; 
• their impact on identified groups in society, specifically women, children, and families; 
and – 
• the ethical, legal, social, economic, and health implications of these technologies.320 
 
A pediatrician and medical geneticist named Patricia Baird was tapped to lead the 
RCNRT and given a budget of $24.7 million to fulfill this sweeping mandate. Commissioners 
included two self-identified feminists as well as a lesbian named Dr. Grace Marion Jantzen,321 a 
professor of religion who was Canadian-born but living and lecturing in London, England.322 
There was, however, no representation from the heterosexual infertile community, or other 
patient-advocacy groups who might be expected to hold concern for questions of access and 
state-funding for reproductive technology. 323 Nor was there representation by people of colour, 
Aboriginal people, or members of the disability community. Nevertheless, hopes for the RCNRT 
were high.  
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The Commission’s progress was never smooth, and continued delays in appointing key 
staff, organizing research plans and coordinating public consultations resulted in great frustration 
both inside and outside the RCNRT. There were allegations of irregular research ethics and a 
lack of transparency, and the Commission kept data, protocols and selection of personnel under 
wraps with the research not being subject to peer review.324 Nevertheless, nation-wide public 
hearings eventually commenced, and women’s groups took the lead in responding. 
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Over fifty women’s groups made submissions to the Royal Commission from 1990 to 
1992.325 Overwhelmingly, these groups called for the regulation of NRTs from a feminist 
perspective, asking government to understand the political, social and economic factors that 
shaped women’s realities. The social construction of motherhood was especially critiqued, with 
groups calling attention to the way that these technologies served to institutionalize women’s 
“natural” role as wife and mother. A group from Laval University, le Groupe de recherche 
multidisciplinaire feminist, argued that women were no longer under pressure from the clergy 
and law to have children, yet Western society was perpetuating the idea that real womanhood 
was not achieved unless women gave birth, thus forcing them to seek the status of birth 
mother.326 
NAC came down even more strongly against these technologies, calling for a halt on the 
construction of new IVF clinics, a ban on all commercial trade in sperm and ova, and a ban on 
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commercial surrogacy.327 In a brief which took its title and inspiration from Atwood’s dystopian 
novel, NAC argued that “these technologies represent the wrong direction in society’s attempt to 
solve the problems of infertility. We believe that, on balance, the new reproductive technologies 
are oppressive to women. They are not effective in preventing or curing infertility or disability 
but will contribute to economic and social trends that erode women’s overall rights, well-being, 
and social standing.”328 Instead, they suggested a focus on the prevention of infertility and 
maternal support programs to address the causes of infant disability, as well as research into the 
emotional and physical impact of IVF on mothers and children.329  
The brief makes only one reference to the reproductive needs of lesbians (in regard to the 
barriers faced in accessing IVF) and none to gay men. Other Canadian literature stemming from 
radical feminist movements had noted that very few same-sex female couples sought out IVF, 
with the majority opting for assisted insemination either with a known or anonymous donor.330 
However the future closing of sperm clinics and fertility centers through increased regulation 
over NRTs was not seen to be an access concern for lesbians, nor was the current barring of 
lesbians from those same clinics. Indeed there was a period of history in which same-sex couples 
faced substantial hurdles in accessing reproductive technology. As testified before the RCNRT, a 
study from that era had found that 19 of 33 surveyed clinics which performed AHR would deny 
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services to women who identified as lesbian.331 A case from British Columbia, which began in 
1993, indicates that such refusals were not an uncommon part of clinical practice.332  
The dispute arose after Dr. Korn, a Vancouver fertility specialist, had been obliged to 
provide expert witness testimony to a custody and support case involving two lesbians - a former 
patient and her partner.333 While the names of the women were protected, Korn’s was not, and he 
received unwanted publicity for his role in the case including telephone calls criticizing him for 
providing artificial insemination to lesbians.334 He subsequently announced his refusal to provide 
reproductive assistance to all lesbian women, although he would still provide other medical 
services. Pursuant to this policy he refused to provide assisted insemination to a same-sex couple 
who had sought out his medical practice in April 1993, instead referring them to other 
physicians. The women lodged an unsuccessful complaint with the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of British Columbia asking that Korn be disciplined for unethical actions.335 They then 
lodged another complaint with the British Columbia Council of Human Rights, which found that 
Korn did not have justification to deny them services under the B.C. Human Rights Act.336 A 
judicial review of the decision by the British Columbia Supreme Court found that the human 
rights complaint had been decided correctly, with Korn indeed in violation of the Act.337 As the 
first case to be decided after “sexual orientation” was added as a protected ground in the B.C. 
Human Rights Code in 1992, this was an important victory for lesbians seeking access to donor 
sperm in British Columbia. 
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While the concerns of heterosexual infertility communities did not align precisely with 
lesbian women and gay men, infertility associations were one of the organized national voices 
arguing against the prohibition of NRTs. Such groups were largely represented by the Infertility 
Awareness Association of Canada, who had placed a call to all members in developing a 
submission to the RCNRT.338 The potential for federal restrictions on NRTs was a cause for 
concern, and the IAAC responded with panic.339 The IAAC’s brief was also focused on the 
social construction of motherhood and the pressures of a pro-natalist society, but from the 
perspective of infertile citizens who demanded entrance into this culture.340 The brief discussed 
the social pressure felt by the infertile and their sadness, loss, anger, guilt and feelings of 
exclusion from the fundamental identity of parenthood.341  
The submission included a statement from Marie Morrissey of the IAAC, who declared 
that the infertile heterosexuals of society perceived themselves as isolated, marginalized, and 
even excluded from the health care system because they are viewed as having “unimportant 
problems.”342 Access to NRTs would allow the infertile to overcome their disability343 and 
participate in society. Thus their focus was not on the potential for looming danger of an 
autocratic patriarchy, but for unrestricted access to fertility services and, crucially, the funding of 
such services under provincial healthcare.344 Representatives from the IAAC publicly opposed 
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the position staked out by NAC, out of fear that NAC’s campaign could substantially limit their 
future access to reproductive assistance.345  
This pivotal disagreement over issues of access to NRTs, and the claims of infertile 
women to “reproductive autonomy” and the “choice” of IVF, led to a bitter rift within the 
feminist community.346 Some women left NAC because of its position on the strict regulation of 
all NRTs, including the ban on surrogate motherhood. Indeed as Tanya Daley reports, the pages 
of the IAAC newsletter and the IAAC submission to the Royal Commission depict not only the 
pain of being childless, but also the sadness and anger felt by those women who had been part of 
a women’s movement that they now perceived as excluding them. As described by Karen 
Woolridge, a regular contributor to Infertility Awareness: “I mourned the loss of friends in the 
women’s movement and the loss of the support of the community itself.”347  
IAAC was silent on the issue of gays and lesbians and their access to reproductive 
technology, as its focus remained only on heterosexual couples suffering from infertility. The 
tacit acceptance of the medical model of infertility also meant that the potential medicalization of 
assisted insemination, something that had been noted with concern by lesbian feminist authors 
such as Coffey, was not flagged as an issue. Nor were matters of access to fertility clinics by 
lesbians, although there was some discussion about the needs of single women under the rubric 
of choice.348 
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Gay and lesbian groups were represented directly at the Royal Commission, although at 
this point in the gay and lesbian movement the focus was primarily on fighting for the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships. In the submission to the RCNRT by Equality for Gays and 
Lesbians Everywhere (EGALE), a national advocacy organization based in Ottawa, the group 
stated that the gay and lesbian community had chosen to stay out of this debate until the 
fundamental issue of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships was addressed.349 However, 
they did respond to the potential restriction of insemination to heterosexual couples, declaring 
such a decision to be “morally wrong.”350 They explained that to ban gays and lesbians from 
access to NRTs would further entrench the legal definition of the family as a heterosexual entity, 
thereby seriously compromising the struggle for equal rights.351 
Commissioners for the RCNRT also heard from single women and lesbians who 
described the forms of discrimination they had experienced in the traditional medical setting.352 
Some witnesses told the Commission that the “overmedicalization of assisted insemination using 
donor sperm has created a situation in which medical practitioners have become gatekeepers,” 
enforcing what they perceive to be community standards about family formation by establishing 
access criteria that exclude single or lesbian women.353 For example, a representative from the 
Halifax Lesbian Committee on New Reproductive Technologies expressed concern about the 
categorization of donor insemination as a medical technology: 
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[A] problematic...recommendation is a designation of alternative insemination as the 
practice of medicine…This would make self-insemination subject to legal prosecution.354 
 Similarly, other women expressed concern that the utilization of new reproductive 
technologies not be limited to married heterosexual couples. Drawing upon a feminist framework 
that stressed inclusion over restriction, historian Katherine Arnup testified to the RCNRT as a 
private citizen, urging that broad access to NRTs be granted to all Canadians:  
Increasingly the use of all of the new reproductive technology is being limited to married 
or at least cohabiting heterosexual couples. Single women, whether they are heterosexual 
or lesbian, find themselves denied access to fertility treatment and to artificial 
insemination [AI]. And I am here today to suggest that it is critical that these technologies 
not be limited to a select population. I believe that access to AI should not be influenced 
by race, class, physical disability, marital status or sexual orientation.355 
 
The Commission also learned about what was termed self-insemination [SI], through 
studies based on the experiences of lesbian women who had used SI and others who had been 
involved in its provision.356 Women who chose SI reported a desire to have control over the 
process, to avoid intercourse, to avoid unnecessary medications, or to avoid having to justify 
their wish to be a parent to clinical staff.357 The majority of women who chose SI used 
anonymous donors for fear of legal complications and from a desire to raise the child without the 
involvement of the donor. Although some said they were able to get safe frozen sperm from 
"friendly MDs," this was the exception, not the rule.358 
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Women-organized assisted insemination networks were also discussed, as was their aim 
of providing knowledge, resources and access to donor sperm.359 Reports indicated that these 
networks were mainly using fresh sperm, with little information available about the donors; at 
the time of the proceedings, only one group of women in Ontario had their own equipment to 
cryopreserve sperm.360 The issue of fresh sperm was emerging as a serious issue due largely to 
the ballooning AIDS crisis and the frequent reliance of lesbians upon gay men to act as 
donors.361 The Commission heard how HIV testing and screening for STDs was fairly rare, as 
“in interviews with 19 women involved in SI networks, only 9 reported that donors were tested 
for HIV, and only 7 used frozen sperm.”362 These concerns about health screening and data-
keeping protocols were to be reflected directly in the RCNRT final report, taking precedence 
over the questions of access and grassroots support. 
 (#$	
 
 Finally, there were a number of briefs and public policy positions against homosexual 
families heard by the RCRNT. Delivered largely by religious organizations in response to the 
new family forms made possible through AHR, these opinions located heterosexual marriage as 
the reassuring bulwark upon which moral ground should be staked. A brief from the Canadian 
Conference of Catholic Bishops is instructive in this regard, with its insistence that “the vitality 
and stability of society require that children come into the world within a family and that the 
family be firmly based on marriage.”363 Similarly, the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada held 
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that “using the sperm of an outside donor is considered by a majority of our members to be 
immoral and would conflict with their view of the sanctity of marriage and procreation.”364  
This position was also shared by non-Christian religious organizations who spoke before 
the RCNRT. For example the Muslim Women’s Auxiliary allowed that assisted insemination 
could be “acceptable between husband and wife,” while any form of “insemination where the 
sperm is brought from outside is not acceptable.”365 This was also the stance of private citizens 
as well, with a brief by an E. Kelly targeting self-insemination as an affective danger to the next 
generation. As Kelly pleaded with the Commission: “I urge you not to consider [AI] for lesbians 
and unmarried women…Our Canadian society does not need more confused, emotionally 
deprived children.”366 
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The Commission also undertook a series of public polls. The methodology of these polls 
faced heavy criticism from within the RCNRT’s ranks, and in particular by Commissioner 
Louise Vandelac – the only social scientist with extensive experience with surveys and opinion 
polls.367 It was felt by multiple commentators that the use of polls as a route to determine public 
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policy was a dangerous and flawed course.368 Despite these concerns the RCRNT carried out 
four public polls, including a survey of 7,664 Canadians on the topic of ‘Social Values and 
Attitudes of Canadians Toward New Reproductive Technologies’ which included a section on 
gay and lesbian families. Conducted by phone and in writing between December 1991 and July 
1992, this survey purported to gain a greater understanding of Canadians' general outlook with 
regard to a sense of tolerance and equality.369 To this end, it included “several items asking about 
the principle of equality; attitudes toward immigration and the extent to which Canadians 
welcome others to our society, tolerance levels for homosexual relationships, and general 
attitudes toward women and women's role in society.”370 
The survey found that 90% of participants agreed with the equality provisions in s.15 of 
the Charter, with over two-thirds in strong agreement. Similarly, a majority felt that equality 
between men and women had not been achieved (69%), and that women gaining more power in 
society would have a positive impact overall (76%). However when it came to the matter of 
“homosexual relationships” the answers were scattered widely, with 35% expressing acceptance, 
21% having no opinion, 16% saying they were unacceptable, and 27% finding such relationships 
                                            
368
 These concerns were raised at a conference held in Nova Scotia in summer 1990, in the context of the public 
polls being carried out on behalf of the RCNRT. See: Christine Overall. "Report on the Search Conference Held by 
the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Wolfville, N.S., June 18-20, 1990” (Kingston) July 
1990. at p 6. Indeed, the first Angus Reid poll proved to be a major site of contention among the Commissioners. 
The results of the poll were released to the media before internal discussion and consultation, provoking four 
Commissioners to publically call the results into question. As they protested:  
We were shocked to see the article in Le Droit on September 20, 1990 on the Angus Reid poll 
commissioned last June 1990, despite vigorous opposition of several commissioners ..... …we know of no 
research that says this [that supports the published findings in the Le Droit article] ... One Commission staff 
member told us that these figures come from the Angus Reid poll. If this is true, it represents a flagrant 
manipulation of public opinion.  
Quoted in Federal Court Statement of Claim. Schedule 12 (Letter from Vandelac, Herbert, McTeer. Hatfield to 
Baird Oct. 12. 1990). See also: Le Droit. September 20. 1990. pp. 36-7; "Most Canadians know little of reproductive 
issues: poll" Montreal Gazette, Sept. 19, 1990. 
369
 Proceed with Care, supra note 320 at 28. 
370
 Ibid at 28. 
125 
totally unacceptable.371 In another part of the survey it was asked whether a homosexual couple 
with children constituted a family. Thirty-seven percent of respondents answered in the 
affirmative, while just 13% considered a childless homosexual couple to be a family.372   
When it came to reproductive technology and gays and lesbians, the responses were even 
more polarized. According to survey results, 74% of respondents supported reproductive 
technology to help an infertile heterosexual couple conceive.373 The specific scenario of a single 
woman using anonymous donor sperm was supported by 30% of respondents, while a lesbian 
couple using donor sperm was supported by just 11%.374 The scenario of a gay male couple 
using a gestational surrogate was not raised.  
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Even with potentially shaky methodology and the overgeneralization of complex social 
issues, the results were clear: a full 89% of Canadians did not support a lesbian couple using 
donor sperm. The response from the Canadian feminist community on this statistic was far from 
cohesive. The largest women’s group in the country, NAC, had not addressed any issues specific 
to gay or lesbian families in their brief to the Commission, despite the substantial presence of 
lesbians within its diverse membership. Miriam Smith explains the ongoing tensions between 
lesbians and straight women in the feminist movement, with straight women often apprehensive 
about advocating for lesbian rights and jeopardizing their political success on other matters.375 
As she writes, “The fear that participants in the women’s movement would be branded as dykes 
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played a major role in the early years of the women’s movement in Canada.”376  This is affirmed 
by Jeri Dawn Wine, a founder of the Canadian National Lesbian Forum, who maintains that 
“NAC avoided the split over lesbian participation that the National Organization for Women 
suffered in the United States only at the cost of a decade of silence on the part of Canadian 
lesbians.”377  
Instead, the diverse membership of NAC was dominated by a radical feminist position 
that called for prohibition over regulation in line with international groups such as FINRRAGE. 
As Lorna Weir and Jasmin Habib explain, few feminist organizations in Canada had much 
expertise in the area of new reproductive technologies before the RCNRT, and therefore drew 
extensively upon the radical feminist position developed elsewhere: 
 
The general understanding that preceded the Baird Commission was consonant with the 
international and largely radical feminist literature then extant that viewed reproductive 
medicine as a research agenda dominated by masculine gender interests.378 
 
The dystopian visions of Corea’s Mother Machine were thus refracted through a uniquely 
Canadian lens, forming a Technological Handmaid’s Tale in which NRTs were an unqualified 
danger to women. However as time passed, and women’s groups conducted research, wrote 
briefs and interacted with the RCNRT, feminist movements developed their analyses and (in 
some cases) broke off into other groups. Canadian feminist author Heather Menzies said in 1992 
that she wished a thorough discussion on NRTs had occurred within the women’s movement 
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before the creation of the Royal Commission.379 Such discussion might have allowed tensions to 
be worked out in private, allowing a unified feminist front to be presented to the Commission.  
As it happened, however, NAC’s stance was viewed by many involuntarily childless 
heterosexuals as a dismissal of their lived experience, and a presumption that they were too 
foolish to make their own informed decisions. According to NAC, greater research on the causes 
of infertility was called for, rather than (for example) a call for funding of fertility services under 
provincial healthcare plans, as was supported by IAAC. In this midst of these tensions, the 
reproductive concerns of gays and lesbians were sidelined as the larger federal battle for LGBT 
rights remained focused on the issue of same-sex relationship recognition. 
These were the complex and often competing messages conveyed to the RCNRT, with 
the ‘feminist’ position roughly typified as one of prohibition, especially in regard to commercial 
surrogacy, trade in gametes and expanded access to IVF. This lack of attention to gay and lesbian 
reproductive concerns, and a distracted submission from EGALE,380 left the field open to 
ideological positions on the right and left, including many from conservative religious quarters 
which drew specific attention to the threat posed by gay and lesbian potential parents. 
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Yet even as these messages filtered slowly through the wheels of the RCNRT, frustration 
with its operations and lack of transparency had reached a boiling point. Despite the 
Commission’s origin as being “born of lobbying by feminist groups, it had been rapidly 
disowned by women's organizations”.381 Indeed by late 1991 then-head of NAC, Judy Rebick, 
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publically declared a lack of confidence in the Commission and in the apparent hostility of 
Chairperson Baird to the inclusion of feminist perspectives.382 Of particular suspicion was the 
autocratic role being played by Baird herself,383 and the lack of confidence in her leadership of 
the RCNRT. Four fellow commissioners, including two of the most prominent feminist voices, 
attempted to take Baird to court to force her to share details of the gathered research.384 After a 
public falling-out, the dissenting commissioners were fired. 
Many of the women who had originally pushed for the Commission were livid at these 
opaque and antagonistic dealings. Margrit Eichler, who had headed the original Canadian 
Coalition for a Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, was one of the 
Commission’s fiercest critics. “We are in the position of the horrified parents who find their 
child horrendously transformed,” she declared in 1993.385 Eichler joined forces with other 
frustrated feminist leaders, including some who had been working inside the Commission, to 
publish an appraisal of the RCNRT even before the report’s release.386 They found that the 
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conduct of the Commission and its staff, as well as its research and its evaluation of the issues, 
were largely deficient. 
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When Proceed With Care, the final report of the Baird Commission, was finally released 
in late 1993 it spanned 1275 pages housed in two volumes, was supported by fifteen volumes of 
research findings, and put forth 293 recommendations. It was also nearly two years late and three 
million dollars over its $25 million budget. While some initially responded with relief at its 
apparent gender sensitivity,387 other critics charged that many of their worst fears had been 
realized. 
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The Commission concurred with many of the points flagged by feminists as politically 
sensitive. There were multiple chapters devoted to the issue of infertility, including suggestions 
to focus money and research on preventing infertility and supporting maternal health.388 There 
were also recommendations to license only those clinics that conducted sex selection testing for 
medical reasons, and to preclude court-ordered obstetrical interventions.389 All of these issues 
had been primary concerns of the feminist platform.  
Under the terms of the report, proscriptions were to be enforced by a newly created 
federal watchdog. The Commission encouraged the federal government to “establish a regulatory 
and licensing body - a National Reproductive Technologies Commission (NRTC) - with 
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licensing required for the provision of new reproductive technologies to people.”390 The NRTC 
would be composed of at least 50% female members and charged with regulating the lawful use 
of assisted reproductive technologies. While the system of regulation was unclear, the aim was to 
ensure a uniform country-wide system. 
Key among the recommendations made by Proceed with Care was a call for revisions to 
the Criminal Code in order to prohibit several aspects of new reproductive technologies. Of 
special concern was the sale of human reproductive material, including eggs and sperm, as well 
as acting as an intermediary to bring about a preconception arrangement, receiving payment or 
any financial or commercial benefit for acting as an intermediary, and/or making payment for a 
preconception arrangement.391  
The report suggested that commissioning parents and any brokers be subject to criminal 
sanction, although the surrogate herself should not be criminalized for participating in the 
arrangement. As well, all surrogacy contracts were recommended to be unenforceable, with the 
woman who gives birth to a child to be considered the legal mother of the child, regardless of the 
source of the egg.392 There was no mention of the specific impact these prohibitions might have 
upon gay men, nor upon lesbian couples who might opt to have one partner carry the other 
woman’s egg. There was specific attention paid to the reproductive needs of lesbians in regard to 
donor insemination (DI), however, opened by a section that intoned:  
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the practice evident in testimony before the 
Commission was the use of DI by single women and lesbians. This mirrors attitudes 
found in the Commission's national surveys. Many respondents were of the view that 
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because DI gives women without a male partner the chance to have children, it devalues 
the role of males in relation to their children and deprives children of a father.393 
Despite adverse public sentiment toward the reproduction of lesbians and single women, 
as evidenced both in polls and testimony, the Commission concluded that donor insemination 
should not be restricted only to heterosexuals but be provided in a fair and equitable manner to 
all. There was seen to be no clear reason to deny single women and lesbians access to safe donor 
sperm, as their needs were not all that different from heterosexual couples, with the Commission 
explaining that they “essentially have the same diagnosis as married women – lack of a male 
partner who is fertile and a strong wish to have a child.”394 Equality principles, the Commission 
continued, therefore dictated that lesbians should not be barred from forming a family. And since 
the practice was already continuing, it was important to regulate donor semen by bringing it into 
the medical system. This medicalization of donor sperm would make it “safe” and ensure that 
women did not have to risk their health or lives.395 
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While these may appear as progressive moves, particularly given the situation at the time 
in other countries,396 it was through increased regulation and surveillance by the medical 
establishment that such reproductive methods were to be made safe. Rather than, for example, 
recommending a strengthened support of the grassroots women’s networks that had already 
sprung up around teaching and access to donor sperm, the Commission suggested the 
                                            
393
 Ibid. at 430. 
394
 Ibid. 
395
 Ibid. at 460. 
396
 For example, Ingrid Lüttichau has outlined the fierce battles that racked the Danish national legislature in 1997, 
within the context of a relatively progressive Scandinavian state, over the lesbian use of donor insemination. Ingrid 
Luttichau. 2004. “'We Are Family': The Regulation of 'Female-Only' Reproduction.” Social and Legal Studies 13(1): 
81-101. 
132 
establishment of an Assisted Insemination Sub-Committee with responsibility for licensing the 
collection, storage, distribution and use of sperm in connection with assisted insemination.397  
The compulsory licensing requirements would apply to any individual or facility engaged 
in “the assisted insemination of a woman other than the social partner of the sperm donor.”398 
According to this framework, known donors would be subject to the same regulatory regime as 
anonymous sperm. Under the mandate of keeping women ‘safe’, the RCNRT recommended that 
all licensed facilities ensure the screening of donors and testing of donor sperm for infectious 
diseases, “including a six-month quarantine on donated sperm to allow for human 
immunodeficiency virus [HIV] testing of donors.”399 Gay men had been referred to as frequent 
sperm donors to lesbian women in public hearings before the Commission, and the report’s 
specific reference to screening for the AIDS virus, and no other, may be read as a reaction to the 
fears of viral contamination understood as circulating in the gay community.  
This medicalization was further ensured by a suggested ban upon fresh sperm (“only 
frozen sperm from licensed storage and distribution facilities should be used”), a ban on sperm 
imports, and the suggestion that “a license is required to perform insemination at any site other 
than the vagina even if the recipient is the social partner.”400 The move to bring donor 
insemination within the ambit of medical licensing and treatment would not only mean that a 
lesbian could no longer inseminate her partner, it also drew lesbians into closer proximity to a 
medical culture of pharmaceuticals and hormones. These proscriptions, when taken together, 
mean that local women’s organizations which had been developing expertise in sperm donation, 
access, insemination and storage would no longer be able to provide lesbians access to fresh 
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sperm. Nor would they be able to assist in procedures such as intra-uterine insemination and the 
deposit of sperm directly into the cervix.  
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Thus under the guise of lesbian access and apparent inclusion of diverse perspectives, the 
RCNRT actually built the foundation for a system that assumed the HIV-positive status of gay 
donors and effectively shut down grassroots women’s organizations aimed at supporting lesbians 
and single women. At the same time a criminal stance was taken against paid surrogacy 
arrangements and the sale of eggs and sperm, which would oblige gay men to seek out altruistic 
gestational surrogates and ova donors, or altruistic traditional surrogates who would agree to use 
their own eggs. Any payment that was to be exchanged would be driven underground, with the 
commissioning parents subject to criminal penalties. 
These initial recommendations proposed by the RCNRT, and the competing strains of 
radical feminism and increased medicalization which infused it, were to have a long-lasting 
effect upon the regulations which would eventually be promulgated. 
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The report also received a range of biting feminist critiques upon its release, not least for 
its “muted conciliatory tone” and failure to genuinely reflect the language of inclusion in the 
recommendations.401 The appearance of broad-based consultation was seen as complicity with a 
conservative stance on a host of issues ranging from family formation to the medical and 
scientific professions, as well the pharmaceutical and bioengineering industries.402 
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It was also critiqued for its failure to attend to economic issues, particularly in regard to 
the enormously lucrative market in pharmaceuticals and technology that was blossoming around 
infertility treatment.403 As Laura Sky explained, “while explicitly stating its concern about 
commodification, nothing in this chapter addressed the mechanisms by which the process of 
commodification could be halted. This report may, in some instances, echo the concerns of 
women’s groups, but through its contradictions and omissions, it offers no substantive solutions 
and does all concerned Canadians a disservice.”404 
In general, the use of feminist language throughout the report was found to exist without 
a grounding in the social reality of women’s lives, and was seen as a willful appropriation of 
rhetoric that lacked underlying substance. Diana Majury accused the report of taking a “Polyanna 
approach to equality” wherein racism, sexism, oppression and “lesbian hatred” are framed as 
matters of individual opinion rather than as systemic and institutionalized discrimination.405 
Anne Burfoot argued that while a passing attempt at a range of opinions had been attempted, 
“important considerations of differences among women’s voices - especially those who resist 
new reproductive technologies for various reasons - are lost in the Commission’s Report.”406 
According to Burfoot, radical feminist voices had been decontextualized and removed from their 
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political grounding, simultaneously appropriating the language of resistance and denying it an 
actual platform.407   
For their part, Allison Harvison Young and Angela Wasunna understood the surprising 
strategy of rooting prohibitions within the powers of criminal law as allowing for the assertion of 
a federal legislative jurisdiction.408 They also pointed out that such a “command model” is 
attractive for politicians because, irrespective of effectiveness, such laws are easily touted as 
concrete evidence of action.409 However they were deeply skeptical of the top-down approach, 
criticizing it as resting upon too ill-fashioned a regulatory instrument, and crudely wedged within 
the constitutional division of powers without regard for social realities or cultural diversities.410 
But perhaps most damningly, and as feminists had anticipated, the Royal Commission’s 
report did not soon lead to effective regulatory measures. 
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Shortly after the report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
was released, a federal election was called. The Liberal government of Jean Chretien, newly 
elected to office, shelved the report. He then directed Federal Minister of Health Diane Marleau 
to call for a voluntary moratorium on nine reproductive and genetic technologies and practices, 
including commercial surrogacy arrangements, the buying and selling of eggs, sperm and 
embryos, and egg donation in exchange for in vitro fertilization (IVF) services.411 This 
moratorium was touted as the first phase of a comprehensive federal response to the Commission 
report and proposed as an interim strategy until a permanent management regime could be 
implemented.412 It was widely unsuccessful and openly flouted.413 This was followed by an 
Advisory Committee on Reproductive and Genetic Technologies, convened in January 1996 in 
order to advise on compliance and track new developments.414 
Strict provisions against sperm donation were tabled by Parliament in early 1996, 
reflecting many of the concerns of HIV and ‘safety’ the RCNRT had identified.415 Bill C-47 
emerged in June of that year, following in the deep traces of the Baird Commission, suggesting a 
federal criminal law power and imposing extremely steep penalties for violation.416 When the 
Bill was first introduced, some private fertility clinics balked at the proposed prohibitions and 
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vowed to ignore them.417 Meanwhile women's advocacy groups, who had been waiting nearly a 
decade for legislation, were disappointed at the lack of an overall education and management 
structure that would establish the conditions under which new tests and procedures could be 
introduced.418 In April 1997 the Canadian Parliament came to a close and a federal election was 
called. Bill C-47 died on the order paper and despite Jean Chretien's Liberal party winning 
another majority, a replacement bill would not be tabled until 2002. 
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Under the name An Act respecting assisted human reproduction and related research a 
series of three nearly identical bills followed. All three listed a range of activities and 
technologies that were to be prohibited, outlined regulations for those that were to be permitted, 
and defined the criminal sanctions against violators of the Act.419 New Reproductive 
Technologies were now known as Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR).   
Finally, eleven years after the RCNRT had submitted its report, the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act [AHRA] received Royal Assent and officially became law. Shortly afterward, 
however, the Attorney General of Quebec submitted a constitutional question to the Quebec 
Court of Appeal challenging the validity of certain provisions of the AHRA.420 Quebec was 
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concerned that sections of the bills encroached on the exclusive legislative authority of the 
provinces, as the strategic move to couch federal legislation within the criminal power had not 
been well received.421 Quebec’s appellate court found that certain provisions were not in fact 
legitimately enacted under federal authority, nor did the federal government have the power of 
conferring a criminal law purpose on the management of “controlled” assisted reproductive 
activities.422 This ruling was appealed by the Government of Canada to the Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC), with arguments heard in April 2009. More than thirty years of feminist 
organizing around reproductive technologies in Canada was stalled yet again. 
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There was a broad and robust field of feminist debate in Canada during the 1980s and 
throughout the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies. A tremendous diversity 
of voices existed both in Canada and abroad, and by no means were all women of a ‘sex 
negative’ or radical feminist stripe, firmly against the commercialization of women’s bodies in 
any form.423 In the mid-1980s, however, when a federal response to NRTs was looming on the 
horizon, a remarkably consistent vision emerged from the National Action Committee on the 
Status of Women.  
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NAC and other women’s groups were deeply concerned about the potential for 
patriarchal domination and harm to women inherent in NRTs, and as such opposed the use of 
such technology on principle. Questions of direct concern to lesbians, such as low-tech options 
using donor sperm which had long been popular within the lesbian community, were not 
addressed by the group, although some concerns existed over the medicalization of grassroots 
networks by fertility professionals.424 Gay male reproduction and the potential for more equitable 
surrogacy contracts never emerged as a point for discussion, nor did the reproductive concerns of 
transgender people, although it may be argued that such matters were not in common circulation 
even among gay and lesbian circles at the time.425 However it is no exaggeration to say that the 
main focus of the national women’s movement remained on IVF, surrogacy and the 
commercialization of eggs, sperm and embryos. 
The vision of female bodies and female ‘nature’ being produced in these debates was one 
standing in opposition to technology, commerce and masculine authority. The radical feminist 
and anti-technology stance that emerged through FINRRAGE and in certain Canadian quarters 
was deeply dependent upon a nature/culture binary to generate meaning, envisioning a ‘natural’ 
experience of sexuality and reproduction that existed apart from ‘cultural’ forms of patriarchal 
domination.  
In its barest form, this position takes up an essentialist framing of the female body which 
understands that body as the ‘natural’ repository for the business of child-making and bearing. 
Although unremarked upon in the debates, it is precisely the heterosexual feature of ‘normal’ 
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reproduction that bestows its natural complexion, and which may then be contrasted against the 
‘unnatural’ and ‘exploitative’ mechanisms of IVF. Yet as Dion Farquhar argues: 
…the experience of conception through heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse in a state-
triangulated legal marriage without reproductive technologies is no more ‘natural’ than 
an institutional medically mediated conception in a laboratory petri dish with anonymous 
donor sperm.426 
The radical feminist position thus leaves unexplored the dissonance between heterosexual 
intercourse as the pathway to ‘natural’ reproduction and female empowerment; and heterosexual 
intercourse as the ultimate expression of sexual domination of men over women.427 It also, 
implicitly, leaves intact the ‘natural family’ in the condition of a ‘state-triangulated legal 
marriage’ as the ideal location for human reproduction. The rhetoric of “choice” commonly 
leveraged by this analysis - as in a woman’s right to choose to be pregnant, to choose not to be 
pregnant, to choose not to remain pregnant – still remains within a heterosexual dialectic, 
wherein men are the protagonists with whom to have sex, to avoid sex with, or to demand 
abortions from. Thus the legal construct of the family as two-parent, heterosexual and 
reproductive is (ironically) reinforced through radical feminist anti-patriarchal hymns to the 
biological essentialism of the female body. 
So long as the conceptual framework remains fixed on the heterosexual order – whether 
in resistance or domination – a deeply conservative reading remains possible wherein this 
arrangement stands in for “nature itself”. For example in a lengthy dissent appended to the 
Report, Commissioner Scorsone acknowledges the double standard inherent in the policy 
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suggested by the RCNRT, wherein the reproductive desires of a single woman would be met 
through access to donor sperm (however restricted), whereas a single man with the same desires 
would be criminalized. As she explains, however, this difference is not discriminatory but 
“derived from the physical realities of sexual dimorphism.”428 The simple biological realities of 
gender must determine how each will be treated, but this rests not upon social distinctions but the 
workings of nature. As Scorsone continues, “Be it granted, only a woman can become pregnant, 
as only a man can produce sperm. Neither fact is discriminatory; they are simply an empirically 
observable given, a function of the highly adaptive, population variability-maintaining sexual 
dimorphism that human beings share with most organisms above the evolutionary level of the 
worm.”429  
While positioned from a different ideological stance than most other feminist 
commentators, Scorsone similarly relies upon radical feminist arguments to mark the “evident” 
physical realities of the body and foreground an essentialized “woman” as the focus of attention. 
Like much of the Report, she proceeds from a binary distinction between men and women, and 
one that assumes a stable and fixed meaning to each body. As Weir and Habib point out, “[t]he 
notion that expertise could in any way be constitutive of the body was a thought that seemingly 
never occurred to the Commissioners.”430  
Propelled by the concern with female exploitation and danger, as well as the challenge 
poised to the heterosexual order by NRTs, radical feminists like Scorsone sought to distinguish 
two sexes upon the basis of anatomy. She continued to hold a position that “is deeply vested with 
a binary of nature and culture, with the sexed body guaranteed in the order of nature” and 
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technologies such as commercial surrogacy viewed as a transgression of this order.431 The effect 
was a total prohibition upon bodily relations seen as standing against nature and culture – 
including both surrogacy and (for Scorsone at least) the unnatural projects of lesbian donor 
insemination.432 
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A queer position on reproductive technology, however, would not need to privilege 
‘natural’ reproduction as the site of bodily empowerment. These heterosexist logics do not 
necessarily dictate the ways in which same-sex relationships locate their definitions of 
empowerment, liberation or oppression.433 By stepping outside the binary model of 
nature/culture, man/woman offered by a queer vantage, one may avoid the monolithic power 
formulation of ‘male technology vs. female nature’ that the radical feminist critique puts forth. 
When the nature/culture binary is not the governing frame, it becomes possible to view the use of 
reproductive technologies as a contested site of power, rather than the power of one group (the 
patriarchy) over the other (oppressed women). This may allow for more complex readings of 
commodification, exploitation, embodiment and resistance to emerge.  
Of course this queer history has not been the dominant story of AHR in Canada. Instead, 
the system of legal regulation that currently exists has been marked by a remarkable encounter 
with institutionalized radical feminism.434 The mandate of the RCNRT was not to craft 
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legislation, but to lay out the policy concerns and implications for the development of new 
reproductive technologies in Canada. However the original framework laid out in Proceed With 
Care proved to be enormously influential on the multiple legislative drafts that worked their way 
through Parliament. When the AHRA finally passed into law it reflected the Commission’s 
original desire for a federal governing body to regulate and oversee issues related to reproductive 
technology. It also selected some allowable activities for control and licensing (such as donor 
insemination, screening and access to gametes, and the manipulation of in vitro embryos) and 
imposed strict criminal prohibitions on others (including the commercialization of reproduction 
including payment for eggs, sperm, and any role in the arrangement of commercial surrogacy). 
While the RCNRT had rejected all forms of surrogacy as a potential harm to women, the AHRA 
did make allowance for altruistic surrogates who would be permitted to receive the 
reimbursement of expenses. However the central distinction drawn by the Report, between two 
categories of activities for which different approaches were recommended, precisely guided the 
AHRA’s distinction between prohibited activities and controlled activities.435  
The remainder of this chapter will pick up with the 2010 Supreme Court Reference Case 
and look at the legal impact this history and its binary modalities has had, and continues to have, 
on LGBTQ people in Canada. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Reference Re Assisted Human Reproduction 
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Act was a lengthy 167-page decision split among three separate opinions.436 Yet over the course 
of the ruling, the Supreme Court justices made only a single mention of LGBTQ users of AHR 
services. The reasons written by Chief Justice McLachlin failed to discuss gay and lesbians at all, 
as did the brief opinion of Cromwell J., while the judgment written by LeBel and Deschamps JJ. 
paused but once to note that AHR “represents the only option for homosexuals who wish to 
reproduce.”437 
An “unusually fractured court” found itself split three ways (4-4-1) across this decision 
with three separate opinions filed.438 Four judges led by McLachlin C.J.C rendered the opinion 
that all impugned provisions of the AHRA were a valid exercise of the criminal law power.439 
Four judges speaking through LeBel and Deschamps JJ. held that while the absolute prohibitions 
against certain assisted human reproduction practices described in the statute as “Prohibited 
Activities” were constitutional, the impugned regulatory sections which formed the bulk of the 
statute were not.440 The tiebreaking opinion was delivered by Justice Cromwell, the newest 
member of the court, who split the difference between the other two opinions, concluding that 
some of the impugned provisions were valid while others were ultra vires. He agreed with LeBel 
and Deschamps JJ.’s pith and substance analysis, but parted company in respect of certain of the 
regulatory provisions at issue.  
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Justice Cromwell framed the issue as “whether the federal criminal law power permits 
Parliament to regulate virtually all aspects of research and clinical practice in relation to assisted 
human reproduction.”441 Answering that question in the negative, he went on to agree with the 
Chief Justice that the prohibitions contained in sections 8, 9 and 12 “in purpose and effect 
prohibit negative practices associated with assisted reproduction and that they fall within the 
traditional ambit of the federal criminal law power.”442 Thus it remains unconstitutional to create 
or use an embryo without the donor’s consent (s.8), or to remove ova or sperm from a person 
under 18 years of age (s.9) 
Section 12 in particular he read with ss. 6 and 7, which reiterate the principle of non-
commercialization of the human body by prohibiting any form of payment to surrogate mothers, 
as well as the purchase or sale of ova, sperm, in vitro embryos, and human cells or genes. These 
sections were conceded by the Attorney General of Quebec to be valid federal criminal law. 
Cromwell understood the regulations of s. 12, which control the reimbursement of expenditures 
incurred by gamete donors and surrogate mothers, as “a form of exemption from the strictness of 
the regime” set by the prohibitions, and concluded that it was necessary to define their scope.443  
However, he also agreed with Justices LeBel and Deschamps that sections 10 (use of 
human reproductive material and in vitro embryos except in accordance with the regulations and 
a licence), 11 (combining parts of human genomes with other genomes except in accordance 
with the regulations and a licence), 13 (undertaking a controlled activity on licensed premises 
only), 14 to 18 (privacy and access to information provisions), sections 40(2) to 40(5) 
(provisions relating to the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada), and sections 44 (2) 
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and (3) (relating to inspectors assuming the management of premises and the costs incurred) 
were ultra vires Parliament.444  
.1& %
 
As discussed below, the primary issue for many gays and lesbians involves access to 
reproductive material as well as regulations around surrogacy. Sections 6 and 7 were not 
contested in the case, and it remains a criminal act to pay a surrogate mother or purchase sperm 
or ova in Canada. Although s.12 remains under federal criminal law, it is as “a form of 
exemption from the strictness of the regime,” to allow for the reimbursement of expenses 
incurred by altruistic surrogates.445 Unfortunately, s.12 has never been proclaimed into force, nor 
have any regulations been promulgated under this section.  
The statement of principles laid out in the AHRA explicitly aimed to prevent 
discrimination against persons who seek to undergo AHR procedures, “including on the basis of 
sexual orientation and marital status.”446 This was one of the feminist imprints left by the 
RCNRT, which, as discussed in Chapter Five, had made mention of the prevailing discrimination 
against lesbians and single women in Canadian society. Notwithstanding the spirited dissent by 
Scorsone, the Commission had expressed its view that:  
it is wrong to forbid some people access to medical services on the basis of social factors 
while others are permitted to use them; using criteria such as a woman's marital status or 
sexual orientation to determine access to donor insemination, based on historical 
prejudices and stereotypes, amounts to discrimination as defined under human rights law 
and contravenes the Commission's guiding principle of equality.447  
 
As has been seen, if the history of the AHRA allowed a footnote for issues faced by 
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lesbian and bisexual women, it was silent on the reproductive concerns of gay men and trans 
people. The issue of sexual orientation has never been at the fore regarding AHR in Canada, and 
it is no hyperbole to say that the present legal regime has been crafted with scarce consideration 
of the reproductive needs of ‘homosexuals.’ Despite this omission, of course, LGBTQ people in 
Canada who wish to become parents remain heavily dependent upon adoption services and the 
often-expensive modes of AHR.448 These are bureaucratically onerous and pricey options, 
leaving LGBTQ communities vulnerable to legislative gaps and judicial decisions which do not 
account for their unique realities.449 The AHRA Reference case once again emphasized this gap, 
leaving continued legal uncertainty alongside the virtual erasure of LGBTQ people in Canada 
from the discussion of how and why AHR technologies are to be used in the future.  
Written as it was at the close of 2010, the Reference Case performed a rather impressive 
feat by hardly mentioning the needs of queer families within its pages. Instead the familiar trope 
of nature/culture was in play, as Supreme Court Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin contrasted the 
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biological ‘facts of life’ against the moral confusions presented by technologically mediated 
reproduction. As she explained in the opening lines of her judgment: “Since time immemorial, 
human beings have been conceived naturally.”450 New reproductive technologies have thereby 
posed a challenge to moral, religious and juridical leaders alike, as these “new questions do not 
fit neatly within the traditional legal frameworks that have developed in a world of natural 
conception.”451 
McLachlin C.J. develops her judicial reasoning around this foundational conceptual 
binary, with the stability and certainty of natural biological reproduction pitted against the 
potential social ills of reproductive technology. By appealing to the eternal stability of the 
heterosexual couple, she reinstates the ‘natural facts’ of reproduction as the touchstone against 
which all else is to be read. With the heterosexual imaginary as her lens the ruling lands on 
solidly conservative footing, reading the potential for abuse in these technologies as one that may 
“legitimately be considered a public health evil to be addressed by the criminal law.”452  
Within this binary, LGBTQ reproduction must take up the opposite pole to ‘natural 
reproduction’ as figured since time immemorial. The assisted reproduction of queer people is 
necessarily grouped with the cluster of new technologies, which together pose a legitimate public 
health evil and may require criminal penalty. What this means for LGBTQ people then is not 
only an erasure, but a placement among the monstrous, the abject, the criminal. It may be noted 
that the joint reasons for judgment penned by LeBel and Deschamps JJ did not rely upon this 
constitutive nature/culture binary. Although queer people were mentioned only briefly by the 
justices, their text quite centrally framed the needs of infertile heterosexuals. This ruling diverged 
markedly from the Chief Justice in finding that none of the impugned provisions fell under the 
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criminal law power, instead viewing “the regulation of assisted human reproduction as a health 
service,”453 although ultimately it was Cromwell J’s terse ruling which settled the matter.  
	* & 2
In June 2012, Parliament repealed the invalidated sections and amended the AHRA, while 
also abolishing the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada.454 As such, the federal role 
relating to assisted human reproduction has been reduced considerably, as has the need for 
administrative and regulatory enforcement. Also notable has been the removal from section 12 of 
the requirement for a license to reimburse expenditures.455 As a result of Bill C-38, all 
responsibilities under the amended Act were transferred to the Minister of Health. All activities 
that were deemed to pertain to provincial jurisdiction over healthcare must now be regulated by 
each province, although there is no legal requirement to do so. In the words of Angela Cameron 
and Vanessa Gruben, the decision has “left a legal vacuum to be filled only when and how each 
province and territory see fit.”456 This presents the real possibility of a heterogeneous landscape 
of regulation in which domestic reproductive tourism may become the norm.457  
Legal uncertainty unduly impacts those with already precarious claims on the state, not 
least because the construction of dominant legal categories as neutral and universal actually 
obscures their historical particularism. When litigants challenge this abstracted form of legal 
rights and advance contextual narratives based on culture, race, or sexuality, Canadian courts 
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have historically found such claims difficult to manage.458 As Hester Lessard has explained, the 
supposed formal equality of access to rights “has no content other than the highly abstract 
content of entitlement to respect by the state for one's status as a rights holder, and it 
contemplates an individual who is simply and fundamentally a rights-holding self, with no 
defining attributes, history, economic status, or social location.”459  
In contrast to Lessard I would argue that, at least in the case of AHR, this abstracted 
content of entitlement does have a set of defining attributes, which are deeply embedded within 
the normative presumptions of heterosexual coupling.460 As was clear in the AHRA Reference, 
the infertile heterosexual couple is contemplated as the exemplary user of AHR services. Other 
dependent populations are either ignored (as in the McLachlin C.J. and Cromwell J. decisions), 
or marked only in passing (as in the LeBel and Deschamps JJ. ruling). This judgment is based 
upon the assumption that heterosexual families constitute the norm, with all other demands for 
reproductive technology to be understood within this guiding framework. The SCC ruling thus 
assumes that LGBTQ needs are similar in kind to those of heterosexual families, if perhaps more 
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starkly rendered. Reproductive assistance may thereby constitute a necessary rather than 
occasional requirement for “homosexuals who wish to reproduce,” but the mechanics and legal 
considerations are basically the same. Thus, LGBTQ concerns warrant no more than a passing 
acknowledgement, as the universality of the heterosexually reproductive family can 
accommodate all forms of socio-biological kinship – scientifically-aided or otherwise.461 Thus, 
Canada’s long journey to develop law and policy around new reproductive technologies has 
rarely accounted for the cultural specificity and community values of LGBTQ Canadians.  
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The piecemeal legal geography around AHR in Canada, as it applies to LGBT people in 
particular, is explored in two attachments to this dissertation, both of which have been published 
in other fora. However queer families seeking reproductive assistance do not only face issues of 
legal access – they must manage the clinical geography and language of medicine as well. This 
chapter explores the ways in which ‘medical infertility’ operates as a powerful diagnostic tool 
and structuring logic for queer people seeking AHR.  
Indeed, amidst the thousands of pages of data gathered by the Creating Our Families 
research project, one central issue overwhelmingly emerged: A concern with how ‘infertility’ 
operates as a governing clinical discourse. Overwhelmingly, participants expressed their 
frustration with the limitations of the concept when applied to LGBTQ people. As discussed in a 
joint publication by the Creating Our Families team, the problem with ‘infertility’ is woven 
through a series of related clinical assumptions that rely heavily upon a heterosexual imaginary: 
Specifically, the overarching framework of AHR services presumes that service users are 
heterosexual, cisgender (non-trans), partnered, and experiencing infertility. These 
assumptions manifest in fertility clinic practices and procedures that do not meet the 
specific needs of LGBTQ service users, for whom one or more of the assumptions 
associated with an infertility model are incorrect.462 
 Instead, the exemplary user of AHR services is a male-female heterosexual couple who 
are experiencing a hiccup in the ‘natural’ biological processes of fertility. In this framing, the 
clinic is simply there to “give a helping hand” to Nature and allow the couple to fulfill their 
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biological destiny.463 For obvious reasons, this conceptual framework does not work for many 
LGBTQ people. 
As recounted by a bisexual woman named Carol in a same-sex relationship in Toronto, 
when the interviewer mentioned the word “infertility” she had the following to say: “I hate that 
word…I’m not infertile. I need some assistance accessing sperm, that’s it.” Carol went on to 
recount an exchange with a gynecologist who had read in her file that she was attending a 
fertility clinic in order to get pregnant: 
Carol: He was like “Oh I see you’re at [a Toronto fertility clinic] for some infertility 
issues.” I said “No, not infertility. I’m just gay and I need some sperm.” (laughs)  
Carol: And he said “Well, you know, infertility…like same difference.” And I was like 
“No, it’s not.”…It’s a very contentious word…’Cause it labels me as – I mean not to 
minimize people who have infertility issues and that’s nothing to be ashamed of – but it’s 
not what my issue is. It’s a totally different piece and because I have to access the same 
spaces as people who are infertile it’s assumed that I have a physical, emotional, 
whatever kind of problems getting pregnant. And it’s not a problem getting pregnant it’s 
just that I can’t do it by having sex with my partner so I need to do it in other ways. 
As this chapter will explore, a diagnosis of infertility built upon the failure of sexual 
intercourse to produce a viable pregnancy holds little traction for many queer folks. As will be 
argued, this represents more than merely a flawed medical diagnosis with unwanted 
consequences of mandatory testing and drug treatment. ‘Infertility’ also reflects the foundational 
logics of the nature/culture binary and is a discourse based on heterosexist assumptions of the 
ideal functioning of bodies and biologies. Infertility functions to narrow the field of reproductive 
possibility for law and medicine alike, and operates as a form of structural exclusion upon queer 
as well as straight families.   
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This section thus proposes a fundamental challenge to how naturalized conceptions of 
fertility and its inverse, infertility, have been constructed. In its place, I will argue for a more 
nuanced set of understandings of reproduction as a relational mode of embodiment.  
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
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In marking the shift to an intent-based structure of family creation through AHR, most 
commentators begin by stating the natural inevitability of fertility – biological procreation as 
how things have been done since “time immemorial”464 – before turning their critical attention 
onto the ambiguous vistas now opened by reproductive technology. In what is a typical framing 
of this teleological march, Marjorie Maguire Shultz has noted that “through most of history, 
biological procreation was more a matter of fate than intention.”465 This simple historical 
yesteryear is contrasted against the modern age of reproductive technology and our confusing, 
complex kinships threaded by knots of intention.  Such analyses, even when sympathetic, must 
ultimately locate non-biological forms of family as a deviance from proper, ‘natural’ kinship. 
They uncritically rely upon the heterosexual facts of reproduction as standing at the core of an 
unproblematized natural order.  
With the chapters of Section Three, I intend to sidestep these well-trodden channels of 
debate and look instead at how even alternative visions of the “future of the family” have 
depended upon an uncontested norm of coital procreation. This in turn has blunted the ability to 
imagine categories outside the ‘natural’. I begin by looking at the notion of medical infertility 
and how it is produced in opposition to properly reproductive bodies, demonstrating how a 
singular category of infertility not only creates a false binary but also serves to mask the sharp 
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differences that exist among so-called infertile people. 
2	
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The last three decades have brought tremendous developments in reproductive 
technologies, alongside ever more complex ethical and legal questions on the nature of such 
interventions. As infertility slowly emerged as a public health issue, debate initially raged around 
the role and social meaning of technology itself in ameliorating childlessness.466 More recent 
years have seen an explosive growth in the epidemiological understanding of infertility as 
treatment for reproductive malfunctions, with a burgeoning private industry poised to offer 
biomedical interventions for their amelioration. At present, both popular and scholarly debate 
remain concerned with bioethical matters regarding the appropriateness of these technologies 
qua technology – especially in regard to embryo management and surrogacy – while also 
grappling with practical matters of how to regard the new family forms being produced. There 
has also developed a strong question about the state's responsibility for providing access to such 
treatments, particularly in countries that offer some measure of insurance coverage for 
reproductive assistance.467 
This snapshot genealogy marks a drastic shift from how reproductive matters were 
viewed in the late nineteenth century, when attention was focused on the issue of fertility as a 
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threat to the health of women, their children and society at large.468 Such a response sought to 
restrict the fertility of women – and disabled, nonwhite and poor women in particular – to 
prevent the reproduction of minority populations the state deemed as inferior.469 Governance 
over the reproductive potential of certain bodies actively relied upon the logics of eugenics to 
exclude and sterilize those who did not conform to norms of the ideal citizen.470 These norms 
clustered around vectors of race, gender, sexuality and ability, working to create a blunt tool of 
reproductive coercion. In the U.S. this was affirmed through the legitimization of state-directed 
eugenics programs in Buck v. Bell, an infamous 1927 ruling written by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. that confirmed the constitutionality of forced sterilization regarding the poor and 
mentally ill.471  
Sterilization was also a favored tool of the colonial project in both the U.S. and Canada. 
In an anthology entitled The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance, 
M. Annette Jaimes and Theresa Halsey quote a study indicating that “as many as 42 percent of 
all Indian women of childbearing age had [by 1974] been sterilized without their consent.”472 
This trend expanded after the mid-1960s and President Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’, as Jane 
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Lawrence documents how large numbers of sterilizations also targeted African-American and 
Hispanic women as part of ‘humanitarian’ measures to keep population numbers down within 
poor communities.473 Homosexuality has also operated as a target of reproductive restrictions. In 
Oregon, for example, as one of thirty-three U.S. states that passed forced sterilization laws, 
reproductive purges were initially aimed at punishing men for having homosexual sex. For years, 
the state “favored castration over vasectomies” and the Oregon Legislature failed to abolish the 
ominously-titled ‘Board of Eugenics’ until October 1983.474  
The role of government in assuring particular fertility outcomes for its citizens has a long 
and continuing history, and it is only recently that attention has shifted to a concern with 
promoting and enhancing childbirth.475 Many exclusionary elements of reproductive governance 
are still in force, however, from the legal barriers discussed in Section II to the discursive clinical 
frame that is the subject of Section III. This exclusion is wrapped within the clinical and legal 
certainty of the term infertility, as a restrictive conceptual model that impacts not only gender 
and sexual minority communities, but also single men and women seeking to produce genetic 
offspring.  
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The word fertile dates from 1375–1425 and derives from late Middle English via Latin. 
The Miriam-Webster Medical Dictionary defines ‘fertile’ as follows: 
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 1 : capable of growing or developing <fertile egg>; 2 : developing spores or 
spore-bearing organs; 3 a : capable of breeding or reproducing b of an estrous 
cycle : marked by the production of one or more viable eggs.476  
Here the relevant aspects of human fertility may be summarized as: “1.the state or quality 
of being fertile; 2.Biology. the ability to produce offspring; power of reproduction: the amazing 
fertility of rabbits.”477 Fertility is defined as the ability to produce offspring through one’s own 
reproductive material; a biological organism that is capable of breeding or reproducing.  
These definitions have distinctly agricultural overtones, and indeed the varieties of 
assisted insemination in use today can trace a lineage from the practical matters of animal 
husbandry. Russian scientist Ilya Ivanovich Ivanov studied assisted insemination in domestic 
farm animals, dogs, rabbits and poultry, and in 1899 pioneered the methods which are now 
refined in the intra-uterine insemination of humans.478 The first reports on human applications 
originated in the early 1940s and into the 1950s, with assisted insemination eventually applied in 
cases where fertility had been impeded by immunological problems, marking the start of a new 
approach to assisted human reproduction: Infertility treatment.479  
As Amy Agigian rightly inquires, however, “At the risk of belaboring the obvious: Since 
when has childlessness been an illness?”480 The shift from childlessness from a social to a 
medical phenomenon occurred at some point in the late 1960s as advances in medical technology 
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made the governance of female reproductive cycles possible.481 As Linda Whiteford and Lois 
Gonzalez (1995) explain: 
The development of infertility as a medical condition [was] dependent on medical 
advances in the understanding of human endocrinology and medical technology. Until the 
1950s infertility was often thought of as emotional, rather than medical in origin. Not 
until the 1960s and 1970s, when the development of synthetic drugs allowed physicians 
to control ovulatory cycles and the technology of laparoscopy allowed them to see 
women’s internal reproductive biology, did infertility become medicalized.482 
 
The origins of infertility have also been dated to 1978 and the IVF conception and birth 
of Baby Louise in the UK.483 According to some scholars, it was not until the medical 
technology existed to remake a ‘barren’ womb into a fertile womb that the diagnosis could 
conceptually exist. Infertility thus was developed as a new category between reproductively 
sterile and reproductively healthy – an in-between state upon which medical science is 
empowered to act. As Margarete Sandelowski and Sheryl de Lacey note: 
 
Infertility was ‘invented’ with the in vitro conception and birth in 1978 of Baby Louise. 
That is, in the spirit and language of the Foucaudian-inspired ‘genealogical method’, 
infertility was discovered—or, more precisely, discursively created—when in-fertility 
became possible. Whereas barrenness used to connote a divine curse of biblical 
proportions and sterility an absolutely irreversible physical condition, infertility connects 
a medically and socially liminal state in which affected persons hover between 
reproductive inability and capacity: that is, ‘not yet pregnant’ but ever hopeful of 
achieving pregnancy and having a baby to take home.484 
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What precisely was invented, however, has been far from clear-cut. The indeterminacy of 
this liminal state and the complex temporalities and relational character of infertility have made 
it a deeply slippery notion. This ‘in-between-ness’ has also hampered attempts to clarify its 
meanings and thereby track its incidence on an international scale. Indeed as a recent study 
concludes:  
A global picture of infertility is not available partly due to the difficulty in defining the 
condition. In the literature, infertility is used synonymously with sterility, infecundity, 
childlessness, and subfertility. These terms are used both interchangeably and 
inconsistently; an explicit detailing of each component of the definition is needed to 
clarify what is being measured.485  
Another report, this one funded by the World Health Organization, also points to 
discrepancies in use: “The terms infertility, sterility, and infecundity are often used loosely, 
without regard to precise definition. Moreover, definitions of these terms may differ substantially 
between demographic and medical usage and between languages.”486  
In trying to think through the failures of infertility as an etiological category, one might 
start with a basic quibble. Given the understanding of fertility as “capable of breeding or 
reproducing,” one might reasonably expected to find its antithesis in infertility, describing the 
condition of not being fertile, not capable of growing or developing offspring, not capable of 
breeding or reproducing. At a very basic level, then, it may be asked: What exactly is the 
difference between infertility and sterility?  
While a strict dictionary definition makes no genuine distinction – both describe the 
condition of being unable to produce offspring – the medical community has adopted a 
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functional use of infertility that describes it as “a temporary condition, usually due to age, but 
often due to unknown causes.”487 Sterility, on the other hand, is understood as a “permanent 
condition, frequently due to known causes such as menopause or removal of the ovaries.”488 This 
temporal differentiation may appear to clarify the boundaries, but even within the understanding 
of infertility as an impermanent condition lies confusion. 
Siladitya Bhattacharya, Professor of Reproductive Medicine at the University of 
Aberdeen, has pointed in a recent co-authored work to deep tensions within the definition of 
infertility.489 In a meta-analysis of prevalence studies measuring infertility, Bhattacharya located 
a major rift between two frameworks: those applied by clinicians and those applied by 
demographers. For example, the following definitions are the common understandings in play 
within most Western clinical settings:  
Infertility is a disease, defined by the failure to achieve a successful pregnancy after 12 
months or more of regular unprotected intercourse. Earlier evaluation and treatment may 
be justified based on medical history and physical findings and is warranted after six 
months for women over age 35 years.490 
Infertility should be defined as the failure to conceive after regular unprotected sexual 
intercourse after two years in the absence of a known reproductive pathology.491 
Thus even within the clinical framework are widely differing time frames – six months, 
one year and two years – which apply unevenly depending on which definition is chosen. It may 
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also include the diagnosis of infertility after three or more consecutive miscarriages or 
stillbirths.492  The first definition, from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, aims to 
set an age threshold wherein older women may be diagnosed as infertile after just six months. 
Otherwise a one-year period of unprotected (heterosexual) sex without intercourse is expected to 
lead to conception. The second definition comes from the U.S. National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence. This definition does not involve an age-related threshold, and places the 
outside limit of healthy conception at two years. Both similarly locate the failure to successfully 
conceive as the primary indicator of infertility.   
When turning to the demographic setting, however, a radically different definition of 
infertility applies: 
Primary infertility is defined as the absence of a live birth for couples that have been in a 
union for at least five years, during which neither partner used contraception, and where 
the female partner expresses a desire for a child.493  
Primary infertility is measured among women who have engaged in regular sexual 
intercourse for five or more years, have not used contraception for that period of time, 
and have not had a live birth.494 
Demographers focus on the absence of live birth, rather than merely conception, and 
apply a much greater time horizon. These definitions look to a duration of five years or more 
before diagnosing a sexually active woman (or her partner) as being infertile. 
There is a clear disciplinary divide at work here, wherein clinicians are interested in 
diagnosing reproductive issues within a much shorter time span and remain focused on the object 
of their labours: successful implantation and gestation. Demographers are more interested in 
tracking larger social trends, and apply a longer time period as well as a concern with population 
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shifts (i.e. live births) rather than the ability to conceive.  In practice, however, these contrasting 
conceptual frames render infertility a difficult phenomenon to track. As it stands, “existing 
definitions of infertility lack uniformity, rendering comparisons in prevalence between countries 
or over time problematic. The absence of an agreed definition also compromises clinical 
management and undermines the impact of research findings.”495  
This matters not least because of the power that a diagnosis of infertility has in 
channeling the reproductive hopes of a roughly estimated 72 million heterosexual parents 
struggling to conceive.496 Infertility is big business, with a report estimating U.S. infertility 
services at a value of $4 billion dollars in 2009, producing more than 50,000 babies per year.497 
The same report catalogued 483 U.S. fertility clinics, 100+ sperm banks and 1,700 reproductive 
endocrinologists in the domestic market, supported by a global market for fertility drugs that tops 
$1 billion.498  
Since Bhattacharya and co-authors conducted their meta-analysis in 2011, a Canadian 
study has also chimed in to critique the poorly defined concept of infertility, and question its 
validity as the diagnostic rubric through which to track national as well as global health 
outcomes.499 After reviewing the evidence, Bhattacharya et al ultimately sided with the clinical 
approach in seeking an optimal definition of infertility for medical practitioners. For research 
geared toward reproductive endocrinology, they concluded, a shorter time span and focus on 
conception makes sense. However by refining the term rather than interrogating it, they missed 
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an opportunity to question its underlying definitional tension. Unfortunately, this palliative 
approach also preserves the normative definitional bounds of infertility, as well as its attendant 
pathology, stigma and heterosexism. 
5%41 # 
In order to unpack the failures of infertility, and its binary anchor fertility, we will return 
first to the typical clinical formulation. This definition engages a twelve-month time period, and 
is focused on conception (although also gesturing to the ability to “have” children) and the lack 
of contraception. 
“Fertility: The ability to conceive and have children, the ability to become pregnant 
through normal sexual activity. Infertility: The failure to conceive after a year of regular 
intercourse without contraception.”500  
Notwithstanding the clinical/demographic divide, this is the understanding of infertility 
most commonly applied across clinical information brochures, message boards, popular media 
and insurance companies. It operates as a temporal marker of conception, creating categories of 
“normal” and “failed” sexual activity. It also renders certain bodies illegible altogether. As this 
chapter contends, such a definition is steeped in complex discourses that must be pulled carefully 
apart to better render the field of access to reproductive technology. Not only is it resolutely 
heterosexual, but it also invokes a series of other problematic assumptions. 
The first assumption being made is that all normal sex is reproductive. This is an 
understanding of sexuality rooted in religious prohibitions against non-reproductive intercourse. 
Medieval theologians in the eleventh century first applied the term “sodomy” to a range of non-
procreative sexual practices, including bestiality, masturbation, oral sex, tribadism, coitus 
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interruptus, and procreative sexual acts performed in the wrong position, as well as the more 
familiar contemporary usage of anal sex.501  These were all understood to be “unnatural acts” 
which women were most likely incapable of committing (although there was some debate on this 
point), with the common thread across perversions being their non-procreative nature.502 This 
vision of ‘normal’ sex has been understood by a generation of feminists as steeped in religious 
dogma and filtered through to contemporary cultural practices which differentiate between 
‘good’ sex and ‘bad’ sex.503 Thus the idea that sex is abnormal due precisely because of its innate 
non-reproductivity is fundamental to an Old Testament understanding of proper biological 
function. This is the understanding that we find exactly reproduced in the modern clinical 
definition of infertility. 
The perversions of non-reproductive sex have not been without punishment, of course, 
and there were periods in human history when the death penalty was leveraged against the vice 
of “unnatural acts” broadly figured. Yet at the same time as (mostly) men were falling prey to the 
dictates of Canon law a gendered burden was also being placed upon women to conceive 
offspring, and preferably male heirs. This brings up the second point, as the body charged with 
responsibility for fertility in this definition is an unmistakably female body. 
The powerful dictates of social reproduction have demanded that women marry and have 
children, with this codification of the family ethic resting at the heart of the gendered division of 
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labour.504 These commands ripple through the notion that twelve months of unprotected sex 
without conception must constitute a failure of the specifically (non)pregnant body. The 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine [ASRM] has attributed male-factor infertility to 
approximately one-third of cases, with factors affecting women comprising another one-third. As 
the ASRM explains, “for the remaining one-third of infertile couples, infertility is caused by a 
combination of problems in both partners or, in about 20 percent of cases, is unexplained.”505 So 
while approximately two-thirds of cases of infertility are not solely attributable to the female 
(heterosexual) partner, the responsibility for fertility by definition falls squarely upon female 
organs.  
There are certainly other ways to describe and diagnose subfertility in adult 
heterosexuals, not least because ‘male factor infertility’ occurs roughly in equivalence to the 
experience of women. Keeping the focus trained on the female body increases the burden 
experienced by women and may also increase shame and stigma for men. As Marcia Inhorn 
describes, “male infertility is a social and health problem that remains deeply hidden…studies 
have shown male infertility to be among the most stigmatizing of all male health conditions.”506 
A recent cross-sectional analysis of 357 men in infertile heterosexual couples came to a similar 
conclusion, determining that male partners who feel solely responsible for infertility are at a 
                                            
504
 This well-established feminist insight is central to a materialist analysis of the public/private divide and political 
economy. An early example of this literature that is still relevant for its attention to the gendered pressures of 
childbirth and rearing is Mimi Abramovitz’s classic 1988 text Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy 
from Colonial Times to the Present. (Boston: South End Press.) 
505
 American Society of Reproductive Medicine, “Resources: What Causes Infertility?”, Accessed online November 
8, 2011. <http://www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012> 
506
 Marcia Inhorn, “Middle Eastern masculinities in the age of new reproductive technologies: male infertility and 
stigma in Egypt and Lebanon.”. Med Anthropol Q 18(2):162-82 (2004) at 162-163. See also: Jane RW Fisher, Karin 
Hammarberg, “Psychological and social aspects of infertility in men: an overview of the evidence and implications 
for psychologically informed clinical care and future research,”, Asian Journal of Andrology, 2012, 14, 1, 121. 
167 
higher risk for sexual, emotional, and psychological strain relative to men without this belief.507 
Such men also experience a lower sexual and personal quality of life.508 Once again, the 
particular imprimatur of pathology and shame that infuse the clinical understanding of infertility 
betrays its origins in ancient dictates around the proper comport and function of gendered sexual 
relations. 
The third assumption being made by this definition of infertility is that the female body is 
open for business. This availability for intercourse glosses over the ways in which actual bodies 
determine how their sexual agency will be enacted. It also assumes that this sex is being pursued 
with an exclusive partner. Such monogamous arrangements may well be the case for some 
couples, but a degree of bodily access and mutuality are here implied that cannot so easily be 
taken for granted. As Marjorie M. Schultz argues in relation to normative aspirations of marriage 
and family (which I argue undergird this definition): “The important issue becomes not who is, 
but who should be having sex with the mother: her husband. Thus, the social construct, in fact 
normative and mutable, draws substantial but disguised legitimacy from the representation that it 
simply expresses “givens” of nature.”509 
This mechanical definition of intercourse also elides the complexity of sexual 
negotiations to create polarized categories of sexual functioning. Exactly how frequent and of 
what duration must sex be to count as “normal” sex? What precisely does the regularity of 
intercourse entail? Who makes these critical determinations? These are very real questions for 
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people facing a diagnosis of so-called infertility. So real, that the failure to perform to an 
idealized model of sexual performance and virility/fertility is what some psychotherapists have 
referred to as ‘reproductive trauma’.510 Even the presence of fertility counselors cannot erode the 
foundational pathology assumed by this vision of a willing female body, ready to engage in virile 
sex at the drop of an ovum. Thus not only does a diagnosis of infertility operate to channel the 
despair of couples struggling to conceive, but it is actually creating the stigmatized categories 
which help produce the traumas of the clinic. The diagnosis of infertility produces the category 
of ‘the infertile woman’ or ‘the infertile man’ for which the medicalized response of reproductive 
technology must then be applied. The longitudinal shifts of human fertility are erased in favour 
of a singular atemporal diagnosis – you are infertile - against which a modern medical apparatus 
stands ready to act.  
Despite this growing medical industry, another issue is that a diagnosis of infertility is not 
necessarily an indication of a permanent state that requires intervention. Approximately half of 
all heterosexual couples who qualify as infertile on the 12 month definition will conceive without 
assistance during the following year.511 Emily Jackson has estimated that one in six heterosexual 
couples in developed countries will experience infertility while of reproductive age, with some 
moving through this temporary and/or unexplained condition to conceive, as others remain in a 
state where procreation without medical intervention remains impossible.512 Since patients in 
assisted conception clinics are the primary source of epidemiological data – those heterosexuals 
who have already determined that some form of reproductive issue exists and have actively 
sought out assistance – the treatment of infertility is skewed towards immediate intervention.  
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 Thus the actual incidence of heterosexual fertility problems is probably unknowable, as 
couples shift through phases of fertility and non-fertility at different times, and may or may not 
seek out clinical assistance depending on their age, inclination or socioeconomic bracket.513 
Amidst all these complex reckonings, disciplinary divides and temporal shifts, queer couples and 
single people remain rarely accounted for. There have been no large-scale studies of, for 
example, lesbian infertility or the infertility of gay men, and the infertility faced by transgender 
people has only recently been addressed.514 
Which leads to the final and most critical point: the current definition of infertility 
excludes LGBTQ communities and single people from the discussion entirely. By the terms of 
entry, same-sex intercourse is a failure. For while a lesbian couple might happily engage in “a 
year of regular sexual intercourse without contraception,” to use the language of the definition 
above, it will surprise no one if this fails to result in successful conception. A single gay man 
may have not engaged in sex at all for a calendar year but still wish to investigate reproductive 
options. Where is his experience within this narrow figuring of infertility? Clearly the issues here 
are not (necessarily) one of subfertile reproductive capacity. Infertility is also therefore a 
relational condition, as a diagnosis of clinical infertility can only be made once an individual has 
approached a medical practitioner with an unfulfilled desire for a child within a (heterosexual) 
relationship.515  
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Yet when queers and single people enter the clinic, they also find their experience 
mediated by the pathology created through definitions of fertility and infertility. They enter an 
environment geared toward addressing the presumed dysfunction of reproductive organs, and 
minimizing the traumas expected to result. The twin dynamos of hypermedicalization and 
normative heterosexuality interact to create an environment which many queer people describe 
as deeply foreign to their needs and intentions. The frustration and anger which results from this 
encounter will be discussed at length in Chapter Eight. 
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I use the idea of ‘the infertility trap’ to describe the conceptual narrowing effected by a 
specific set of normative presumptions about reproduction. The infertility trap is laid by 
antiquated categories which embrace medieval concepts of sexuality, place an undue burden on 
female bodies, foster stigma by promoting blunt polarities of normalcy and failure, presume a 
high degree of sexual availability, flatten shifting and relational timelines, and ignore the lived 
realities of single people and queers. It is also created by the definitional inconsistencies of the 
term infertility itself, which has drastically limited the ways in which both clinical and 
demographic researchers conceive of adult procreation. The infertility trap is based upon a 
misleading characterization of reproductive potential, intense temporal anxiety, and heavy 
reliance upon invasive and often expensive forms of reproductive technology. 
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The infertility trap impacts not only LGBTQ people but heterosexual couples as well. 
The reproductive trauma that heterosexuals may experience is located within their own 
expectations of ‘normal’ reproduction, and amplified by the clinical model of medicalization and 
pathology. This process is saturated with stigma not only for the gendered effects discussed 
above, but for lingering associations from the nineteenth century that equated sterility with 
“slack moral habits” like masturbation or excessive sexual activity.516 While there is perhaps no 
longer a direct equation made between sinful behaviour and sterility, the idea that people may be 
in some way responsible for their ability to procreate persists.517 Focus on the reproductivity of 
female bodies means that women are generally viewed as bearing the brunt of this responsibility. 
As Emily Jackson explains:  
Today it is widely assumed that women are infertile as a result of their own choices, for 
example, by choosing to delay childbearing, by having had an abortion, through 
contracting sexually transmitted infections, or by over-use of particular contraceptives. 
So a woman’s inability to conceive is commonly thought to be the consequence of her 
deviation from conventional gender roles, through an over-zealous pursuit of her career 
or through sexual promiscuity. She is then responsible for her infertility, which is 
“nature’s” punishment for her unnatural behaviour.518 
 Thus the cultural deviation of women from the cycles of ‘nature’ is seen as the root of the 
problem, with references to a fictitious “infertility epidemic”519 in the Western world making it 
appear as if infertility is a modern issue stemming from female promiscuity and/or deferral of 
childbearing.520 The ‘choice’ of women to delay childbearing until later in life, in particular, is 
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often viewed as an individual decision rather than as a function of neoliberal economic systems 
which lack public infrastructure for childcare and penalize women for going on the ‘mommy 
track’.521 A post-menopausal woman’s reproductive incapacity is therefore sometimes 
considered to be the “just dessert” for opting for a career over a family, and her responsibility for 
choices made earlier in life.522 
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Under a chapter subheading entitled “What is Reproductive Trauma?” doctors Janet 
Jaffe, Martha Diamond and David Diamond – all specialists in the field of Reproductive 
Psychology - define ‘reproductive trauma’ as based upon the following assumptions: 
Being unable to have a baby as and when you had hoped is one of the most painful crises 
that couples confront. Clearly this is not how you thought it would be…What makes the 
experience of infertility a trauma? The diagnosis of infertility, and the medical 
interventions often needed to treat it, represent a threat to our physical integrity, our sense 
of being healthy and whole. One of the most fundamental aspects of our physical selves 
is our reproductive capability. When that does not function properly, we doubt everything 
else. Infertility is a trauma because it attacks both the physical and emotional sense of 
self, it presents us with multiple, complicated losses, it affects our most important 
relationships, and it shifts our sense of belonging in the world. 523 
Once again, this formulation depends upon a naturalized heterosexuality that takes as 
given the above presumptions of infertility. When the ‘medical interventions often needed’ to 
‘have a baby as and when you had hoped’ are framed as an aberration to ‘our sense of being 
healthy and whole,’ a specific form of reproductive heterosexual coupling is privileged as the 
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ideal. It imagines an unsullied ‘natural’ form of procreation that evokes the time immemorial, as 
contrasted with the threat to human integrity posed by reproductive assistance. When the clinic is 
involved, and whenever medical interventions are required, it is because something has 
malfunctioned. The encounter with the clinic, with the diagnosis of infertility, is the cause of 
multiple and complicated losses. In this formulation, where ‘healthy and whole’ does not belong 
inside a fertility clinic, it is expected that all people seeking reproductive assistance must be 
suffering from ‘one of the most painful crises that couples confront.’ 
A series of presumptions underlie this concern for the reproductive health of heterosexual 
couples, and set the foundation for how counseling and support are offered at the clinic: 
1) The logics of the nature/culture binary assume that natural reproduction only occurs 
within the private embrace of heterosexual intercourse.  
2) When reproduction does require assistance, it is because something has gone wrong 
and threatened the integrity of the natural function. 
3) This failure is necessarily experienced as sorrow and loss and may be labeled 
“reproductive trauma.” 
4) Reproductive trauma can be ameliorated by a positive outcome and successful 
conception in the clinic. 
 
Thus the modern fertility industry perpetrates a neat double move: on one hand 
reinscribing the normative diagnostic bounds of infertility and the pathology it contains, and on 
the other, simultaneously attempting to palliate its effects. This double move is predicated upon 
the nature/culture binary and made possible by a singular attention to wounded 
heterosexuality.524 By this I refer specifically to a heterosexuality which cannot fulfill the 
normative expectations of biological procreation via sexual intercourse.525  
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To be clear: The inability to conceive is a very real phenomenon and one which wreaks 
profound misery in the lives of heterosexual couples seeking to have biological children. 
However, my argument is that some (much?) of this trauma is generated by the clinical structures 
themselves and the misconceptions bundled into the diagnosis of infertility. This trauma also 
affects LGBTQ parents and single people as they encounter this governing master discourse 
when seeking reproductive assistance. 
The assumption that fertility clinic patients bring with them a wounded heterosexuality 
marked by reproductive trauma is profound. Indeed at present, fertility clinics are almost 
exclusively geared toward mitigating the wounded heterosexuality of the infertile couple. To 
illustrate how deeply the discourses of trauma currently saturate the clinical encounter, one need 
look no further than Canada’s largest fertility clinics. 
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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Genesis Fertility Centre in Vancouver is the biggest IVF clinic in British Columbia. The 
range of counseling services advertised by the clinic is strictly limited to the script of wounded 
heterosexuality. From their website: “Many women describe the experience of coping with 
infertility and IVF treatment as an ‘emotional rollercoaster.’ Studies show that women 
experiencing fertility issues have distress levels equal to women with cancer, AIDS, or other life 
threatening issues. [Our counselors] can help you learn strategies for dealing with stress, 
managing your IVF cycle, and nurturing your relationship with your partner.”526  
The same narrative is on display at Manitoba’s only fertility and gynecology clinic: 
“Infertility can be a painful, emotional and exhausting experience. We encourage you to partake 
                                                                                                                                            
with an inadequate masculinity, a homosexual longing, or an inability to financially care for his family.  
526
 Genesis Fertility Centre website. Accessed January 14, 2012. <http://www.genesis-fertility.com/> 
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in counseling as you prepare for treatment and afterwards. Our counselor is available to help you 
through the trying and sometimes devastating roller coaster of infertility and to assist you with 
any ethical questions and concerns you may have.”527 Continuing this theme, the McGill 
Reproductive Center in Montreal explains how “counseling can facilitate coping with such 
overwhelming feelings of sadness, anger or blame”528 while the Ottawa Fertility Centre offers 
the same rollercoaster image to its clients:  
The experience of infertility is profoundly emotional. Clients usually have experienced 
long periods of disappointment and sadness over difficulties conceiving children before 
they are ever referred to the Ottawa Fertility Centre. Infertility can result in depression, 
feelings of isolation, relationship stress, problems with friends and family, and 
interference with work and social relationships. It has been described as an emotional 
roller coaster.”529   
ReproMed clinic in Toronto offers access to similar counseling services to help alleviate 
reproductive trauma and provide support to individuals in “dealing with emotions and issues 
related to infertility such as: grief, anger, jealousy, guilt, self-image, and isolation.”530 The clinic 
also provides couples with support on issues “specifically affected by infertility such as: 
intimacy, sexuality, self-esteem, blame, communication, expectations, finances, and decision-
making.”531 
This is a litany of the traumas of failed reproduction, even as these clinics seek 
compassionately to ameliorate its painful effects. And these effects are painful. Heterosexual 
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couples face genuine difficulty in reorienting their family-creation plans, and a number of 
compassionate ethnographies have traced these emotional struggles.532 Our society is powerfully 
centered around the ideal of reproductive heterosexual intercourse, and deviations from this 
norm are difficult for heterosexuals as well as for LGBTQ couples and individuals. My 
argument, however, is that the normative underpinnings of the infertility trap are actively 
contributing to the sadness and distress faced by heterosexual as well as queer families in the 
clinic. This normalizing regime needs to be addressed, and Chapters Nine and Ten will outline 
an alternative conception that seeks to avoid the limitations of a diagnosis of infertility for 
heterosexual and queer families alike. 
For while the current conceptual model may be doing a disservice to heterosexual 
couples, there is no doubt that it is drastically under-serving LGBTQ populations. Queer families 
are not (necessarily) dealing with “disappointment and sadness over difficulties conceiving 
children” but are seeking reproductive assistance because of an inherently non-reproductive 
sexuality. What they find upon entering the clinic, however, is a space of wounded 
heterosexuality almost exclusively aimed at the needs of two-parent male-female couples. The 
heterosexist presumptions of reproductive trauma are thereby extended onto the queer bodies 
caught in the infertility trap.   
When queer people who enter the clinic are also experiencing what they perceive as 
infertility, the devastating effects are compounded. Not only are they subjected to the 
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heterosexist models of family which prevail, but they are then counseled with the same tools 
developed to care for heterosexual couples. As the empirical data below will show, this is often 
not appropriate for queer people, single people or trans-identified people. They find themselves 
doubly stigmatized by being unable to conceive ‘naturally,’ and may be subjected to highly 
inappropriate suggestions that conflict with their gender identity, stated intention or family-
planning modality.533 
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Although data is scarce, existing information indicates that queer people may be even 
more at risk than heterosexuals for some conditions that lead to subfertility. A social 
determinants of health model links the wellbeing of various populations to health conditions, 
with sexual orientation and gender identity tied to subfertility in regard to endometriosis, 
Polycystic Ovaries (PCO) and Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome (PCOS).534 As Michelle Weeks 
explains, queer folks often experience misinformation when being screened for these conditions, 
even as negative attitudes and homophobic experiences in turn influence the patterns of health-
seeking behaviour.535  
Endometriosis is a condition in which menstrual tissue grows outside of the uterus on the 
pelvis, causing rubbery bands of scar tissue to form between surfaces inside the body. This scar 
tissue can prevent the fallopian tubes from capturing the egg, thereby preventing conception. 
Endometriosis is a fairly common condition, affecting between 4 and 10 million women in the 
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United States, and is often managed through the use of hormones such as oral contraceptives.536 
Lesbian women thereby experience a “higher rate of untreated endometriosis [which] may 
contribute to infertility problems” due to the fact that, “many straight women receive ‘accidental’ 
treatment for mild endometriosis by spending years on oral contraceptives.”537 
There are also higher experiences of PCO and PCOS among lesbian women. According 
to a 2004 report that tracked the health outcomes of women visiting a fertility clinic in Britain, 
the “self identified lesbian women had a significantly higher prevalence of PCO and PCOS 
compared with heterosexual women.”538 In detail, polycystic ovaries were observed in 80 percent 
of lesbian women and in 32 percent of heterosexual women, with further analysis revealing that 
38 percent of lesbian women and 14 percent of heterosexual women had PCOS.”539 High rates of 
PCO and PCOS may translate into difficulty conceiving or carrying babies to term, as “women 
with PCOS may miscarry at a rate of approximately 40 percent, compared with a 15 percent rate 
in the general population.”540 The study offered no explanation as to why lesbian women 
experienced higher rather of polycystic ovaries than heterosexual women. 
There are clearly specific concerns that need to be addressed among lesbian women in 
regard to conception and childbirth, and urgent research that needs to be done among gay and 
transgender communities. Yet as has been seen from the definitions above, the diagnosis of 
infertility currently in circulation depends upon a rigidly heterosexual viewpoint. As sociologist 
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Laura Mamo argues in regard to lesbian women in her important work on Queering 
Reproduction, this epidemiological rigidity does not have to be the case. In regard to the timeline 
at work in the definition of infertility she suggests the following: 
The definition could be extended to lesbians by referring to twelve cycles of intravaginal 
insemination rather than twelve months of unprotected heterosex, but this shift has not 
taken place. Instead, either lesbians are immediately routed toward infertility medicine 
due to the obvious absence of sperm, or their pregnancy attempts take place outside of 
biomedicine. In many ways, the starting place of lesbians’ trajectories depend on what 
they think and feel about biomedicine, advanced technology, and natural reproduction, as 
well as what they know about women’s health movements and their connections with 
alternative insemination.541  
There are multiple ways in which infertility could be adapted and transformed to meet the 
needs of not only queer folks and single people, but heterosexual couples as well. Michelle 
Weeks, for example, calls for more education of physicians and queer folks regarding risk factors 
and screenings for endometriosis and PCO/PCOS. She also argues that “physicians and the 
general public need to understand that queer individuals and couples bring unique situations and 
perspectives to the table, in regards to diagnoses and experiences with infertility.”542 
The next chapter will draw heavily upon interview data gathered through the Creating 
Our Families research project to illustrate the unique perspective of LGBTQ people on medicine, 
law and reproductive technology, and how this shapes their reproductive outcomes. By doing so, 
it highlights the ways in which fertility clinics have been poorly calibrated to the needs of their 
LGBTQ clients. It will showcase the voices of study participants as they entered the clinic, and 
explore the assumptions of pathology, mandatory testing, misreading of queer bodies and 
reliance upon a heavily medicalized and unswervingly heterosexual mode of treatment. 
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Previous chapters have laid an historical and theoretical framework for the ways in which 
queer people find themselves positioned in regard to reproductive technologies. Chapter Seven in 
particular detailed how reproductive trauma operates under the presumption of wounded 
heterosexuality and a reification of ‘natural’ reproduction as a singular form of heterosexual 
intercourse.  
The stories in this chapter include people who conceived both within and outside of the 
clinical model of reproduction. As Laura Mamo suggests, “the biomedical in/fertility framework 
is well institutionalized as the key access point and structure for reproductive assistance. Thus, it 
may be that for lesbians who want to conceive, infertility medicine is becoming ‘an obligatory 
point of passage.’”543 This is borne out by the data, which indicates that lesbian women using 
anonymous donor sperm focused on the clinic as the site of insemination, often using language 
that indicated an apparent lack of choice in the matter. Women who used known donors had 
more latitude, however, and this chapter will detail a couple who began their path to conception 
at the clinic but soon rejected the medical model of reproductive assistance. Gay men and their 
reliance upon surrogates will also be discussed in Chapter Nine, as will transgender women and 
concerns around the heterosexist norm of the two-parent family. 
!%'#.$%
It is important to note at the start of this chapter that the barriers formed by the clinical 
structure are not explicitly discriminatory. While the words “sexual orientation” do not appear in 
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section 15(1) of the Charter as enumerated grounds for protection against discrimination,544 
when the question of same-sex equality finally reached the Supreme Court in Egan v. Canada, a 
unanimous ruling held that sexual orientation should be recognized as an analogous ground for 
Charter protection.545 Also at the federal level, the preamble to the AHRA reflects a concern for 
discrimination against same-sex couples and individuals that dates from the support of lesbian 
access to donor sperm by the RCNRT, and includes a statutory declaration that “persons who 
seek to undergo assisted reproduction procedures must not be discriminated against, including on 
the basis of their sexual orientation or marital status.”546  
On the basis of lower court decisions, provincial legislation, the AHRA and judicial 
interpretation of legislation in light of section 15 of the Charter, it is difficult to imagine that 
lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender people in Canada would today be denied access to assisted 
reproduction, as has occurred in the past.547 Nevertheless, profound structural barriers remain. 
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In 2009, a report by Ontario’s Expert Panel on Infertility and Adoption highlighted some 
of the challenges faced by same-sex families seeking reproductive assistance. The report noted 
that members of LGBTQ communities rarely encountered gender-neutral language in clinical 
assessments or application documents, that brochures and posters depicted only heterosexual 
couples, and that LGBTQ communities may face even greater barriers outside major urban 
centres.548 These outcomes are the result of the normative frames of heterosexuality and 
infertility discussed in Chapter Seven. Charis Thompson refers to the processes of naturalization 
in operation at reproductive centers as the “bedrock” – the discursive and structural practices that 
are dictated less by scientific or formal reasoning than by norms of socialization. As she 
explains, this bedrock:  
[A]lso encompasses the ways in which scientific, biological, or ‘‘natural’’ idioms 
normalize and control the physically or socially deviant, pathological, and dangerous. 
Examining naturalization invites an analysis of the role that is played by specific 
configurations of bedrock in establishing the moral, epistemic, and technical taken-for-
granteds that are essential to the practice of infertility medicine.549 
The bedrock of the clinic is formed by positive attention to the reproductive needs of 
heterosexuals, and attenuating the pathology and trauma of deviance from ‘nature’ that infertility 
medicine seeks to perform. As discussed, the clinic operates to soothe wounded heterosexuality 
and recast its technological interventions as giving nature a ‘helping hand’.  However the 
stability of the heterosexual imaginary is also reliant upon the abjection of the Other, of the 
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genuinely pathological, the agentive unnatural. The co-production of histories of infertility and 
homosexuality has created an epistemic twinning between queer barrenness and the unwanted 
barrenness of heterosexuality. This episteme sits uncomfortably at the bedrock of clinical 
practice, pressed both by a legal mandate to assist queer families, as well as the heterosexual 
imperative to procreate naturally. The result is a clinical discourse that privileges the ‘natural’ 
order and seeks to recreate queer families in the image of the heterosexual couple. 
This chapter will draw upon the voices of research participants to illustrate precisely how 
the inclusions and exclusions of law and medicine impact those bodies who fall outside the 
heterosexual imaginary, and the ways in which participants have responded. As will be seen, the 
queer agents in this chapter both trouble and affirm the constitutive discourses of the clinic, and 
in particular the link between compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory motherhood.  
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the diagnosis of infertility depends on a gendered 
and heterosexist discourse of failure and loss. The medicalization of AHR has pulled all aspects 
of reproductive assistance into a clinical space of monitoring, surveillance, pharmaceuticals and 
vigorous intervention.550 There is a presumption of illness that attaches to the reproductive 
journey, with childlessness understood as a disease that requires swift and often aggressive 
treatment. This pathologization of reproduction can have painful consequences for the queer 
person, even before they enter the fertility clinic.  
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Laura Mamo has argued that the medicalization of reproduction and sexuality are 
intimately linked as ongoing cultural practices. She traces Foucault’s genealogy of the 
‘invention’ of homosexuality (and heterosexuality) by late 19th century sexologists and 
psychologists, and the role of the medical profession in creating the category of the homosexual 
invert.551 This had both psychic and physical dimensions as, for example, the sexual organs of a 
lesbian woman would be compared to that of a ‘normal’ heterosexual woman to locate the source 
of her pathology; Mamo describes how “lesbians stood in contrast to the ideal fertile woman who 
possessed the normal-sized uterus, large breasts, and wide hips necessary for childbearing and 
breastfeeding.”552 Scientific and social discourses constructed lesbian sexuality as a betrayal of 
the ‘natural order’ of the sexes as well as of the ‘naturally’ procreative order of society.553 The 
twinning of pathology in both the frame of infertility (as discussed in Chapter Seven) and the 
figure of the homosexual demonstrates how both have shared a long and interrelated history as 
constructions of ‘unnatural’ deviance and illness. These are overlapping systems of meaning that 
continue to shape the landscape of family formation.554  
Queer people, then, and especially trans-identified people, have long been familiar with 
the medical gaze. Trans people continue to be reliant upon medical authority for basic survival, 
including legal access to their chosen gender identity. To change the sex designation on one’s 
birth certificate in Ontario, for example, a letter of support from a practicing physician or 
psychologist (or psychological associate) authorized to practice in Canada must be provided.555 
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In the past, government interpretation of the Vital Statistics Act has required sex reassignment 
surgery in addition to the medical letter before allowing a change to the birth certificate.556 At the 
same time, the listing of ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ as a psychiatric diagnosis of pathology has 
historically located trans people within a highly medicalized system based not upon client-
centered care but concerns over liability litigation.557   
In order to protect themselves from lawsuits, the medical profession requires that 
a transsexual have a psychiatric diagnosis requiring the surgery. Though you may 
be able to have breast reduction or enhancement surgery, or facelift, etc. 
essentially on demand, you cannot have SRS [sex reassignment surgery] without a 
psychiatrist’s letter saying you need it.558 
Trans-identified people seeking AHR are thus obliged to wrestle not only with 
reproductive trauma and the heterosexual presumptions of the clinic, but a fraught history with 
medical expertise. Even as social movements increasingly redefine homosexuality as well as 
transgender identity in nonmedical terms, these bedrocks persist. To be sure, at times and under 
certain conditions, medicalization may be welcomed as a way to make sense of people’s lives; in 
other moments it may be viewed as a hostile intrusion by an objectifying medical apparatus.559 
These are uneven and multi-directional processes of power, and as Mamo rightly insists: “There 
are no one-way arrows.”560 
                                            
556
 Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter V.4. 
557
 The latest version of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5) has revised ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ to what it considered the less-stigmatizing ‘Gender 
Dysphoria’. However this new definition retains the distress implicit in the original category, and places the 
responsibility for alleviating such distress upon the individual (and her medical practitioners), not upon a culture 
structured according to a strict, presumably fixed, gender binary. As such, even the updated version has received 
strenuous critique from trans activists and allies. See for example: W.P.A.T.H.: Response of the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health to Proposed D.S.M. V Criteria for Gender Incongruence. 25th May 2010. 
558
 Findlay, B., Finding our Place: Transgendered Law Reform Project, (Vancouver: High Risk Project Society 
(March, 1996) at 8. 
559
 For example, gender reassignment surgery may involve a trying process of medical and surgical expertise enacted 
upon trans bodies, even as it provides a welcome conduit for many to physical self-recognition and a cohesion of 
embodied identity.  
560
 She is speaking in exclusive reference to lesbian bodies, but the disciplinary logics apply equally to 
186 
The overwhelming presumptions of infertility discussed in the last chapter serve to haunt 
the clinic in a special way for queer people. They create a space in which the negative 
presumptions of infertility interlock with fears of subjectivation by the medical apparatus, 
lending itself to both a distrust of medical knowledge, as well as a suppliant hope for its benefits. 
Queer bodies are both in step and out of sync with the heteronormative goal of ameliorating 
infertility, simultaneously the focus of technologies aimed at the (normative) heterosexual 
infertility user, and the creator of a possibility for the restructuring of that normativity. For some 
queer people, this combination can lead to great emotional turmoil. One of the most affecting 
interviews I conducted was with a transman in his late 30s. As Daniel described his experience 
of seeking reproductive assistance, he was literally shaking with emotion.   
Interviewer: So you’ve now decided you’re going to take up the fertility clinic 
route…what was that experience like for you? Let’s go through it step by step. 
Daniel: Okay. First, it was very, very scary…Worrying that it means infertile even 
though at that time it’d been literally a handful of times that we’d tried at home…I had no 
concerns about my fertility. So, mostly, I just thought the clinic is gonna pin-point to 
ovulation and help me get pregnant. But then I guess there was still a part of me thinking 
“Well that’s where you go when you can’t have a baby. Clinics are for people who are 
having trouble, who are having difficulty. Do I belong there…do I not belong there?” So 
for all that it was scary.   
The clinic is here figured as a site of helpful intervention – a place to track ovulation and 
allow for successful conception. At the same time it is also viewed as a site of reproductive 
illness – a place for people who are unable to conceive. Daniel struggles to navigate this 
contradiction, afraid that his association with the clinic will mean that he is actually infertile 
despite having no evidence to that effect. The baseline of reproductive pathology reinforces 
Daniel’s fears that the clinic is not a space in which he belongs, as a site of wounded 
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heterosexuality and a place in which one may encounter (and be ensnared in) the trap of 
infertility.  
%& !&$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The impact of reproductive trauma was experienced by lesbian couples as well. It was not 
uncommon to hear how the pathologies of the clinic can shift knowledge of one’s own body and 
heighten one’s anxiety. As the normalization of infertility creates the ideal user of technology as 
heterosexual, it also constructs the range of “normal” treatment options upon an expectation of 
aggressive medical attention. These gendered and heterosexist processes assume that the female 
body in the clinic will be a diseased body, incapable of achieving conception without directed 
medical assistance. Yet as other ethnographies of lesbian families have described, and this 
project confirms, many women initially expect that getting pregnant will be an easy, low-tech 
process carried out without the need for much medical assistance.561 The medicalization of 
reproduction, however, creates not only doubt in this do-it-yourself approach, but routinizes the 
application of high-tech methods as the best (if not only) approach.562 
This complex of doubt and the expectation of advanced technological assistance was 
expressed by Antoinette and Donna, a queer female couple living in a medium-sized city in 
central Ontario. Donna had given birth to their first child, and they had decided that Antoinette 
would carry the second child with assistance from a known sperm donor. Antoinette had been 
doing concerted research online, and calling around to fertility clinics to ensure that – if clinical 
assistance was required – their family’s reproductive needs could be met. She was anxious as to 
whether the clinics would allow them to use a known donor, whether they could use fresh sperm, 
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if the donor would be subjected to psychological evaluations, and if the whole process could be 
carried out before their planned move to another city. They were intending to start with the low-
tech home option, which had been successful for Donna, but had not yet tried home insemination 
with Antoinette. Here, the women describe the ways in which discourses of failure and pathology 
had saturated their experience, to the point that they began to doubt Antoinette’s reproductive 
capability: 
I: So at this point you were planning to do home insemination first. And if things didn’t 
work out then the clinic was going to be your fallback plan. 
Antoinette: Yeah. Pretty much. And that’s kind of what I felt we had to have in place. 
Donna: Yeah. That’s also because for [our first child], when I was cycle-monitoring for 
him, uh, my cycle’s pretty regular. I think that part of it was because Antoinette’s cycle is 
not very regular. And that might have been why you were doing this intense research 
because of fears that it wasn’t going to work. 
Antoinette: Yeah. 
Donna: And, uh, we never really trusted her body for some reason. 
Antoinette: Well, that’s what the clinics do to you. They make you not trust your body. 
Like, that’s what they’re there to do. That’s how they make money, is to make you not 
trust your body.  
The processes of bodily normalization which take place under the rubric of infertility 
exert a profound impact on queer people, as bodies which already exist outside the normative 
bounds of heterosexuality. As Mamo suggests, “Those who do not fit within normalized 
categories are ready targets for the intervention of expert knowledge, as was true for the so-
called barren women who became objects of early-twentieth-century scientific and medical 
discourse as a result of their ‘deviations’ from normal reproductive women.”563 As a queerly 
reproductive body within the pull of clinical expertise and the medical apparatus of reproductive 
technology, Antoinette found herself being subjectivated as a target for expert knowledge. Her 
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irregular cycle was grounds for fear of failure and a turn to the expertise of the clinic, even 
before they had begun to try home insemination. Yet as she recognized the power of the medical 
discourse – that which makes the women not trust Antoinette’s body – she sought to negotiate 
her ‘patient’ role through determined self-advocacy as an informed consumer and researcher of 
medical options. Antoinette thus produced herself as a competent consumer-citizen able to 
navigate the complex economy of reproductive options and fulfill her procreative intentions.564 
" %
The infertility trap manifests not only in regard to the ideal user (heterosexual, suffering 
pathology) and the range of ideal treatment (aggressive, successful), but in terms of the pace at 
which such treatment is extended. This protocol of care similarly follows the model of 
expectation set by heterosexual couples, with screening and surveillance mechanisms designed to 
a) diagnose infertility and b) swiftly ameliorate the reproductive crisis which follows this 
diagnosis. Depending on medical provider, clinical location and the negotiations made by queer 
clients, this may take the form of a step-by-step incremental approach to reproductive care, or a 
fast-track directly into ‘high-tech’ biotechnologies. 
Demonstrating one of these negotiations is a couple named Aisha and Winona - two 
lesbian women who had planned to conceive with an anonymous sperm donor, with Aisha to 
carry the baby. They had purchased frozen sperm through a Toronto-area sperm bank, and were 
seeking help only with the process of insemination. As they made clear during their first 
appointment, they were not interested in accessing any reproductive treatment beyond assistance 
to inseminate with the donor they had chosen. Under the AHRA they were unable to inseminate 
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at home with an anonymous donor, even if Winona had known how to carry out intra-uterine 
insemination and lead a catheter into Aisha’s uterus.565 
In the absence of indications to the contrary, there would be no reason to assume 
reproductive impairment on Aisha’s part. The women had not been inseminating at home before 
making an appointment at the clinic, so even an analogy to the heterosexist diagnosis of 
infertility – twelve months of penetrative sex without conception – would clearly not capture 
their situation. Yet by virtue of walking through the clinic's front doors, Aisha was obliged to 
undergo a battery of mandatory diagnostic testing that assumed the presence of a reproductive 
impairment.566 The rationale for this testing is generally shrouded in rhetorics of efficiency - 
cost, time and clarity – although Aisha and Winona also suspected the intentional exploitation of 
public health funds. Despite their middle-class economic status and college education, the 
women found little room to argue with their doctor about the required testing. Instead, Aisha and 
Winona were swept firmly into the infertility trap and subjected to a regime of medicalization 
designed expressly for the heterosexual couple. In this extended passage, they discuss their 
frustration at a medical system that barreled on without regard for their situation or needs. 
Interviewer: Did the clinic ask you anything about your fertility? Did you have to go 
through fertility testing in the beginning? 
Aisha: Yes. Yeah. Yeah.  
Winona: Yep. 
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Aisha: A whole slew of it. Which, I actually didn’t really want to do…And fairly 
invasive really. I think. Like… 
I: Did you ask at any point, “Why do I have to have these tests?” Or did they explain it 
very much? 
Aisha: Um...I didn’t ask, I don’t think. I don’t remember asking. 
Winona: Well, and as for their explanations, it was just really to sort of see where you 
were at. And to see that, you know, everything was in the best place to conceive, I think 
is how they put it basically, but… 
Aisha: That’s right. In fact, remember Doctor Jones explained...He was like “Okay, we’re 
going to do all of these tests. And if they come back, you know…” He was very sweet, 
but, “If they come back, you know, in a certain way, then we might have to give you 
some drugs.” And I was like, “Am I in grade six or something?” (laughs) That sounded 
so bizarre. And (jokingly) “You might have to give me some drugs.” You know? So I 
think that, because they’re a fertility center, they’re not in the business of being just a 
sperm bank. They’re a fertility center and so what they want to make sure that you’re set 
up and aligned to be, you know, as... 
Winona: …as fertile as possible... 
Aisha: ...as possible…before they go in. Because, right, I’m sure it affects their success 
rates, and everything else. And the diagnostic testing, again— I don’t know if it’s a 
conspiracy theory or what— but all of this is covered through OHIP. So every time you 
go in and all of the tests they do, they are billing back to the Ontario government. We 
didn’t have to pay anything out-of-pocket for it. And it’s not really given as a choice, like 
“Do you just want to come in and try?” Or “Should we go through this?” It’s just 
presented as a...“Here’s what we’re going to do. Here’s all the steps leading up to when 
you can then come in.” 
 
Aisha and Winona expressed a series of frustrations with the screening protocols, the 
invasive character of unwanted tests and the paternalistic language of medical diagnosis. They 
also experienced their suspicion with the clinic’s mandatory screening in the language of a 
“conspiracy theory,” making sense of these protocols as a cash-grab from the provincial health 
care fund.  
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Rather than view the coverage of these services as a welcome provision by the Ontario 
Health Insurance Plan [OHIP], as might a heterosexual couple experiencing difficulty with 
conception, Aisha could make no sense of the program except as an example of clinical self-
interest. As a reproductive body outside the normative structure of heterosexuality and infertility, 
yet struggling to negotiate a place for herself within the clinic, Aisha read the failure to attend to 
her needs as a lesbian as a non-patient-centric and therefore selfishly motivated action. In order 
to access the sperm they had purchased, she was obliged to allow herself to be categorized by the 
diagnostic logics of the clinic and be made a candidate for pharmaceutical treatment. Thus “the 
social category of being a lesbian or a single woman is transformed into a biomedical infertility 
classification, triggering referral to infertility and fertility services.” 567 Aisha’s social status as a 
lesbian was transformed by Doctor Wilson into a legible medical category – an infertility status – 
thereby assigning her a medical classification and allowing her to access the reproductive 
services she desired.  
As discussed, this process of transformation is necessary because the reproductive clinic 
is built around a structure of wounded heterosexuality which assumes that couples will require 
substantial diagnostics to locate their infertility. The system has been designed to process this 
imagined need, and even, to some degree, to help mitigate the costs. Notwithstanding the issue 
Aisha raised of excessive billing to provincial insurance,568 this is structured as a pro-natalist 
medical structure for heterosexual couples in need. It is a biopolitical initiative aimed at allowing 
heterosexual couples with the time, inclination and OHIP coverage to determine why their 
regular intercourse is not leading to pregnancy. Should the diagnosis then compel such couples 
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to move on to expensive IVF procedures and other costly reproductive options, access will 
narrow to only those who can afford such out-of-pocket initiatives.569 As Charis Thompson has 
rightly framed it: “Contemporary infertility and its treatment are conceptualized and structured 
around a strongly coupled, heterosexual, consumer-oriented, normative nuclear-family 
scenography.”570 
For the queer person with a reproductive plan, however, these compassionate supports 
may be perceived as overly medicalized and even invasive responses. At the very least, such 
protocols are not well-calibrated for a same-sex couple who simply need access to sperm.571 
However the medical system cannot understand the social practices of lesbianism that brought 
Aisha and Winona to the door without first transforming them into an epidemiological 
classification. The framework of the clinic funnels these women into a system designed to assess 
the capacities of their reproductive equipment, regardless of social context. For Lou-Ann and 
Rosie, another lesbian couple from the study, this experience led to no small degree of 
resentment. 
Lou-Ann: I think there was a period of anger about having to use these types of services 
when we’re not infertile, and I don’t remember how long that anger lasted. I think it 
probably intensified during the cycle monitoring weeks because then you’re up really 
early in the morning. And sitting in a waiting room for two hours... 
Rosie: …Before you go to work and then you’re just like, “Really? Come on.” 
Lou-Ann: And in terms of the services, this is a whole world that we had to learn about 
that I really wish I never had to learn about…And some people have to do it for physical 
problems and some people have to do it because they’re gay. 
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Rosie: Yeah I think, well I think it was a struggle definitely and there was really a point 
when I kind of thought about, “Yeah, I think maybe we have to give it up.” Because it 
was so hard and definitely not easy. It’s not just, you know, because we have to do it but 
also accessing all the services, and all the little things that you have to do, and waking up 
really early in the morning. 
Lou-Ann: Yeah we were grumpy in the mornings too so we’d argue. 
I: So you both would go to the cycle monitoring?  
Lou-Ann: Yeah we always went together. I never went on my own. Which (laughs), 
which was great and supportive but also meant we argued more. ‘Cause we’re both up 
early and grumpy. So… 
Rosie: Yeah. But, you know, we got her. (Gestures toward baby.) 
Lou-Ann: Yeah. 
Rosie: I wouldn’t have changed a thing because now we have her. 
 These couples were all successful in negotiating the infertility trap of the clinic and 
accessing the insemination services they required to conceive. However they also expressed 
varying degrees of frustration, doubt, resignation and despair at the process. As Rosie says, there 
was a period during which she and Lou-Ann nearly gave up due to anger at having to undergo 
early-morning cycle monitoring when there were no clinical indications it was necessary.  
Many of the queer couples I interviewed had expected to start right away with the 
business of getting pregnant; instead they found a medicalized structure in place that required 
extensive gatekeeping and screening. The presumption of illness was always at the fore, even 
when not appropriate to the situation or the actors seeking reproductive assistance.  
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LGBTQ people were not passive recipients of reproductive services, however, and a 
number of study participants described their attempts to actively resist a range of unwanted 
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testing. Resistance to medical protocols was especially pronounced with trans-identified people 
and their partners, who were intimately familiar with the normalizing structures of the clinic and 
had developed a responsive vocabulary against these biomedical regimes. Kristin, a cisgender 
woman who conceived a child with her partner Isabel, a transwoman, recounts her attempt to set 
limits on the tests she would undergo. In this passage, Kristin is talking about her response to the 
medical procedures the clinic wants her to take. 
Kristin: They were also quite insistent on treating me as if I was infertile and testing me 
endlessly to prove I was fertile before they wasted their resources on trying to get me 
pregnant. And I mean, I eventually said no to anything that involved radiation. 
Isabel: Or Clomid. 
Kristin: Or Clomid – which they wanted to give me before they even tried to impregnate 
me once! 
 In this reading the insistence on mandatory testing is again ascribed to non-
compassionate motives on the part of the clinic. However this time it is not the ‘conspiracy 
theory’ of tapping provincial healthcare reserves, as Aisha advanced, but Kristin’s suspicion that 
she would be viewed as a “waste of resources” if she were found to be infertile. (Although 
interestingly, in another passage of the interview, Isabel also suggested that fleecing OHIP might 
be a motivation.)  
In Kristin’s analysis her queer reproductive body experiences the baseline assumption of 
infertility as a suspicion, a threshold that must be disproven to qualify for the benefits of 
reproductive assistance. While the perception of the gatekeeping function may be viewed 
differently, the heterosexism of infertility again displaces the queer frame of reference. These 
medical procedures are again experienced as non-patient-centric and an example of clinical self-
interest, drastically out of step with queer timelines for conception.  
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It may be helpful at this point to overview just what this range of fertility testing might 
involve. It is also important to note that testing protocols will vary widely from clinic to clinic. 
There are no standard regulations in North America to lay out mandatory diagnostic procedures, 
with each facility determining their own best practices. The stories of the Creating Our Families 
participants, however, indicate that the following series of tests is fairly standard practice in at 
least Ontario fertility clinics. 
When a couple like Kristin and Isabel first walk into the clinic, they will have an 
appointment with an on-site fertility counselor, nurse or doctor. The medical practitioner will 
offer an appraisal of the reproductive options open to the couple, listing the procedures and risks 
involved. The person intending to carry the baby, in this case Kristin, will then have initial blood 
work drawn to provide information about how her ovaries function on a daily basis.572 These 
tests include a breakdown of levels of Follicle-Stimulating Hormone, Luteinizing Hormone, and 
estradiol (biologically available estrogen). Kristin will also be screened for uncommon causes of 
decreased ovulation, such as elevated prolactin and an under-active thyroid.  Bloodwork will 
commonly include screening for HIV, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and Syphilis, and may involve 
confirmation of the immune system status to other conditions that may affect the pregnant body, 
such as Measles, Mumps, Rubella, Chicken Pox, Parvovirus and Toxoplasmosis. If the woman is 
considering donor sperm, basic testing will then include a blood test for cytomegalovirus (CMV) 
exposure.  
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In Kristin and Isabel’s case they were planning to use Isabel’s sperm to conceive, and so 
her semen will also be collected to undergo testing for low motility or abnormal morphology. As 
the women are sexual partners, under the dictates of the Semen Regulations it will be possible to 
inseminate Kristin with Isabel’s fresh, washed sperm. First, however, Kristin will be encouraged 
to undergo a procedure to check for issues with her uterus, ovaries, endometrium and fallopian 
tubes. Many women also undergo a hysterosalpingogram to x-ray the uterus and check for 
blockages of the fallopian tubes, a painful procedure which involves exposing the pelvis and 
ovaries to a small amount of radiation. Using a technique called fluoroscopy, dye is injected 
through the cervix and into the uterus, from where it flows through the fallopian tubes. (Kristin 
was articulate in her refusal to be exposed to radiation and rejection of this procedure, but this 
was certainly not the case for all study participants.)   
Other participants underwent sonohysterography, an ultrasound procedure used to 
evaluate the endometrium. The technique involves the placement of a catheter into the 
endometrial canal with subsequent instillation of sterile saline solution. Depending on the clinic 
she may also be asked to have an Antral Follicle Count performed in order to obtain an 
ultrasound assessment of the ovaries, as well an Anti-Mullerian Hormone Level blood test to 
measure ovarian responsiveness and the number of potential eggs remaining in her ovaries.573 
This barrage of jargon is intentional. As my research made clear, when queer people seek 
out reproductive assistance in Ontario fertility clinics – and even when making explicit the 
absence of a medical issue - they are being urged if not required to undergo comprehensive 
diagnostic blood testing before assistance can begin. It also appears as if women and transmen 
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are being advised to perform the deeply uncomfortable hysterosalpingogram. This is a highly 
medicalized system of treatment and one which requires costly and often unnecessary procedures 
under a dizzying array of names. 
Should the woman be planning to inseminate with frozen donor sperm, it is likely that she 
will also be prescribed oral fertility drugs such as Clomid or progesterone to stimulate her 
ovaries and improve the chances of insemination.574 Kristin was planning to use her partner’s 
fresh sperm, and even she reported feeling pressure from the clinic to take Clomid, which, as she 
says, “they wanted to give me before they even tried to impregnate me once!” If she does not 
successfully conceive after a few rounds of insemination with oral pharmaceuticals, she may 
then be encouraged to try injectable drugs such as Bravelle, Menopur or Repronex. 
Once the woman has begun the drug cycle, her ovaries will be monitored by sonography 
and the final process of ovulation triggered by an injection of Human Chorionic Gonadotropin 
before the prepared semen sample is injected directly into the uterus with a fine catheter. As U.S. 
and Canadian clinics are currently self-regulating the range of mandatory testing will vary; 
however the Creating Our Families research makes it clear that people are being encouraged to 
undergo screening and drug regimes which may be inappropriate for their situation. When 
Kristin and Isabel were pressed to describe exactly what was mandated for their intake, and what 
they resisted, they offered the following description of the clinic’s medical protocols: 
Kristin: They wanted to do a test that involved radioactive dye… I said, “I don’t want 
you putting radioactive dye into my reproductive system as I try to get pregnant. So no.” 
(laughs) And, uh, then they offered me Clomid. 
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Isabel: Yeah! 
Kristin: They were like, “Well why don’t we just give you some Clomid? Like, see what 
happens.” And I was like, “Well, I totally don’t want twins. And I’m not infertile.” So I 
was like, “No!” (laughs) So…yeah...those were the two things that I said no to.  
Isabel: And again, like, they would have billed OHIP for prescribing that and dispensing, 
possibly. 
Kristin: Yeah...yeah. 
I: And did you get a sense of why they were so keen to prescribe infertility drugs to 
someone who had no fertility problems? 
Kristin: Well, Isabel’s analysis is convincing…about billing OHIP.  
Isabel: (laughs) 
Kristin: I also thought it was, like, uh...to someone with a hammer everything looks like a 
nail situation. Like, you’re a fertility clinic and you’re not built for helping fertile people 
get pregnant. You’re built for infertility and that just becomes your mindset after a while. 
 
This theme - that people take unwanted drugs to stimulate their fertility despite not 
presenting with a medical issue - was commonly expressed by many participants. A suspicion of 
the clinic was also present, with a number of women independently suggesting that access to 
OHIP funds might be the real motivator behind clinical protocols. Others clearly identified the 
framework of ‘infertility’ as the problem. As Kristin says succinctly: “You’re built for infertility 
and that just becomes your mindset after a while.” This mindset, unfortunately, imposed real-
world consequences upon the queer people seeking to navigate the space of the clinic. Pressure 
to undergo extensive testing and – potentially dangerous - pharmaceutical treatment was widely 
reported. As a lesbian-identified woman named Simone relates in the passage below, the 
pressure to begin drug therapy started even before she had begun her fertility diagnostics (where 
it would be found that she had so-called “gorgeous ovaries”): 
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Simone: I can remember they really pushed the drugs on you, the fertility drugs. They try 
and convince you to, you know, make you ovulate more or whatever. So I didn’t want to 
do it, at least…Yeah I didn’t want to be pregnant that badly.  
Interviewer: So first they commented that you have gorgeous ovaries and then they were 
also saying – 
Simone: Well this is even before they looked at the ovaries I think. This was like “You 
know this is an option you can think about.” Cause they just, you know, it’s like a 
factory. Trying to just push people in, get them knocked up (laughs) and push them out 
(laughs) or whatever. I don’t know. So yeah like they really offer up the drugs right away 
almost or they said “You know we can try it a couple times and then you can decide” or 
you know. 
Interviewer: And this is before they even tested you? 
Simone: Yeah. Yeah.  
 
Lesbian women may feel obliged to seek out biomedical forms of assistance when using 
anonymous donor sperm, with a known sperm donor, or when seeking to inseminate with the 
sperm of a partner with whom one does not have penetrative sex. The institutionalization of the 
medical structure of reproductive assistance has made it the ‘first step’ for many on the journey 
to conception, even if for basic screening and bloodwork. The more recent technologization of 
donor sperm has made it especially likely that the clinic will be a necessary point of passage.  
Despite active negotiation of this medical frame, queer people are being subjectivated by 
a system based on dysfunction, and clinical temporalities which remain in sync with exclusively 
heterosexual rhythms. For example, even based on the (flawed) heterosexual definition of 
infertility, which the clinics profess to follow, a medical issue is flagged after twelve months of 
sexual intercourse without conception. By this model, then, lesbian couples should undergo one 
calendar year of drug-free insemination before ramping up to more invasive methods, and 
particularly injectable drugs. Too high of a dose of any of these drugs can lead to a serious 
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condition called ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, wherein the ovaries swell and fill with 
fluid, leading to bleeding, infection and even life-threatening complications.575 Based on 
numerous retellings of the reproductive ‘factory’ story, and the immediate clinical push toward 
bloodwork, scans and drugs, this one-year window is not being observed. 
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Of course this testing may sometimes have a positive side. Certainly not all LGBTQ 
people are robustly fertile, and some face reproductive issues which might be usefully caught by 
diagnostic testing. As discussed in Chapter Seven, some research indicates that lesbian women 
may actually be more prone to endometriosis, Polycystic Ovaries and Polycystic Ovarian 
Syndrome than heterosexual women.576 Clinical screening methods may well be viewed as 
appropriate in hindsight, when potential issues were caught early and addressed successfully. 
For example I conducted an interview with a lesbian couple who had undergone 
reciprocal IVF – a procedure in which the egg of one woman is fertilized with donor sperm and 
transferred into the uterus of the other. Here, Nicole and Paula discuss their positive experience 
with sonohysterography, an ultrasound test involving the infusion of a saline solution into 
the uterus. Mandatory testing had revealed polyps in Paula’s uterus, which they then removed 
before beginning IVF.  
Paula: So, I had the two polyps that had to be removed because they can cause 
miscarriages and, you know, I never would have known about that if we hadn’t gone 
through this procedure. If we had been doing home inseminations or if I was with a man 
and having sex, I could have had multiple miscarriages or trouble getting pregnant and I 
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never would have known why until I would have had to go to a doctor anyways. So it’s 
good to be all checked out (laughs). 
Nicole: Which we had said in relation (laughs) to the fact that it is quite medical and 
maybe antiseptic at the clinic, but that those battery of tests can actually be a reasonable 
thing. They have to catch the... 
Paula: …I mean we had some friends that are straight and are trying to get pregnant and 
having a hard time. Yeah, sometimes it is hard.  
Nicole’s positive review of the tests as “a reasonable thing” is a pragmatic evaluation, 
welcoming the finding of Paula’s potential conception issues despite the medicalized and 
“maybe antiseptic” setting of the clinic. It is interesting to note that the women had already 
chosen to undergo the process of reciprocal IVF, which is a far more engaged and complex 
intervention than (for example) donor sperm insemination.  
The partner who is providing the eggs for reciprocal IVF, in this case Nicole, must 
undergo a grueling procedure involving pituitary suppression and ovarian stimulation through 
daily drug injection, in which hormonal medications are used to stimulate the ovaries to induce 
maturation of multiple eggs. Her cycle will then be manipulated with oral contraceptive pills 
and/or Lupron, after which controlled ovarian stimulation with Follicle Stimulating Hormone 
may begin. When the follicles are mature, Nicole’s eggs will be retrieved via ultrasound-guided 
needle through the top of the vagina into the ovaries. The extracted eggs are then fertilized with 
donor sperm, after which the embryo transfer of fertilized eggs occurs via catheter into the 
uterus. The only technical difference between standard IVF and reciprocal IVF is the 
involvement of two women, with the transfer happening into Paula’s uterus rather than 
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Nicole’s.577 Paula must therefore undergo her own battery of tests, including the 
sonohysterography which located the polyps in her uterus.  
Thus Paula and Nicole had negotiated a decision-making position within the clinic based 
upon their willingness to undergo advanced medical procedures and drug intervention. They had 
already accepted a location within ‘high-tech’ clinical practice, and were grateful for the testing 
which “caught” Paula’s polyps before the difficult and costly procedure of reciprocal IVF began. 
Their starting point is therefore quite different than that of the women in the first part of this 
chapter.   
Monica and Rochelle, on the other hand, were a lesbian couple who had expected to get 
easily pregnant and were simply seeking out the clinic for assistance with ‘low-tech’ donor 
insemination. 
Monica: …And then it turned out that Rochelle had endometriosis. 
I: And she didn’t know beforehand? 
Monica: No, I mean, she’d always had painful periods, so I think it kind of explained a 
number of things. And so, she originally thought, you know, “We don’t really need a 
fertility specialist.” Like I remember her saying, “It’s not like we’re infertile, we just need 
somebody to get us pregnant.” Like, “I don’t need to go through all the stuff, right? I 
don’t need to take medication, I don’t…” She didn’t really feel like she needed to do all 
these different things. 
Despite her reluctance to take the tests, Rochelle was required to undergo the standard 
series of blood and diagnostic evaluations. It was during these tests that the doctors found 
indications of endometriosis. Rochelle and Monica navigated their participation in the full 
biomedical regime of the clinic by deciding to try a first round of donor insemination just to “see 
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what happens” before considering more intensive procedures. This initial round was 
unsuccessful, and the women went back to their doctor for advice about how best to proceed. 
Monica: And then after that, our doctor said, cause we were older, you know, I think 
Rochelle was thirty eight at the time.  He kind of said, “You know what...” And we had 
limited, we only bought five samples [of donor sperm], so, you don’t want to use them all 
up and it’s expensive.  Each time, we figured, between the sperm and the procedures 
about a thousand bucks, so and I kind of thought, “We can’t go through our sperm this 
quickly.”  And he said, “You know because of the endometriosis, you would improve 
your chances if you had surgery.” So we tried in the summer, I think that was maybe June 
or July with nothing and then in September she had the surgery and then she got pregnant 
right after that in October.   
I: And it was laser surgery? 
Monica: Yes.  Laparoscopic and, so that was actually quite effective. So she got pregnant 
that fall…So that was great, we only had to use two of our samples, which was super.   
Their pragmatic approach to the scarcity of donor sperm and the cost of privatized 
reproductive assistance led the women to quickly acquiesce to the option of surgery. The 
objective of achieving pregnancy with limited resources necessitated an aggressive surgical 
approach, which Monica recalled with satisfaction. The choreography of their interaction with 
the fertility clinic involved an exercise of agency through their willing subjectification to the 
objectifying medical modes and diagnoses (“endometriosis”) of the clinic.  
As Charis Cussins has argued in the context of heterosexual IVF, objectification and 
agency are co-constitutive, not distinct social processes.578 Thus women can adopt the role of 
patient and manage medical treatments to achieve their goals of, in the case of Monica and 
Rochelle, getting pregnant while conserving scarce donor sperm resources and limited funds. 
They intended for Monica to conceive their second child from the same donor sperm, and 
following Rochelle’s socialization within the medical system, Monica also willingly submitted to 
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the full range of testing. After the birth of their first child, for example, Monica describes her 
willingness to undergo a hysterosalpingogram despite a certainty that she would not be facing 
any issues of reproductive impairment. 
Monica: I had presumed everything would be fine for me because you know, I’ve got 
seven nieces and nephews, I just felt like our family obviously is fertile and this isn’t 
going to be an issue.  And I remember Rochelle was in the hospital and I went for the dye 
test where they check your tubes. 
I: Yes. 
Monica: And it didn’t work.  It was extremely painful and he tried twice and it was like 
agonizingly painful and he said, “You know, you’ve got blocked tubes, the dye is just not 
going to go through.” And I remember, Rochelle just had the C section, she was in the 
hospital, Frida [their first child] was just a few days old and I just, just thought, you 
know, it had been fairly smooth for her after all that initial stuff.  And it just wasn’t in my 
realm of conception that I would have any issues at all. So I remember being devastated.  
Like I just can’t believe this, you know, cause he said, you know, “You have to go 
straight to in vitro, there’s no other options for you.” So that just, you know, lots more 
money, lots more, just lots more uncertainty right.   
Monica then experienced a series of three unsuccessful IVF cycles. Rather than follow 
the surgical pathway, as Rochelle had done, Monica took the advice of her doctor to go “straight 
to in vitro” without exploring other options. Over the course of one year Monica had her eggs 
extracted and fertilized, and underwent one fresh and two frozen cycles of IVF without success. 
Finally, approximately a year after her diagnosis with blocked tubes, Monica had a fresh cycle of 
IVF that implanted successfully. Unfortunately she shortly experienced hyper-ovarian 
stimulation as a result of the injectable hormones she had prescribed as part of the IVF treatment.   
Monica: …I developed right away, what do you call it, uh I’m drawing a blank, what do 
you call it, where you bloat up.  Where you’ve got too much of the, oh it will come to me.  
Anyway I had to be hospitalized shortly afterwards because I ballooned up, like I was 
three months pregnant and uh, cause you develop all this extra fluid going through… 
I: OK.  What was the cause of this? 
206 
Monica: It was the in vitro, so it’s a side effect of the medication.  Hyper stimulation, so 
in a very small percentage.  Like, I think a lot of women hyper stimulate but a very small 
percentage, you actually get the severe fluid retention.  So I was hospitalized for a few 
days and eventually it passed…but I actually maintained a lot of fluid throughout my 
pregnancy, it was very odd actually.  Um, and then the pregnancy was generally pretty 
straight forward, other than the fluid retention and then I developed gestational diabetes, 
but you know, that’s more genetic than anything… 
The story of Monica and Rochelle is instructive as a complex negotiation of their social 
expectations as lesbians in search of donor insemination, skepticism of infertility as a diagnostic, 
and the biomedical trajectory of surgery, medication and reproductive intervention designed to 
meet that diagnostic. Clearly, although these tests are designed to account for heterosexual 
infertility they do not always pose an unwanted hurdle for LGBTQ people. Monica spoke of her 
experience without anger, and was able to persevere through physical and financial hardship to 
meet her family’s reproductive goals.   
Yet after her negative experience at a Toronto-area clinic, Antoinette looked ruefully 
back at the treatment she had received. Although Antoinette had also gotten successfully 
pregnant, and their children were lively presences in the room during the interview, there were 
still regrets about the way treatment had proceeded. 
I: Had they not been mandatory at the clinic, do you think you would have wanted to 
have those tests done? 
Antoinette: I probably would have not wanted to. Because all we wanted was the sperm. 
And my philosophy always was, if there’s no problem, don’t go investigating it. Like, 
unless I’d tried twelve times with live sperm, you know, an had a problem, then I 
probably wouldn’t have sought those — ‘cause they’re really uncomfortable tests. 
The mandatory application of diagnostic tests, without regard for the social positioning of 
the client of reproductive technology, posed a problem for some women. Others, at least in 
retrospect, welcomed these tests and the results they offered in achieving their goals of 
pregnancy and reproduction. Queer folks were adept at constructing the narrative and agency of 
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their own medical histories, as they managed to maneuver the biomedical trajectory in ways that 
mimic, borrow and supplant normalization tendencies.579 Yet most had little option as to whether 
this trajectory was the proper course. The disciplinary forces of the clinic operated to flatten the 
social experience of LGBTQ people, pressing them into a medical model which may, in 
retrospect, appear effective for some, but which for others is recalled as oppressive and 
heterosexist. A blanket proscription aimed at the infertile heterosexual couple is frankly unwise 
in terms of time, cost and emotional wellbeing. Foregrounding patient agency and latitude to 
navigate the medicalized discourses of the clinic will also require recognition that not every 
person passing through the clinic doors is a heterosexual ‘patient’ who will present with a 
medical problem for treatment. 
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 There are some clinics that do not mandate this barrage of testing for same-sex couples. 
Interestingly, the data indicates that Ontario clinics operate from this baseline of heterosexual 
infertility, requiring all people seeking reproductive assistance to undergo standard diagnostics. 
However a lesbian couple who lived near the Ontario border had sought out reproductive 
assistance in Manitoba, as the closest clinic to their home. They reported a more flexible regime 
that was adapted for the social experience of same-sex couples.  As they recounted, the doctor 
had not suggested or directed diagnostic testing, instead contextualizing their needs as a same-
sex partnership and counseling a ‘low-tech’ approach to start. After conducting her own cycle 
monitoring at home, Trish immediately began insemination with anonymous donor sperm and 
conceived upon the first round.  
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Interviewer: When you were at the fertility clinic in Winnipeg did they put you through 
fertility tests? Was that part of your intake? 
Trish: No. 
Interviewer: Did they ask if you wanted to have them? 
Trish: No. They said that they don’t - they wouldn’t do that unless I wasn’t getting 
pregnant. They don’t put people through fertility tests unless there’s a reason - unless 
they’re not getting pregnant when they should be…So [the doctor] said, “If we try three 
times and you don’t get pregnant then we’re gonna look into it. But we’ll give it three 
tries first.” 
 
Trish and Anya were grateful for the ease of their experience and rated both the doctor 
and the clinic very highly. They did not recall any LGBTQ-specific issues with their treatment, 
and even looked back on their time at the clinic with some fondness. This was partly because of 
the speed of their successful insemination – their child was conceived on the first try – but also 
due to their evasion of the infertility trap. In recognizing their social positioning as a lesbian 
couple, the doctor was able to accurately respond with patient-centric care that was appropriate 
to their age, sexuality, reproductive history and health. This is a working model of reproductive 
assistance that remains quite uncommon. Few reproductive providers are able to recognize the 
particular needs of LGBTQ people without depending upon the rubric of wounded 
heterosexuality and the hypermedicalization of queer experience. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most sustained critique of fertility clinics and the flattening of 
queer experience came from a couple who had rejected the clinical mode entirely. Jacqueline and 
Tonya had recruited Jacqueline’s brother to serve as their donor, and the two women visited a 
clinic in Toronto to learn more about their reproductive options. When they encountered the 
onerous demands of the Semen Regulations on known third-party donors, however, they decided 
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to carry out the process at home.580 This experience with the barriers posed to known donors 
continued to irritate Jacqueline long after their visit to the clinic. 
Jacqueline: I’m serious, like I’m still angry to this day about, about that clinic 
experience. Cause I think that a lot of people that are going in with known donors 
or friends, they virtually put a barrier up and it makes so that if you want an 
anonymous donor it’s already out of the price range. But if you have a known 
donor or you want to co-parent or anything like this, it just makes the cost even 
more. And for the average family it’s already expensive, so can you imagine what 
it does if they’re going to store this stuff for six months and do these extra 
procedures… financially [it] can be impossible for some families. 
 
Their rejection of the medical protocols for known third-party donors led to a decision to 
avoid the clinic altogether, which meant an avoidance of the testing regime as well as the early-
morning cycle monitoring described by other study participants with distaste. Jacqueline and 
Tonya describe the intentionally ‘low-tech’ modes of reproduction they pursued, structured in no 
small part by distrust of the medical practices of the clinic: 
Jacqueline: [For the insemination] we used a medicine syringe, just a little medicine 
syringe, we did nothing special other than charting Tonya’s cycle. Which I did for a good 
year before we actually did the insemination itself, because I don’t trust those clinics. 
Even though we were [planning on] going to the clinic, I had already started charting her 
cycle ahead of time from what I’d been reading, because I’m just that kind of nerd. But, 
you know, we charted a number of different ways because the temperature thing doesn’t 
always work out. So finally we used a whole combination of, I’d say our own home 
grown method of figuring it out, and we were able to nail it down to two days. 
They describe the series of tests the clinic had scheduled after their first intake session, 
and the scheduling of a hysterosalpingogram for Tonya as part of standard protocol. As 
Jacqueline said with incredulity: “Isn’t this something that you do with someone with a potential 
blockage? And when there may be some reason why you might want to do this procedure?” the 
women ended up cancelling the appointment, not least because they had already begun 
inseminating at home and  were concerned about the potential for the dye to interfere with 
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Tonya’s pregnancy. As Tonya explains, they had already started to “feel hopeful” that they could 
do home insemination, which both of the women much preferred to the hypermedicalization of 
the clinic. Ultimately Tonya successfully conceived two children at home through simple intra-
cervical insemination. Her dominant emotion was relief at being able to avoid the surveillance, 
heterosexism and barriers of the clinic. 
Tonya: Well I have to say, well I was a little surprised by the whole thing, I thought it 
would be simple but I was actually kind of relieved because once I went there, I didn’t 
feel comfortable, I just thought, I don’t want to go through it.   
Jacqueline: I don’t understand how anyone gets pregnant there.   
 
Heterosexual Reiterations of the Clinic 
The queer families described above experienced a variety of different clinical encounters. 
The norms of reproductive medicine and their heterosexist foundations are cemented by both law 
and protocol, yet these norms still require reiteration for their sustainability. Clinical practices 
must be enacted by doctors, nurses, students as well as by the people seeking reproductive 
assistance. It is within these enactments and the meanings attributed to the disciplinary modes of 
the clinic that queer people found rhetoric and strategies to allow them to achieve their goals of 
conception. In some cases this meant leaving the clinical framework altogether. In others it 
meant contesting or refusing certain diagnostics or pharmaceuticals. Queer people occasionally 
found purchase and recognition within the clinic, as with the lesbian couple who traveled to 
Winnipeg for reproductive assistance. They may also be grateful for diagnostic testing and the 
heterosexist logics of the clinic, not least when it apparently functions to carry them closer to 
their aims. 
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Queer agents are uniquely able to trouble the relations of coherence among 
heterosexuality and the ‘helping hand’ to nature that the fertility industry aims to provide. Queer 
reproductive projects thereby have the capacity to open the “matrix of intelligibility” and trouble 
anticipated structures of continuity between sex, gender, sexual practice and reproduction.581 Yet 
as has been seen, the resolute heterosexuality of the infertility trap may also render queer 
reproductive needs as marginal. The internal logics of the clinic are based around etiologies of 
disease and trauma, and leave scarce room for alternative versions of family.  
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When seen through the rigid modality of infertility, family arrangements that exist 
outside of the heterosexual dyad become hard to read. This extends not only to the trajectories of 
care, as discussed above with the presumptions of heterosexual disease. It is also overlaid upon 
structural relations as well. This means that bureaucratic protocols designed for the two-parent 
heterosexual couple are applied without hesitation onto the queer couple. For example, Monica 
discussed the headache she Rochelle experienced at a critical moment in their IVF cycle. Due to 
the clinic’s rigid paperwork requirements, they would not proceed with Monica’s IVF treatment 
unless Rochelle’s blood work was current.  
Monica: One thing that we encountered was, blood work had to be a year old. You had to 
be up to date.  But I remember when I went to have my second in vitro, I got a call saying 
“Rochelle’s blood work is not up to date.” Which isn’t so relevant for us, right, like we’re 
not using…like if it’s a male and we’re using their sperm. I can see there might be issues 
with that blood work needing to be up to date but… 
I: Right. 
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Monica: And that’s where she said, “And I realize for you that that’s not an issue but our 
policy is that the partner has to have their blood work up to date.” And I think I 
remember, that they won’t do the procedure unless they have that on file.  
I: Right. 
Monica: So it was like a big rush, like we had to rush to get it done, otherwise… 
I: Was this within a day or two, or the same day as your IVF? 
Monica: No it was a few days before because we needed to get our results back pretty 
quickly… 
I: So that can be stressful? 
Monica: Yeah. Because obviously, you know, timing is everything with IVF. 
*** 
Monica: That sort of surprised us and I think they were apologetic about it but basically 
said… 
I: It’s the policy. 
Monica: It’s the policy, the partner needs to have it, whether or not it makes sense for 
you, but it needs to be up to date.   
 This last-minute scramble to complete the necessary documents was a harried episode for 
the women during an already stressful period. And while the clinic’s staff recognized, and even 
apologized for, the arbitrary nature of the policy, it was nevertheless enforced as a matter of 
protocol. The structural elements of heteronormativity pervade the bureaucratic operations of the 
clinic, obscuring other social arrangements and intimate frames. This bedrock defies scientific or 
procedural logic, and yet is reproduced by the clinical staff as a necessary operation in the 
production of structural coherence. Adherence to the heterosexual matrix of intelligibility also 
extended to expectations around the two-parent model of reproductive partnership.  
For example, Wendy and her partner Kanako described how they both underwent 
standard screening and bloodwork at an Ottawa fertility clinic, despite the fact that Wendy had 
clearly presented as the only one intending to carry the child. The clinic’s intake protocols 
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included mandatory testing for both partners, even though for many queer couples, only one 
party is there as a reproductive agent.  
Kanako: We were both tested for…all kinds of sexually transmitted diseases. 
Wendy: Not sure why you were tested. 
Kanako: The standard thing before they start apparently, that they check everybody for 
diseases you would pass on I guess in pregnancy.  
I: (to Kanako) But if you were not…did you declare specifically from the start that you 
had no intention of becoming pregnant? 
Kanako: No. No…I’d never said “No. I wouldn’t get pregnant.” 
*** 
Wendy: Although when they did talk about the testing you did say, “But I’m not…” 
Kanako: Yeah. 
Wendy: I remember that. 
Kanako: “I’m not the one that’s getting pregnant.” 
Wendy: “And that’s what, well that’s the standard and this is what we do.” 
 
Another same-sex female couple, Mahta and Veronica, had a similar experience, with the 
non-reproductive partner subjected to a range of intake testing. In the following passage, they 
describe being asked to take the test for cytomegalovirus (CMV) – a necessary requirement when 
a woman is inseminating with donor sperm. Approximately half of North American adults have 
been affected by CMV, but it is usually without symptoms and the infection results in the 
presence of antibodies in the blood.582 If a woman does not have immunity to CMV, however, 
using a sperm sample from a donor who is CMV-antibody-positive creates a small risk of 
infection in the newborn.583 It had been clearly established that Veronica was the only partner 
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inseminating with donor sperm, yet both she and Mahta were told they both needed to get 
bloodwork taken, including the test for CMV. They had some difficulty remembering the exact 
name of the virus – they had already cycled through the acronyms CHC, CIB and CHA as this 
passage begins.  
Mahta: You can catch it from others just like some sort of sexually transmitted disease 
that you can get. It would not affect you at any time. It’s either CIB or CBI - either of 
those.  
Veronica: Something like that. And then if the donor had it…it would have been a bad 
thing. 
I: But they tested you for this? 
Mahta: Yeah. 
Veronica: Both of us. 
I (to Mahta): And did they explain why you were being tested for anything? 
Mahta: Well I told them, I said: “I have nothing to do with the whole process. So why?” 
and then they’re like, “Oh you have to be tested.” I’m like, “Okay.” I mean, well, it’s not 
like I really have a choice there. Whatever they say, you have to do. 
 
Mahta notes her lack of ability to negotiate the heterosexual model of intake, wherein 
both partners are tested for their reproductive capacity and for the presence of infertility. The 
practices of the clinic expect that the male-female partnership is aiming at biological 
reproduction, and as such both partners are viewed as (at least potentially) reproductive bodies. 
When the goal is donor insemination, however, the focus is only on the individual who will be 
trying to conceive. In the cases above, only Veronica is planning to carry the child; only Wendy 
intends to get pregnant. As Mahta said clearly: “I have nothing to do with the whole process.” 
However the clinic still pushes both members of the reproductive partnership to undergo testing, 
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and specifically a screening protocol which is required only when planning to become pregnant 
from donor sperm. The reasons for this are three-fold. 
First, as discussed, is the foundational mode of the heterosexual imaginary. As both 
partners are expected to have a biological stake in the child, it is expected to be necessary to 
evaluate both parties to the reproductive union. This mode persists in the clinic’s ready 
application to queer families, despite its evidently inappropriate character for same-sex couples. 
Bureaucracy, screening and internal protocols designed for heterosexual families are overlaid 
upon queer experience to unfortunate effects.   
Second, is the assumption analyzed in Chapter Seven in the unpacking of infertility: that 
the female body is open for business. In a later section of this chapter, it will be shown how 
easily the focus can shift from one female body to the next, when the first lesbian partner is 
deemed an unsuitable candidate for pregnancy.584 Every body in the clinic is thought to be a 
potentially reproductive body, even when this contradicts what has been indicated by the 
individual herself. Thus even when Mahta protests that she has nothing to do with the process, 
and Kanako explains that she will not be bearing the child, the clinic still treats her like a 
possible candidate for reproduction. In this way “infertility medicine appropriates compulsory 
heterosexuality and transforms it into ‘compulsory reproduction.’ The new grounding 
assumption becomes ‘If you can achieve pregnancy, you must procreate.’”585 
Finally, there is the question of negotiation and agency within a limited range of options. 
A language of hapless resignation was pronounced in all three of these interviews. As Mahta 
said, “[I]t’s not like I really have a choice there. Whatever they say, you have to do.” Monica 
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relayed the language of the clinic’s staff regarding mandatory testing, and their blunt explanation 
that “it’s the policy” whether it makes sense or not. Similarly, Wendy recounted what the intake 
staff had told her, as they made it clear: “[T]hat’s the standard and this is what we do.” As the 
machinery of the clinic grinds along, these women found themselves unable to exercise much 
control over their own treatment.  
This loss of control is referenced very clearly by Wendy and Kanako at a later point in 
the interview. As discussion progressed, the question arose of how these procedures had made 
them feel, given that Kanako was not the one getting pregnant and the tests would be 
unnecessary. Their sense of vulnerability within a dispassionate clinical structure was painfully 
apparent. 
I: Okay, so they just ran a bunch of tests. They ran a bunch of tests on you…was any of 
this making you feel any which way? 
Kanako: I did think it was odd.  
I: Yeah. 
Kanako: I did think it was odd that I was tested…Um but never really questioned it.  
I: You just figured it was part of the package. 
Kanako: Yeah, yeah. 
Wendy: It’s part of what you do, right? You want to get pregnant, it’s part of what you 
do. You’re in a vulnerable place when you’re trying to get pregnant, when you’re trying 
to conceive. I think. 
Kanako: Emotionally and physically, right? 
Wendy: And emotionally and physically and if they say X Y and Zee, sometimes you’ll 
go “Okay, X, Y, and Zee.” Right? Because you want that outcome. 
 
To summarize thus far, the bedrock of the clinic is founded upon a prevailing model of 
medical infertility, which assumes that couples and individuals seeking assisted reproduction 
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have a reproductive malfunction that requires treatment. Even a healthy body will thereby be 
subject to a suite of diagnostic procedures, some of which may be uncomfortable and invasive. 
As well, every body in the clinic is understood to be a reproductive body, even when this stands 
in conflict with stated reproductive intentions. At the fore remains a traumatic model of wounded 
heterosexuality, constantly anticipating the worst. Interestingly, these discourses do not shift 
once conception is achieved, but continue to presume the presence of failure, risk and medical 
pathology.  
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This final section of the chapter explores how even a successful conception is treated as a 
high-risk situation within the infertility trap. Like Trish and Anya at the clinic in Manitoba, a few 
queer families reported achieving conception on their very first try. Kristin and Isabel were such 
a couple. After recounting their struggle with mandatory testing and their resistance against the 
obligatory prescription of drugs like Clomid, the women talked about the procedures that 
snapped into place after Kristin became pregnant after the first round of insemination. 
I:  Okay. So first time was the charm and… 
Kristin: First time’s the charm. And we were outta there. I mean, that was it. 
They…well no, they wanted…they were doing a bunch of follow-ups, and very 
reluctant to acknowledge that I had gotten pregnant, that I was statistically likely 
to remain pregnant and that they could let me go. So I mean they aren’t… 
I: What do you mean? 
Kristin: Well, they wanted to do constant ultrasounds on the fetus as it developed. 
And they…um…I eventually just stopped coming.  
Isabel: Yeah, that’s right. We did finally brush them off. 
Kristin: Yeah, we just stopped showing up! We’re like “No, I’m pregnant. I don’t 
need to go anymore.” And…yeah, there was..if I said anything about being 
pregnant, the doctor was like “Well, you know, don’t get too excited…”  
*** 
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Isabel: I mean, anybody can miscarry but, you know… 
Kristin: Anyone can miscarry but there’s also nothing wrong if you haven’t 
miscarried…with assuming that you’re not going to. I think there was…you 
know...I think ‘cause they’re a fertility clinic and they’ve dealt with a lot of 
disappointment, they...I think the instinct was to protect me from disappointment. 
But it wasn’t really what I needed.  
Isabel: It was just another case of them being overly involved. 
 
This story of unwanted medical intervention and the reproductive traumas of the clinic 
was seconded by other participants. The techniques of surveillance, emotional insulation and 
risk-management which pervade the medical approach to infertility were experienced as 
culturally inappropriate for queer families who had not experienced reproductive trauma. At the 
start of Attachment One we met Carol, a bisexual woman who conceived using donor sperm 
despite a frustrating diagnosis of “infertility” which Carol had strongly felt did not apply to her 
case. In this passage, Carol describes her experience with the clinic and the manner in which the 
clinic aggressively tracked the progress of her pregnancy.   
Carol: The experience after we got pregnant was really interesting ‘cause every 
pregnancy there is treated as high risk because of the fact that you’re using their 
services…so even though I was a low risk pregnancy, they offer a blood test to show 
you’re pregnant, then another one two weeks later, and then I think we had like three 
blood tests over the course of the first few weeks. Like every few weeks just to see that 
you’re actually progressing in the pregnancy. 
I: Yeah. 
Carol: And then they do ultrasounds--I don’t remember I think at like six weeks, at two 
months, at three months, whatever. Other friends who got pregnant who weren’t 
accessing services like this, they don’t have an ultrasound till twenty weeks. I had two or 
three already by that point, which I thought was cool ‘cause I got the pictures and I liked 
it. 
Interviewer: (laughs) 
Carol: We got a midwife right away who advised, “You don’t have to do those if you 
don’t want to. You can tell them that.” But it’s just automatic. You automatically get 
several blood tests, several ultrasounds, and then they recommended progesterone 
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suppositories for the first trimester and I can’t remember exactly what they do but it was 
just a precautionary thing. And I asked, you know, “Do I really need to do it?” “Well, 
you’re not necessarily at risk but it doesn’t hurt just to make sure.” And because the fact 
that we got through so much trouble to get pregnant, “Whatever they say might help, I’m 
not risking losing this pregnancy.” So we did it but we had to pay for them and they’re 
really just not comfortable.  
*** 
Carol: But it was just awkward and I debated, you know, “Do I really want to take this 
[progesterone] and do I really want to worry about it?” But, again, we just spent how 
much money and how much time trying to get pregnant and I don’t want to have to do 
this again if I don’t have to. So I need to keep [the baby] and I’ll take them. So that was 
really annoying. So just the, again the ultrasound part I liked but everything else is - the 
treatment idea is “Congratulations, you’re pregnant. Oh my God, let’s be careful.” 
 For Carol, the degree of medical intervention supplied by the clinic is experienced with 
some ambivalence. Her sense is that the pregnancy is low risk and not in need of surveillance, 
yet she also understands the “automatic” mechanisms of the clinic as being there to support her 
and ensure the baby is brought successfully to term. Her negotiation with the 
hypermedicalization of her pregnancy is one of grudging acquiescence, recognizing the medical 
apparatus as a useful mode despite the discomfort that may be involved. This is guided by the 
long-term investment she has already made in the epistemic practices of the clinic: the time, 
emotional effort and finances expended, and the desire to ensure a healthy birth of her child. 
Similar to Paula and Nicole and their acceptance of a location within ‘high-tech’ clinical practice 
due to their pursuit of reciprocal IVF, Carol has already subjectivated herself as an infertility 
patient and therefore finds it easier to engage the risk management techniques of the clinic.  
This stands in contrast to women like Kristin and Isabel, who perceived the clinic’s post-
conception recommendations for regular ultrasounds to be “overly involved” and eventually 
stopped attending appointments altogether. Kristin had conceived after just one round of 
insemination with Isabel’s sperm, allowing them to invest relatively minimal resources into the 
medical process. As will be discussed in Chapter Nine, Isabel also experienced profound mis-
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gendering by the clinic, alongside their expectation that she was prepared to behave like a 
heterosexual man. The lack of trans-sensitive care coupled with their low-tech and rapid process 
through the medical system almost certainly contributed to an easy dismissal of subjectivation as 
infertility patients. 
As the interviews made clear, the infertility trap operates as a normative bedrock, 
obliging queer people to navigate an often hypermedicalized system that assumes pathology and 
limits room for negotiation. While queer people navigated these heternormative landscapes in 
different ways depending on their situation, embodiment and investment in the process, the 
language of grim resignation to mechanisms beyond their control was widespread. This included 
choices about their own medical treatment, testing and drug regimes, the treatment of their 
partners, and even the ways in which they were treated after pregnancy. 
%& 
In her work on the performance of female gender, Judith Butler has outlined the ways in 
which heterosexuality is naturalized through the idealization of maternal desire as a cultural 
given.586 It is through the depiction of female desire to have children as ‘natural’ that the 
reproductive union of men and women is able to assume a seamless harmony. This in turn offers 
a script for the culturally inscribed expectations of heterosexual childbirth and nurturing, as 
reproduction comes to be understood as simple biological fact, a process that has occurred 
naturally “since time immemorial.”  
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Butler argues that heterosexuality necessarily involves the “cultural construction of the 
female body as a maternal body.”587 She reads the production of maternal desire as natural to 
womanhood as an effect or consequence of a system of compulsory heterosexuality, in which the 
female body is expected to assume a desire for maternity as the essence of self. Thus, in Butler’s 
terms, it becomes possible to understand “the maternal libidinal economy as a product of an 
historically specific organization of [hetero]sexuality."588  
The clinic marks a location wherein the maternal libidinal economy is both in crisis (due 
to reproductive trauma) and under active reinforcement and stabilization (through the palliative 
care of reproductive medicine). This chapter has explored the ways in which queer bodies 
encounter this system of compulsory heterosexuality, crisis and medicalization. It has argued that 
the clinic’s labour is directed at stabilizing the heterosexual model of ‘natural’ reproduction, and 
has tracked the manner in which clinical procedures and standards seek to reassemble this 
fractured norm. The use of technology to recreate ‘natural’ reproductive outcomes, I contend, is 
rendered all the more starkly when queer agents are placed at the center of analysis. This 
argument has used interview data to explore queer desires for maternity and paternity outside of 
the heterosexual organization of desire, and tracked the ways in which their use of AHR 
variously challenges, rejects, reframes and affirms prevailing heteronorms.  
The next chapter will further explore the crisis of the maternal libidinal economy wrought 
by infertility, and map out the categories of reproduction in play at the clinic. It will refine these 
operational categories from a queer perspective, challenging the ‘natural facts’ of heterosexual 
reproductivity and seeking to create a queer paradigm for reproductive kinship. 
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This chapter argues for a new paradigm that is able to embrace the fragmentations in 
normative heterosexuality wrought through the widespread use of reproductive technology. 
Despite advances in biotechnology and the legal recognition of new family forms beyond a 
strictly heterosexual reproductivity, the governing clinical paradigm of ‘infertility’ continues to 
find bedrock in a limited imaginary. It is based in an assumption of trauma, pathology, deviance 
and loss that cannot account for queer parenting arrangements, nor the desire to avoid excessive 
medicalization of reproductive assistance.     
As a corrective, this chapter will turn aside from the narrowed vista that infertility offers. 
I hope to expand this conceptual imaginary through a new set of neologisms: orthofertility, 
parafertility and synfertility. I will show why these terms represent an important new way of 
thinking through a critical impasse, and demonstrate their utility in scenarios from the clinic to 
the courtroom. In creating new vocabularies to render the particular legal, clinical and social 
needs of queer people accessing assisted reproductive technologies, the aim is to radically shift 
away from the normative model of wounded heterosexuality that currently holds sway.  
By disaggregating 'the infertile' into more complex categories, the variegated needs of a 
whole spectrum of users of reproductive technology will become clear. The hope is that by 
decentering the singular heterosexual reproductive couple from the heart of the medico-juridical 
imaginary – by which I mean both clinical spaces and family law - a more partial, contingent and 
reflexive framework can emerge. Such a relational mode can more readily engage the concerns 
of all communities seeking to access assisted reproductive technologies, as well as the children 
224 
born through such procedures.  
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The chart below describes the current state of infertility thinking. It offers only two 
options: normal reproductive (heterosexual) intercourse or a failed (heterosexual) fertility that 
requires reproductive assistance. As we have seen already this constitutes an infertility trap: a 
reductive model that relies upon medieval and gendered concepts of sexuality, fosters stigma, 
flattens shifting and relational timelines, and ignores the lived realities of single people and 
queers. It is hampered by definitional inconsistencies, intense temporal anxiety, and heavy 
reliance upon invasive and often expensive forms of technology. 
In this section I will clarify the effacement happening under the rubric of infertility, and 
show why new conceptual models are required to fracture this oppositional thinking. 
&5 1 #
 
Normal Healthy Fertility 
*Natural* 
Pathology of Infertility 
*Artificial* 
Ability to conceive and 
have children; the ability 
to become pregnant 
through normal sexual 
activity. 
The failure to conceive 
after a year of regular 
intercourse without 
contraception. 
The binary framing of natural fertility versus artificially-assisted reproduction was 
explored in Chapters Seven and Eight. This dichotomy depends upon the opposition of nature to 
technology, and assumes that the physical, social and legal organization of penile-vaginal 
penetration around the nuclear heterosexual family represents an unproblematic and pre-
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culturally natural form of reproduction. It has also been discussed at length how this binary 
marginalizes and pathologizes queer and single people.  
This medical formulation is aimed at the reproductive intervention (artificial) in contrast 
to biological reproduction which occurs without intervention (natural). It makes no distinctions 
between the different types of bodies and family arrangements seeking assisted reproductive 
technologies; focus remains on the technology as the key actor of intervention. This is in keeping 
with the histories of development of AHR, in which early feminist critics rejected the imposition 
upon female bodies of reproductive technology qua technology. However it may be useful to 
view technology not as an adjunct to human aspirations for family, but as constitutive of those 
very kinship forms. As Haraway reminds us, “We’re inside of what we make, and it’s inside of 
us.” 589 A perspective that seeks to trace this world of connections – attending to “which ones get 
made and unmade” in Haraway’s terms – clarifies the contestations and negotiations occurring 
through the production of human subjectivity through technology.590  
Such a nuanced materialism seeks to trace the pathways of kin and family construction 
pursued through reproductive technology, understanding how it is that clinical interventions may 
in turn reflect new possibilities for being human into the legal order. Rather than allowing the 
spectre of technology to divide the natural from artificial, this approach focuses on the bodies at 
work both inside and outside the clinic, seeking a richer ontology of the networks of meaning 
being produced. In challenging the naturalized bedrock of infertility, it is hoped that a more 
queerly relational understanding of the kinships being forged through, by and with AHR will 
emerge.  
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 Donna Haraway quoted in an interview with Kunzru, Hari. “You Are Cyborg.” Wired 5.02, February 1997. 
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As has been argued, the primary goal of fertility clinics is to replicate the mechanics of 
heterosexual coupling. The gold standard thus becomes the re-creation of a ‘normal healthy 
fertility,’ maintaining the correlation between biological and social parenting for the benefit of 
heterosexual clients. The clinic’s labour revolves around the centrality of two-parent genetic 
kinship, as part of a larger cultural incapacity to privilege other structures of family not based on 
biological alignment.591 As has been seen, the trauma of the clinical encounter is produced by the 
body’s deviance from expected ‘natural’ forms of reproduction, as idealized through the private 
embrace of heterosexual intercourse. The work of the clinic, then, is to ameliorate this trauma 
and reproduce what would have occurred ‘naturally’ – in Sarah Franklin’s terms by “giving 
Nature a helping hand.”592  
As discussed in Chapter Seven, the fertility industry thus enacts a tidy double move: on 
one hand reinscribing the normative diagnostic bounds of infertility and the pathology it 
contains, and on the other, simultaneously attempting to palliate its effects. To rupture this closed 
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 This argument locates itself within a rich trajectory of feminist legal analysis, which has long sought to question 
the private family as a properly heterosexual unit. Scholars have interrogated the primacy of marriage as the 
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Young, Claire F.L., Feminism, Law, and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing Times, Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal, Vol. 42, Issue 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 545-582; Philipps, Lisa and Young, Margot, Sex, Tax and the Charter: 
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claims (Kim, Natasha, Much to Do about Something: Destabilizing Law's Support of Dominant Ideologies in the 
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shifted in the past twenty years. See for example:  Gavigan, Shelley A. M., Something Old, Something New - Re-
Theorizing Patriarchal Relations and Privatization from the Outskirts of Family Law, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 
Vol. 13, Issue 1 (January 2012), pp. 271-302. 
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 Sarah Franklin, Embodied Progress: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception (London: Routledge, 1997) at 
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circuit, I will begin by clarifying the terms for these two affectively weighted categories – people 
who require assisted reproduction (poor sods) and people who (blessedly) do not.  
Distinguishing Between Two Categories of Parents  
I believe these categories mask substantial internal divergence. In the chart below, the 
white column indicates those couples who conceive through heterosexual intercourse, while the 
shaded columns describe a variety of assisted reproduction projects. The key distinction I wish to 
make is not between the experience of natural or artificial reproduction, as with the 
fertility/infertility dichotomy and its focus on technological intervention. Instead I wish to look at 
the kinships produced through such engagements. This conceptual distinction will lead to what I 
think are rather helpful consequences beyond the infertility trap. To begin, I think it useful to 
make a central distinction between two categories of parents: intra-reproductive and extra-
reproductive.  
Normal Healthy 
Fertility 
*Natural* 
INTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
Pathology of 
Infertility 
*Artificial* 
INTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
Pathology of 
Infertility 
*Artificial* 
EXTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
Pathology of        
Infertility 
*Artificial* 
EXTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
Two adults with 
reproductive 
alignment combine 
gametes through 
sexual intercourse to 
produce offspring.  
Two adults with 
reproductive 
alignment combine 
gametes through 
assisted reproduction 
to produce offspring.  
Two adults with 
reproductive 
alignment are unable 
to combine gametes 
by sexual intercourse 
or assisted 
reproduction to 
produce offspring. 
Gametes required 
from outside 
parenting dyad. 
Any number of adults 
with or without 
reproductive 
alignment do not 
combine gametes via 
sexual intercourse. 
Assisted reproduction 
elected to produce 
offspring. Gametes 
required from outside 
parenting dyad, 
monad, triad, etc.  
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Intra-reproductive relations are indicated in the first and second columns of the chart. I 
define intra-reproductive parents as two adults with a reproductive alignment who use their own 
reproductive material to create a child. The term reproductive alignment describes any scenario 
in which two adults produce complementary gametes which may be paired to produce offspring. 
This most commonly describes heterosexual couples where the male contributes sperm and the 
woman an ovum. The child of such a heterosexual union is genetically related to both of her 
parents as the product of an intra-reproductive relationship. The genders of the sexual partners 
are not important, although to be sure this column is heavily represented by heterosexual 
couples.  
Heterosexuals do not hold a monopoly, however, upon paired gamete reproduction from 
within the adult sexual partnership; one may also find bisexual, two-spirited and trans-identified 
people in reproductively aligned scenarios. An example might be a gay couple in which one man 
is transgendered, and is impregnated following vaginal intercourse with his cisgendered male 
partner (this exact scenario will be discussed in Chapter Ten). Although these men may be in a 
same-sex partnership, they are still able to genetically reproduce from within the parenting dyad. 
Their child would also be genetically related to both her fathers, with whom she shares both a 
social and biological tie. Indeed, what all parents in column one share is the successful 
conception of a child through sexual intercourse. 
Reference to reproductive alignment allows us to avoid the same-sex vs opposite-sex 
dichotomy by invoking the relational quality of biological reproduction. This framing is more 
readily able to account for mobile gender identifications, such as among two-spirited and trans-
229 
identified people, and resists the eclipse of reproductively aligned bisexual people into a 
heterosexual matrix. It draws attention strictly to the reproductive character of the gametes rather 
than adult sexuality or gender identifications.593 It also functions to highlight the privileged role 
that is accorded to the alignment of biological and social kinship in creating family. Intra-
reproductive parents represent an idealized mode of procreation, wherein both adult caregivers 
are also genetically related to the child. This is what is commonly understood to be the normal, 
healthy fertility of natural conception.   
Parents in the second column are also intra-reproductive, although they have required 
some form of technological assistance to conceive. An example might be a cisgendered 
heterosexual couple in which the man is experiencing male-factor infertility. The couple pursues 
multiple rounds of IVF, their ova and sperm are blended in the laboratory of the fertility clinic, 
and ultimately the women is successfully implanted with an embryo and brings a child to term. 
As with the couples in column one, children produced intra-reproductively will be genetically 
related to both parents. The only difference in column two is the need for technological 
intervention – the correlative outcome between social and genetic parenting will be the same. 
Intra-reproductive relations, assisted and otherwise, represent the idealized form of human 
reproduction in Western society and fall directly in line with standard kinship norms of child-
making and rearing. 
*(&%-$
Columns three and four refer to the second category of relations: extra-reproductive 
parents. These adults cannot create a child with genetic material from within the sexual family, 
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 While the use of a term like alignment carries with it the spectre of ‘misalignment’ and the potential of creating a 
normative regime of its own, the intention is not to erect new categories of sexual propriety but to demonstrate the 
range of actors, intentions, bodies and technologies which may align in surprising and familiar ways. 
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and instead will rely upon donated eggs, sperm and/or a surrogate in order to procreate. There 
may be one parent, two parents, or multiple parents involved in the reproductive process. If two 
parents, the child will not share a biological connection with both of them, and perhaps not with 
either. All extra-reproductive parents require assistance to conceive, although there are further 
distinctions to be made.  
Column three encompasses parents with a reproductive alignment inside their sexual 
dyad, who find themselves unable to combine gametes to produce offspring. These couples have 
been unable to conceive either through intercourse or assisted reproduction, despite the presence 
of complementary gametes. This most often describes heterosexual couples in which one or both 
partners learn through medical diagnosis of their impaired reproductive material or facilities. 
These parents experienced an unplanned extra-reproductivity in their reliance upon outside 
gametes or surrogate labour to conceive. In many ways the parents of column three experience 
the brunt of reproductive trauma, as their expectations for the intra-reproductivity of ‘normal’ 
reproduction are dashed.594 
Finally in column four are located any number of adults with or without reproductive 
alignment who do not combine their gametes via sexual intercourse. Instead, there is an elective 
use of assisted reproduction to produce offspring, and reliance upon gametes and/or reproductive 
labour sourced from outside the parenting dyad or monad. Here is where we will find most 
LGBTQ people as well as all single parents, multiple-parent arrangements and (interestingly) 
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 This chapter will shortly explore the complex interaction of privilege and deprivation experienced by unplanned 
extra-reproductivity. 
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older heterosexual parents.595 This is a category of purposive kinship which expects to locate 
procreation outside the marital bed.596 
This category of parent may involve only one set of donated gametes - as in the case of 
two bisexual women who use anonymous donor sperm to inseminate one of the partners. Their 
child would be genetically related to one mother, but not the other. It may also involve a wide 
host of actors, such as the case of a gay couple using a gestational surrogate. In this instance we 
would find the intended male parents as well as the surrogate and a third-party egg donor. If we 
imagine that each woman also has a partner of her own, this would bring the number of 
potentially involved parties to six adults. 
I argue that these four columns mark out very different modes of reproductive access 
with diverging needs and outcomes. Lumping columns two through four under the broad rubric 
of ‘infertility’ sweeps aside their specificities while creating a traumatic rupture from the non-
clinical idealized mode of reproduction in column one. Marking out these differences directs 
focus onto the relations of kinship as mediated by technology, rather than on technology laid 
bare, and begins to open the closed figuration of medical infertility.597 
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 The connections that join these reproductive outsiders in purposive queer kinship will be explored shortly. As will 
be seen, the inclusion of older heterosexual couples within a queer matrix offers a useful platform to engage both the 
criticisms commonly leveraged at their reproductive projects, as well as their planned strategies (most commonly, 
securing an egg donor) for procreation outside the sexual union.  These connections also push us closer to an 
argument that threads through this dissertation: that queer perspectives and analytical strategies offer a useful 
vantage to think through the use of reproductive technologies. 
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 There is an interesting point to be made here about (i.e.) a single woman who chooses to have sex with a man in 
order to become pregnant. While her purposive intent may be to parent the child alone, the matrix of heterosexual 
presumption makes this a difficult proposition. She is collapsed back into the first column of intra-reproductive 
parentage and the hegemonic weight of the heterosexual legal order. It is precisely the normative weight of 
heterosexuality which leads many lesbian and single women who intend a parenting project without a father to 
choose anonymous donor sperm rather than a known donor or sexual partner, as discussed in Chapter Six. 
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 It is also important to note that my focus here is explicitly on human reproductive relations. This schema does not 
make account for those people – straight and queer alike – who choose not to have children at all, or who instead 
raise plants or animals. While childless family formations as well as inter-species relations also challenge the 
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The disaggregation of these categories shows how the infertility discourse operates upon 
a foundational inability to envision more complex kinships even before the moment of 
conception occurs. This in turn prevents thinking on a host of related matters around parentage, 
law and the privatized social order. To explore this further, the next section will take a detailed 
look at the differences between intra-reproductive and extra-reproductive parenting projects. 
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As discussed, the second column introduces us to a reproductively aligned pair of adults 
who use their own gametes to reproduce. The majority of this column is comprised of 
heterosexual couples seeking fertility assistance, although trans-identified people and couples 
with a bisexual partner will also account for some of this population.598 A ready example might 
be cervical narrowing or blockage, a condition that occurs when the cervix cannot produce 
sufficient mucus to allow for sperm mobility. If sperm cannot pass through into the uterus after 
sexual intercourse, the ovum will not be fertilized. Should a heterosexual couple be experiencing 
cervical blockage, all that is required from the clinic is assistance to traverse the woman’s 
mucosal barrier for insemination with her partner’s washed sperm. They will be using their own 
reproductive material to create a child, usually through the relatively non-intrusive procedure of 
intra-uterine insemination (IUI). They are not challenging any issues of biological parentage, nor 
are they in need of any gametes from outside the adult pair-bond. 
This intra-reproductive situation does not trouble any presumptions of parentage, rely 
upon sperm or ova donors, or require a surrogate, and effectively maintains the heterosexual 
                                                                                                                                            
dominant mode, and surely deserve their own taxonomies, my intention for this project is more narrowly focused. 
598
 To my knowledge, no quantitative data has been published as to the gender identity and sexual orientation 
demographics of AHR users. However the Creating Our Family study made it clear that transpeople and bisexually-
identified people are seeking out clinical assistance to use their own gametes and reproduce within the sexual dyad. 
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model for reproductive coupling. A simple medical intervention is all that is required to restore 
the viability of the intra-reproductive genetic material. While this procedure will probably occur 
in a fertility clinic, which is where the couple would likely be channeled after difficulty 
conceiving, it could conceivably be carried out in a doctor’s office as well. 
However life is not always so simple, and in some cases a more drastic intervention may 
be indicated. Should the man’s sperm present low motility or abnormal morphology, for 
example, the washed sperm cannot simply be injected into the uterus. Instead, the couple may 
require a more specialized form of IVF like Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI). For this, 
the woman must first undergo the phases of standard IVF, involving ovarian stimulation through 
daily drug injection, egg retrieval via ultrasound-guided needle, fertilization of the extracted 
eggs, embryo transfer, and luteal phase and pregnancy test a few days after the transfer. ICSI 
involves an extra step in the process of fertilization, wherein the retrieved eggs are examined 
under a microscope and injected with a single sperm. Many clinics also offer advanced 
microsurgical techniques such as Assisted Hatching (AH) to increase the chance of an embryo 
implanting and biopsy procedures for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).599 
Unfortunately, these procedures are not without risk. ICSI now accounts for 
approximately half of all IVF procedures performed, despite recent data which indicates that one 
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 I hope to take up the bioethical problematics of procedures such as PGD in future work; for the time being it 
should be understood that the battery of available assisted reproductive technologies includes techniques not only to 
create human life, but to create a certain type of human life. For excellent analyses of the social construction of PGD 
see: Roxanne Mykitiuk  and Jeff Nisker, “The Social Determinants of ‘Health’ of Embryos: Practices, Purposes, and 
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(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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in ten children produced through ICSI may face significant impairment.600 In most cases where 
ICSI is recommended, the woman will be in possession of a reproductive system in functioning 
order. Yet she will choose to take potentially dangerous drugs; undergo an expensive, painful 
egg extraction; have on average three to four rounds of embryo implantation; and risk a greater 
chance of conceiving multiples, who in turn will face an elevated chance of health risks. Consent 
to such extraordinary treatment stems from a singular, if deeply compelling reason: ICSI allows 
sperm of low quality or motility to replicate the blending of reproductive material that occurs 
through heterosexual intercourse. It creates a child or children reflecting the gamete contribution 
of both parents, with the purpose of emulating the idealized model of reproductive 
heterosexuality. So powerful is the cultural interdiction to have social and biological kinship 
align, that parents are willing to spend thousands of dollars on intra-reproductive procedures 
while accepting the possibility of health risks to both mother and child(ren).601   
Of course parents with intra-reproductive aspirations are not merely ‘dupes’ of the 
system. These are profound social institutions, with normative heterosexuality deeply rooted 
within the biological imperative and influencing the forms of technological development which 
have occurred. Indeed Sarah Franklin has argued that the introduction of IVF was in fact directly 
aimed at enabling greater conformity to traditional family values.602 One of the ironies of the 
proliferation of IVF has thus been its ability, in quite a short period of time, to create a 
multiplicity of reproductive modes which challenge those traditional family values.  
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IVF has “undermined the very basis of normative ‘biological’ parenting by introducing a 
seemingly endless, and inevitably somewhat parodic, sequelae of quasi-, semi- or pseudo-
biological forms of parenting.”603 And so we see, for example, reciprocal IVF being used by two 
lesbian parents to reflect and refract the desire for a blood connection, and as a strategy to 
triangulate their parentage to their daughter. As will be discussed, these ‘semi- biological’ and 
extra-reproductive forms of parenting are reshaping existing kinship norms through the 
mediation of technology designed to precisely hold such norms in place, both influenced by and 
in parodic response to the hegemonic authority of intra-reproductive parentage. 
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The ‘naturalness’ of the intra-reproductive family is also affirmed through its reification 
in law. When a child is born to an intra-reproductive partnership, the unremarkable nature of this 
arrangement means that no special legal considerations are required.604 The parents may simply 
file a statement of live birth to their provincial registry and apply for the infant’s birth certificate, 
social insurance number and child benefits. There is no declaration of parentage, no adoption 
needed, and no contracts or lawyers to manage. Be they formed through sexual intercourse or 
assisted reproduction, intra-reproductive families are viewed identically through the lens of 
parental and custodial rights. This may be understood as a privileged form of reproduction that 
extends from column one across to column two, enfolding both in the legally unproblematic 
alignment between biological and social kinship.  
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 An exception would be a child born to a pregnant transman and his cisgendered male partner. While their 
arrangement may be strictly intra-reproductive, all statements of live birth in Canadian provinces presume that the 
party who gives birth will be the ‘mother’. There would of course be no mother if a child was born to two fathers, 
one of whom was the gestating parent. It is difficult to imagine grounds for contesting the parentage of a child born 
to two fathers, however, when both intended social parents are also the biological progenitors. 
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Scientific ideas and practices embed consequential social and political decisions, and in 
modern states the application of the life sciences in particular is intricately connected with the 
exercise of political control. Reproductive technologies lie at the heart of this fostering of 
populations, and the easy embrace of intra-reproductive families within the legal order is one 
avenue by which the Canadian state promotes a certain, naturalized vision of (heterosexual) 
reproductive life through technological means. This ordering of life itself represents a crucial 
mode of centralized, institutionalized control.  
Of course it is not only intra-reproductive families which find purchase in law; a great 
deal of the wrangling over the ‘new kinships’ described in Chapter Two stems from the law’s 
attempt to order and consolidate extra-reproductive arrangements. Yet a queer legal analysis 
allows us to critically examine the stakes of intra-reproductive AHR and its attachment to the 
privileged model of heterosexual reproduction.605 It understands the alignment of biology and 
sociality as reinforced by a legal culture that rewards parents for pursing intra-reproductive 
arrangements, and struggles to place other forms of family into this heterosexual matrix. It also 
illustrates the institutional culture of fertility clinics and their central mandate as alleviators of 
wounded heterosexuality, despite an ever-increasing role as sites for the quasi-, semi- and 
pseudo-biological negotiations being carried out by queer families.  
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but to uphold the social structure of heterosexuality through the apparent coherence of the nuclear family. Intra-
reproductive procreation in the fertility clinic affords a degree of biological certainty that, ironically, more closely 
approximates this heterosexual ideal than ‘old-fashioned’ reproduction performed through sexual coitus. (For 
exceptions to this coherence, see the public outcry which followed revelations that Ottawa fertility doctor Norman 
Barwin had accidentally swapped sperm samples in his clinic. A series of women who had been inseminated by 
Barwin in 2004, 2006/07 and 1985/86 discovered, following DNA testing, that the biological father of their children 
was not their husband.) See: Tom Blackwell, 'Worst nightmare': Respected fertility doctor impregnated three women 
with the wrong sperm, National Post, January 13, 2013. Accessed September 30, 2013. 
 <http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/01/31/respected-fertility-doctor-and-order-of-canada-member-admits-using-
wrong-sperm-in-three-artificial-inseminations/>
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A move away from the closed circle of family genetics arrives at the parents in columns 
three and four. These are parents who, for a variety of reasons, are not capable of producing and 
gestating offspring from their own gametes. As may be recalled, this category could include 
reproductively aligned heterosexual and bisexual couples with non-viable gametes, as well as 
post-menopausal heterosexual women and their partners. It also includes lesbian couples, gay 
couples, bisexual people partnered in a same-sex relationship, some partnerships with a 
transgender or transsexual person, and single people of all ages, orientations and gender 
identifications. Finally it may include multiple-parent arrangements wherein three or more adults 
intend to play a role in the child’s life. These prospective parents will all have an extra-
reproductive need that compels recourse to assisted reproduction and/or surrogacy.606 
As discussed, an extra-reproductive arrangement occurs when the genetic material 
required to create an embryo is sourced from outside the parenting monad, dyad, triad, etc. There 
will not be a strict alignment between biological affiliation and social parenting, meaning that the 
child may be raised by one or more parents to whom she is not biologically related. The child 
may also have a biological tie to someone who is not a social parent, for example an anonymous 
sperm donor living in another country. This category can also include reproductively aligned 
parents who have created an embryo but require the assistance of a surrogate for gestation: while 
the genetic material may be from within the parenting dyad, there exists a quasi-biological 
relationship of blood, nurture and physical connection between the child and surrogate. What 
defines an extra-reproductive family is the presence of gamete donors or surrogates outside the 
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 This also includes interventions that are not carried out in a clinical setting, such as home insemination by a 
lesbian couple and their known donor. As mentioned, my concern is not with the degree of technological expertise, 
but the relational forms of kinship produced through mediations of science and sociality.  
238 
heterosexual dyad; it refers to techno-assisted kinship relations that do not match up with the 
normative ideal of the traditional family. 
I distinguish extra-reproductive parenting through AHR from such parenting models as 
adoption, step-parentage or absent parentage, in which there may also be a dis-alignment 
between biological and social parenting. The difference is marked by AHR’s complex 
entanglements of semi- and quasi-biological relationality, as well as the presence of purposive 
intent before conception occurs.607 An example of extra-reproductive family formation through 
purposive intent might be a gay couple seeking to have children. One or both men may 
contribute sperm to the parenting project, and they may also be reliant upon a gestational 
surrogate as well as an egg donor. In fact the presence of an egg donor is very likely, as most 
clinics in Canada refuse to assist in traditional surrogacy arrangements wherein the surrogate 
uses her own ova to inseminate.608  
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 Adoption may be distinguished from AHR in a variety of grounds, as was recently reviewed in Pratten v British 
Columbia (AG), [2012] BCJ no 2460. The case sought to draw an analogy between adopted children and children 
produced through anonymous sperm donation, with Pratten making arguments based on ss. 15 and 7 of the Charter 
to assert that she was discriminated against based on her status as a child of AHR. In British Columbia, adopted 
children can open their adoption files and have access to any genetic information held therein when they turn 
nineteen, whereas Pratten could not access information about her sperm donor. At the appeals court level, Frankel J. 
found that the analogy between adoption and AHR failed. The purpose of the law was “to remedy the disadvantages 
created by the state-sanctioned dissociation of adoptees from their biological parents.” (at para 37) Distinguishing 
between children on the basis of the manner of conception was therefore valid, ameliorative in purpose and 
protected under s. 15(2) of the Charter. See also Lori Chambers and Heather Hillsburg, “Desperately Seeking 
Daddy: A Critique of Pratten v. British Columbia (Attorney General)”, 28 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 
229 2013 for an extended discussion of why this analogy fails. 
608
 For example, Genesis Fertility Centre in Vancouver explains:  
“At Genesis, we do not perform traditional surrogacy for legal and emotional reasons. To date, the only surrogacy 
cases that have been challenged in court (e.g. where the surrogate is not willing to give the child to the intended 
parents) have been traditional surrogacy cases. For this reason we do not engage in traditional surrogacy. Protection 
of the intended parents, fetus/child and the surrogate is at the heart of the program.” <http://genesis-
fertility.com/fertility-services/surrogacy> 
The closer a fertility project creeps to intra-reproductivity and the alignment of biology and sociality, the more valid 
are the legal claims to parentage. This direct line between genetics and parentage rights is what extra-reproductive 
family arrangements challenge in both clinical practice and law.  
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First, the men will need to hire independent legal counsel for both themselves and the 
surrogate, draw up a surrogacy agreement, and sign and notarize informed consent forms 
including legal contracts, affidavits and the appointment of a local guardian. Through the 
mediation of legal professionals this family can begin to take form, shaped by the techno-
bureaucratic apparatus of the clinic. All parties will then undergo counseling, where the 
surrogate will be individually counseled and profiled to ensure her willing compliance and 
understanding of the risks involved. If she is married, the consent of her spouse may also be 
required.609 At the same time, an independent egg donor will be identified and her services 
retained.610  
Once the clinical procedures begin, the egg donor will most likely undergo hyper-ovarian 
stimulation through a course of injectable drugs.611 The surrogate will begin a parallel course of 
drugs in order to align her cycle with the egg donor. Both women will be required to take the 
diagnostic tests outlined in Chapter Eight although neither will have complained of issues related 
to poor fertility; on the contrary, they are present because of a proven fecundity!612  One or both 
members of the male couple will be designated as the gamete-providing parent, and as IVF or 
ICSI will be the preferred mode of treatment, the semen will receive the full complement of 
tests: a routine analysis reports the number of sperm, the motility and volume, as well as an 
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 This depends on the individual clinic, and not all make their procedures of consent a public matter. 
610
 For more on gamete donors and the AHRA see Chapters Five and Six. For more on the market in human eggs in 
Canada, see: Motluk A. (2010) ‘The human egg trade. How Canada's fertility laws are failing donors, doctors, and 
parents.’ The Walrus April: 30-37. 
611
 It is also possible that the couple will secure frozen eggs which can be thawed for fertilization and implantation. 
This will depend on access, availability, cost and their inclination for a specific type of gamete donor.  
612
 According to standard practice, surrogates are only selected as gestational carriers after they have given birth to at 
least one child. Egg donors will have undergone independent testing to ensure the viability of their ova, although it 
appears that the most important factor in successful egg donation may be age. See for example: Patrizio P, Silber SJ, 
Ord T, Marello E, Balmaceda JP, Asch RH. “Variables that influence the selection of an egg donor.” Hum Reprod 
7:59-62, 1992. 180.  
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assessment of sperm morphology, an antisperm antibody screen, and a trial wash.613 If 
everything proceeds as planned, the donor egg will be fertilized and implanted in the surrogate.  
Her expenses over the next nine months may be covered (to an uncertain degree) by the two 
men, although they are prohibited from providing payment for her services.614 
Legal mechanisms such as surrogate, donor and parenting contracts mark out the 
contours of this intentionality.615 Informed consent, general consent and release documents, 
gamete provider ‘consent to use’ agreements, and consent to use sperm for embryo creation are 
required documentation on the path to conception at the clinic. This clarity of intention structures 
the circumstances of a child’s creation, which is enabled not through sexual intercourse but 
technological and bureaucratic means. Indeed, the legal affiliations developed through purposive 
intent are the key mechanism by which extra-reproductive families are bound together (as 
opposed to the genetic ties which bind intra-reproductive families). 
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Legal parentage involves the determination of who, in law, are the parents or parent of a 
child. This is a different question than who may have responsibility for a child or rights in 
relation to that child.616 A legal parent is also not necessarily coterminous with the individuals 
listed as a “parent” on a child’s birth certificate, although this does provide evidence (if not 
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 Fertility Ontario, Diagnostic Services. Accessed November 17, 2013. 
<http://www.fertilityontario.com/Diagnostic_Services.html> 
614
 The uncertainty of section 12 of the AHRA and the particular impact on gay men is discussed in Attachment One. 
615
 The validity and enforceability of such contracts varies across provincial jurisdiction. Controversy is far more 
likely to occur with contracts drawn up between a known sperm donor and the intended parents, as such agreements 
are generally unenforceable and function only as statements of intent. Surrogate reproduction with an egg donor in 
Ontario, as in the current example, will involve IVF and the mandatory techno-bureaucratic contracts of the fertility 
clinic and therefore hold more weight. Nevertheless, surrogacy contracts are likely unenforceable and are 
specifically not enforceable in Alberta, and under the Quebec Civil Code. See the following discussion on surrogacy 
contracts and Chapter Eleven for more detail. 
616
 Barbara Findlay, “Baby Steps: Assisted Reproductive Technology and the B.C. Family Law Act” (Vancouver, 
2013) at 6.1.5. 
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proof) of parentage.617 Legal parentage falls within provincial jurisdiction, and there is 
substantial variation across Canada in terms of approaches to extra-reproductive families.618 
In 2001, British Columbia became the first jurisdiction in the world to permit a lesbian 
couple to file a joint birth registration. Following a successful human rights challenge, the 
province’s Vital Statistics Agency was obliged to allow for the registration of same-sex parents 
with non-genetic ties, in this case for a child conceived via donor sperm.619 The issue was shortly 
litigated in other provinces as well. Four years later in Alberta, the lesbian co-mother of a child 
conceived through anonymous sperm donation applied to have the presumption of paternity in 
the Alberta Family Law Act declared unconstitutional.620 The FLA expressly provided for extra-
reproductive heterosexual families, presuming the male spouse of a woman to be the legal parent 
of a donor-conceived child if he had consented prior to conception. However the same-sex 
partner of a donor-conceived child enjoyed no such presumption.621 The court in Fraess held that 
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 Ibid.  
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 There are presumptions of paternity in all provincial family law statutes. Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 
128, s 95; Children's Law Reform Act, RSO, 1990, c 12, s 8; Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, RSA, 2000, 
c C-12, s 1(1)(a); Family Law Act, SA, 2003, c F-45, s 1(f), s 8(1); Family Maintenance Act, CCSM, c F20, s 23; 
Family Services Act, SNB, 1980, c F2.2, s 103; Children's Law Act, RSNL, 1990, c C-13, ss 7 & 10; Children's Law 
Act, SNWT, 1997, cl4, s 8; Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, s 2(j); Child and Family Services Act, 
RSNS, 1990 c 5, s 3(1)(r)(vii); Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-33, s 3(1); Child Status 
Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-6, s 9(1); Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64, art 525; Children's Law Act, SS 2002, c C-8. 
1, s 45; Children's Act, RSYT, 2002, c 31, s 12. 
619
 Gill v. Maher, [2001] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 34. OR Gill & Maher, Murray & Popoff v Ministry of Health, 2001 
BCHRT 34, (sub nom Gill v British Columbia (Ministry of Health) (No 1)) 40 CHRR D/321. Two lesbian couples 
filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. If the Vital Statistics 
Agency received an application to register a birth with a “female name” and a “male name,” they registered the 
female as the mother and the male as the father. There was no question as to whether the named man was genetically 
related to the child. However if they received a request with two “female names” they rejected the application. In 
Gill v. Maher, the BC Human Rights Tribunal held there was no distinction between an unrelated male parent and an 
unrelated female parent seeking registration. 
620
 Fraess v. HRMQ (AB), [2005] A.J. No 1665. 2005 ABQB 889, 278 D.L.R. (4th) 187, 56 Alta L.R. (4th) 01. 
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 “Men married or partnered to women can receive parental status immediately upon the birth of the child 
conceived through artificial insemination provided that they consented to being a parent in advance of the 
conception. Women married or partnered to women cannot.” Ibid at para 6. 
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the FLA contravened s.15 of the Charter and directed language to be read in that would extend a 
presumption of parentage to the same-sex spouse of a biological mother.622 
Extra-reproductive heterosexual families using donor sperm have enjoyed the presumption of 
paternity long afforded to the traditional marital family, while same-sex couples have been obliged to 
file human rights and Charter litigation to claim the same parental rights.623 The issue here is not the 
‘strange new world’ of reproductive technology, but the centrality of the heterosexual order and its 
long-standing ability to normalize the social parenting of intended fathers. The analogy in Fraess was 
therefore a simple move for the court, extending the uncontested status of second parent to a lesbian 
co-mother due to the women’s use of anonymous donor sperm.624 When the genetic father is a known 
donor, however, different provisions may apply.625 
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 For successful Charter litigation on the same issue from Ontario, see M.D.R. v Ontario (Deputy Registrar 
General) (Rutherford) (2006) 81 OR (3d) 81, 270 DLR (4th) 90, 141 CRR (2d) 292, 30 RFL (6th) 25. While Ontario 
allowed same-sex social parents the option of applying for a declaration of legal parentage under Ontario legislation, 
the applicants sought “access to the benefit of being able to register both intended parents as of right, with the 
resulting presumption of parentage, or access to the social and symbolic institution of having their names on the 
birth record at first instance.” At para 150. 
624
 When the role of second parent is contested, due to a potentially competing claim by a parent with a genetic link 
to the child, the determination of the court is not as fluid. This then becomes a matter not of discrimination against 
protected Charter groups but of the best interests of the child. For example in C(MA) v K(M), 2009 ONCJ 18, a 
lesbian couple was unsuccessful in limiting the access of the sperm donor father and then unsuccessful in dispensing 
with his consent to an adoption by the co-mother. The court held that the mothers had failed to show the value of an 
order dispensing with the donor's consent, ultimately determining it was “in the child's best interests to include 
preserving her connection with [the] father.” (at para 74). 
While argued on different grounds, a controversial decision by the Supreme Court in 2003 held that the biological 
father of a child may be registered as a parent over the objection of the child’s mother. This case involved a single 
heterosexual mother who had conceived through sexual intercourse, but its reification of the heterosexual genetic 
dyad created a potentially chilling precedent for lesbian and single women considering conception with a known 
donor. Trociuk v. British Columbia (A.G.), 2003 SCC 34 (CanLII), 226 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2003] 7 W.W.R. 391, 107 
CRR (2d) 277, 36 R.F.L. (5th) 429, 14 B.C.L.R. (4th) 12. For an analysis of this case, see Lori Chambers “In the 
Name of the Father: Children, Naming Practices and the Law in Canada” (2010) 43 U.B.C. L. Rev 1.  
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 A case currently pending in Ontario frames a clear conflict for parental rights between two lesbian mothers and a 
known donor. The outcome of W.W. v X.X. and Y.Y., 2013 ONSC 879 will be the first Canadian ruling that involves a 
signed donor contract relinquishing rights to the child, a biological progenitor contesting that contract and 
petitioning to affirm his parental rights, and a lesbian couple seeking to uphold the terms of the original contract. For 
more on the background and import of this case, see Fiona Kelly “Equal Parents, Equal Children: Reforming 
Canada's Parentage Laws to Recognize the Completeness of Women-led Families” 64 U.N.B.L.J. 253 2013. 
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For example in Ontario, following amendments in January 2007, the Vital Statistics Act 
allows a non-biological parent to certify a birth statement for a child born through assisted 
human reproduction. For an “other parent” to register they must be acknowledged by the child’s 
mother and – importantly - the biological father must be unknown. Thus, two lesbian mothers 
may register their child's birth, but only if they have used an anonymous donor.626 With this 
amendment, as Joanna Radbord argues, “the government has attempted to do the minimum 
required, and has failed to consider the equality rights of co-mothers in crafting its remedy.”627 
Should equivocation exist, the biological tie remains a trump over preconception intention, 
reflecting the “facts of life” and the legislative valorization of two-parent genetic intra-
reproductive family.628 Nor is this trend unique to Canada; scholars from other common law 
jurisdictions have found similar outcomes in privileging biology over social and engaged 
parenting.629 Angela Campbell has drawn attention to the strangeness of this prioritization in the 
context of reproductive technologies: 
In circumstances involving assisted reproduction, identifying biology as a basis for 
[parentage] seems perplexing, given that the point of using reproductive materials or 
services from third parties is to acquire parental status even where one cannot rely (or 
chooses not to rely) on biological/'natural' methods of procreation. Thus, locating 
parenthood should command more than tracing a child's genetic heritage.630 
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 Note this varies by degree across the provinces. Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and 
Quebec have legal parentage laws that contemplate same-sex couples and assisted conception, with Quebec being 
the only province that explicitly addresses parentage where the sperm donor is known. Quebec also makes provision 
for a single woman as a child's sole legal parent. Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 5. 1(1)(a); Family Law Act, 
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42 
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 Fiona Kelly has chronicled the scholarly literature on the heterosexism of family law with examples from 
Australia, England and Wales. Infra note 625. See also: Jenni Millbank, "The Limits of Functional Family: Lesbian 
Mother Litigation in the Era of the Eternal Biological Family" (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and 
the Family 149. and Therese Callus, "A New Parenthood Paradigm for Twenty-First Century Family Law in 
England and Wales?" (2012) 32 Legal Studies 347. 
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 Angela Campbell, "Conceiving Parents Through Law" (2007) 21(2) International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 242 at 259. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, when the intended fathers are two gay men who have conceived with 
a surrogate, the balance between competing genetic and intentional parental rights grows even more 
complex. In the United States a highly publicized case in the 1980s brought attention to the 
statutory gaps around surrogacy arrangements.631 The Baby M case served as a catalyst to action 
for many state lawmakers, although there was little consensus on what such action should look 
like.632 At present, U.S. laws around surrogate motherhood offer a patchwork of jurisdiction with 
some banning surrogacy contracts, others enforcing them, and still others having no laws at 
all.633  
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To return to the gay male couple from the example above, after the successful conception 
and birth of their child by an altruistic surrogate, it will be necessary to fill out a birth certificate 
and file a birth registration according to the provincial Vital Statistics Act. As mentioned, this 
process varies across jurisdiction in Canada, but in all Canadian provinces - whether there are 
specific laws around surrogacy or not - the birth mother will be considered to be the presumptive 
legal parent of a child.634 No Canadian jurisdictions allow a surrogate mother to relinquish 
parentage before the birth of the child. Legislation in British Columbia and Alberta, as well as 
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 This matter involved a custody dispute between a traditional surrogate and the commissioning family. The case 
brought national attention to the complex bioethics of surrogacy when the birth mother refused to relinquish her 
parental rights. See: In the Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1987).  
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 Carla Spivack notes that in the wake of Baby M “there was a wide spectrum of views as to what kind of regime 
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Spivack, “The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States,”, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 97-114 (2010) 
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 As a point of interest, however, the recent B.C. Family Law Act, which came into force in March 2013, is unique 
in Canada in that for cases of surrogacy the intended parents may be the legal parents from birth. This marks a 
departure from the presumption of the birth mother’s parentage. In such a scenario all parties must have recorded 
their intentions in writing before the conception, the surrogate must provide written consent to the intended parents 
after the birth, and the intended parents must take the child into their care. If these requirements are met the intended 
parents are registered on the birth certificate, and no genetic link is necessary between the intended parents and the 
child. Where all parties consent after the birth, the process is administrative rather than judicial; a court declaration 
is not required. 
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regulations in Nova Scotia, lay out a process by which a birth mother may relinquish legal 
parentage to the intended parents under a surrogacy arrangement; in other jurisdictions, courts 
must rely on the best interests of the child when making parentage determinations in surrogacy 
situations.635 As the men interviewed for the Creating Our Families project were from Ontario, 
the focus will be on that provincial system of registration. 
In 2004 in Ontario, a single gay male father was unable to register the birth of his 
daughter by surrogate without first obtaining a court order. Following application to the Superior 
Court of Justice he registered the child’s birth in his name alone and obtained a declaration of 
parentage. He then sought the reimbursement of costs to obtain the declaration, as his situation 
was not provided for in Ontario’s birth registration system.636 The court in K.G.D. v. C.A.P. 
recognized the inadequacy of the system and ordered the government to pay half the costs, but 
did not order a comprehensive remedy or legislative action.637 
Thus the initial presumption remains that the surrogate is the mother, although she will 
not be necessarily named on the registration. According to Sara R. Cohen and Sherry Eve 
Levitan, two family lawyers with extensive experience managing surrogate contracts in Ontario, 
the standard process in such a scenario is to delay the birth registration.638 With the help of DNA 
evidence and sworn affidavits from all parties, an Ontario solicitor can file a court order to 
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 Alberta specifically provides that a surrogacy contract is unenforceable and may not be used as evidence of the 
surrogate mother’s consent after the birth. The Québec Civil Code provides that a surrogacy contract is null. See: 
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 K.G.D. v C.A.P [2004] O.J. No. 3508. 
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 Ellen K. Embury, “A national review of the law of parentage declarations”, Published by Canadian Fertility 
Consulting on, December 10, 2013  . Accessed on June 14, 2014. <http://fertilityconsultants.ca/blog/national-
review-law-parentage-declarations-ellen-k-embury//> 
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request that the intended parents be declared as the baby's legal parents.639 This avoids need for 
the replacement or amendment of documents and allows the registration and birth certificate to 
be issued in the names of the intended parents.640 The process may take in excess of six weeks, 
and requires independent legal counsel for the surrogates and intended parents.641 
Extra-reproductive projects exist within an ambiguous location in the law. The more they 
diverge from the two-parent heterosexual norm, the more they challenge fundamental notions of 
kinship and genetic belonging. In the above example of the gay parents, only one father of the 
child will be a biological relation. The recognition of the parental rights of a gay co-parenting 
couple both engages the genetic tie and diminishes its centrality to the formation of family. In 
this way assisted reproduction thus both reinstates and denaturalizes biological kinship, enacting 
a “dispersement” of kinship across the multiple agents who participate in the process of 
conception.642 The non-genetic father is as nevertheless an equal actor in this extra-reproductive 
project, with his location as legitimate parent depending on a complex process of techno-
bureaucracy, social recognition and purposive intent.  
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This process of recognition involves a demand for respectability and normalcy while also 
pressing at the bounds of acceptable kinship formation. Thus planned extra-reproductivity 
represents an instance of queering at the same time that it lodges a demand for normativity and 
inclusion within legal recognition. This queer dialectic sharpens when kinship dispersement 
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involves a wide host of actors, such as with the gay couple and their gestational surrogate. When 
multiple adults may hold claim to a child the demand for normativity, for a politics of 
respectability, weighs heavily. 
Laura Mamo has written about this process in reference to women in same-sex 
relationships: 
Seeking recognition [as a lesbian mother] includes the intersubjective process of 
recognizing oneself as a parent, but it also includes being recognized by self and others as 
belonging to or connected with a child; as part of a family; as legible (and thereby 
legitimate) mothers, parents, and families in social interactions; as full citizens, via state 
benefits and entitlement; and as full participants in the polity or sociality.643  
Perhaps as a result, those who pursue queerly reproductive projects at the edges of legible 
kinship very often enact a particularly conservative politics. The interviews I conducted with 
some gay male parents confirms the intensity of this demand for normalcy, for being “just like” 
any other family wishing to have a child. The petition for the approving gaze of the state 
accompanies a necessary subjectification of oneself as a “good parent” deserving of such 
approval, a strategy of normalization that underscores the call for inclusion. The rhetorics of 
‘choice’ and ‘autonomy’ are key aspects of this strategy, as liberal subjects exercise their 
individual rights to (in the case of surrogacy) create a family which involves some element of a 
genetic tie. The transformation of gay male subjecthood into fatherhood through surrogacy 
requires, as Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow have discussed in the context of infertility, “the re-
imagining of human capacities as open to re-engineering and enhancement by medicine.”644 
Former pathways to fatherhood which may have been located through adoption or through 
heterosexual intercourse, in the context of reproductive technology and modern sexual 
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citizenship, may now be imagined through the privatized economies of surrogacy, 
hypermedicalization and techno-bureaucracy.  
For example, in this passage, a gay couple from the study is discussing their decision to 
hire a surrogate rather than adopting.  
Chad: Well, I guess the reason we went with assisted reproduction is because we 
originally looked at adoption and we talked to a counselor to have a Homestudy done, 
and she said that she would be happy to do a Homestudy, but she thought that we would 
be wasting our money because we didn’t have a chance in hell in getting a child.  
Rick: …She just said you could go with the other type of [special needs] adoption and 
you’re not going to be guaranteed a young child, you’re not going to be guaranteed a 
healthy child. But you’ll probably be successful in getting a child…which is what we sort 
of thought. 
Chad: Well, if you get a...if you get a…if you get a uh…a child with a disability from 
natural causes at the hands of God then that’s fine, but we didn’t necessarily want to 
voluntarily sign up for that, it’s a huge, huge cost commitment. And we didn’t want to 
ride on the back of the bus just because we’re gay.   
 Rick and Chad were both wealthy, white professionals in their 40s, and to some degree 
the conservative views espoused throughout this interview reflect their race and class privilege. 
Their ability to locate a willing surrogate, provide her with substantial reimbursement and fund 
multiple rounds of insemination was effectuated through a great deal of private capital. However 
they also faced substantial legal precarity through this process – a position of which they were 
very much aware. This was enhanced by their decision to arrange a traditional surrogacy 
arrangement, in which the surrogate’s own eggs were fertilized.  
Chad’s speech betrays this pressure of claiming a normative right from the margins of 
acceptable kinship. Chad’s refusal to “ride at the back of the bus” because of his sexuality draws 
intentionally from U.S. civil rights imagery, framing a demand for the achievement of his family 
aspirations in the language of social equality. This phrasing uses past struggles for race and 
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economic justice as a tool to lever his own privilege into being – a not uncommon strategy by 
mainstream LGBT activists seeking the normative recognitions of same-sex marriage.645 The 
claim to full citizenship, to a liberal equality to the same benefits and entitlements as all 
members of society, exerts a powerful drive on queer kinship projects pursued through AHR. 
That the state’s extension of equality might result in the intensification of normalization has not 
commonly been seen as a problem by the mainstream gay and lesbian movement. As Judith 
Butler explains, in respect to the gay marriage debates: 
To be legitimated by the state is to enter into the terms of legitimation offered there and 
to find that one’s public and recognizable sense of personhood is fundamentally 
dependent on the lexicon of that legitimation. And it follows that the delimitation of 
legitimation will take place only through an exclusion of a certain sort, though not a 
patently dialectical one. The sphere of legitimate intimate alliance is established through 
producing and intensifying regions of illegitimacy.646 
 Butler is speaking in reference to the symbolic recognition of same-sex relations in the 
frame of legal marriage, and the potential for the further marginalization of illiberal queer 
subjects (i.e. polyamorists, those who practice BDSM, undisciplined sexual subjects). However 
the change to family law that gay male surrogacy implies, similarly involves a fundamental shift 
in the fabric of heterosexual kinship construction. While the potential naturally exists for the 
legitimation of certain queer family arrangements to exclude and minimize other forms, I believe 
the destabilization of the heterosexual family wrought by AHR offers an expanded field of 
family relations in which multiple kinships may take hold. However this process is necessarily 
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 For a critique of this approach, see: Novkov, J. (2008), “The Miscegenation/Same-Sex Marriage Analogy: What 
Can We Learn from Legal History?” Law & Social Inquiry, 33: 345–386. For a meta-analysis of how arguments 
about same-sex marriage privilege some relationships while stigmatizing others and may justify discriminatory 
policies toward sexual minorities, including the use of race as a discursive tool, see: Cole, E. R., Avery, L. R., 
Dodson, C. and Goodman, K. D. (2012), “Against Nature: How Arguments about the Naturalness of Marriage 
Privilege Heterosexuality.” Journal of Social Issues, 68: 46–62.  
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 Butler, Kinship, supra note 46 at 16. 
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contested, and existing in tension with the regions of illegitimacy against which such kinships 
are defined. 
These are complex processes. Even in regard to the symbolic value of same-sex marriage, 
Butler acknowledges that one’s political stance on the issue may be far from clear. For Butler, 
neither a permanent exclusion from the state nor a critical rejection of that state are viable 
options. Instead, she suggests that “it becomes increasingly important to keep the tension alive 
between maintaining a critical perspective and making a politically legible claim.”647 In the 
context of AHR, then, it may be useful to keep a tension alive between the critique of 
reproductive normativity (and the incitement to ‘good’ sexual citizenship it entails) and the 
process of normalization under which queer families are subjectivated. This binary does not 
exhaust the possibilities, however; there are multiple spaces for non-normative and reproductive 
kinship which may refigure and complicate the dyadic two-parent family.  
Even Chad and Rick discussed their complicated and ongoing relationship to their 
surrogate, who bore two children for the men over the course of three years. The continued role 
the surrogate played in their lives, as the genetic mother of two children with no legal mother, 
speaks to this tension between normativity and the potential to refigure dominant notions of 
kinship. These queer modes of family are also seen in the openness of lateral kinship forms, such 
as with Paula and Nicole and the dozens of donor sibs of their daughter discussed in Attachment 
Two.  
Whether recognized, sidelined, ignored or abjected by law, a variety of novel family 
forms are being created through extra-reproductive arrangements in the clinic. Yet at present, 
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 Ibid at 17. 
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heterosexual couples who are utilizing intra-reproductive material are somehow understood to 
co-exist in the same infertility space as the extra-reproductive gay couple and their entourage of 
reproductive labour. Both groups would walk into a fertility clinic, meet with the same 
counsellor, sign the same consent and release forms, and undergo a strict range of mandatory 
testing. As has been explored by this section, my two-pronged contention is that a) the needs of 
such groups are patently different, and b) the guiding discourse of ‘infertility’ is not a helpful 
descriptor for what either group is actually facing. To proceed with the misnomer of infertility 
only serves to shore up the naturalness of ‘fertility’ and reproduce the ‘natural facts’ of 
conception as an unmarked normative category.  
By unpacking the columns of the clinical experience, this chapter has begun to open the 
closed figuration offered by medical infertility. This has clarified the role that idealized genetic 
kinship plays in structuring family outcomes and reproductive choices, despite the presence of 
reproductive technology which questions the centrality of such biological ties. Such a critique 
also sheds light on the normative pressures that structure extra-reproductive queer kinship, and 
sketches the role of law in approving certain models of parentage to the exclusion of others. The 
next chapter will continue the disaggregation of infertility by offering new conceptual categories 
to describe the clinical experience of AHR.  
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While the separation of intra- and extra-reproductive family projects helps to clarify many 
of the social and legal issues at play, it does not create any new models. In this chapter, therefore, 
I would like to propose new ways of thinking about ‘infertility’ that offers fresh vocabularies and 
conceptual horizons. The chart below revisits the framework developed in Chapter 9 and begins to 
open up some of these foundational categories.  
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Once again we will start with the white column on the far left.648 Here we find 
heterosexual couples, as well as bisexuals and transpeople who are coupled with a reproductively 
aligned partner, all of whom are able to create children without reproductive assistance.  
 
*Natural/Non-Clinical* 
INTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
ORTHOFERTILITY 
*Artificial/Clinical*  
INTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
PARAFERTILITY 
*Artificial/Clinical* 
EXTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
SYNFERTILITY 
(UNPLANNED)  
*Artificial/Clinical*  
EXTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
SYNFERTILITY 
(PLANNED)  
 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and transpeople 
coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and 
transpeople coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and 
transpeople coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Gay and lesbian couples. 
Single people. Bisexuals 
and transpeople coupled 
with a reproductively 
non-aligned partner. 
Older heterosexual 
couples. Multiple-parent 
families. 
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 Note the identical sexual demographics in columns one, two and three. All consist of heterosexuals as well as 
bisexuals and transpeople with a reproductively aligned partner. It is only the final column that offers an exception 
to the reproductive alignment – I will return to this issue in more detail below. 
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This column tends to exist as an unremarkable category; the standard baseline for how 
children have been conceived since “time immemorial”.649 Yet in order to ‘make strange’ this 
most normative of reproductive categories, I would like to resist allowing it to reign as the 
champion of an unmarked fertility. This project finds inspiration with recent outsider scholarship 
that has sought to unmask the social construction of the norm.  
Authors in whiteness studies, for example, have worked to locate the privileges that 
cohere to unmarked racial identifications. Whiteness studies has recognized the need to identify 
‘white’ as a racialized category and challenged whiteness as a powerful symbol of privilege.650 
In her seminal 1989 piece on whiteness, Peggy McIntosh writes how:   
I have come to see white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets that I can 
count on cashing in each day, but about which I was “meant” to remain oblivious. White 
privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, 
maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank 
checks.651  
  That same privilege exists within the binary of ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ wherein one’s 
assigned gender at birth is expected to match up with one’s adult gender identification. 
Transgender activists and scholars have argued that this unproblematic vision is actually an 
idealized construct that depends on a static notion of sex and gender. They have drawn attention 
to the constructed nature of cisgendered bodies, and resisted the site of transgenderism as the 
proper location for gender pathology.652 Without this critical analysis, the category of 
“transgender increasingly functions as the site in which to contain all gender trouble, thereby 
                                            
649
 As discussed above, this is the language used by McLachlin CJ in the AHRA reference case decision. Supra note 
450. 
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 See for example:  Dyer, Richard: White (London & N.Y., Routledge, 1997); Delgado, Richard and Stefancic, Jean 
(eds.): Critical White Studies (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1997). 
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 McIntosh, Peggy, “White privilege and male privilege: A personal account of coming to see correspondence 
through work in women’s studies.” Working paper #189. (Wellesley, MA: Wellesley College Center for Research on 
Women., 1988). 
652
 See for example: The Transgender Studies Reader, edited by S. Stryker and S. Whittle, eds. (New York: 
Routledge: 2006); Dean Spade, 2010. “Be Professional!” Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, 33:71-84. 
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helping secure both homosexuality and heterosexuality as stable and normative categories of 
personhood”.653  
By noting the many privileges enjoyed by the unmarked fertility of heterosexual 
reproduction, I aim to join these scholars in attempting to make strange the privileges of the 
normal. As such, I have designated this intra-reproductive category as orthofertility, from the 
Greek prefix for ‘straight’. This identifies the orthodox modality of kinship construction in 
society and law, wherein the social parents and biological parents are naturally presumed to 
correlate. When orthofertility is recognized as one of merely a range of options, one may more 
readily track its normative power and the ways in which heterosexual coupling has assumed 
reproductive supremacy. Yet orthofertility is not the same as heterosexuality. They are often 
conflated, but in drawing attention to the constructed nature of dyadic genetic kinship it is 
important to remember that sexuality and sexual reproduction need not be in parallel. 
First, as has been seen, the orthofertile also may include bisexuals and transpeople with a 
reproductively aligned partner. In fact, identical sexual demographics exist in columns one, two 
and three, with only column four offering an exception to this reproductive alignment. It is 
clearly not a question of heterosexuality alone that affords normative weight to orthofertility, but 
the manner in which sexual reproduction has historically been matched with heterosexual 
expectations for child-bearing and rearing. A bisexual woman and her male partner may not view 
themselves as properly heterosexual, but when they conceive through sexual intercourse it is 
under the rubric and privileges of orthofertility. The situation is more complicated for a transman 
and his gay male partner, for whom social approbation may weigh more strongly, but the intra-
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 Stryker, Susan. 2004. “Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil Twin.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay 
Studies10(2):212-215 at 214.  
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reproductive privilege of their coupling will ensure that no other party may supplant either man’s 
parentage claim without consent.654  
Despite the configurations of bodies and sexual identities which may pursue orthofertile 
reproduction, its conflation with heterosexuality remains profound. For example in 2011 a 
transman named Paul, widely touted as “Britain’s first male mother,” was impregnated through 
sexual intercourse with his male lover Jason.655 Paul had neglected to take his hormone 
injections while on holiday, and after a difficult pregnancy in which both men struggled to come 
to terms with their impending fatherhood, the couple separated. The story garnered much 
attention in the press, with the vast majority of commentators attempting to reinstate Paul as a 
woman to restore the bounds of orthofertility as a properly heterosexual practice. Multiple media 
outlets ran an article on the pregnancy; the following is a small sample from the flood of 
(international) comments the story garnered on the Daily Mail website:656 
So, if "Paul" really wants to be a man, why wasn't "he" having sex with women? 
And, if Jason is really a gay man, then why did he enjoy sex with "Paul"? They 
sound like a really confused heterosexual couple...          
- Mimi, Syracuse, NY 
So, a man and a woman were having sex in the way most men and women do, and 
the woman fell pregnant - what a surprise!  
- MJ, Lisbon, Portugal 
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 While a transgender man who gave birth to a child would be listed simply as a “parent” on the birth certificate, he 
will be listed as the child’s “birth mother” on the birth registration because of the way the Vital Statistics Act is 
written. This is the case for all Canadian provinces including British Columbia and their recent comprehensive 
reform of family law. In their discussion of the new legal regime in British Columbia, Barbara Findlay and Z 
strongly recommend that, given the current language of the registration form, a transgender birth father seek a 
declaration of parentage or a stepparent adoption in anticipation of difficulty should the family plan to travel. This is 
does not represent a challenge to the birth father’s underlying parental rights, but is a pragmatic suggestion for 
clarity given the likelihood of the family encountering homophobic and transphobic jurisdictions. Findlay, supra 
note 616 at 6.1.24. 
655
 David Lowe, “Partner On UK’s First Ever Male Mum,  ”, The Sun, March 11, 2012. 
<http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4186028/Partner-on-UKs-first-ever-male-mum.html> 
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 Ibid. 
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I have no issue with one sex changing to another sex if that's what they truly want, 
but until a woman changes FULLY completes their transformation to a man, they 
should not be classed as so. None of this half-hearted rubbish, if you want to have 
naturally conceived children, do it as a woman and then do your changes. The 
same stance goes for a man changing to a woman. 
- mysslo, London, UK 
There's nothing unnatural about a woman giving birth vaginally, completely 
natural, been doing it for centuries. In the human race only the female can give 
birth due to the reproductive organs she has, so this is [a man and a] woman that I 
hope are in love and will go out of their way to protect the children. 
- Jo, Ware, Hertfordshire 
If they're a gay couple, how come they had heterosexual sex for them to 
conceive?  
- Ian Bygum, Up North, In't Yorkshire 
Call me old fashioned, but Jason and Paul are a man and a woman who fell in 
love and had a baby. Shame no-one thought to tell them. 
- cha cha, the town that time remembered 
 
Here, the imagery of “naturally conceived” children is invoked alongside the location of 
Paul and Jason as a heterosexual couple, a “man and a woman who fell in love and had a baby.” 
The dictates of orthofertility, and the reproductive supremacy it commands, apply a powerful 
logic to Paul’s body, transforming him into a cisgender woman – and a confused one at that. The 
reproductive alignment between Paul and Jason is shunted back into a familiar heterosexual 
frame, and into the way the human race has “been doing it for centuries.” This rhetorical strategy 
is buttressed by naturalistic language and a common-sense attitude – an ‘old fashioned’ folksy 
wisdom that was rarely refuted within hundreds of comments on the titillating details of this 
case.  
Interestingly, however, this strategy also places a normative demand upon heterosexual 
reproduction. For even as it polices the boundaries of orthofertility, demanding that all 
‘naturally’ procreative sexuality be heterosexual, it also has the effect of containing the 
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heterosexual within the boundaries of orthofertility: As all intra-reproductive couples are 
properly heterosexual, so all heterosexual couples should be properly intra-reproductive. Thus it 
becomes difficult to imagine a heterosexual couple who might not wish to be orthofertile despite 
their desire for children; who might intentionally decide not to procreate through sex, even 
though they are able. This includes the reproductive imperative experienced by intentionally 
childless couples, as well as the presumption that children should be produced within the 
reproductive dyad. Why does the ideal mode of procreation involve the conception of a child 
through sexual intercourse? Why cannot a fertile body who wishes to parent seek out 
reproductive labour, or donor gametes, if the intention exists? The question is so contrary to 
orthofertile logic that it may seem odd to pose.657 Heterosexuality and orthofertility are resolutely 
fixed, making it awkward to think of them as decoupled.658 
Response to what has been termed ‘social surrogacy’ is partly indicative of this 
dissonance.659 Citing career pressure, the pain of childbirth and the prospect of stretch marks, 
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 After a surrogate gave birth to her twin daughters, U.S. celebrity Sarah Jessica Parker was accused in popular 
media of being ‘too posh’ to try to have a child ‘naturally’. She soon came out to defend herself, explaining that her 
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pregnancies.” <http://www.today.com/id/30832692/ns/today-today_entertainment/t/sarah-jessica-parker-opens-
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 An exception might be the exhortation for genetic superiority that was exemplified by such social experiments as 
the Repository for Germinal Choice – a sperm bank in California that opened in the early 1980s. The Repository 
aimed at providing donor sperm from men of high IQ, professional attainment and education level and even 
included several Nobel Prize winners. One may imagine a heterosexual couple choosing the ‘superior’ Repository 
sperm to create their children, electing for a genetic hierarchy in which the social father was understood to have an 
inferior contribution to make. For more on this sperm bank in particular see David Plotz, The Genius Factory: The 
Curious History of the Nobel Prize Sperm Bank (New York: Random House, 2005  ). 
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 I would locate the primary issue with ‘social surrogacy’ in a feminist concern with the exploitation of poor 
women’s bodies. In the past decade there has developed an important transnational critique of stratified reproduction 
and the role played by the reproductive systems of poor women in (perhaps most troublingly but not limited to) 
countries in the Global South. This analysis has drawn attention to international systems of capital, mobility, 
regulation, access and the commodification of female bodies. While not minimizing the critique of these 
reproductive economies, I would also suggest that amplified horror at the elective decision to hire a surrogate, rather 
than a decision out of reproductive necessity as with a heterosexual couple who cannot conceive, is rooted in the 
conceptual coupling of heterosexual coupling and orthofertility. 
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some women have chosen to avoid pregnancy and hire a surrogate not due to reproductive 
incapacity, but as an elective decision.660 In fact this may be growing more common, especially 
in locales where surrogate labour is relatively cheap and/or unregulated. A 2012 news article in 
The Telegraph of Calcutta, India, discussed the blossoming of local surrogacy markets and cited 
drought conditions in a nearby region as driving more women into surrogate labour.661 While 
much Western scholarship on Indian surrogacy has focused on the transnational aspect of 
surrogacy markets and concerns over exploitation by wealthy tourists, reporter G.S. 
Radhakrishna quoted the State Health Secretary as saying that, out of the 50-100 infants 
delivered each month to surrogates, only about five percent of births are commissioned by 
foreigners.662 The piece then quoted a fertility expert who discussed the phenomenon of social 
surrogacy by Indian women as a relatively commonplace practice: 
“Most of the clients are women from well-to-do Indian families who want to 
avoid childbirth so that their lifestyle, or body shape, is not affected,” said 
Srinivas Prasad, a doctor at one of the city's top 15 fertility centres.663 
While reproductive incapacity is generally viewed sympathetically, at least in Canada, 
the intentional choice to avoid pregnancy is viewed with suspicion at best. Even within the 
fertility industry, social surrogacy is often held at arm's length. Many fertility clinic websites are 
circumspect about appropriate reasons for considering surrogacy; some clearly state that they 
will not accept clients who are themselves able to carry a pregnancy.664 This rejection maintains 
                                            
660
 Tessa Mayes, “Career Women Rent Wombs To Beat Hassles Of Pregnancy” The Sunday Times , London , July 8, 
2001. <http://www.sunday-times.co.uk 7-8-1> 
661
 G.S. Radhakrishna , “Mom dumps surrogate baby, gets him back,”, The Telegraph, Calcutta, India, January 29, 
2012 . <http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120129/jsp/frontpage/story_15065100.jsp#.UflzMm2KK0Y> 
662
 Ibid.  
663
 Ibid. 
664
 Marcy Darnovsky, “Too Posh for Pregnancy? Are there good reasons and bad reasons for surrogacy?” Genetic 
Crossroads, February 8, 2012.  <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/genetic-crossroads/201202/too-posh-
pregnancy> 
 
259 
intact the appropriate link between heterosexuality and orthofertility, with reproductive 
transgressions viewed as a repugnant form of vanity, selfishness, luxury, or worse. 
Of course the costs of social surrogacy are beyond the reach of many. There are strong 
economic reasons for a couple to choose orthofertility as an available option. In jurisdictions 
which do not offer subsidized access to AHR, financial considerations will have an enormous 
impact on how people approach reproductive strategies. However the normative weight of 
orthofertility currently plays a role even where cost is not the determining factor and 
reproductive technology is ubiquitous.  
When it is assumed that orthofertility is always the best approach, the conceptual and 
practical application of other forms of reproduction is delimited. This maintains the conceptual 
tie between heterosexuality and orthofertility, as seen by the public insistence that Paul and Jason 
were a cisgendered male-female couple. At the same time, heterosexual individuals and couples 
not in an orthofertile situation may experience this idealized mode as abjecting, as a form of 
structural exclusion. By making orthofertility merely one of a range of fertility practices, it 
becomes possible to challenge the reproductive supremacy of this vaunted method of procreation 
and open the field for the following new modalities. 
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The first new mode to be explored is located in column two of the chart below. This 
reproductive category encompasses what I am calling parafertility. It describes a fertility that lies 
not in opposition to orthofertility (the sterility of infertility) but rather sits in parallel to it. The 
term is derived from the Greek prefix para- meaning “alongside of; beside; near; resembling”. 
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*Natural/Non-Clinical* 
INTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
ORTHOFERTILITY 
*Artificial/Clinical*  
INTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
PARAFERTILITY 
*Artificial/Clinical* 
EXTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
SYNFERTILITY 
(UNPLANNED)  
*Artificial/Clinical*  
EXTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
SYNFERTILITY 
(PLANNED)  
 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and transpeople 
coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and 
transpeople coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and 
transpeople coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Gay and lesbian couples. 
Single people. Bisexuals 
and transpeople coupled 
with a reproductively 
non-aligned partner. 
Older heterosexual 
couples. Multiple-parent 
families. 
 
The last section explored non-assisted intra-reproductive coupling as the idealized form 
of fertility – what the Mayo Clinic describes as “normal sexual intercourse”.665 As has been 
discussed, an important motivator behind the normalization of orthofertility is to have biological 
and social kinship align, with children produced as the ‘natural’ outcome when a man has sexual 
intercourse with a woman. My contention is that parafertility describes a nearly identical 
scenario, albeit one requiring a bit of assistance. The goal of this intra-reproductive form of 
assisted reproduction is to approximate the ‘natural’ reproduction of orthofertility, with 
biological father and biological mother matching up precisely with the categories of intended 
parent.  
The last chapter detailed the experience of an imaginary heterosexual couple in the 
fertility clinic, who underwent an egg extraction and ICSI procedure in order to recreate the 
structure of the intra-reproductive family. This may be understood as an instance of parafertility. 
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 See supra note 490 for a discussion of the definition of infertility. This issue has been thoroughly discussed in 
prior chapters. 
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The sperm and ova of the mother and father were both sourced from inside the parenting dyad, 
despite the substantial hardship and cost involved. Under conventional thinking, the focus rests 
primarily upon the complex technological intervention carried out within the space of the clinic - 
the diagnosis of infertility, the medical apparatus, and the reproductive expectations that unfold. 
(And certainly the couple, and the woman in particular, would be acutely aware of the 
materiality of these interventions.)  
I contend, however, that the clinical/non-clinical dichotomy is not the only, and perhaps 
not even the most appropriate, vantage from which to understand this process. When focus is 
instead brought to bear on the actors, their gametes, and the legal outcome of their parenting 
project, it is clear that parafertility is very much in keeping with the standard heterosexual model 
of parentage. This sharpens awareness of the normative standards of orthofertile reproduction, 
which function to structure and inform the decisions made under the banner of parafertility. 
This parafertile couple and their intra-reproductive genetics are able to benefit from the 
same privileges of parental recognition afforded to orthofertile couples. Simply put, parafertility 
does not pose a challenge to the family order as currently or historically figured in Canadian law. 
On the contrary, it is hard to imagine a case in which the presumptions of legal parentage would 
be more certain than in a laboratory setting!666 At the conclusion of successful parafertility 
treatment and pregnancy, a child will be born to two parents with whom she shares a biological 
connection. In the absence of death or divorce she will presumably be raised by these parents, 
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 See supra note 605 for a discussion of medical error in donor insemination and the scandal that has surrounded 
Ottawa fertility doctor Norman Barwin. I would argue that such mix-ups feel so shocking not only because of a faith 
in the performance of medical expertise, but because of a deep attachment to parafertility as an approximation of 
orthofertility. The expectation that biological and social kinship will be aligned means that unintentionally giving 
birth to a stranger’s baby represents the deepest sort of error, the most painful of errant biological outcomes. 
Compare this affective response with the distaste expressed toward couples who pursue social surrogacy, where 
parafertility is not the intentional outcome of reproductive assistance. The idealized operations of orthofertility loom 
across the other categories of the chart as a powerful standard for ‘proper’ reproduction. 
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and at some point they may (or may not) discuss the medical intervention that allowed for her 
conception.667 
Certainly the child would not have been born without this intervention, but this is no 
Pandora’s baby,668 no terrifying journey into the embryonic stuff and matter of life itself. While 
the cyborg spectre of test tube children may still hold some fears of the unnatural,669 in fact these 
are complex interventions made wholly in the service of the natural. In the 1970s when IVF first 
came on the scene it represented a potentially dangerous alchemy; a tinkering with life that 
seemed to open a slippery slope into a chimerical future where human clones would march in 
lockstep. As Robin Marantz Henig describes it, in her book on test tube babies and the 
reproductive revolution, “[i]n vitro fertilization was frightening because at the time anything 
seemed possible, the worst outcome every bit as likely as the best.”670  
Yet as Henig notes, nearly four decades later, IVF is considered a relatively simple and 
harmless procedure, a medical procedure with the same sort of risks and benefits as any other 
intervention.671 The parafertile couple is merely using technological enhancements to produce 
the same genetic outcome that would have occurred via heterosexual coupling, masking the site 
of technological intervention and allowing the couple to proceed with the social rewards of 
orthofertility. This masking is often so complete that a vibrant industry exists to help parafertile 
parents tell their child they were not the product of ‘natural’ conception.672 Books like Mom, 
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 Heterosexual couples who require donor gametes and/or surrogate labour to procreate would not be classified as 
parafertile and will be discussed in the next section. Couples who experience a successful intra-reproductive birth 
through AHR represent the definition of parafertile reproduction.  
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Johnny said I grew in a test tube!?: A guide to assist parents in explaining technological 
conception are part of a growing library of texts aimed at helping parents and their children in 
navigating the break from orthofertile privilege.673  
By pulling back from the clinical/non-clinical divide, and the sweeping diagnostic of 
infertility upon which it rests, it is possible to draw some long-overdue distinctions. 
Understanding the constitution of parafertility allows us to question the fundamental binary of 
‘natural’ versus ‘artificial’ that primes the infertility trap. This is a crucial move to help reduce 
the stigma and shame that attends parafertile heterosexual couples, who may experience the 
fertility clinic as a site of failed, malfunctioning sexuality.674 Indeed there is nothing damaged or 
broken about parafertility, and one may readily think of this process as travelling alongside of 
intra-reproductive coupling performed via sexual intercourse.  
Parafertile couples simply require a reproductive boost which does not trouble the 
prevailing social order. The needless stigma that attends these discourses has made it difficult to 
mobilize political action in Canada and contributed to the lack of effective regulation around 
reproductive technologies. For example Preston Manning, former leader of the Reform Party, 
was a political insider to the long journey of the AHRA detailed in Chapters Five and Six. At a 
2011 conference on the AHRA Supreme Court reference case, Manning specifically located this 
shame – and the chariness of politicians to address such a sensitive issue - as a barrier to the 
effective promulgation of statutory regulations in Canada.675  I believe the formulation of 
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parafertility is a first step toward reducing this stigma: This is not a wounded model, merely a 
parallel reproductive form that requires medical intervention and assistance.  
Framing this as parafertility not only minimizes trauma for heterosexual couples and 
opens discursive space for political mobilization and action, it also allows us again to account for 
the relational character of reproduction, bracketed apart from a fixation on the heterosexist 
categories of male and female. For just as orthofertility must be decoupled from the heterosexual, 
so must parafertility. As is evident in the chart, parafertility is equally inclusive of trans and 
bisexual people who may be paired with a reproductively aligned partner. Unfortunately at 
present, the clinic is aggressively blind to non-heterosexual parafertility. The operations of 
orthofertile power that sought to reclaim Paul and Jason as a heterosexual couple apply in equal 
measure to parafertile families.  
A painful instance of this normative disciplining was recounted by Kristin and Isabel, 
who talked about their initial intake at a clinic in Toronto. As may be recalled from earlier 
chapters, Isabel is a lesbian-identified trans woman and Kristin is her cisgendered female partner.  
They had presented themselves to the clinic as a lesbian couple, and here the women recount 
their experience seeking assistance to inseminate Kristin with Isabel’s sperm. 
Isabel: Well, I mean, there were tons of factual inaccuracies in all our documentation and 
everything. I mean, I had a health card that lists me as female correctly and on their charts 
they always had me listed as male. Which was, you know, and then so we told them that 
that’s actually not correct according to my documentation and everything. And 
they…instead of apologizing or trying to remedy the situation, they were defensive about 
how difficult it would be for them to do that….to change their records and so on. So they 
wrote down, basically, that Kristin was a heterosexual woman – which she’s not – and 
that I was…uh…the father…the potential father who has, you know (incredulous) sperm 
problems or something! 
Kristin: Yeah, they wanted to treat us as a straight couple with male-factor infertility.   
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The healthcare practitioners of the clinic are riveted upon the heterosexual presumptions 
of intra-reproductive procreation. When reproductive alignment is present – either orthofertile or 
parafertile – the compulsion to label the couple as heterosexual seems nearly irrepressible. Even 
when Isabel confronts the clinic staff on their transphobic mislabeling, they prove unable to 
apologize or amend the records. These women have come to the clinic to manage their 
parafertility, and despite consistent and vocal self-advocacy are unable to chip away at the 
cemented presumptions of heterosexuality.  
This is a reproductive heterosexism actualized through the medical apparatus of the 
clinic, not only through the willful mis-identification of Isabel’s documentation, but in the 
inappropriateness of medical treatment provided. The women went on to explain how the clinic 
encouraged them to have sexual intercourse to inseminate, even though they had clearly sought 
out assisted reproduction and had not presented intercourse as an option:  
Kristin: They were very also interested in us making an effort to get pregnant at 
home..um..which wasn’t anything that we expressed an interest in. 
I: Meaning through...some sort of coitus? 
Isabel: She wanted us to…yeah…exactly. 
Kristin: She wanted us to have sex and get pregnant...which…(incredulous noises) 
Isabel:  (laughs) We were…yeah...like...why were we at a fertility [clinic]...you know? 
Clearly, that… 
Kristin: But they really consistently perceived of us as having...being a straight couple 
with male-factor infertility who needed to make lifestyle changes…‘Cause that’s how 
their system is set up. 
 
 The experience of Kristin and Isabel in Toronto, as well as Paul and Jason in the UK, 
demonstrates that it is not enough merely to break open the clinical/non-clinical dyad and 
account for more reproductive options. It is also critical to strip the presumptions of 
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heterosexuality from both orthofertility and parafertility. As Kristin notes, the ‘system is set up’ 
with a presumption of heterosexuality – at least when it comes to parafertile couples - and this 
flawed perception was a source of great strain to both women, in addition to the pressures they 
already felt to successfully conceive. Trans-sensitive training and cultural competency for 
clinical staff has been recommended by some LGBTQ parenting organizations, and this is a 
useful palliative to reduce the discomfort of trans-identified people and their partners.676 
However the foundational discourses of the infertility trap must also be identified in order to 
recognize the operation of the natural/artificial binary and shift the dominant paradigm of 
orthofertile reproductive supremacy.  
 By detaching heterosexuality from reproductive alignment and the variable modes of 
intra-reproductive fertility, space is created for the recognition of queer modes of reproduction 
that do not involve a male-female dyad. As with any challenge to a normative order, it may give 
rise to new systems of meaning as well as new forms of control. However a focus on relationality 
rather than the fixed gender of bodies has the capacity to offer an interesting refiguration of the 
‘traditional family,’ while also diminishing idealization of the ‘natural’ as non-assisted 
reproductive coupling. When the divergence between avenues to family formation is marked by 
intra- and extra-reproductive arrangements, rather than clinical and non-clinical, it may even 
serve to minimize the traumas of the clinic and allay wounded heterosexuality. At the very least, 
it holds the promise of carving out room for queer bodies such as Kristin and Isabel, Paul and 
Jason.  
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 Thus far, the terms orthofertility and parafertility have been developed to describe the 
two varieties of intra-reproductive arrangements. The next section will explore extra-
reproductive arrangements and the ways in which these sub-categories can be rethought.  
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To account for extra-reproductive arrangements which do not involve the two-parent 
contribution of gametes, one last neologism is required: synfertility. This term takes the prefix 
syn– from the Greek for 'with' to describe the collective nature of sourcing gametes and 
reproductive labour from outside the dyadic family unit. It describes the quantitatively unique 
experience of extra-reproductive procreation, wherein one or more social parents may be lacking 
a biological connection to the child. Synfertility is captured in the third and fourth columns of the 
chart.   
*Natural/Non-Clinical* 
INTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
ORTHOFERTILITY 
*Artificial/Clinical*  
INTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
PARAFERTILITY 
*Artificial/Clinical* 
EXTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
SYNFERTILITY 
(UNPLANNED)  
*Artificial/Clinical*  
EXTRA-
REPRODUCTIVE 
SYNFERTILITY 
(PLANNED)  
 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and   
transpeople coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and 
transpeople coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Heterosexual couples. 
Bisexuals and 
transpeople coupled with 
reproductively aligned 
partner. 
Gay and lesbian couples. 
Single people. Bisexuals 
and transpeople coupled 
with reproductively non-
aligned partner. Older 
heterosexual couples. 
Multiple-parent families. 
Within synfertility we then can distinguish two further refinements: those parents who 
walk into the clinic with a planned synfertile parenting project - the reproductive outsiders of the 
fourth column; and those who must resign themselves to synfertility after medical diagnosis 
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indicates the sterility of one or both partners – the overwhelmingly heterosexual couples of 
column three. All synfertile parents create their families with gametes from outside the parenting 
dyad, and may also rely upon the reproductive labour of surrogates. The ways in which they 
engage with the clinic and the discourses of reproductive trauma may be very different, however. 
5# #
As has been seen, the infertility trap produces stigma from the division it creates between 
normal and pathologized forms of reproduction. This dull binary renders parafertility as the gold 
standard of the fertility clinic, and casts synfertility as a last resort when other forms of 
parafertile intervention have failed. It has been discussed how this model seeks to replicate the 
‘normal’ process of reproductive heterosexual intercourse, with every degree of variance a 
further remove from the ideal. Thus, the intensity of stigma increases as one departs from 
parafertility into the realms of unplanned synfertility.  
Within column three, for example, one might encounter a heterosexual couple who is 
unable to achieve conception after multiple rounds of IVF with their own ova and sperm, and 
who turn in eventual defeat to gamete donors or surrogate labour.677 This unintentionally 
synfertile couple bears the difficult burden not only of so-called infertility, but the confusion of 
kinship creation beyond genetic affiliation. Of all the reproductively aligned forms of fertility, 
this presents the greatest challenge to social parents who had also expected to share a biological 
tie. 
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One such crisis point for clients is when the possibility of having their own, shared 
biological child has come to an end. After years of trying, couples must decide what path, 
if any, to take next. In the midst of grieving the dream of a genetically shared child, 
couples must face one of the hardest decisions they will ever have to make.678 
 
Synfertility gains its affective power as a “crisis point” and “one of the hardest decisions” 
a couple may ever face through the fixation on orthofertility as an unquestioned ideal. The 
cultural dominance of compulsory heterosexuality and the norms which privilege orthofertile and 
parafertile kinships are pervasive; they are layered deeply in the foundational discourses of law, 
medicine and society, and even in sites (such as the fertility clinic), where reproduction is 
explicitly structured apart from a need for sexual intercourse.  
Controversial legal disputes over parental rights in the field of reproductive technology 
are all instances of synfertility.679 When the clear lines of genetic affiliation are ruptured, and 
multiple parties may hold competing claims to parentage, law has found itself splayed across 
intended, genetic, gestational and custodial parents without clear guidelines for determination. 
As Janet Dolgin has described within a U.S. context: 
Now, the society and the law must determine not only who is the mother, the father, or 
the baby, but what is a “mother,” a “father,” or a “baby.” The simultaneous challenge to 
the social facts of family and to the biological facts of family precludes certainty of 
almost any sort…By threatening central assumptions about the biological correlates of 
family – assumptions that until recently were rarely examined at all – the new 
reproductive technologies endanger the ideological framework within which family has 
long been understood.680 
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However this threat to central assumptions of law and society is not posed by 
parafertility, as has been explored. While the two have long been conflated under the rubric of 
‘new reproductive technologies,’ synfertility and parafertility in fact mark out distinct 
ontological relations with distinct legal ramifications. By removing the clinical/non-clinical 
boundary marker that has framed all forms of AHR as a challenge to the ideological framework 
of family, attention may be sharpened on the varieties of synfertility which actually pose a novel 
effect. 
In fact it is unsurprising that the two have remained wed – the goal of reproductive 
technology has long been to naturalize the technological intervention itself. Reproductive 
technology has multiplied the ways through which human reproduction can occur, but it has not 
widely challenged existing scientific paradigms that explain the ‘biological facts’ of human 
reproduction.681 Instead it uses existing paradigms of nature, as based in the heterosexual 
imaginary, demonstrating their accuracy by multiplying possibilities for control over the 
processes of reproduction.682 The revolutionary aspect of AHR is thereby not found in its 
challenge to a contemporary scientific vision; on the contrary, “it is revolutionary because it 
actualizes that vision through the control and manipulation of biological processes previously 
understood as “natural” and impervious to human manipulation.”683 
To this point, there has been no clinical requirement to disaggregate parafertility and 
synfertility as conceptual and ontological categories. The goal of ‘orthofertility-plus’ has 
dominated the clinic, offering a hyperboost to the natural world even as it avoids challenging the 
underlying ‘biological facts’ of heterosexual reproduction. AHR has been aimed at multiplying 
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possibilities for traditional reproduction, not creating new ontological formations altogether.684 In 
law and society, synfertility has also operated in an odd liminal space. On one hand, the loss of 
the biological anchor is recognized as a complex figuration of family wherein the biological facts 
appear to dim in significance.685 This is the site of cultural anxieties around reproduction and 
fears of an emerging army of surrogate handmaids, for example. Yet at the same time, the socio-
legal changes wrought by reproductive technology have occurred under the aegis of the 
‘traditional family’ and have not fundamentally rewritten (yet) family law and the assumption 
that human reproduction is the result of natural processes.686  
The ontological relationalities of synfertility are thus stubbornly interpreted through the 
gaze of orthofertility, as “the social contours of family have been consistently defined through 
reference to the biological correlates of [heterosexual] familial relationships.”687 This has begun 
to shift in recent years, as seen with British Columbia’s new Family Law Act and select legal 
cases that are discussed in the final chapters of this dissertation.688 The Act in particular provides 
an impressively comprehensive guide to the multiplicity of ontological relations that may be 
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created through AHR.689 I would argue, however, that this detail is only possible because of the 
drafters’ specific attention to the queer kinships of intentional synfertility. It is precisely by 
taking up a queer perspective on the complex family forms made possible through AHR that 
legislation may be crafted to account for families created outside the heterosexual imaginary.  
1# #
To return to the chart, it is in the multiple, ranging kinships of column four that 
procreation is actively and intentionally decoupled from sexual intercourse. When the queer 
families of column four are foregrounded, a different vantage point is gained upon the multiplied 
forms of reproduction made possible by AHR. These collective engagements from outside the 
parenting dyad are able to open the conceptual field, and hold potential to genuinely destabilize 
the biological correlates of heterosexual familial relationships.  
Of course at the same time that novel forms of reproduction may be potentially 
destabilizing, their configuration and appropriation may uncritically recuperate class and race 
privilege and patriarchal power. These technologies are inseparable from the cultural matrix in 
which they are produced, and as such their operations are negotiated and constructed to uncertain 
outcome. What is clear, however, is that through the operations of synfertility it has become 
“increasingly visible that [kinship] is nothing but a process of social, cultural and legal 
construction; a construction which obviously cannot be reasonably legitimated by recurrence to 
an unchallenged consensus about its "natural" foundation.”690 Thus as intentionally synfertile 
families push themselves into law and the public order, a flood of questions about ‘natural’ 
mothers, fathers, sex and kinship enter the space of the heterosexual imaginary, affecting key 
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determinist key notions of ‘unalterable’ links between reproductive capacities, sexual desires and 
subjectivity.691 As Dion Farquhar makes the point: 
By separating parenting into genetic, biological and social-legal aspects, ARTs change 
and challenge the fetishizing of blood ties, the nuclear romance of reproduction and their 
concomitant sexual identities. They declare the constructedness of reproduction by 
posing alternative ways to conceive. Rather than condemn this…as a ‘reproductive 
brothel’…I would like to celebrate the diversity and oddities and exclusions that such a 
position denies.692  
In this spirit, then, rather than take a techno-utopic stance on AHR, I suggest that the 
figuration of intentional synfertility may allow for a productive space in which to think through 
reproductive difference and potentially destabilize heteronormativity. The disaggregation of 
parentage into multiple categories of attachment reveals their inherent constructedness, and 
offers alternatives for family formation that remained previously unthinkable. However these 
technologies are not static objects, but are shifting historic practices that interact with and shape 
the groups and individuals built within and through them. As such it matters what groups are 
using them, when and why. What kinds of diversity, oddities and exclusions are being produced? 
What new forms of normativity and control are being generated? To begin to answer these 
questions, it may be helpful to look closely at the denizens of column four and the ways in which 
queer parenting projects are negotiating the spaces of the clinic and courtroom. 
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To a large extent, planned synfertility describes the reality of assisted reproduction for 
gay and lesbian couples, single people, bisexuals and transpeople coupled with a reproductively 
non-aligned partner as well as multiple-parent families. These are the people whom Jenni 
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Millbank has called ‘reproductive outsiders,’693 families excluded by the operation of two blunt 
categories of fertility – a normal positive ability and an abnormal deficiency that requires help – 
as well as by the reproductive supremacy afforded to genetic relations. I would also extend this 
category to include older heterosexual couples, who approach the fertility clinic with the 
intention of using gamete donors or surrogate labour to procreate. Cathy Cohen has shown how 
heteronormative systems of oppression exclude not only lesbians from the category of acceptable 
‘normal’ femininity, but also single mothers, welfare recipients, women of colour, etc.694 By the 
same token, the ‘normal’ reproductive family is a heterosexual couple of natural child-bearing 
age who may conceive through sexual intercourse. The labor of the clinic is to repair the rupture 
in this ‘normal’ process through the application of heightened and directed forms of parafertility 
and (if necessary) by ameliorating the pain of unplanned synfertility.  
$(&"&%
Like same-sex families and single parents, however, older heterosexual couples approach 
the clinic with an intentional project of reproductive assistance. Women past ‘natural’ 
childbearing age also fall outside acceptable models of kinship, with questions of access to AHR 
for post-menopausal women often the focus of fiery public debates, particularly in the early 
1990s as countries moved to regulate access to and funding for reproductive technologies. For 
example, in 1993 former French Health Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy launched an effort to 
ban IVF for older women in France, and lobbied for a similar ban throughout the European 
Union.695 As Douste-Blazy saw it, older mothers represented a critical threat to the natural 
reproductive order and would be unable to care for their children in later life. In a radio interview 
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from that time quoted in the Washington Post, he exclaimed, “I think it is absolutely shocking 
that a child can be 18 when his mother is 80.”696 
The RCNRT in Canada reached a similar conclusion, when they recommended that 
“women who have experienced menopause at the usual age should not be candidates to receive 
donated eggs.”697 France ultimately limited infertility treatment to couples of reproductive age, 
as did places like the United Kingdom,698 although Douste-Blazy’s larger European Union 
campaign was unsuccessful. In countries like Italy, for example, the absence of regulations have 
made it attractive to older women from neighbouring countries who have been rejected by their 
home clinics.699 
The demonization of unnatural childbearing in older women represents not an issue of 
sexual object choice, as it does for same-sex couples and single people, but a temporal rift in the 
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acceptable timeline of reproduction. In some respects, the social approbation of post-menopausal 
mothers holds an even more vigorous character than for lesbian mothers (for whom the 
immutability of sexual identity presumably applies). In a certain tenor of public debate, these are 
women who have intentionally squandered their reproductive capacity and now seek state 
assistance to reproduce. Nina Lykke describes the post-menopausal woman as a “monstrous 
figure” when she appears in public discussions around reproductive ethics and access to AHR. 
The “Career Woman” is “one who out of pure selfishness puts off having a child until it is nearly 
too late. Obviously, she is a bad and selfish person without the right maternal instincts. To her, 
whose life style is probably focused on consumption, a child is just consumer goods.”700  
Post-menopausal women serve as a central location for cultural anxieties around the loss 
of ‘nature’ and the gendered expectations for childbearing as wrapped in the notion of infertility. 
They represent the transgression of a temporal boundary reflected through a misogynist logic of 
appropriate reproductive agency. A dichotomy is thereby formed between ‘normal’ women in an 
age-appropriate heterosexual relationship, and ‘queer’ women who are too old, too gay, too 
single, too selfish or too focused on their career to reproduce ‘naturally’. And critically it is 
women who experience this temporal boundary marker as social violence - older men entering 
fatherhood do not encounter the same uproar over their reproductive intent.  
Describing a series of older men who uncontroversially fathered children with younger 
women - Charlie Chaplin became a father at 73, Sen. Strom Thurmond at 74, actor Anthony 
Quinn at 78 - Washington Post health columnist Abigail Trafford blames the censure being 
heaped on older mothers on sexism, as enacted through “the familiar and unscientific Double 
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Standard.”701 Thus when comedian Steve Martin recently fathered a child at age 67 with a much 
younger woman, it was to much benevolent acclaim, with online press exclaiming “Mazel Tov!” 
and wishing the new parents well.702 
Of course older fathers may not require reproductive assistance, placing their sexual 
behaviour outside of regulatory limits. Nevertheless a misogynist logic underscores this political 
stance, with female bodies held as the focus of medical intervention and the affective site of 
blame for deferred reproduction. In piece typical of this censuring genre, entitled ‘Why Old-Age 
Parenting Is A Bad Idea,’ Globe and Mail columnist Margaret Wente starts off in a mock 
huckster address to the women of Canada: “Are you too busy to have kids? No worries. Thanks 
to medical technology, having children in your 40s is no big deal…You could be warming baby 
bottles and having hot flashes all at the same time!”703 She goes out to outline the supposedly 
amplified dangers of post-menopausal reproduction, while intimating that pregnancy in older 
women is likely to result in a parade of horribles, including a higher likelihood of childhood 
autism.  
After skimming past the American Society for Reproductive Medicine’s recommendation 
of an outside limit of 55 years for female reproduction, Wente wrings her hands at the negative 
outcomes of older women seeking to conceive, including “hundreds of thousands of useless and 
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costly medical procedures, thwarted expectations, marital stress, heartbreak and an epidemic of 
children with autism, learning disorders and perhaps even schizophrenia.”704 Were one to drift 
away from Wente’s prose at this point – a forgivable lapse – a simple, blunt impression remains: 
selfish career women who were “too busy” to get pregnant during their natural childbearing 
years are endangering a whole generation of children.  
Despite scores of studies, data remains unclear on the relationship between advanced 
parental age and the increased risk of some psychiatric disorders.705 The most recent and 
comprehensive study comes from Sweden, and tracked all individuals born in that country 
between 1973 and 2011 (a total of 2,615,081 people), comparing the mental health outcomes of 
children born to fathers 20 to 24 years old with those born to fathers 45 years and older.706 The 
study found a strong association between a father’s age at childbearing and disorders including 
autism, attention-deficit/hyperactivity-disorder [ADHD], bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, 
substance abuse problems and low educational attainment.707 The researchers indicated that, for 
most of these disorders, prevalence increased steadily with paternal age: When compared to a 
child born to a father in his early twenties, a child born to a man of 45 years or older was 3.45 
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times more likely to have autism, 13 times more likely to have ADHD and 24.7 times more 
likely to have bipolar disorder.708  
Even Wente gets around to this father-focused vein of research eventually. After laying 
the blame on careerist women for most of her column, she finally notes that some data has found 
causal links between older fathers and “the soaring incidence of autism and other brain 
disorders.”709 Wente even quotes genetic researcher Dolores Malaspina and the move away from 
saddling post-menopausal women with guilt for having children late in life. As Malaspina says: 
“People have always focused on maternal age, but now we know that paternal age matters, 
too…This is a true paradigm shift.” Wente immediately sidesteps this insight to zoom back into 
blaming older mothers, ending the piece with a prod to her (imaginary) daughter to stop dithering 
around with the business of baby-making and “get on with it.”  
However impressive Wente’s misogynist tunnel vision may be, the paradigm shift to 
paternal age as a potential contributing factor to childhood morbidity should not simply displace 
blame onto older men who father children. Indeed none of these results should be interpreted as 
placing blame on parents, cautions epidemiologist Michael Rosanoff. As the associated director 
for public health research at Autism Speaks, Rosanoff explains that the increase in autism risk is 
relatively modest and the “vast majority of children born to older fathers will not have any of 
these disorders.”710 Here, the politics of blame colludes with the rejection of ‘unnatural’ 
synfertility to demonize older mothers for post-menopausal childbearing.  
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Susan Drummond, in an opinion piece in the Toronto Star, suggests that age limits to 
reproductive assistance for women represent an arbitrary cutoff based more on discrimination 
than on concern for child or maternal health.711 The complexity of kinship and character of the 
environment in which a child will be nurtured should instead be the primary concerns for a 
compassionate provider of reproductive health care. As she maintains, “A less discriminatory test 
would focus on the thoughtfulness and care of parental plans for sheltering a child within a 
capricious world,” 712 rather than the attainment of a physical age untethered from social context, 
embodiment and location. 
Importantly, the demonization of post-menopausal women rests uneasily with the 
unqualified acceptance of other ‘unnatural’ aspects of modern medicine.713 As Emily Jackson 
points out, while it might be ‘unnatural’ for a woman to have a child after menopause, it may be 
similarly ‘unnatural’ for a young woman who has suffered from ovarian cancer to subsequently 
bear children, and it is probably ‘unnatural’ for her to be alive.714 Jackson suggests that rather 
than a blanket prohibition on post-menopausal reproduction, screening for potential risk factors 
and performing a careful medical assessment would offer a genuinely patient-centric response.715  
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While agreeing with Jackson’s compassionate stance, as well as the demonization 
experienced by reproduction outside of appropriate temporalities, I think it is helpful to 
conceptualize the atemporal and asexual reproductions of column four as similar in kind. I 
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understand the abjection of post-menopausal women and the ‘unnatural’ character of this 
reproduction as also occurring within the frame of queer kinship. It represents an intentionally 
synfertile variance from the ‘normal’ model of procreation, as a reproductive project being 
pursued beyond the bounds set by idealized orthofertility.  
Planned synfertility deviates from the central assumption derived from an orthofertile 
model: that the superior form of reproduction draws exclusively upon the gametes of the 
intended parents. Such an assumption operates in contrast to the ‘withness’ of extra-reproductive 
genetics that synfertility represents.  
Orthofertility also assumes that an ideal parenting project involves two people, and that 
reproductive labour will be provided (wherever possible) by the intended parents. These are 
presumptions imported from an idealized heterosexuality without analysis or review of their 
application to AHR. And while some parents may indeed wish to perform reproductive labour 
and utilize their own gametes, as with the reciprocal IVF carried out by Paula and Nicole, these 
scenarios should not be taken for granted. Orthofertility crafts the foundational assumptions that 
the reproductive outsiders of column four must encounter when they seek out AHR, yet they may 
be deeply inappropriate for families constructed through intentional synfertility.   
The inter-racial parenting project of Carol and Maricel was discussed in Chapter Nine, in 
regard to their struggle with Canada’s strict sperm importation regime. Carol, who is white, was 
prepared to be inseminated and have a child with her own eggs, while Maricel, who is from the 
Philippines, was unwilling to get pregnant. They thus decided to use a sperm donor of Filipino 
origin in order to reflect their family composition and ensure the child would also share a racial 
heritage with Maricel. However when it proved difficult for them to locate Canadian-compliant 
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Filipino sperm, it was assumed by the clinic that the best course of action would simply be for 
Maricel to carry the child. The women related their conversation with a doctor at their Toronto 
fertility clinic: 
Carol: The solution was: “Why doesn’t Maricel try and get pregnant instead?”…”And 
then you can use a white donor and it won’t be a problem.” 
Maricel: Yeah and they just said like, “Do you want to start the testing?” But we already 
told her in the beginning that I don’t want to be pregnant. 
Carol: Yeah. That wasn’t an option for us. 
**** 
Maricel: Because we already told her that, you know, it’s not even an option that I’m 
getting pregnant and then she’s coming back to me and saying they want to start all the 
testing and stuff. 
Carol: Yeah it was interesting. Just because you have the capacity to you should. Like, 
why wouldn’t you, why do you want to go to all this trouble… 
 
Maricel had been consistent with the clinic regarding her position. Yet once Health 
Canada’s restrictive importation regime threw a hurdle in the couple’s reproductive plans, it was 
immediately assumed that the work of pregnancy would shift from Carol’s body to Maricel’s. 
Her clearly articulated lack of consent was immaterial in the face of the orthofertile reproductive 
imperative. The bedrock of the clinic is constructed upon an expectation that family should be 
created through as many intra-reproductive ties as possible, with reproductive labour provided in 
whatever means available by the intended parents. It thus becomes inconceivable as to why 
Maricel would not want to provide her egg (and uterus!) if it proved difficult for Carol to access 
a desirable donor.  
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Maricel: It made me feel…awkward because she was kind of saying, “Well you can get 
pregnant and then it will be easier for you guys. Then why aren’t you doing it?” But I 
didn’t want to get pregnant. 
I: So did you feel like you had to give a full explanation to her? 
Maricel: Yeah, yeah. But I don’t usually give explanations to people in that way (laughs 
nervously). Like, I just told her, “No.” But you know that feeling, like, “Why aren’t you 
doing it? You could do it and it would be easier.” So…yeah. 
Carol: And that’s interesting too, because that’s come up [again] since we’ve had the 
baby…Cause we went through all this trouble and we ended up getting our half-Filipino 
child… 
Maricel: And I have to explain… 
Carol: Yeah. 
Maricel: So many times…that I don’t want to get pregnant (laughs nervously). 
Carol: Now people are like, “Well you went through all that trouble so next time why 
isn’t Maricel just gonna do it?” And we’re kind of like, “No. Next time we’ll do it the 
same way. Cause it’s important.” 
 
While the women’s doctor clearly understands the heterosexual imperative for racial 
alignment – families should look like a racial blending of both parents – it is not clear to her why 
Maricel’s body is not available to produce this ideal phenotypical mixture. Maricel’s desire for 
motherhood did not include the conception and gestation of her child, and she was not willing to 
provide reproductive labour even though it may have been facially “easier” by the logics of the 
clinic.  
The expectation that all female bodies are reproductive bodies is a central aspect of 
compulsory motherhood, and has long been critiqued as a cornerstone of the manifestation and 
institutionalization of male dominance over women and children.716 Patriarchal ideology has 
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defined motherhood as the “instinctive vocation” of women, with structural and ideological 
pressures applied to ensure the reproductive function of female bodies.717 Motherhood thus 
becomes a major and constitutive social role for women, with all women “socially defined as 
mothers or potential mothers.”718 As Martha Fineman has framed it, motherhood is "[a] 
colonized [concept]...an event physically practiced and experienced by women, but occupied and 
defined, given content and value, by the core concepts of patriarchal ideology.”719 
These discourses remain potent in the clinic, as a location attuned toward the 
reproduction of orthofertility and steeped in the heterosexual imaginary. In an empirical study of 
nurses working with lesbian clients in professional practice settings, Judith A. MacDonnell has 
described how “discourses of compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory motherhood frame the 
nuclear family and many nursing programs.”720 Lesbian motherhood, however, may offer a 
challenge to this patriarchal mode, as it need not involve the reproductivity of female bodies. The 
parenting project envisioned by Maricel did not involve her pregnancy, yet this did not lessen her 
desire to become a parent. Nor did Carol anticipate that her partner would be sharing 
reproductive duties. On the contrary, Carol staunchly defended Maricel’s position as the women 
contemplated having their second child, insisting that they follow the same process again, 
“[be]cause it’s important.” The link between patriarchy, control over women’s bodies and 
                                                                                                                                            
relationship between a woman and her children, and “motherhood as enforced identity and as political institution.” 
Thus the clinical discourses may have disciplinary effects and mediate access to reproduction for queer folks, but the 
experience of parentage need not be steeped in the patriarchal norms of orthofertility.  
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reproduction that is figured by compulsory heterosexuality, and enacted through the bedrock of 
the clinic, has the potential for disruption…but at a cost.  
This reproductive pressure was experienced as deeply unsettling for Maricel. For most of 
the interview she had been a quiet presence in the room, displaying a butch stoicism as her 
femme partner Carol recounted their experience in an animated fashion. Maricel’s nervous 
laughter while recounting this part of their story spoke to her discomfort with the memory, and 
the awkward feeling she had experienced as the contours of her planned synfertility project 
abraded the normative expectations of the clinic. Interwoven by the legacy of patriarchal power 
over women’s bodies, radical feminist interventions into reproductive technology, the paternalist 
recommendations of the RCNRT, limited contemporary reserves of non-white donors in Canada, 
and the production of strict Health Canada regulations on sperm importation, Maricel and Carol 
had found themselves securely ensnared in the infertility trap.  
Fortunately, the women were able to extricate themselves from their medical providers in 
Toronto. They contacted a clinic in New York state, and arranged for it to receive the California 
donor sperm they had selected and set up insemination. This was a stressful endeavor, however, 
as the clinic was a three-hour roundtrip drive across the border. As they were not planning to 
inform Carol’s employer about her pregnancy until it was well underway, the women were 
obliged to visit the clinic in the early morning before their work day began – a pre-dawn hustle 
they described as intensely nerve-wracking.  The women told the border guards at every crossing 
that they were going shopping in the U.S., and were concerned about being flagged by customs 
for their regular monthly visits and hauled in for an interview. Maricel’s visa for travel in the 
286 
U.S. was only for six months, and the precarity of her legal status, the fear of lying to border 
guards and the potential duration of their reproductive project caused her particular anxiety.  
Maricel: Yeah so I didn’t I didn’t want to be like, what’s it, grilled, at the border ‘cause I 
didn’t want them to find out what exactly we are doing. And since we’ve been doing it 
for like three consecutive months I was worried that it will show up and…It well, for 
[Carol] ‘cause she’s a Canadian citizen it doesn’t matter but yeah. It was definitely a 
concern. (laughs nervously) 
Despite these hurdles, the couple remained clear that their family plan involved Carol 
carrying the child through insemination with Filipino donor sperm. While their story had a happy 
resolution, recounted as their infant son cooed at the table, Maricel’s discomfort at the clinical 
and legal apparatus remained affectingly stark. 
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Synfertility is now an everyday occurrence at fertility clinics across the world, but it 
continues to be collapsed into the technological ambit of reproductive intervention and viewed as 
a poor cousin to clinically-assisted parafertility. The dominant model of infertility persists as the 
structuring frame, obliging that synfertility, that withness to be suppressed in order to preserve 
the sanctity of the imaginary heterosexual family. Yet synfertility is not merely a bad case of 
parafertility (or infertility for that matter): it represents a completely different biosocial 
formation.  
While the empirical work of the Creating Our Families project focused on the clinical 
encounter and issues of access to reproductive technology, the complex kinship structures of 
synfertility are also starkly rendered in family law. The ‘gayby boom’ has not led to a profusion 
of three- or four-parent families, nor has it reshaped the terms in which reproductive technology 
is conceived; the scarce mention of LGBTQ parents by Canada’s highest court in the AHRA 
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Reference case attests to the still-marginal character of queer parenting.721 Nevertheless the legal 
landscape has shifted in response to synfertile families, albeit marginally, inducing both judicial 
rulings and statutory reform to, overwhelmingly, “solidify parentage within the same-sex nuclear 
family by extending the rights and responsibilities of parenthood to the spouse of the birth 
parent.”722 Still the ideology of the heterosexual family remains dominant, and this can pose a 
hurdle for families built outside this model – even when they follow a two-parent structure.  
Kyle and Micah, two transgender men that I interviewed, had conceived with a known 
donor, with Micah carrying the child and a friend providing the sperm. After the birth of their 
son, Harold, the men had planned a trip to the U.S. to introduce their baby to his great-
grandparents, who had all booked flights in anticipation of the gathering. However the new 
parents encountered difficulty registering their names on the birth certificate form, which only 
had entries for ‘Mother’ and ‘Father/Other Parent’. As Micah was a birth father, they were 
unsure of how best to proceed. This was a matter of some urgency for the men, as they could not 
get a passport for Harold without his birth certificate, and the date of the family meeting was fast 
approaching. As Kyle explained, he was feeling a great deal of pressure during this period to get 
Harold’s paperwork in order, as “I had two octogenarians flying in from two other cities in six-
and-a-half weeks to meet their great grandson for the first time.”  
Micah had initially called around to sort it out and was told that both men needed to 
physically come into the Toronto office to discuss the matter.723 They arrived at the office with 
their ten-week old son, their documentation in order, and a printed copy of the Ontario Human 
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Rights Commission’s ‘Policy on preventing discrimination because of gender identity and 
gender expression.’ They encountered one employee after another with a sympathetic attitude 
but no idea how to address their situation. 
Micah: Everyone was respectful and totally understood that this was a legitimate 
problem.  “We see you and who you are.”  “We understand why this is difficult but 
nobody has ever told us how we answer this.” 
Kyle: …And people kept saying, “I don’t know if I have the authority to do that?” 
Micah: “Okay, okay, so who does? If you don’t, who might?” 
Kyle: And so we just kind of got passed up the food chain to some degree. 
 After many hours at the office they were eventually sent home without resolution, and 
told to wait for a response from the next level of authority. Two days later they received a call 
from another government employee, and they had to start from the beginning and explain their 
situation once more. 
Kyle: Government Employee #2 called back two days later and was like, ‘Okay so walk 
me through this.’ (laughs) 
Micah: Which we did.  And interestingly she called as Harold and I were heading out in 
the car for whatever reason. And we said, “Hang on a sec,” and she had to listen to us get 
the baby ready and work through things and really sound like a normal, normal family 
with a new baby doing things that families with new babies do. Like, “Do you have the 
diaper bag and new hat?” and you know, “Can you carry the bucket out to the car?” 
‘cause I had a C section, and all of that stuff. So by the time we got to telling her the story 
she’d already had this, “Oh you really are a family, doing family things, with a baby that 
I can hear in the background.” And we hadn’t intended that as sort of normalization 
theatre. 
Kyle: But I think it helped.  
The woman they referred to as “Government Employee #2” told the men that she would 
send the registration forms to them directly, and they could simply “cross off Mother wherever it 
says Mother, fill in Father.” However she was also hesitant in regard to her authority to sign off 
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on the doctored forms. Micah and Kyle described how the province’s Assistant Registrar General 
was eventually brought in to consult on the case, and determine whether it would be necessary to 
file a court petition to allow Micah to file as the birth father.  
Micah: And it wasn’t intended as a threat, like “Do it or else we will take you to court.” 
But I think they were like, “Ok, family. We understand great grandmothers. Like, Ok.”  
And I will say that it also builds on the lesbian thing and two moms on the birth 
certificate, that’s already in place, so it’s not like it wasn’t building on people’s earlier 
court battles and struggles. But it was surprisingly easy in the grand scheme of things.  
The men highlighted their sense of how the “normalization theatre” they had performed 
had advanced their case and placed them within a two-parent frame of legibility. Certainly the 
revision of Ontario’s Human Rights Code to include protection from discrimination and 
harassment because of gender identity would not have hurt their case (nor did their strategy to 
bring a printed copy-in-hand).724 However they also spoke to how the bureaucratic recognition of 
a traditional form of family – great-grandmothers, family reunions – seemed to make their 
petition easier than it might have been. In light of the judicial successes of cases like Rutherford 
there was already a statutory frame in place to allow for two mothers to register, which they felt 
had laid a foundation for their two-father claim.725 All of these factors contribute to the 
normative framing of the queer ontology of synfertile parenting, a discursive maneuver that 
requires the performance of a certain type of ‘normalization theatre’ for inclusion into the 
privileged nuclear family of law.726 
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This contradictory and ambivalent subjectification may be understood within a long 
tradition of queer encounters with law. As Brenda Cossman rightly explains:  
While the heteronormativity of law and the legal subject has been increasingly 
challenged, lesbians and gay men have been partially absorbed into dominant modalities 
of legal subjectivity. The complex processes of inclusion and exclusion have led to the 
emergence of new legal subjects who are both normalized and transgressive.727 
In her piece on the role of the Charter in advancing gay rights claims in Canada, 
Cossman discusses at length the Mossop case – the first gay equality rights case to reach the 
Supreme Court.728 She describes the strategy adopted by these early litigants as a conscious 
attempt to disrupt the heteronormativity of law.729 Mossop was argued not on the equivalency of 
heterosexual relationship to same-sex relationships, but within a discourse of equality which 
aimed to avoid the sameness argument and refused to stake ground on, for example, the 
foundation of sexual monogamy.730 The litigants also advanced a sophisticated argument about 
intersectionality, insisting that discrimination on the basis of “family status” – the issue at the 
heart of the case – included discrimination against same-sex couples. As Cossman relates, the 
case “challenged the heteronormativity of dominant modalities of family and legal personhood, 
and it was partially successful in so far as the challenge made inroads in a strong dissent” by 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé.731  
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In the majority opinion, however, these transgressive elements were folded back into the 
normalizing field of heterosexual family relations. The opinion, which ruled against Mossop, 
operated to reinforce the heteronormativity of the dominant family by finding that family status 
did not include same-sex couples. Thus, as Cossman ultimately concludes, “the broader political 
message was a normalizing one of sameness and assimilation.”732 
This tension between assimilation and transgression, normativity and disruption, also 
underscores the encounter of the synfertile family with law. Micah and Kyle were joyfully 
irreverent during our interview, and talked about their unconventional family arrangement 
involving a polyamorous relationship with multiple lovers in other cities. Micah described with 
relish the conception of their son, which had occurred in a hotel room in Baltimore while he was 
on a date with one of his lovers, a flight attendant. It turned out that the weekend of his date was 
at the same time as his ovulation, so Micah asked the sperm donor – who was, incidentally, a 
rabbi – if he could meet them at the hotel rendezvous.  
Micah: And so I phoned the rabbi and said, “So, that’s the right weekend…” And he sort 
of said, “So are you coming?” And I said, “Well I actually already have this date in 
Baltimore with a flight attendant.” 
Kyle: “So we were wondering if we could fly you there instead?” 
Micah: And he was willing. So the rabbi and the flight attendant and I spent a weekend 
together in Baltimore. We talked about you know, having two hotel rooms on the same 
floor. The person I’m fucking and not sharing body fluids with and the person I am 
sharing body fluids with but not fucking.   
This non-normative foundation of their parenting project did not pose a difficulty for the 
two men when it came to registering Harold. This was for a variety of reasons. Partially, it was 
because they were able to read as ‘family’ due to their normalization theatre and their reference 
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to conventional intergenerational modes of care. It was also because of policies against 
discrimination based on gender identity as reflected in the Ontario Human Rights Code, and 
because of previous legislative victories and statutory amendments in Ontario giving rights to 
same-sex parents. However it was also large part because there was no strife in their relationship.  
Had the determination over Harold’s legal guardianship come to a custody battle, the 
details of their sexual escapades might not have been so benignly recounted. Their queer family 
project was thus discursively subsumed into the available legal categories of parentage, creating 
a functional equivalency between “birth mother” and “birth father” that belied the complex 
circumstances of Harold’s creation.733 
In fact there have only been two instances where Canadian law has legally validated non-
normative queer families: the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in A.A. v B.B. and British 
Columbia's new Family Law Act.734 The latter has been discussed in Chapter 9 as a site of recent 
statutory reform. The former offers an interesting case on the three-parent model that has not yet 
been replicated in Canada, and was only possible in the first instance thanks to the lack of 
dispute between all parties. This parental stability offered room to challenge the limitations of 
the dyadic family model and open (albeit limited) space for queer family formations. 
A.A. v B.B. involved a male sperm donor, a lesbian mother who carried the child, and her 
female partner, the non-biological mother of the child.735 The appellate judgment saw Rosenberg 
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J. tracking between the poles of biological and social kinship in order to focus on the best 
interests of the child (D.D.). Ultimately the court decided that all three adults had an equal stake 
in raising this child, a judgment that adapted to the materiality of this queer family and its 
planned synfertility. In affirming the non-biological mother's legal parentage, the Appeals Court 
exercised its inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to remedy what it found to be a “legislative 
gap” in the current statute, the Ontario Children's Law Reform Act. According to Rosenberg J.: 
It is contrary to D.D.’s best interests that he is deprived of the legal recognition of 
the parentage of one of his mothers. There is no other way to fill this deficiency 
except through the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction.736 
This is one of the very few cases in Canadian jurisprudence in which the needs of the 
queer family were actually placed at the fore. Rather than a familiar routine to juggle the primacy 
of biology over sociality, the decision rested upon the best interests of D.D. not only as a 
queerly-conceived child but specifically as a queerly-conceived child of reproductive technology. 
This marks a sharp departure from the judicial logics discussed in previous chapters, which 
sought to recreate the heterosexual, two-parent family by whatever means necessary. With A.A. v 
B.B. the court recognizes a dispersed form of kinship which revolves around the nexus of 
sexuality and technology required to create a child with three parents. As Rosenberg J. noted, in 
regard to the rationale behind the CLRA:    
The possibility of legally and socially recognized same-sex unions and the 
implications of advances in reproductive technology were not on the radar 
scheme. The Act does not deal with, nor contemplate, the disadvantages that a 
child born into a relationship of two mothers, two fathers or as in this case two 
mothers and one father might suffer. This is not surprising given that nothing in 
the Commission’s report suggests that it contemplated that such relationships 
might even exist.737 
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This nexus of sexuality and technology, and the specific character of planned synfertility 
in creating queer families, are intrinsic to the court’s recognition of D.D.’s three legal parents. 
This case was seen as a partial victory for many in the field of gay and lesbian rights, with Fiona 
Kelly and others critiquing the lack of a Charter claim and the court’s invocation of parens 
patriae discretionary jurisdiction, thus limiting the scope of the judgment.738 This case also 
placed the onus of applying for third-parent status recognition on the non-biological parent (in 
this case the lesbian partner of the biological mother) and served to prioritize the donor’s status 
as a natural father.739 Yet as Kelly continues, “[w]hile A.A. v. B.B. is the only decision of its kind 
and is not applicable outside of Ontario, or perhaps even beyond the individual facts of the case, 
it suggests that in families in which three adults agree they are all parents, the courts may be 
willing to give legal recognition to the arrangement.”740 
However I believe the significance of this decision is not reducible to a victory – partial 
or otherwise – for gay and lesbian equality. Extra-reproductive family-making extends beyond 
the LGBTQ community, and it is imprecise to frame these shifts in family law as belonging 
properly to gay or lesbian kinship formations. Nicole LaViolette is approaching this conclusion 
when she states that the A.A. v B.B. “decision is more rightly situated in the developing caselaw 
on new methods of conception and parenting than in the context of lesbian and gay rights”.741 
However as this dissertation has argued, synfertility also involves a queer component of family 
construction which must be accounted for. It is not gay and lesbian rights or reproductive 
technology, but a queer form of technologically-assisted family composed in slantwise relation 
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to the heterosexual imaginary. The framework of planned synfertility allows for the reproductive 
frame to be opened beyond the dyad into multi-parenting arrangements, and recognizes the 
intentionality of all reproductive actors as well as the necessary patchwork of biology, genetics 
and social care they may provide. An actualized vision of planned synfertility thus has the 
potential for a tremendous and revolutionary impact on current conceptions of family law. 
 	

The increasing ubiquity of AHR demands new approaches to evaluate historic categories 
of parental affiliation and caretaking. British Columbia has been the first and only province to 
adopt sweeping reform in the light of synfertile families and the new forms of extra-reproductive 
kinship they represent. In the meantime, courts continue to place synfertile families within the 
bounds of existing family law, whether appropriate for their condition or not.742 
Reproductive technologies were designed to enable greater conformity with the 
traditional family and recreate parafertile family forms, but the extra-reproductive alignments 
made possible by AHR have ironically undermined the basis of normative biological parenting. 
While the complex family forms that have emerged from synfertile arrangements – planned and 
otherwise – have reshaped the legal landscape of family, the normative two-parent model has 
proven extremely resilient. The processes of legal inclusion and exclusion which synfertile 
families must face, often brought to the fore in the midst of acrimonious legal battles, have 
engendered a steady reliance upon the dominant modalities of legal subjectivity.743 Thus even as 
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the queer ontologies of synfertile families have taken on rich social resonance and lived 
meaning,744 their legal recognition has occurred within a narrow frame of formal equality with 
orthofertile couples.  
I argue that the traditional legal form of family should not be reinscribed atop the 
multiplied kinships of synfertility. Instead, the legal frame should be expanded and enlarged in 
step with the social and discursive forms that already exist. A.A. v. B.B. relied upon a best 
interests of the child analysis to determine that D.D. was better off with three legal parents. This 
is a narrow ruling that requires a stable and monogamous family form to demonstrate the solidity 
of home life.745 While Micah and Kyle were loving parents with a bright and active toddler in the 
home, they were also transgender men in a committed polyamorous relationship involving 
multiple international lovers. Judicial discretion is an unreliable tool to determine the new 
contours of legal parentage, particularly as ad hoc judicial decisions increasingly govern this area 
of family law.746 As Susan Boyd has warned, “[m]ore contested scenarios are bound to produce 
more ambivalent results.”747 
The synfertility model offers a blueprint toward the engagement of more complex legal 
forms that does not implicitly privilege biological or sexual affiliates, but looks broadly to the 
host of actors involved in producing a child. It creates more space for contractual relations by 
expanding the imaginary of the legal family, and turning it away from biological lineage as the 
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primary factor in kinship construction. Kinship is understood as relational and produced in 
various forms by the actors in each particular interrelation and assemblage. These are already 
extant social realities; the task for law is to legitimate these various forms by allowing for legal 
ties not bound by heterosexuality or patriarchy. Law must also actively engage by supporting the 
conditions for their production through funding and subsidized access to AHR, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 11. 
The two-parent mode for parentage is no longer tenable as the singular form of relational 
care and family construction. However there is no guarantee that simply expanding the bounds of 
family to include multiple parental actors will lead to improved outcomes for parents or children. 
It is important to understand the patriarchal and heterosexist context in which these new social 
forms are emerging, and judiciously balance competing and multiplied claims to parenthood in 
light of the normative bedrock on which they stand.  
Statutory amendment that allows for the contractual and intentional position of all parties 
to be laid out in advance may enhance the legal protection of synfertility projects. In the 
meantime, synfertile families are at the mercy of judicial discretion in a deeply heterosexist 
society. The threat to exclusive two-parent lesbian parenting posed by a known donor seeking 
custodial rights must be viewed not only from a utopian stance that welcomes the fragmentation 
of the parenting dyad. The embodiment, intention and lived reality of synfertile families matters, 
and neither biological nor sexual affiliates should be understood to automatically create a 
stronger kinship bond. Community may be multiplied, but any claims to parental rights must be 
evaluated with an eye to patriarchal, masculinist and sexist social norms.  
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Chapter Eleven: Financing Reproductive Assistance
	

 
While questions of legal access to gametes and reproductive labour were touched upon in 
Attachments One and Two, this chapter will look in depth at economic barriers facing synfertile 
families and argue for the primacy of affordable access to AHR as a central plank of a platform 
of reproductive justice. It will begin by considering the role of financial investments in AHR 
more broadly, as reflected in the anti-commercialization tenets of the AHRA as well as the 
lucrative medical complex of what has been referred to as ‘Fertility Inc.’ It will then move on to 
explore the health and economic rationales for limiting multiple births in IVF as well as other 
forms of reproductive intervention.  
This chapter argues that the primary focus on IVF funding represents a heterosexual 
focus on parafertility and does not reflect the experience of many LGBTQ people seeking access 
to AHR. It then considers the limited case law that exists around petitions for state funding of 
reproductive assistance, and demonstrates the assumptions that undergird these decisions. A 
queer lens will be applied to this investigation of judicial responses. It then looks to the 
provincial funding models advanced by a handful of Canadian jurisdictions, and considers the 
impact on LGBTQ people in particular.  
!#1%8
In a 2002 New York Times piece called ‘Fertility Inc.: Clinics Race to Lure Clients’ on 
the growing fertility industry and the competition for patients, Gina Kolata discussed the 
approach taken by some establishments to drum up business.748 She described the case of a 
recently-opened New Jersey fertility clinic which had hired a marketing consultant, founded 
weekly support groups for infertile couples, and flown in a sommelier from France to preside 
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over a wine-tasting dinner to woo the support (and referrals) of local doctors. As Kolata 
explained:   
They had little choice but to invest heavily in marketing, fertility experts agree. Infertility 
has become a big, fiercely competitive business, with a billion dollars in revenues and 
with more and more doctors fighting for a limited number of patients. The growth of the 
field has been fueled by rising success rates and increased demand from patients, many of 
whom pay tens of thousands of dollars out of their own pockets in hopes of having a 
child.749 
This hyper-marketization of the industry has only continued since then. Fertility clinics 
are for-profit enterprises, buoyed by specialized diagnostic testing and expensive procedures like 
IVF and ICSI. Fertility Inc. is big business, valued at approximately four billion dollars in the 
U.S. alone.750 Competition remains fierce, and in the U.S. at least, a competitive market 
encourages inflating numbers by exaggerating estimates, using internal metrics of success, and 
transferring more embryos than might be ideally recommended to boost numbers.751 As indicated 
by the Joint Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs and the Council on Scientific 
Affairs: 
Another troubling aspect of ART concerns promotion of these services. Fertility clinics 
sometimes claim inflated success rates in advertising. Providers have included data on 
outcomes in media promotion, in some cases giving exaggerated estimates of success or 
defining success differently from the accepted standard. Even if the figures are genuine, 
predictors are so mercurial in ART that a cited figure may not represent the chances of 
successful outcomes for the majority of patients. Furthermore, average success rates do 
not necessarily reflect the results of a specific clinic since outcomes are affected by the 
nature of the pathology (some types of infertility are more successfully treated than 
others) as well as the skill of the professional and technical staff.752 
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This is of particular concern given the low success rate of the most expensive procedures, 
such as IVF, with success measured by the birth of a child. Despite being a technologically 
advanced treatment, IVF is often unsuccessful, with only a 25% to 30% chance of success per 
round of treatment.753 Patients thus often attempt multiple rounds of IVF, with some estimates 
indicating that more than half of patients will continue treatment until they have a birth.754 With 
the out-of-pocket cost of each round ranging between 10,000 and 15,000 dollars, this may soon 
become a very expensive enterprise for most families seeking treatment.755 
At the same time, there is concern that an established trend for ‘money back guarantees’ 
may put the success of the clinic above the health of the pregnant body and any children that 
result.756 Jim Hawkins recently conducted an in-depth study of how fertility refund programs are 
presented to patients, noting that refunds represent an innovative financing tool that is virtually 
unparalleled in other areas of medicine.757 Hawkins reviewed and coded online information on 
refund programs offered by every U.S. fertility clinic with membership in the Society for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ASRM). He found that the majority of clinics failed to 
comply with professional self-regulations that mandate the disclosure of certain information 
about their refund program.758 Most clinics also often present information in a deceptive manner, 
or in a manner that exploits poor decision-making on the part of patients.759 For example, 
Hawkins found that only 14% of fertility clinic websites followed ASRM guidelines by stating 
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that “the program is not guaranteeing pregnancy and delivery,” while only 2.2% of clinics 
complied with policy by making it “clear to patients that they will be paying a higher cost for 
IVF if they in fact succeed on the first or second cycle than if they had not chosen the shared-risk 
program.”760 As Hawkins argues, additional consumer protection regulations are necessary, 
given the regulatory vacuum that currently exists around refund programs and the evident failure 
of voluntary self-regulation.761 
As discussed in Chapter Six, both the U.S. and Canada are currently without 
comprehensive national or state/provincial regulation regarding the operation of fertility clinics. 
The few standards that do exist are mostly derived from research review boards or nonbinding 
ethics committee guidelines.762 This lack of regulation has been of particular concern due to 
concerns over multiple birth pregnancies, which represent substantial and elevated health risks 
for both the pregnant body and infant.763 For example, twins are six times more likely to die in 
their first year of life than single children; for triplets, the risk of death increases twelve-fold. 
Twins are four to six times more likely than singletons to contract cerebral palsy.764 In Canada, 
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IVF accounts for only one percent of all births but 17 percent of neonatal intensive care unit 
admissions.765 
1%% &
There are two forms of clinical intervention which may result in an increased chance of 
multiple births: ovarian stimulation and the intra-uterine insemination (IUI) of washed sperm via 
catheter; and all forms of IVF including ICSI.766 Ovarian stimulation with IUI represents a 
common intervention in the management of unexplained subfertility not only in North America 
but throughout the world, as its relative ease and non-invasiveness have made it a very popular 
option.767 It is also cheaper than IVF and a route pursued by many poorer families unable to pay 
for expensive rounds of IVF.768 One of the gay couples I interviewed had pursued ovarian 
stimulation + IUI with their traditional surrogate, and spoke approvingly of the lower cost, but 
most gay couples will be facing a scenario with a gestational surrogate and IVF. As discussed 
above, many lesbian women and transmen are immediately encouraged to begin rounds of 
fertility drugs upon entering the clinic, and will also face a greater likelihood of conceiving 
multiples than if ovarian stimulation drugs had not been prescribed.   
At present, AHR multiple birth rates are currently around 30% per delivery, compared to 
an unassisted rate of 2%.769 This has been attributed to the difficulty of controlling the number of 
follicles produced during a round of ovarian stimulation drugs + IUI, and the practice of 
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transferring more than one embryo per cycle of IVF.770 Data from the U.S. indicates that all 
forms of IVF account for about 40% of multiple birth pregnancies, while ovarian stimulation + 
IUI accounts for a further 40%; the remaining 20% occur spontaneously.771 For its part, Canada 
has posted one of the highest rates of multiple births from IVF in the world.772  
Given the high cost of AHR, the low success rates and the lack of regulation on number 
of embryos transferred, it has become common in many clinics to ‘stack the deck’ and aim for 
successful pregnancy and birth on the initial rounds of IVF.773 As Janvier et al. explain, this is 
done in consultation with the prospective parents, as “[p]atients and their doctors choose the 
number of embryos to implant during a treatment, with a greater number of embryos providing 
both a higher birth probability and a higher chance of a multiple birth.”774 
This is of apparent benefit to the patient, as it serves to reduce emotional, physical and 
financial strain by leading to an early conception and birth. It is also of apparent benefit to the 
clinic, as a successful pregnancy is the central mandate of reproductive assistance. Under the 
refund scheme described by Hawkins there may also be a financial incentive, as the up-front 
premium paid by all entrants to the refund plan is not refunded should the first round (or rounds) 
prove successful. As Hawkins describes, patients who invest in IVF refund programs and 
achieve a pregnancy in their first or second cycle may pay over $10,000 more than if they had 
been on a cycle-by-cycle basis.775 Yet as he explains: “Because people are so happy to have a 
baby…they do not worry about the excessive costs incurred with the refund program and they do 
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not sue to recover these costs.”776 A powerful financial incentive thus exists on the part of the 
clinic to ensure that a successful birth is achieved on the first or second round; this makes the 
presence of unregulated multiple-embryo transfers all the more likely.  
Some Canadian clinics have also instituted an American-style refund program in recent 
years. For example, NewLife IVF Canada in Mississauga, Ontario, offers a ‘Guaranteed Success 
Program’ for $20,000 (plus additional costs such as medication, prescreening tests and cycle 
monitoring), promising a refund of $15,400 if a live birth is not attained following three fresh 
IVF attempts and all frozen embryo transfers.777 However should a couple conceive upon the 
first IVF attempt - as with the U.S. model - the clinic retains the up-front investment and banks 
the entire payment.  
While NewLife does not post their regular fees on the website, a clinic in Scarborough, 
Ontario, offers a similar IVF Guaranteed Pregnancy Program and lists both program and regular 
fees. According to the IVF Canada and the LIFE Program website, couples can enter the 
Program for a cost of $22,000 plus medication, which includes a $17,600 refund if they do not 
have a successful pregnancy.778 However a single round of out-of-pocket IVF is priced at $6,000 
(plus medication and testing, which may run as high as an additional $14,000), meaning that a 
couple would have to undergo a minimum of four rounds of IVF for their investment to avoid 
loss; any fewer cycles and it is the clinic which gains. This appears to incentivize the clinic to 
ensure successful conception and birth in as few cycles as possible, making the suggested 
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transfer of multiple embryos a sound financial prospect. At the same time, Canadian clinics are 
not obligated to publish their success rates. 
%&%%
At present, both the U.K. and the United States require clinics to report how many 
pregnancies or births they produce per treatment. Yet despite the incorporation of American-
style models of refund guarantees, and Canada’s broad adoption of the for-profit business 
structure of Fertility Inc., this country lacks any independent source of information about which 
clinics might give patients the best chances of having a child.779  
The AHRC would have collected and potentially published such data, but in the wake of 
its disbanding there is no federal agency tasked with monitoring reproductive health care 
outcomes. Canadians currently have no way to compare expensive out-of-pocket reproductive 
outcomes on a clinic-by-clinic basis.780 This is a problem not least because data from other 
countries indicates that clinics may range widely in terms of success, with a study from Australia 
and New Zealand reporting birth rates following fresh-embryo IVF treatment at different clinics 
ranging from 3.6% to 25.9% in 2011.781 While these percentages gloss over potential differences 
in patient demographics and health, a similar 2010 study from Holland did adjust for individual 
patient attributes and found it made only a slight impact on final numbers.782 
For its part, CFAS has argued against the publication of clinical success rates, suggesting 
that such data would be misleading to patients and may spur clinics on to dangerous medical 
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practices in order to boost outcomes.783 As CFAS spokesman Al Yuzpe has argued, “It has 
dramatic implications on the financial health of that clinic…They feel themselves under 
immense pressure to distort their practices in ways that, as clinicians, they don’t want to do.”784 
However it is precisely the conflict between a for-profit system and a patient-centered 
model of care which is the issue. For most of Canada, like in the U.S., the business of assisted 
reproduction remains extremely lucrative for practitioners; a recent Quebec lawsuit indicated that 
the director of a Montreal clinic was earning more than $1.5 million per year as long ago as 
2005.785 Amidst a hypermedicalized system of infertility which is growing increasingly 
marketized, Canadians find themselves in a mixed system of reproductive assistance – they are 
barred from a ‘consumer awareness’ model out of concerns that clinics may seek to increase 
their bottom line at the expense of patient health. Yet they are also faced with refund schemes 
that demand complex consumer acumen and negotiation to determine sound fiscal choices. At 
the same time, fertility clinics are reaping substantial profits without oversight or the need for 
transparency on their success rates.  
1;!&
Canadian families paying out-of-pocket for IVF are thus faced with difficult decisions. 
They may opt-in to something like a refund guarantee program, without access to indicators of 
general clinical success or published data on success rates for their specific age and health range. 
Although one hopes not, they may also potentially encounter clinical pressure to transfer more 
than one embryo per cycle, with the goal of exiting the refund program early. Indeed such 
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pressure may not even be necessary: studies show that 85% of parents planning to undergo out-
of-pocket IVF - even after being counseled about the risks - still wish to minimize the stress, 
expense and difficulty and conceive twins.786  
On the other hand they may also decide to pay for IVF on a per-cycle basis. As 
mentioned, the cost can run as high as $20,000 per cycle. In this case, multiple-embryo transfers 
may also be indicated as a pragmatic choice for the prospective parents due to expense, time and 
emotional strain. When funding is provided by the government, however, the election of 
multiple-embryo transfers shifts dramatically. In 2009, before Quebec provided access to 
subsidized IVF, only two percent of couples elected for single-embryo transfer; when the cost 
was borne under universal coverage in 2011, however a full 32 percent of cycles in that province 
were elective single-embryo transfer.787 
Fertility doctors themselves have been a powerful driver behind Quebec’s policy shift. In 
a 2008 paper, three doctors from the University of Montreal calculated that a mandatory policy 
of single-embryo transfer would substantially reduce the number of babies admitted to neonatal 
intensive care units every year, result in fewer deaths, lower incidence of brain injuries and result 
in 42,000 less days of intensive care.788 Anne Janvier and her colleagues were adamant that the 
only way to lower Canada's level of IVF multiple births is to eliminate the “perverse economic 
incentives” that drive it.789 As they insisted, every time more than one embryo is transferred, “we 
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increase the risks to the mother, we increase the risks to the patients that don't even yet exist.”790 
IVF with single embryo transfer has been shown to almost completely eliminate multiple 
pregnancies. 
Yet with the exception of Quebec, there are no binding federal or provincial standards in 
Canada for how many embryos may be transferred during a cycle of IVF. In 2009, Canada's 28 
private fertility clinics reported 1,274 multiple pregnancies, including 1,193 twins, 76 triplets and 
five quads; in the same year, Canada and the United States tied for the highest twin rate.791 In 
2010, however, Quebec began paying for up to six cycles of IVF with the proviso that only one 
embryo be transferred per cycle for most women.792 The argument for public funding of IVF has 
taken on a distinctly economic cast; as framed by the Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
Technologies in Health, “there is a belief that the public funding of IVF with single-embryo 
transfer is a more sustainable strategy, as it offsets the downstream costs associated with the 
ramifications of multiple pregnancies.”793  
Outside of Quebec, fertility clinics still commonly transfer two, three or more embryos in 
a single round of IVF; nevertheless the impact on national birth rates from Quebec’s policy alone 
been dramatic.794 In 2009, 32% of pregnancies achieved via IVF in Canada resulted in a multiple 
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pregnancy; by 2012, after Quebec had fully instituted its provincial reproductive assistance 
policy, this number declined by almost half to 18.4%.795  
Ontario has recently made a similar move toward reducing the number of embryos 
transferred, with an April 2014 announcement that the provincial government will now fund one 
cycle of IVF treatment per patient. 796 There are also plans to set up an advisory body to ensure 
the practice of medical standards, including single-embryo transfer for certain patients.797 The 
single-embryo standard has also been championed by CFAS.798 
This singular attention to IVF, however, fails to attend to multiple births which occur 
through ovarian stimulation. While all 26 IVF centers accredited by the Canadian Andrology and 
Fertility Society must submit health reporting data on IVF deliveries to a national registry, they 
are not required to report on births through IUI + ovarian stimulation.799 This constitutes a 
significant gap in data reporting not least because it is far more likely to be the route that lesbians 
and transmen follow, as well as those few gay men with a traditional surrogate. Yet CFAS does 
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not track this data, despite indications that the procedure has a similar rate of multiple births as 
IVF. There is thus no way of knowing the effect that provincial health policy or enthusiastic drug 
prescription may be having on the multiples rate for some members of the LGBTQ community. 
2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The focus on funding for fertility procedures has been primarily on treatments such as 
IVF, a medical technology that can fertilize an embryo with the genetic material of both intended 
parents. A central reason for this focus is the sheer cost of IVF, as a prohibitively expensive 
treatment for the patient and a potentially lucrative source of revenue for the for-profit clinic. 
This tension between economic efficiency and maternal health outcomes has led to a high 
incidence of multiple births and has formed an important rationale behind the drive for state 
funding and mandated single-embryo transfer in some provinces.  
However I argue that IVF’s status as the sine qua non of parafertile interventions is also a 
factor in its discursive primacy. Through procedures like ICSI, the heterosexual couple is able to 
procreate using their own gametes, achieving the gold standard of fertility treatment by 
paralleling ‘normal’ heterosexual coupling. IVF is used by a relatively small portion of LGBTQ 
parents-to-be, most notably gay men using gestational surrogates and lesbian couples undergoing 
reciprocal IVF.800 Yet the issue of public funding for IVF continues to be at the fore of 
mainstream discussion, rather than options like drug-free IUI or modified cycles of IUI.  
Such discussion also obscures the fact that multiple birth rates are similarly high for 
procedures of ovarian stimulation + IUI. This less expensive procedure is still a major 
investment for many poor and queer families, and it remains priced out of the grasp of many 
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more.801 As seen in Chapters Eight and Nine, these procedures hold their own dangers due to 
hyperovarian stimulation and the recorded evidence of fertility doctors pressing fertility drugs 
onto lesbian and transgender bodies and couples. Priorities in access to state funding for 
reproductive assistance may therefore be quite different for subfertile heterosexual couples than 
for those with an inherently non-reproductive sexuality. Yet with the focus of heterosexual 
litigation and provincial funding schemes focused on IVF – rather than a broader agenda of 
accessibility, safety and affordability for all forms of AHR – the issue continues to be narrowly 
construed.  
Each province mandates allowable forms health care coverage under the aegis of 
provincial insurance. In Ontario, for example, the costs of IVF were covered under provincial 
medical care from 1985 until 1994, when all IVF procedures - except “complete bilateral 
anatomical fallopian tube blockage that did not result from sterilization”802 - were 
comprehensively delisted. Ontario has recently announced its intention to pay for a single round 
of IVF treatment, once again refocusing on one form of reproductive assistance to the exclusion 
of all others. The singular focus on expensive IVF treatment obscures the importance of this 
procedure as a primarily heterosexual modality of parafertility, as well as the financial concerns 
faced by people using other forms of reproductive assistance.  
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The Quebec government began offering full funding for IVF treatments as well as other 
forms of AHR in mid-2010, making it the first jurisdiction in North America to do so.803 
Quebec’s provincial health care system now provides coverage for all services related to the 
medical aspects of ovarian stimulation, artificial insemination and three cycles of IVF, 
mandating in most cases a single embryo transfer for women under 36.804 The new plan also 
covers up to six ‘natural’ cycles (meaning a cycle in which ovulation occurs spontaneously, 
without being stimulated by medication) or modified natural cycles (meaning a cycle of ovarian 
stimulation through fertility drugs), which are aimed at producing only a single embryo.805 The 
plan will not pay for AHR services beyond three stimulated cycles or six natural cycles, although 
in the case of a live birth resulting from IVF, the patient is eligible for coverage for an additional 
three-cycle program. 
The rate of multiple births in Quebec decreased sharply following the introduction of this 
policy, dropping from 29% in 2009 to six percent in 2011.806 This same period also saw a steep 
rise in the number of fresh IVF cycles performed, which leapt from 1,875 cycles in 2009 to 5,489 
cycles in 2011.807 The public program has been far more popular than expected, increasing 
government costs per IVF treatment cycle from $3730 to $4759.808 However despite larger costs, 
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the “efficiency defined by the cost per live birth, which factored in downstream health costs up 
to 1 year post delivery, decreased from $49,517 to $43,362 per baby conceived by either fresh 
and frozen cycles.”809 As reported by a large comparative analysis conducted by physicians at 
the University of Montreal Hospital, “our study confirms that the implementation of a public IVF 
programme favouring eSET not only sharply decreases the incidence of multiple pregnancy, but 
also reduces the cost per live birth.”810 
Nevertheless, the program has been criticized for its overall burden on the health care 
system: while initially budgeted at $30 million in 2010-11, the cost was close to $70 million in 
2013-14.811 The program had been driven by a goal of recovering $100 million in overall health 
costs by reducing the cost of neo-natal care for multiple births, and while the cost per live birth 
did decrease, the overall demand for the service outweighed any savings. The Minister of Health 
for Quebec, Gaétan Barrette, has publically said that assisted reproduction is not an essential 
health service.812  
Barrette has also suggested that the program should be restricted to people with a 
diagnosis of ‘infertility,’ in specific reference to limiting access to the program by queer families. 
As he made explicit: “While single mothers and same-sex couples make wonderful parents, 
homosexuality is not an illness.”813 The framing of medical infertility as a necessary condition 
for access to a taxpayer-supported reproductive benefit is of evident concern as the situation 
moves forward. Thus far, Barrette has spoken of considering two options for the future of the 
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program: ending public finding in part or in whole; or introducing a new bill that would 
implement a series of recommendations made by a Quebec report released in summer 2014. 
This report, by the Quebec’s Commissaire à la Santé et au Bien-Être, is a comprehensive 
386-page review of the province’s reproductive assistance program. The report suggests that the 
program be maintained overall, but offers twelve recommendations aimed at streamlining and 
improving the process. These recommendations are focused on ensuring better health outcomes 
and cost controls, as well as allowing greater access to information, oversight of best practices, 
and generating social consensus around commercialization and ethically contentious issues such 
as surrogacy.814  
First, the Commission recommends a range of access restrictions for reasons such as 
elective fertility preservation and voluntary sterilization. This appears to include individuals who 
have undergone elective procedures such as tubal ligation or vasectomies.815 However the 
proviso against fertility preservation due to “social reasons” is of particular concern to 
transgender women who may wish to bank their sperm before transition; whether this would be 
considered an elective procedure is not certain. Nor it is clear if a post-transition transgender 
woman with no viable sperm would be viewed as having undergone ‘voluntary sterilization,’ 
thereby rendering herself and (potentially) her partner ineligible for treatment. Given that the 
recommendations also suggest that “both partners be covered within the provincial health 
insurance program,”816 it appears to model a two-parent dyad of intra-reproductive family 
formation that reflects orthofertile standards. 
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For this reason, as well as for the gatekeeping and heterosexist standards of the clinic 
mentioned in earlier chapters, there is also concern about the recommendation for psychosocial 
evaluation of intended parents before access to fertility services is granted. Similar to the 
controversial approach used in the U.K. to assess parental suitability, the Quebec report 
recommends that intended parents must complete and sign a declaration documenting past 
psychosocial issues such as addictions and matters of child welfare.817 In a related matter, the 
report also suggests the development of a database that clinics can access to track patient 
contacts, clinical interactions and psychosocial assessments to ensure that patients are not 
“shopping around” for services that may have been denied elsewhere.818  
In its eleventh recommendation, the Commission calls for the funding of both open-
identity and anonymous sperm.819 At present, Quebec covers only the cost of anonymous sperm 
acquisition; however as discussed in Attachment Two, many lesbian families strongly prefer to 
use open-identity gametes. Assuming that same-sex couples are not barred from the program 
altogether, as Barrette has intimated, the funding of open-identity sperm donors would be likely 
to have a positive impact on queer families, and will open already-limited donor selections to a 
wider range of options. While there are no explicit recommendations on surrogacy, the 
Commission does suggest that the government deal with demands by single and same-sex 
parents for access to assisted procreation, and advises a public discussion on the legal, ethical, 
clinical and social aspects of surrogacy.820 
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Perhaps controversially, the report recommends means tested payments, suggesting that 
users should pay a fee for the service based on their income.821 It also suggests moving away 
from IVF as the first choice for a woman seeking medical assistance to conceive, instead 
favouring less invasive and less costly procedures, such as ovarian stimulation.822 While based 
on primarily economic rationales, this may actually lead to a less medicalized model in which 
reproductive interventions are applied more sparingly. Rather than being driven by the logics of 
parafertility, such a cautious approach may open the door to greater consultation and discussion 
before treatment is applied. Such an approach may also be used as a means to bar gay couples 
from accessing the program with gestational surrogates, however, as IVF with an egg donor 
would normally be the first stop for such intentionally synfertile families.823 
There is also the danger that cost-cutting measures may be taken too far. A recent 
investigation of a fertility doctor in London, Ontario found evidence of professional misconduct 
in regard to repeated low-tech options. Dr. James Martin admitted to performing repeated intra-
uterine insemination (IUI) treatments and prescribing high doses of ovarian-stimulation drugs, 
putting some patients in danger of serious complications.824 An expert report submitted to the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons hearing found that by persisting with the low-tech IUI 
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method and delaying a move to IVF, Martin may have left some older women unable to get 
pregnant with their own gametes.825 Such women would certainly be left out under the Quebec 
recommendations: the government report suggested that fertility clinics adopt a moratorium on 
women over 42 who use their own eggs, as well as a general minimum and maximum age for the 
program.826 
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Other Canadian provinces have also recently launched a program of public contributions 
to IVF cycles, including Ontario and New Brunswick. The Ontario government announced in 
April 2014 that it will contribute to the cost of one cycle of IVF, exclusive of the expense of 
associated drug treatments. As Vanessa Gruben notes, the press release refers to single embryo 
transfer as the principal way to reduce multiple births, indicating that the government’s new 
policy will likely include both a funding and a regulatory component.827 The Ontario policy is far 
more limited than Quebec’s current model, however, and does not appear to include funding for 
donor gametes, IUI or other non-IVF services. While the contours of this program will become 
clear, Gruben rightly suggests that overall affordability is the key to sustainable practices in 
Ontario. As she says, “social policy regulating the price of fertility services is much needed and 
likely will be more effective than partial funding for one cycle of IVF.”828  
The press release also describes the creation of an advisory body to assist in the 
development of Ontario’s funding program; Gruben suggests that such a body should include 
health care professionals who provide fertility services; those who have used fertility services to 
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build their families; sperm and ova donors; women who have acted as surrogates; and adult 
children conceived using donated gametes.829 To this list I would add members of the LGB and 
T community as well as the adult children of queer parents conceived through AHR. 
Following suit to these developments, New Brunswick announced in August 2014 the 
government’s plan to offset the cost of AHR for eligible residents. The Special Assistance Fund 
for Infertility Treatment is a one-time maximum grant of $5,000 to claim costs related to IVF or 
IUI as well as related pharmaceuticals.830 While there was no mention of limits on the number of 
embryos that may be transferred, or whether there will be a regulatory aspect to this policy, the 
full details of the program have yet to be released.831 
To qualify, however, applicants must “[h]ave been diagnosed by a physician with fertility 
problems and have received infertility treatment after April 1, 2014.” The medical model of 
infertility is again in place, channeling access to taxpayer-funded services through a diagnostic 
procedure squarely aimed at the heterosexual couple. Whether this will prevent access by same-
sex couples and single people without a medical diagnosis of infertility remains to seen. Rachael 
Johnstone has also pointed out that this announcement follows on the heels of another significant 
change in reproductive health in New Brunswick, and the closing of the province’s only abortion 
clinic due to a lack of government funding.832 As she explains: 
If it were part of a larger commitment to create a spectrum of women’s reproductive 
health services, the infertility fund could be laudable. However, when contrasted with the 
government’s long held, paternalistic stance against the creation of substantive access to 
abortion, it suggests more alarming commitments. Validating the desires of women to 
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have children by investing money in expensive (often unsuccessful) treatments, while 
simultaneously denying the rights of those facing unwanted pregnancies by failing to 
provide relatively minimal financial support, suggests deeply troubling views of women’s 
reproductive rights.833 
The apparent adherence to a heterosexist model of infertility is also a cause for concern 
as New Brunswick ushers in this new funding regime, and the possibility for exclusion by same-
sex couples, single people and multi-parent families seeking reproductive assistance. 
This prioritization of IVF has also shaped the legal challenges that have argued for the 
public funding of reproductive assistance. Almost without exception, heterosexual couples have 
framed their claim for IVF funding within a perspective that depends on reading infertility as 
medical pathology.834 This approach rests upon the twin presumptions of ‘normal reproduction’ 
and ‘failed reproduction’ to stake a claim of discrimination. This position has the effect of 
privileging heterosexual forms of sex and erasing LGBTQ relationships from petitions for state 
recognition of reproductive needs. Emblematic of this privileging is one of the first appellate 
cases to petition for provincial funding to cover the costs of IVF and ICSI. 
 
!

	

In Cameron v. Nova Scotia (1999), the appellants were a heterosexual couple who had not 
been able to conceive due to the husband's diagnosed “severe male factor infertility”.835 Cheryl 
Smith and Alexander Cameron had undergone four unsuccessful cycles of ICSI and were seeking 
reimbursement of the medical hospital costs of these procedures from the Nova Scotia Health 
Care Insurance Plan.836 As such procedures were not covered under the Plan, the appellants also 
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sought a declaration that IVF and ICSI constituted insured services under the Health Services 
and Insurance Act of Nova Scotia.837 They advanced a two-pronged argument: first, that proper 
interpretation of the Act would include coverage for IVF and ICSI and thus their denial of 
funding was unlawful; and second, that the province’s failure to provide coverage was a violation 
of their Charter rights. The couple argued that by virtue of a physical disability – infertility - 
they had experienced impermissible discrimination, as the lack of provincial coverage for ICSI 
represented a breach of the equality provisions of Section 15 of the Charter.838  
At the trial court level, the justice addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that such 
reproductive procedures are “medically required” and on a par with other health interventions 
covered by law.839 He found that they were not, despite being “medically indicated,” and 
furthermore that the nature of the treatments was the basis of the province’s decision not to fund 
them, not the personal characteristics of a potential user.840 As such the treatments simply failed 
to meet the province’s criteria for coverage, liberating the court from the need to invoke a 
Charter analysis.841 
  Upon appeal, the court was unanimous in concluding that the case should be dismissed. 
Interestingly, Chipman J.A. rejected the trial court’s finding that procedures such as ICSI are not 
medically required, arguing that procedures aimed toward the non-medical end of human 
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reproduction “could qualify as medically necessary”.842 However give the costs, success rates 
and risks of ICSI and IVF in particular, such procedures were not shown in this case to be 
medically required.843 He then deferred judgment as to which procedures might be deemed 
medically necessary in the future in the hands of policy administrators, recognizing the flexible 
and ongoing contestation over the allocation of limited health care funds.844 
As for the Charter argument, Chipman J.A. found that there was indeed a distinction 
being drawn between the “fertile” and the “infertile,” with the latter category affirmatively 
constituting a form of disability.845 Although he recognized infertility as an enumerated ground 
for constitutional protection, and the presence of discrimination in limited provincial funding for 
AHR services, Chipman J.A. nevertheless found such discrimination to be justified by Section 1 
of the Charter.846 The objective of the Plan was to provide broad public health care with limited 
financial resources, directing the court to apply deference to difficult decisions over allocation. 
He also noted that their equality guarantees were only minimally impaired, as the appellants’ 
focus had been exclusively on securing access to IVF.  Chipman, J.A. determined that denial of 
public funding for IVF did not therefore constitute undue hardship because it “denies to the 
infertile funding for only two procedures, leaving them not only the full panoply of medical 
services available to all, but a number of specific procedures available for their condition.”847 
Chipman J.A. relies heavily upon a discourse of wounded heterosexuality to draw the 
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infertile into the category of disability. As he claims, “the infertile have been shown to suffer pre-
existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping and prejudice. They have been portrayed, and 
seen themselves portrayed as, having undesirable traits or lacking those traits which are 
worthy.”848 Fascinatingly, he equates the stigma experienced by infertile heterosexuals with the 
stigma faced by gays and lesbians.  
Quoting approvingly from Vriend, which involved the dismissal of a gay teacher, 
Chipman J.A. explains that “even if the infertile are less stigmatized than, for example, gays and 
lesbians, what must be considered is the effect of the law drawing a distinction based on their 
characteristics.”849 He then underlines a passage from the Vriend decision to highlight the 
potential for discrimination against infertile people, emphasizing that: “Compounding that effect 
is the implicit message conveyed by the exclusion, that gays and lesbians, unlike other 
individuals, are not worthy of protection.”850 Drawing an analogy to the “implicit message” 
potentially conveyed by Nova Scotia’s health care plan - that infertile people, like gays and 
lesbians, are not worthy of protection - he concludes that infertile people are vulnerable to 
discrimination.851  
The use of a gay and lesbian judicial victory to highlight the vulnerability of infertile 
heterosexuals is an interesting move. Chipman J.A. draws upon the wounded heterosexuality of 
the clinic to analogize the experience of gays and lesbians with infertile people, but not as 
similarly non-reproductive – as might be expected - but as an abjected category of social 
exclusion. In the process, he fails to consider how gay and lesbian people might themselves be 
viewed through the model of medical infertility being applied to categorize infertile people as 
                                            
848
 Ibid at 194. 
849
 Ibid at 198. Emphasis in original. 
850
 Ibid at 198 
851
 Ibid at 199. 
323 
disabled.  
This remarkable oversight is further compounded in the concurring reasons by Bateman 
J.A., when she analyzes whether or not equal protection for infertile people has been denied in a 
discriminatory manner. As she explains, policies excluding funding for certain treatments or 
procedures may indeed discriminate, but must be linked to the nature of the service and not the 
personal characteristics of a particular social group: 
If, for example, it was the government's policy not to fund any medical services for the 
infertile (assuming them to be “disabled”), without regard to the nature of the service, it 
is likely that such a policy would be seen to promote the view that such persons were less 
worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society.  
Such would likely be the case, as well, with a policy that denied all medical treatment 
specific to gays or lesbians or all treatments which only women required.852 
Quite astonishingly, Bateman J.A. echoes her colleague’s use of the historic 
marginalization of gays and lesbians (not to mention women) as a rhetorical lever to highlight 
the vulnerability of infertile heterosexuals. In the process she apparently fails to notice that an 
imagined policy that might deny treatment to all gays and lesbians could be the variety of 
reproductive services she had precisely under scrutiny.853 Instead her attention remains with the 
location of reproductive impairment within a medicalized framework of disability. By adhering 
to a strictly medical model, both Chipman J.A. and Bateman J.A. allow an uncontested 
relationship between the pathology of infertility and the definition of disability to remain 
uncontested by the court.854 
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The Cameron appellate ruling displaces a concern with the social dimension of disability 
in favour of a strictly biological modality. It constitutes disability as a failure located in the 
abnormal body, rather than understanding disability as a social construction in conflict with 
normalizing regimes.855 Discrimination is here sited in the failure of the state to assist in 
achieving heterosexually reproductive outcomes, rather than questioning the medical diagnosis 
of infertility itself. This decision also conflates the two claimants as a single infertile 
heterosexual unit, despite the fact that it was only the male experiencing an issue of 
subfertility.856 This failure to apply a gendered analysis to the case is in keeping with the dyadic 
model of orthofertility and the host of expectations that fuel the heterosexual imaginary.  
It is also notable that Chipman J.A. tacks back and forth between dismissal and approval 
of the possibility of intentional synfertility for the couple. When reviewing the trial court 
judgment, he states that he was not impressed by “the suggestion that the availability of other 
choices to the condition of childlessness such as donor insemination, adoption or simple 
acceptance was in itself a convincing reason for deeming IVF and ICSI to be not medically 
necessary.”857 This appears to be a recognition of the critical role of parafertility in recreating the 
model of dyadic heterosexual parenthood. Yet in concluding that the violation of the appellants’ 
Charter rights is only minimally impaired by the funding scheme, he determines that this is 
because “it denies to the infertile funding for only two procedures, leaving them not only the full 
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panoply of medical services available to all, but a number of specific procedures available for 
their condition.”858  
Yet the decision has already described the range of parafertile procedures the couple 
underwent, including surgery on the male appellant, three cycles of intrauterine insemination of 
the female appellant and the removal of fibroids from her uterus.859 It was only after these failed 
that the couple sought out ICSI as a last resort.860 What procedures remain? One must conclude, 
then, that the “number of specific procedures available for their condition” involves the synfertile 
donor insemination that only recently failed to impress the court.  
This incoherence is not only due to sloppy analysis, as has been discussed by other 
commentators,861 but also because court lacks the necessary vocabulary to describe the 
deviations from orthofertility that it contemplates. The analysis also leaves uninterrogated the 
correlation between stigma and non-reproductive alignment. The heterosexual parent who finds 
themselves infertile and reliant upon assisted reproduction tends to experience this biological 
limitation as deprivation. And importantly, it is because of this deviation from the 'natural' mode 
of reproduction (and the trauma and loss that results) that a legal claim of discrimination may be 
launched, triggering a demand for state involvement and compensation. Since Cameron, this 
script has been followed by other petitions for the government subsidy of reproductive 
assistance.  
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In 2006, a landmark human rights challenge was won by Canadian soldier Terry Buffett, 
who successfully claimed that his wife's IVF cycles should be funded under the Army's medical 
plan.862 The grounds for the case started back in 1997, when the Canadian Forces (CF) agreed to 
cover the IVF treatment of a female officer. A year later Buffett applied to have his wife's IVF 
treatment receive similar coverage.863 When he found himself denied, Buffett filed a grievance 
arguing this restriction was discriminatory and based on gender. In 2001 his filing was denied by 
the Canadian Forces Grievance Board, which noted that dependents are not covered under the 
CF health policy, justifying the refusal of Buffett's IVF request as a reasonable limit under s.1 of 
the Charter.864  
Buffett filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in which he claimed 
that this refusal constituted adverse differential treatment based on his disability (male factor 
infertility), his sex, and his family status, in breach of s.7 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.865 
The Tribunal ruled in favour of Buffett, concluding that infertility constituted a disability within 
the meaning of the Canada Human Rights Act, with its diagnosis as a medically treatable illness 
allowing for his claim under s.7. 866  The decision of the Tribunal, under direction from Justice 
Hadjis, hinged upon the distinction between procedures that reverse infertility and procedures 
that induce or assist conception. As the former can be characterized as medical procedures, and 
therefore are covered under the CF's medical plan, it was determined that “CF members with 
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male factor infertility should receive substantively equal benefits as either CF members with 
double fallopian tube obstruction, or all female CF members, as the case may be.”867  
According to Hadjis J., substantively equal benefits may include not only treatment for 
male infertility for an Army officer, but also IVF treatment for the non-enlisted marital partner, 
making the Canadian Forces responsible for a style of publicly funded IVF that at that time was 
not available through any provincial health care plan in the country.868 This 'additional' benefit 
was deemed necessary to equalize the gap between female factor and male factor infertility, for 
as the expert medical witness at trial testified: medical treatment for both male and female 
infertilities was required to normalize the pregnancy rates to about 30 percent per cycle.869 As 
Hadjis J. concluded: 
Thus, in order for male CF members to receive a benefit that is 
equal to the benefit being offered to female members with bilateral 
fallopian tube obstruction [leading to female infertility], IVF 
treatments with ICSI [male infertility treatment] would need to be 
made available to them.870  
While this judgment affords a greater claim to reproductive services for male CF 
members, it is at the cost of a deeply rigid and binary model of not only sexual partnership but 
parenthood. Indeed the language of the case is oriented fully toward a dyadic heterosexual 
structure of coupling, with Hadjis J. remarking how “assisted conception procedures are different 
from all other medical procedures...in that, by biological necessity, two individuals must be 
involved.”871  
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In case the gender of those two individuals was not evident, the judgment details at length 
the requirement for a male-female model of both medical infertility and the resultant claim to CF 
benefits. In the paragraph below, which I have quoted at length, one finds it difficult to imagine a 
single male who wishes to use the services of a gestational surrogate. Nor is it easy to imagine a 
lesbian couple in which the non-CF member wishes to have IVF treatments in order to 
conceive.872 The wording of the judgment is so tightly structured, and so resoundingly built upon 
an orthofertile framework of parenthood, that only the 'disability' of infertility is conceptualized 
as a medically necessary procedure under the bounds of CF health care funding. The single 
father and lesbian couple have no grounds for claim here: 
The CF's health care policy is structured in such a way as to 
provide the female member who has a form of female factor 
infertility with a publicly funded service that will afford her the 
opportunity to have a child. Physiologically, this procedure can 
only be completed with the contribution of a person of the opposite 
gender. The CF funds the service for the female member, even if 
the opposite-gender contribution comes from a non-member of the 
CF. On the other hand, the CF does not provide the equal benefit 
to a male member with male factor infertility, merely because the 
contribution from the opposite-gender non-member is much more 
medically complex. And yet, the same physiological reality exists 
that conception can only occur with the participation of both 
partners.873  
Under this strictly intra-reproductive reasoning, while a female heterosexual CF member 
with a male partner will be eligible for treatment and insemination with her partner's sperm, a 
lesbian CF member will not be able to claim the same coverage. Now it may be that a further 
court challenge by a lesbian member of the Armed Forces is required to advance this claim on 
discriminatory grounds; but as the results of the case depend on the existence of medical 
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infertility, it is only in the absence of 'normal' conception that such procedures are deemed 
medically necessary. If one callously wishes a bilateral fallopian tube obstruction upon the non-
CF member of the imaginary lesbian couple, then she might have a claim to these services. But 
in the absence of an 'infertility problem' this case provides no reasonable grounds for a claim. 
When medical necessity is strictly equated with reproductive impairment, and the focus 
remains on expensive ICSI and IVF procedures that challenge limited health care allocations, 
little room remains for queer families to stake a claim for state support. Critically, while these 
cases have focused on heterosexual couples and the diagnosis of infertility, they have laid the 
conceptual bedrock for litigation advanced by same-sex couples as well. The leading Ontario 
case launched by a gay couple to claim some of the expenses of assisted reproduction 
demonstrates some of the restrictions imposed by the narrow argumentative ground carved out 
by Cameron and Buffett, and the ways in which they fail to align with queer parenting projects. 
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In the arbitration hearing Toronto (City) v. Toronto Professional Fire Fighters’ 
Association,874 two grievances were filed on behalf of a married gay male couple to claim the 
drug costs required for their gestational surrogate and egg donor under the City’s drug benefit 
plan (one member of the couple was a firefighter and city employee). Although fertility drugs 
were covered under the City’s plan, their claim for the cost of the drugs had been denied. The 
City justified this denial on the grounds that the plan covers the employee, his or her spouse 
(whether same-sex, heterosexual, common-law or married) and dependent children; it does not 
cover third parties, such as the gestational surrogate and egg donors in this case. 
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The Fire Fighters’ Association [Association] filed a policy grievance against the City. In 
an individual grievance filed on behalf of the firefighter, the Association claimed his right to be 
free from discrimination in employment on the basis of sex and sexual orientation. In line with 
the jurisprudence set by Cameron and Buffett, as well as the dominance of the medical model of 
analysis, in a separate policy grievance the Association also asserted that the benefit plan 
discriminated against a separate category of persons “on the basis of disability.”875 However as 
will be discussed, even this claim by the Association was carefully contextualized by the social 
reality of the men.   
It is notable that the grievance did not seek the reimbursement of costs for IVF coverage, 
but merely drug cost benefits allowable under the existing plan. Thus the challenge was not to 
determine whether a procedure was medically necessary and should be newly included within 
health coverage (as with Cameron) but to determine whether it was a substantively equal benefit 
according to an existing plan (as with Buffett). The court sought to determine whether 
discrimination had occurred in the distribution of substantively equal benefits, and, if so, what 
the grounds of such discrimination might be.  
 The Association’s submission claimed that to be unlawful, discrimination need not be 
intentional or express, but can be unintentional and indirect. The submission thus contended that 
the denial of coverage in this case represented a “classic case” of “adverse effect” discrimination, 
as an apparently neutral rule regarding the limitation of funding for procedures of assisted 
conception to marital partners serves to prevent access by surrogates, therefore excluding gay 
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men from health funding explicitly meant to provide for AHR.876  As the Association insists, “it 
is solely because of the gay male firefighters’ sex and sexual orientation – namely the reality of 
being in a same sex relationship with two men – that they cannot achieve conception without 
reliance on a female surrogate and egg donor.”877 Thus, the Association submitted that 
discrimination is based on the intersecting grounds of sex and sexual orientation, and the City’s 
response failed to account for “the contextual reality of the grievor’s life as a gay man”.878  
 In line with these intersecting grounds, the Association submitted a qualified definition of 
infertility as a person “who, as a result of the nature of her or his infertility, is incapable of 
conceiving a child without the use of reproductive technologies involving a female surrogate 
and/or egg donor (to whom the [fertility] drugs are prescribed)”.879 This moves away from a 
strictly biological frame to a more relational inquiry, where the focus is not on determining the 
individual cause of reproductive incapacity but evaluating the contextual setting of a synfertility 
project. This move avoids focusing on the medical diagnosis of infertility in order to stake a 
claim for reproductive impairment as a disability. Instead it takes up an embedded understanding 
of reproductive alignment, arguing that it is discriminatory to deny the cost of fertility drugs to 
“gay male firefighters who, as a result of their sexual orientation and sex, are partnered with 
another man and are therefore biologically incapable of conceiving a child without the use of 
reproductive technologies”.880 This definition does not rest upon an individualized medical 
pathology, but upon the constitutionally protected grounds of sexual orientation and sex and the 
sexual object choices that follow from queer relations.  
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 Finally, the Association argues that this policy is discriminatory not simply because it 
may adversely impact people in same-sex relations, but because it also treats different types of 
same-sex relationships differently. Heterosexual male firefighters, heterosexual female 
firefighters, and lesbian female firefighters who require reproductive assistance can receive 
reimbursement for the fertility drugs, whereas gay male firefighters and their reliance upon a 
surrogate and egg donor are denied reimbursement. This is similar to the reasoning applied in 
Buffett, wherein the procedures available to a female CF member were not available to a male 
CF member. However in this case, it is not an equivalent parafertility but the complex 
synfertilies of surrogate labour that create the grounds for discrimination. The Association’s 
attention to the socially embedded context of reproductive alignment allows them to advance a 
complex argument for reimbursement that accounts for the synfertility of the men. 
 Despite the Association’s careful attention to the contextual reality of a planned gay 
parenting project, the arbitrator’s decision reflected a painfully thin vision. Arbitrator 
Goodfellow begins his decisions with the distinction between two categories of employees who 
may be discriminated against under the current provisions: 1) those whose infertility can only be 
overcome through the use of surrogates to whom fertility drugs are prescribed; and 2) gay males 
who are not infertile but who engage surrogates to whom fertility drugs are prescribed.881 From 
the start, Arbitrator Goodfellow rejects the socially embedded model of reproductive alignment 
in favour of a medical model of infertility. He asserts that “[t]here is no dispute that infertility is 
a disability,” explaining that there are many causes and types of such infertility, “some of which 
are ‘treatable’ by the ‘sufferer’ taking fertility drugs and some of which are not.”882 He thus 
frames the employees of both categories as reproductively disabled, despite the use of scare 
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quotes to indicate that gay reproductive non-alignment might not actually be a malady from 
which one suffers (and that being gay is not something one would wish to consider ‘treatable’!). 
Arbitrator Goodfellow is admittedly constrained by the terms of the drug program, which require 
evidence of adverse treatment upon a prohibited ground to stake a claim of discrimination. In the 
policy grievance filed by the Association the ground is disability, with adverse treatment 
comprised of drug payment for some infertile persons but not for others. 
 Within these terms, however, Goodfellow must read gay reproductive non-alignment as 
disability, and he makes repeated reference to the individualized character of infertility as 
experienced by “a disabled person.”883 Thus the negotiated benefit of the plan, as he concludes, 
attaches to the employee as well as their spouse and dependent children. However these benefits 
encircle only properly disabled bodies within the bounds of the sexual dyad, not the synfertile 
character of surrogacy and egg donation. Only those forms of ‘disability’ that are treatable 
through drugs are covered, and only within the sexual family unit. As he concludes, “[w]hat the 
plan does not do…is enable a disabled person who is covered by the Plan to, in effect, contract 
out that benefit to a third party”.884  
 Because this conceptual rubric cannot account for the contextual experience of the gay 
couple, Goodfellow relies solely on the benefit of the drugs to alleviate medical infertility. This 
framing of infertility as disability reflects the norms of the insurance industry,885 as well as the 
increasing medicalization of reproductive bodies. By narrowing his judgment to the issue of 
negotiated drug benefits to treat disability, rather than the ontological difference that synfertile 
families may present, Goodfellow is able to produce the following reasons: 
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…the plan does not discriminate against infertile employees in the provision of the 
benefit: fertility drugs. Such drugs continue to be available to them. They are simply of 
no value in dealing with their particular form of infertility.886 
 The problem here is viewed not as located in the definition of either infertility or 
disability, but with the particular form of disability-as-homosexuality that the two men are 
facing. When he then turns to the specific issue of discrimination based on sex and sexuality, 
Goodfellow is able to neatly extend his line of reasoning to conclude that the drug plan benefits 
make the drugs available, they are simply not efficacious because the two men are not properly 
disabled.887 By divorcing the men from their social and relational context, Goodfellow is able to 
examine their individual bodies in isolation, allowing him to make the observation that “we are 
dealing here with a claim for the cost of fertility medication advanced on behalf of a fertile male 
whose partner – who is also covered by the plan – is also fertile.”888 This dogged reliance on the 
fertile/infertile binary as constructed within a framework of disability ignores the intersectional 
factors of sex and sexual orientation that make their claim necessary in the first place.  
 Finally, in noting that “the obstacle to conception in this case is that [the fire fighter’s] 
partner is male” Goodfellow closes the book on their lived reality, remarking that “unlike at least 
some forms of ‘disability’ (including some from which males can suffer), this is not an obstacle 
that the City’s drug benefit plan or, indeed, any drug benefit plan, is capable of overcoming. 
What is missing in this case is a member of the opposite sex.”889 Thus a same-sex relationship is 
figured as a biological ‘obstacle’ outside the bounds of the drug treatment benefits available to 
assist conception, with those very bounds defined by their adherence to a rigorously heterosexual 
and orthofertile model.    
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So where does this leave intentionally synfertile families? The reviewed case law has 
indicated limited utility for the medical model of infertility, which is deployed to make a claim 
of discrimination based on disability.890 This equation, in which assisted reproduction is always 
incumbent upon an underlying medical problem (infertility) which requires medical intervention 
and public funding (as a disability), works to pathologize the provision of AHR and construct 
reproductive assistance as a remedy for abnormality. This is an individualized frame that 
depends on a host of assumptions about intra-reproductive orthofertile families, and has 
difficulty accounting for the collaborative synfertility of queer parenting projects. 
However some of the legal strategies pursued by the Toronto Professional Firefighters 
Association in their grievance submissions offer a promising response. The submissions rejected 
a biological frame of reproduction in favour of a more relational inquiry. Rather than seeking to 
determine the individual cause of reproductive incapacity, the analysis focused on evaluating the 
contextual setting of a given reproductive project. This moves away from the infertility trap and 
the problematics of the medical model of disability as grounds for a discrimination claim. Instead 
this approach pursues an embedded understanding of reproductive alignment.  
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The discrimination claim is thus grounded in a contextual analysis that seeks an explicit 
accounting of the sexual orientation and sex of synfertile families.891 It becomes easier to make a 
claim for the public funding of reproductive assistance based not on disability, but on a 
contextual analysis that accounts for synfertile couples who are not reproductively aligned with 
their partner. Such an argument does not rest upon medical pathology, but upon the 
constitutionally protected grounds of sexual orientation and sex and the sexual object choices 
that follow from queer relations.  
The discussion from Quebec shows that, for the first time in Canada, an open regime of 
state-funded reproductive assistance has provided support for all manner of queer families, 
including a gay couple and a gestational surrogate. By not hinging access to AHR upon a 
medical diagnosis, the province has avoided the infertility trap and made wide-ranging access a 
possibility. However there have also been critical limitations, including the program’s refusal to 
fund open-identification donors and the invalidity of surrogacy contracts in Quebec. 
Nevertheless the program has met public health goals by reducing the number of multiple births, 
and provided access to AHR that is not contingent upon psychosocial gatekeeping or the 
presence of reproductive pathology. Unfortunately this all seems set to change in the near future. 
To date, however, no other province in Canada offers this sweep of coverage, under the 
rationale that AHR is not medically necessary and therefore does not oblige the state to provide 
subsidized access.892 Yet reproductive technologies can only be framed as medically 
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unnecessary within a heterosexual model that understands ‘normal’ reproduction as orthofertile 
reproduction. By prying apart the categories of what is considered 'essential' care and what is 
considered 'elective', it is possible to reveal powerful bioethical assumptions about what a 
healthy (heterosexual) populace requires. When the field is broadened to include synfertility as 
well as parafertility, this drastically opens the conceptual rubric for all manner of families.  
By centering the experience of the queer reproductive family and rejecting the limits of 
the infertility trap, I believe that one may more readily demand access to state-led subsidies that 
can help mitigate the ruthless logics of privatization. The uneasy hybrid of Canada’s fertility 
industry – as an unregulated, for-profit, opaque, private and yet occasionally publically funded 
regime – should not be based upon efficiency goals that replicate corporate modalities to the 
exclusion of broad social welfare. This includes both an attention to reducing multiple-embryo 
transfers, as well as care for ensuring sustained access by queer families and single people who 
do not fit a medical model of infertility.  
By rejecting a market-based approach to health care, not only queer people but all users 
of reproductive assistance are able to voice a concern for reproductive outcomes that can 
account for their specific needs. As it stands, the infertility trap holds the potential for very real 
consequences upon the reproductivity of LGBTQ people. Quebec stands at the cusp of radically 
reframing its funding model, while the newly announced plans in Ontario and New Brunswick 
are restricted to a single round of IVF and/or couples with a medical diagnosis of infertility. 
While there is still no public funding for reproductive procedures in most of Canada, the tide 
appears to be turning. Certainly the past decade has seen vociferous debate about the wisdom of 
                                                                                                                                            
Services Plan relies on the advice of the medical profession in determining the medical necessities of procedures. To 
date, there has been no indication from the medical profession that it considers IVF to be medically necessary.” 
While both of these examples refer narrowly to the practice of IVF, they are exemplary of provincial approaches to 
the funding of AHR more broadly. Emphasis mine. 
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including AHR procedures within provincial insurance plans.893 The tenor of such debates may 
indicate the future direction of reproductive funding, if LGBT advocates and voices continue to 
remain silent. 
Columnist Margaret Wente again offers an example of how current discourses exclude 
and marginalize queer perspectives, this time in a Globe and Mail editorial on the decision to 
publicly fund IVF treatment in Quebec. In the piece, Wente roundly criticized the Quebec Health 
Minister at the time, lamenting the drain on public monies now that provincial “government will 
start funding in vitro fertilization for people who can’t conceive normally.”894  It is not a stretch 
to imagine how a professional muckraker like Wente might read the situation faced by Maricel 
and Carol in the previous chapter. Despite her (presumably) functional uterus, Maricel was 
unwilling to be inseminated and it was her partner Carol to whom the labour of reproduction fell. 
The women were fortunate in that Carol did not require IVF, merely a wider range of donor 
sperm options, but if Carol had needed a donor egg, the apparent obstinacy of a lesbian co-
mother like Maricel may have been thrown into relief. A commentator such as Wente would 
surely have little difficult in placing Marciel’s ability to exercise reproductive control over her 
body in tension with the taxpayer-funded provision of IVF.  
When the underlying framework of assisted reproduction is a heterosexual model, it is 
impossible to imagine why a reproductive body might decide not to reproduce while still wishing 
to engage in a parenting project. Where might we find a rationale for the public funding of 
expensive egg donation and IVF procedures for a subfertile lesbian, when she has a female 
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partner with the biological capacity to get pregnant through donor insemination? Framing her 
rejection of pregnancy as a ‘choice’ rather than a fundamental expression of her gender identity 
casts the issue as one of individual caprice. Maricel’s decision appears a peevish whim, except 
when read through a queer lens wherein a woman may not want to get pregnant, may not want to 
adopt, but may still wish to parent a child that is biologically linked to both her partner and her 
own heritage. This is a vision of synfertility that is unreadable through the narrow conceptual 
framework of the infertility trap, where the instrumentalist logics of the health marketplace 
remain powerfully buttressed by the reproductive logics of orthofertility. 
Should Canadian provinces one day decide to broadly subsidize these procedures, it is 
uncertain what normative expectations will be applied to people in their position, although the 
recent fracas over the gay radio host and Quebec’s funding of his gestational surrogate provides 
a clue.895 The effacement of alternative modes of kinship occurs because synfertility has not been 
seen as a valid and intentional form of family creation. When the singular lens of AHR is trained 
on producing parafertility within a heterosexual imaginary, it limits the options for other family 
arrangements to take place. Instead, debate focuses exclusively upon an imaginary privatized, 
heterosexual family making specific, individualized claims (either just or unjust, depending on 
one's ideological stance) upon a distributive state.  
I do not of course deny the validity of medical risks to heterosexual women, and agree 
that greater access to safe IVF, including single embryo transfer, results in improved health 
outcomes for mother and child, as well as reduced expenses for the state. But this debate 
represents only part of the picture, and yet it has dominated national discussion. What I am 
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interested in is the continued polarization between the 'ordinary' families who can conceive 
'naturally' and the 'exceptional' cases who are plagued by the 'abnormal' disease of infertility and 
require public funding to safely produce offspring.  
As explored throughout this dissertation, this conceptual natural/artificial binary works to 
create reproductive stigma while effectively erasing LGBTQ people from the discussion. It is 
this foundational discursive frame of natural/unnatural, normal/abnormal and the excision of 
queer embodiments which prevents broader discussions. The explicit incorporation of a medical 
model of infertility in New Brunswick is thus cause for concern, as are recent comments by the 
current Health Minister for Quebec. This is the wrong direction to be moving in, as the current 
Quebec model of funded reproductive assistance has allowed LGBT people, single people, poor 
people and subfertile heterosexuals to work toward actualizing their parenting plans. This has 
also allowed people seeking IVF to avoid deliberations over multiple embryo transfer, which 
places the intended parent(s) in an impossible bind wherein the best interests of their 
unconcieved child must be weighed against the chance of not conceiving a child at all.  
Yet these progressive moves cannot be stripped from the fact that Quebec is the first 
province in Canada to take these measures, not to mention the first jurisdiction in North 
America. The rationale here, I would argue, primarily fulfills not social goals of safe medical 
treatment nor even economic goals of fiscal management, but solidly nationalist goals of 
population expansion. A declining birthrate and clearly stated provincial aim to maintain 'a 
distinct society' practically mandate the free provision of procreative technologies. At the same 
time, this explicitly natalist reckoning is framed by the recent debates in Quebec on “reasonable 
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accommodation” for racial and ethnic minorities, and haunted by xenophobic fears and 
discourses of Quebecois purity.896   
Dorothy Roberts has written persuasively of the connections between racial inequality, 
access to reproductive technology and social trends toward privatization. Her work in Killing 
the Black Body described the workings of a “reproductive caste system” which contrasted 
policies that punish the childbearing of poor black women with the high-tech fertility industry 
that promotes childbearing by more affluent white women.897 There is also a growing 
international component to this analysis. Cross-border reproductive travel has increased the 
potential for racialised exploitation as people move out of cautious and prohibitive jurisdictions 
into more permissive jurisdictions, where they may acquire treatment more quickly or 
substantially reduce costs.898 Yet Quebec’s provision of accessible reproductive assistance for all 
families, despite its uneasy foundations upon pro-natalist policy, served poor, queer and 
racialized families as well as wealthier white families on the top of the reproductive hierarchy. I 
believe this is the right model. 
The empirical research of the Creating Our Families study backs up this concern for the 
effects of reproductive stratification. Despite a central methodological goal of recruiting 
LGBTQ people of colour and those living outside major urban centres, our research sample 
nevertheless consisted of predominantly white, same-sex partnered, urban women with 
relatively high levels of education and income.899 While additional research is required to more 
fully identify barriers to access, our sense is that this demographic reflects the predominant 
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users of AHR services from within LGBTQ communities in Ontario. As our study concluded:  
It is notable that despite the relatively high levels of education and income within 
our sample, one of the most common concerns expressed by our participants was 
the financial inaccessibility of AHR services.900  
 
This data points strongly to the importance of state-funded medical care and the need for 
reproductive support to ensure that AHR does not remain a remote technology out of the reach of 
poor, queer and racialized communities.  
 
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 This dissertation has traced the figure of the queer family as an empirical location to 
bring conflicting discourses of nature and culture into conversation. It has sought to track the 
paths through which relationality is recognized and privileged in law, with a focus on 
reproductive technologies and the new biosocial forms of kinship which are created. It has given 
specific attention to family arrangements which involve the sourcing of gametes or reproductive 
labour from outside the sexual dyad – a formation referred to as ‘extra-reproductive’ family – 
and tracked these families through the medico-juridical forms of power in operation at fertility 
clinics and in family law. 
It has also involved a historical component, looking at the impact feminist scholars have 
had on the development of AHR-related legislation in Canada. It explored the strand of radical 
feminism which rejected reproductive technology as an instantiation of patriarchal control over 
women’s bodies, and the influence this mode of thinking had on Canadian feminists seeking to 
respond to and influence newly developing state policy. It also explored the impact this strategy 
of ‘governance feminism’901 had on a report issued by the Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies and later iterations of a federal bill. It has traced feminist concerns that their ideas 
had been absorbed without political context, and looked specifically at the impact on sperm 
regulations and commercial surrogacy bans as they affected lesbian and gay prospective parents. 
It then relied upon empirical data to show how queer families are being medicalized and 
pathologized in the fertility clinic, and paid special attention to the construction of ‘infertility’ as 
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a normalizing mode rooted in heterosexist and biologically essentialist modes of thought. It 
suggested that the ‘infertility trap’ is a central agent in developing and sustaining the 
reproductive traumas of the fertility clinic, and looked at the effect this formation has on non-
normative families seeking reproductive assistance. Finally it moved to create a new conceptual 
framework for the multiple forms of intimate affiliation being produced through assisted and 
non-assisted means, and rejected techno-mediated kinship construction as an exceptional form of 
family creation. 
This dissertation has argued that the privileging of nature functions to affirm the 
heterosexual imaginary. Thus technologically-assisted reproduction needs to be understood not 
in opposition to ‘natural’ modes, but as a form of power operations that represent much more 
than the neutral application of reproductive tools. Indeed, the very idea of ‘natural’ maternity 
relies on the construction of ‘unnatural’ modes as its constitutive other. As Dion Farquhar rightly 
argues: 
“Unitary” maternity is a political category, a historically constructed and weighted 
polemical inscription of a formerly naturalized “experience” as something it was not, and 
could not have been, before discourse invested it as such. The purported universality and 
fixity of the category of unitary maternity is called into question at the same time it is 
named and called into existence – by its difference from an other, technologically 
distributed, maternity…Technophobic naturalizing discourses operate by positing a pre-
technological, protected idyll…Reproductive technologies thus create a nostalgia for 
projections about what might have been before present regimes of fragmentation.902 
Reproductive technologies thereby pose a challenge to the “romanticized holism” of 
unified maternity, demonstrating the political character of the intra-reproductive family, as well 
as its socially constructed nature. AHR is thus not really a fragmentation of a formerly unified 
whole, as the unitary frame was already a fiction. I contend that the romanticized holism of 
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orthofertility is soothed in the clinic by recourse to parafertility. The easy recognition of 
parafertile family forms in law also operates to mask the constructedness of this unitary ideal, 
and claim a universality for the mechanics of intra-reproductive family formation. Synfertile 
families may appear to fragment the ‘natural’ family, but in fact they merely draw attention to 
the political character of the heterosexual imaginary and the legal recognitions that flow from its 
limited vision. The dispersed kinships of synfertility make it difficult to naturalize this ‘idyllic’ 
mode as a pre-cultural frame of reproduction. 
This dissertation has also sought a corrective to much writing about AHR and its binary 
figuration of nature/culture. For even when providing a sophisticated analysis of the operations 
of technology and social power, feminist theorists have demarcated the ‘technological’ space of 
the clinic from the supposed ‘natural’ world of sexual reproduction. This boundary marker 
between artificial and natural may be critiqued, but it is still understood to have material effects 
in its uncoupling of sexual intercourse from reproduction.903 Indeed it is precisely this innovation 
– the breach between sex and conception - which is thought to represent the central disruption 
posed by reproductive technologies. While I am a great admirer of her work, Farquhar’s writing 
is nevertheless instructive in this regard, when she argues that:  
By definitively separating sex from reproduction, reproductive technologies break the 
naturalized assumption that reproduction is heterosexual and heterosocial. By fetishizing 
the social criteria of ‘the [heterosexual] couple,’ medical discourse invokes the 
heterosexist standard only to disrupt it by its asexual and third-party donor 
interventions.904 
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I respectfully disagree. It is only synfertility that performs this break from the naturalized 
assumptions of heterosexuality. The clinical intervention of parafertility – a form of intra-
reproductive family construction that operates in parallel to un-assisted reproductive coupling – 
does not in fact trouble the heterosexual and heterosexual model that Farquhar describes as 
broken. Parafertile interventions in the clinic actually perform reparative work to wounded 
heterosexuality, and do not separate sexual affiliates from their intended reproductive outcomes. 
By refusing the natural/artificial dichotomy which has long structured the discussion about 
reproductive technologies, I have sought to disaggregate various forms of clinical activity and 
demonstrate their very different effects in law. 
$-!" 
This final chapter revisits the discussion in the opening pages, and the discussion of 
shifting family forms in Canadian law. It argues that law, like medical discourse, also reflects a 
privileging of nature and an idyllic attachment to heterosexual coupling as the pre-eminent mode 
of family formation.905 This is why parafertile families, who precisely approximate the parental 
modes of orthofertile reproduction, are so easily welcomed into an untroubled presumption of 
parentage and the heteronormative family order. It is only the synfertile family, and the extra-
reproductive character of their family formation, which pose any potential for rupture. These are 
the intimate modes which have troubled legislators and challenged courts to account for their 
configuration. 
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The legal family is an overdetermined site of social and economic organization that has 
long been understood as being founded upon a very traditional, culturally specific, heterosexual, 
middle-class familial ideology.906 As Martha Fineman has argued, our “societal and legal images 
and expectations of family are tenaciously organized around a sexual affiliation between a man 
and woman,” flattening other forms of familial arrangement so that “[f]ormal, legal, heterosexual 
marriage continues to dominate our imagination when we confront the possibilities of intimacy 
and family.” 907 Even legal reforms aimed at expanding the family to include unmarried 
heterosexual couples or same-sex couples do not challenge the primacy of the sexual family, as 
“[b]y duplicating the privileged form, alternative relationships merely affirm the centrality of 
sexuality to the fundamental ordering of society and the nature of intimacy.”908 At a deep level, 
then, the legal category of family is “equated with the paradigmatic relationship of heterosexual 
marriage”909 and exerts a powerful subjectivating force through its ability to absorb other 
(appropriately) sexual forms into its fold. It reflects the foundational primacy of the orthofertile 
pair-bond and the ‘natural’ union of two sexually-affiliated adults even when expanding its 
bounds to include non-reproductive same-sex couples.  
Indeed while same-sex marriage was anticipated by many as having the capacity to 
dislodge this normative frame, this has not been the outcome. Through the rubric of ‘sexual 
citizenship,’ Brenda Cossman has written on how by encouraging the “right” choices to become 
“good” citizens, the state intimately interlaces sex with belonging and sexual freedom with self-
governance. This allows for members of previously disparaged sexual identity categories, such 
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as gays and lesbians, to manage their sex lives appropriately and be included within the liberal 
state. As Cossman says, “to the extent that we conduct ourselves as ethical sexual subjects, 
through appropriate sexual practices, choices and desires, we may be constituted and 
reconstituted as eligible for sexual citizenship.”910 
As other Canadian legal feminists have argued, the failure of the same-sex marriage 
campaign to critique the mechanisms of formal equality and provide an analysis of gendered 
inequality has simply reconstituted the two-person marital family as the fundamental social 
institution par excellence.911 Shelley Gavigan’s work has drawn attention to the discursive 
construction of ‘legitimacy’ in regard to the children of lesbian couples, and the presumption that 
same-sex marriage was required to remove the stigma of ‘illegitimacy’ that otherwise would 
attach.912 This language invokes old categories of family law, long since repudiated and repealed, 
and reinstates them as relevant signifiers for the formal legal equality of same-sex couples.913 
Thus the process of same-sex equality partially depends on reforming and reinstituting the 
language of normalcy, encouraging legal convention and the dyadic structure of marriage – or 
what Hester Lesssard has referred to as the equality formalism of “marriage fundamentalism.”914 
In the context of embryo management and their potential designation as property, 
Jennifer Nedelsky has argued that, in choosing an operational legal category to work with, 
“perhaps the most important starting point of inquiry is what the presumptions are, what will 
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require justification, what norms will have to be argued against, what values will be taken as 
given.”915 This is precisely the concern I have with the legal category of ‘family’ and its site as a 
discursive and ontologically normativizing force. In Chapter Two, I posed the following 
questions: 
Is the family a strictly legal concept, and one which only finds culturally legible form 
through the categorizations of law? If so, might the queer family represent not only the 
breakdown of the symbolic heterosexual order, but also a rupture in the ways in which 
‘family’ has assumed a coherent legal form? Might the queer family, in its material form 
and inherent non-reproductivity, represent an oxymoron with which the law cannot 
grapple? And ultimately, is it possible for law to adapt, or must it seek to reinstate 
existing heterosexual modes of nature/culture upon the palimpsest of the queer family? 
At the conclusion of this investigation, I believe that the synfertile family does represent 
a potentially transformational rupture. However due to the impossibility of finding other models 
for kinship affiliation reflected in law, it has been difficult to account for the extra-reproductive 
nature of these parental alignments. At the same time, the legal order remains gendered, classed, 
abled and raced in ways that make deviations from that norm precarious. The familiar language 
of ‘legitimacy’ thus becomes available to lesbian couples seeking to make their claim for formal 
recognition to the state, as well as the claim by a twelve-year girl that her lesbian mothers are 
“just like everybody else’s family.”916 It is through reinstantiation of the two-parent norm – even 
when those parents are gleefully polyamorous transmen – that subjects may stabilize their 
parenting projects. The subjectification may occur with conscious awareness, as through the 
production of a form of ‘normalizing theatre’ that enacts familiar family tropes, but it must occur 
nevertheless. 
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Thus it appears a fraught mission to try and infuse the abstracted form of legal family 
with complex embodiments of synfertility. Family as a legal category may not be the right place 
to stake queer claims of affiliation.917 Indeed Richard Storrow has chronicled the various bodies 
of law which have been applied to sort out the parentage issues that arise of assisted 
reproduction, with some courts presuming the matter is “best addressed through the application 
of adoption law, marital presumptions of legitimacy or equitable estoppel, [while] legislatures 
addressing assisted reproduction have fashioned unique statutes to resolve these issues.”918 As he 
notes, the overall tendency has not been toward coherent and clear criteria, although it has 
skewed to policies that favor restriction instead of expansion of the legal definition of family.919 
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Storrow is also one of many legal scholars who have called for a central role for 
intentional parenthood in breaking free of traditional definitions of family and recognizing 
alternative family forms.920 As he argues, intentionality can serve as a “tie-breaker” between 
contending indicia of parenthood; in the heterosexual context of gestational surrogacy in which 
he writes, the primary modes are genetic and gestational contribution.921 By developing a theory 
of parentage that focuses on those who intended to raise the child, such analyses hope that a 
more flexible mode will emerge to ameliorate the ideological conservatism of assisted 
reproduction law.922 Contract law has thus proved an attractive terrain for scholars in this vein, 
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although the focus has remained almost exclusively on heterosexual families and the confusions 
of unplanned synfertility.  
For example Marjorie Maguire Shultz has proposed that legal rules governing assisted 
reproduction must include an enhanced role for intention. She argues that law should recognize 
“the importance and the legitimacy of individual efforts to project intentions and decisions into 
the future”923 as long as such intentions are deliberate, explicit and bargained for. As intention 
plays a key role in projects of assisted reproduction, Shultz sees a natural fit between contractual 
perspectives, doctrines and concepts, and the solution of legal issues raised by modern 
reproductive technologies.924 To bring these solutions to bear, Shultz argues for a new “meta-
rule” that would make bargained-for intentions determinative of legal parenthood.925 As she 
maintains: 
Where arrangements involve several persons, where the opportunity for planning and 
deliberation exists, where reliance is weighty, where expectations are substantial and 
their validation is personally and socially important - as is true of reproductive 
agreements - contracts offer a means of arranging and protecting these various interests. 
If we are to construct legal policies that effectuate intention in assigning legal 
parenthood, contract law can contribute a set of principles and rules attuned to the 
problems of private ordering.926 
 
However as Nedelsky reminds us, “The choice of legal category is a strategic one. And 
the first step of the strategy is to ensure that the category will facilitate, rather than obstruct, the 
outcomes we most care about.”927 Is contract law the right legal mode through which to 
effectuate the recognition of the synfertile family? 
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Susan Drummond has recently argued for the utility of enforceable gestational carrier 
contracts, and suggested that intended parents should prevail over gestational carriers in the 
event of disputes over parentage following the birth of a commissioned child.928 Given the lack 
of federal and provincial legislation around AHR in Canada (as has been discussed at length), 
Drummond suggests that private law offers a deft mechanism to respond to the complexities of 
extra-reproductive family formation. Her attention is specifically on gestational carriage 
contracts, which she recommends treating as “analogously to domestic contracts – i.e., that they 
will be enforced unless they fail to meet context specific limitations on the validity of contract, 
such as unconscionability, fraud, error, or duress, that take into account the unique settings of 
physical intimacy in which they are conceived.” 929  
In her view, the combination of failed legislation, weakly enforced criminal provisions 
and an emerging professional model of surrogate labour demands a response that can account for 
the contemporary realities of gestational carriage. After a thorough review of theoretical and 
empirical literature, Drummond concludes that provincial governments would be well advised to 
create legislative and regulatory frameworks under which gestational carriage contracts are 
enforceable.930 However she distinguishes between the existing family law model of domestic 
contract and her proposed gestational carriage contract. As she explains, family law legislation 
places a variety of limitations on the sort of contractual arrangements that may be entered into as 
a mechanism to enforce standardization and avoid “default legislative regimes”.931  
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Cases like Doe v. Alberta, for example, have drawn clear limits on the contours of this 
[heterosexual] standardization in setting the role of intention in the determination of parentage.932 
Jane Doe and John Doe were unmarried cohabitants in a sexual relationship. While Jane Doe 
wished to have a baby, John Doe was not prepared to father a child nor take on any parental 
rights or obligations. Jane Doe thus sought out anonymous donor insemination at a clinic, and 
the couple continued their cohabitation. When Jane Doe gave birth to a child in August 2005, 
both she and John Doe sought a declaration in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench that they had 
the right to enter into an express, binding contract detailing their agreement that she was the sole 
parent of the child and he had no parental rights or obligations.933 
The court dismissed their application, ruling that intent was relevant but not 
determinative in this case, as the applicants could not “by agreement preclude the possibility that 
a Court may sometime in the future find John Doe to stand in the place of a parent.”934 Their 
claim was dismissed upon appeal, with the court ruling that due to his ongoing sexual 
relationship with the mother, John Doe had evidenced a “settled intention” to stand in the place 
of a parent.935 Despite their attempt to negotiate a contractually binding agreement outside the 
bounds of the traditional two-parent family, the court applied existing family law doctrines to 
collapse the Does back into the stable roles of mother and father. As Brenda Cossman has 
argued, when trying to structure an intimate life outside the assumptions of the nuclear family, 
and particularly in the context of parenting, a reliance on contract may in fact be suboptimal.936 
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Drummond acknowledges the controversy that followed the Doe v. Alberta ruling, and 
the limits it set on the role of intention in the establishment of parentage, yet remains optimistic 
about the capacity of private contract to manage the particularities of family relations.937 I am 
convinced by her reasoning in distinguishing between a gestational carriage contract and the 
John and Jane Doe scenario of domestic contract, in which a “settled intention” to parent may 
develop within an integrated family. A gestational carrier contract such as she envisions would 
ensure only one set of custodial parents on the scene, and therefore avoid the risks of functional 
parent-like relationships as contemplated by the court in Doe v. Alberta.  
Drummond attends explicitly to the ways in which assisted reproductive technologies 
have expanded the role for intention and contract as family forms have developed outside of 
normative heterosexuality – and in particular for same-sex families and single parents.938 She 
makes a sustained argument on behalf of the utility and flexibility of contract law, as well as its 
increasing validity in the realm of intimate ordering, consciously rejecting the universalizing pull 
of commercial contract jurisprudence and its language of commodification and market value.939 
Indeed the emotional language of commercial contract has long coloured discussion of surrogacy 
by radical feminists and their descendants; the very idea that a child may be seen as a “product” 
by her commissioning parents – a quotation that Drummond attributes to Francois Baylis – holds 
its direct antecedent in FINRRAGE and the prohibitionist stance of the RCNRT.940 
                                            
937
 Drummond, supra note 928 at 45. 
938
 Ibid at 49. 
939
 Ibid at 52. Drummond argues that that the public/private conceptual divide can create a “romantic fog” about the 
family, which remains oblivious to the fact that much of family law is aimed at the breakdown of intimate 
relationships.  
940
 Ibid. Baylis is quoted in Tom Blackwell, “Couple urged surrogate mother to abort fetus because of defect” 
National Post, Oct 6, 2010. <http://news.nationalpost.com/2010/10/06/couple-urged-surrogate-mother-to-abort-
fetus-because-of-defect/> 
355 
To return to and rephrase Nedelsky’s clarifying question, then: will reliance upon 
contract law in managing the parentage claims of synfertility facilitate or obstruct the outcomes 
we most care about? Despite the rigid reformulation of the heterosexual family in cases like Doe 
v. Alberta, Drummond is optimistic that increasing latitude has emerged for individuals to 
reformulate and transform fundamental aspects of the social order.941 Yet in her own analysis, 
she distances her gestational carrier model from domestic family contracts. She is particularly 
concerned with the supervisory reach of the court as regards custody, and its latitude to review 
contracts not only for adequacy but in light of the best interests of the child.942 As an example of 
this troubling judicial scope, Drummond also notes that it remains possible for a court to impede 
divorce proceedings if a judge determines that child support arrangements are insufficient.943   
In framing her contractual model away from this overburdened domestic weal, 
Drummond distinguishes gestational carrier contracts as a sui generis form of contract.944 This 
jettisoning of the domestic contract in favour of a new model makes strategic and intellectual 
sense, and offers a useful tool for gay couples thinking of commissioning a surrogate. But I 
cannot help wondering where this leaves Jane and John Doe. Their intentional parenting project 
was one of synfertility, in which the ongoing relationship (or lack thereof) of non-genetic and 
non-biological parents is not as easily severed by the relinquishment of a newborn infant. Does 
“the flexibility of individual tailoring”945 which she rightly touts also extend to synfertile 
families? Or will judicial latitude and the best interests of the child standard, when applied in a 
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heterosexist and orthofertile society, consistently thwart attempts to create families outside the 
nuclear parenting norm? 
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Of course this also raises the question as to whether such flexibility is even necessary. 
Certainly the empirical evidence from the Creating Our Families study indicated that many 
people were planning to parent in exclusive two-person family units. Indeed, many lesbians and 
trans-identified couples had intentionally chosen anonymous donor sperm to avoid legal battles 
with known donors, in step with the legal advice offered at LGBTQ parenting workshops and 
queer community-based organizations (at least in Toronto). Their construction of a two-parent 
family was conscious and strategic, designed to minimize potential future hassles by aligning 
with a standard domestic paradigm. Yet nearly as many reported feelings of frustration and anger 
with the operations of the clinic, and a profound sense of alienation at the hypermedicalization of 
queer bodies. Might an ability to create flexible parenting contracts and structure their intimate 
lives outside the traditional two-parent framework, allow queer people to more easily create 
families without a necessary reliance upon donor anonymity?946  
Put another way: What if synfertile families were not shunted into a normative mode by 
the operations of law and clinic alike? What kinds of families might emerge? It may well be the 
very same two-parent models. However it may also take the form of complex and gradated 
kinships with multiple family modes and categories. For example the vernacular term “spunkle,” 
commonly used to describe a known sperm donor in an avuncular family role, indicates that 
there may be existing social categories that could be reflected in a fractured model of family law 
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no longer reliant upon an exclusive dyadic structure. Here we may take up Fineman’s call to 
move beyond the sexual family, through the creation of domestic units for childbearing and 
childcare that do not rely upon adult sexual partnerships nor a two-person framework. Such 
contracts, ranging from single parent to multi-parent households living together or apart, have 
the potential to genuinely shift the heterosexist matrix of family law. At the very least, I believe 
we need a relational analysis in domestic contract that can account for individual modes and 
desires for family formation, and for the structural inequalities that permeate society.  The idea 
of contextual purposive intent may move us closer to this goal.947  
The concept of contextual purposive intent was recently advanced by Nancy Kim at the 
California Western School of Law to more accurately describe the embedded sociocultural 
matrix of contract law.948 In her first paper on the subject, Kim introduces the idea of contextual 
purposive intent as a concept both necessary to determine why a party intended to enter into a 
contract – examining a party’s reason or motive for entering into an agreement – as well as the 
relevant circumstances both at the time the contract was made as well as those arising after 
contract formation.949 According to Kim, this approach helps to bring to the surface concepts of 
fairness and substantive justice that are latent in many of the defense doctrines.950 This matters 
because, as she explains: 
The primary objective of contract law is not, however, to standardize contracting 
behavior. Perhaps the single most acknowledged justification for contract enforcement is 
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that contracting promotes individual autonomy or the “will of the parties.” Yet, the 
parties to a contract are not always “reasonable,” or at least not reasonable as such a term 
may be understood by a decisionmaker with a different background and experiences. 
People, even where they are reasonable, are not always reasonable in the same way. 
Parties often do not always share the same assumptions, experience, cultural or social 
values, bargaining power or access to information, either with each other or with the 
decisionmaker or hypothetical reasonable person. Thus, even if we were to accept 
dynamic contract law's view of contractual intent as purely subjective, we must still 
resolve the issue of how we should analyze such intent.951 
 
Her framing recognizes the subjective character of the ‘reasonable person’ standard – a 
legal fiction that has been critiqued as derived from the cultural lexicon of the dominant group in 
society, and staunchly reliant upon the supposed neutrality of the judiciary as decisionmaker.952 
This judicial neutrality has been challenged in Canadian law, but remains a powerful ideological 
force in American jurisprudence.953 As Deborah Waire Post has argued, “While there is an 
emerging consensus that cultural competence is a skill and ethical obligation of practitioners, it is 
much harder to find articles promoting a judicial ethic of cultural competence.”954 As a 
corrective, Kim attempts to develop a language that takes into account three levels of culture and 
law: the cultural context that is present in a particular dispute; the ideological and cultural 
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content of contract theory; as well as the culture and institutional norms that are internalized by 
the judiciary.955 
In her second paper on the subject, Kim applies her theoretical framework to two case 
studies regarding issues of nationhood and gender, exploring the cross-cultural readings which 
might emerge from an expanded intent analysis.956 Kim begins with a contractual intent dispute 
involving two Korean claimants in a California appellate court, which was dismissed by the 
judge for a variety of contextual factors, not least because the contract was signed in blood after 
heavy drinking in a sushi bar.957 Kim argues that the strict application of objective consideration 
doctrine ignored Korean cultural expectations, such as the fact that Korean businessmen 
typically conduct business under precisely these circumstances, with business relationships in 
Korea based upon personal relationships that are “integrally related” to the consumption of large 
quantities of alcohol.958 As well, the drawing of blood may be understood within Korean cultural 
norms as “a way to show sincerity rather than evidence of extreme intoxication, mental 
instability or coercion.”959  
Thus when viewed in cultural context, the circumstances under which the blood contract 
was made are not unusual and do not raise the same suspicions that they do without an 
understanding of the business and social norms guiding the parties’ conduct. Instead of pressing 
this encounter into a dominant Western mode that is inappropriate for the situation, Kim calls 
instead for a “contextual purposive intent” that would require courts to consider facts in cultural 
context and include the social identities of the parties to the contract. This approach recognizes 
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the relationship between the individual and the collective, provides focus and direction 
appropriate to the specific context, and references the expectations and beliefs of the cultural 
community from which the dispute arises (in this case the Korean or Korean American 
community).960 
Kim then turns to a treatment of a case involving the disposal of frozen embryos upon 
marriage dissolution. Arthur (Trip) Witten and Tamera Witten had undergone in vitro 
fertilization during their seven-and-a-half year marriage without success.961 As part of the 
clinical process, the couple had signed an “Embryo Storage Agreement” that required the signed 
agreement of both parties for the transfer, release or disposition of any cryopreserved embryos 
that might be created. Trip then filed for divorce, and Tamera requested that she be awarded the 
17 stored embryos that remained as part of dissolution proceedings. Trip refused to allow her 
access and asked the court to enforce the mutual consent provision in the Agreement. 
The judge relied on the enforceability of the Agreement and held that written consent was 
required from both Tamera and Trip to release the embryos, holding that “agreements entered 
into at the time in vitro fertilization is commenced are enforceable and binding on the parties, 
subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind about disposition up to the point of 
use or destruction of any stored embryo.”962 Kim argues that this ruling failed to take into 
account the gendered nature of IVF as well as the parental expectations of the female party. As 
she asserts: 
The gender neutral language belies that only one of the parties - the woman - will have 
endangered her health in vain…The contemporaneous mutual consent model ignores the 
difference in nature of the contributions of a man and a woman in the in vitro fertilization 
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process. The woman will always suffer more physical pain and risk more to her health 
than the man. To assume equality in this context ignores the disparate nature of their 
participation in the in vitro process.963 
Kim refuses the neutral equivalence between Trip and Tamera in this context, arguing 
that Tamera’s greater investment of time, physical hardship and medical risk is not on the same 
footing as Trip’s provision of a semen sample. She also notes that Trip did not want to destroy 
the embryos, but merely prevent Tamera from utilizing them to get pregnant. Thus Trip’s ability 
to “change his mind” about the disposition of the embryos and maintain them in stasis is 
validated by the court, while Tamera’s consistent and unchanged intention – that of using the 
process of in vitro fertilization to have a child – is disregarded. As Kim describes: “[T]he court 
recognizes Trip's ability to change his mind - something that is generally not recognizable in 
other contracts - as worthy of protection and prioritizes that over the expectation and reliance 
interest of Tamera, thus utterly disregarding the physical suffering experienced by her.”964 This 
disproportionate investment in reproductive labour has been called a matter of “sweat equity” by 
Robyn Ikehara, who argues that women should be awarded greater dispositional authority than 
men when a contractual gap (in this case, divorce) exists within such disputes, as women have 
borne a greater physical burden and relied heavily to their detriment.965 
By applying her expanded doctrine of contractual intent, Kim argues that the gendered 
character of the situation must be engaged, recognizing the differently weighted investments that 
each party holds in the outcome. Tamera’s willingness to undergo the physical hardship of IVF 
and her continued commitment to the reproductive project indicates that she holds the contextual 
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purposive intent to become a parent. It is clear why she entered into the contract, and her reasons 
or motives for entering into the agreement have not changed, despite shifting circumstances since 
the time the contract was signed. Trip, on the other hand, appears to lack such intent, with his 
participation in the creation of embryos conditioned by an expectation that the couple would 
remain together. He apparently had not considered what might happen should the relationship 
end, and if this consideration had been raised, Trip would presumably have specified that his 
consent rested on the continuation of their relationship, or he would have declined to enter into 
the agreement altogether. Thus, argues Kim, “because Trip lacked contextual purposive intent, 
the agreement between Tamera and Trip should not be enforced unless there is a strong public 
policy compelling enforcement.”966 
By adding this contextual element to their adjudication of contract disputes, the court 
may enhance their understanding of what ‘reasonable expectations’ might be in a given situation. 
It allows a judge to view the contracting situation from the standpoint of the parties, not merely 
from his or her own vantage point.967 It complicates the idea of an ‘objective’ standard 
unaffected by race, class, sexuality, gender or other social factors,968 and allows contract law to 
be analyzed within a socio-cultural context that considers the intentions and purposive motives 
of the disputants, as well as the social environment in which these decisions are being made. 
I believe this sensitivity to the social identities of the claimants in contract disputes may 
also offer an important corrective within the domestic contractual arrangements of family law. 
This socio-cultural framing is neatly able to capture something of the tension between dominant 
models (of the legal family) and the intentional complexity of many queer reproductive projects 
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(via synfertility). Intentional synfertility is a purposive form of kinship that expects to locate 
procreation outside the marital bed, and as such involves a different contextual frame than the 
two-parent model of orthofertile coupling. By considering the contextual purposive intent of Jane 
Doe, for example, the judiciary may have acknowledged the social pressures to conform to a 
dyadic model of heterosexual coupling, the refusal of both her and John Doe to equate the sexual 
tie with a reproductive imperative, and the contextual purposive intent of John Doe himself as a 
determined non-participant in this parenting project. This would have allowed the couple to 
navigate their intimate lives at a distance from the orthofertile heterosexual framework, via 
judicial recognition of the complex and purposive motivations of intentional synfertiltiy.  
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 While was writing against the limitations of U.S. jurisprudence, the different legal 
context in Canada may make it easier to argue for a subjective review of contractual disputes. 
There is precedent for decisionmakers to avoid the charge of judicial bias when they apply their 
knowledge of identitarian or differently-lived experience, allowing for specific socio-cultural 
factors to be contemplated by the court. In R.D.S. v. The Queen, for example, the Supreme Court 
of Canada reviewed a challenge to a racialized judge who had acknowledged the presence of 
pervasive structural racism in Nova Scotia in her reasons for decision on a children’s court 
criminal matter.969 A black youth had been charged with assaulting and resisting arrest by a 
police officer in Halifax, with the youth and the officer the only two witnesses to the alleged 
crime. Their accounts of the events differed widely.970 The only African-Canadian judge in Nova 
Scotia, Corrine Sparks, had presided over the case, and made remarks in her judgment that spoke 
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to the racialized character of the criminal justice system. As she explained her reasons for 
acquitting the youth: 
 I am not saying that the officer overreacted, but certainly police officers do overreact, 
particularly when they are dealing with non-white groups… I believe that probably the 
situation in this particular case is the case of a young police officer who overreacted. I do 
accept the evidence of [R.D.S.] that he was told to shut up or he would be under arrest. It 
seems to be in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the day.971 
The approach of Judge Sparks was challenged in the lower courts, with a claim that her 
attention to the “attitude of the day” described above, and her reference to the well-documented 
history of “racism” in Nova Scotia in another passage, could have been seen as having affected 
her approach to the evidence, and in particular the evidence of the white arresting officer. 972 
The lower courts agreed with this analysis, accepting the claim of a reasonable apprehension of 
bias in Judge Sparks’ language.973 Upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed the lower court 
rulings, and in a joint judgment, Justices McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé said: 
[W]hile judges can never be neutral, in the sense of purely objective, they can and must 
strive for impartiality. [The test for bias] therefore recognizes as inevitable and 
appropriate that the differing experiences of judges assist them in their decision-making 
process and will be reflected in their judgments, so long as those experiences are relevant 
to the cases, are not based on inappropriate stereotypes, and do not prevent a fair and just 
determination of the cases based on the facts in evidence.974 
 
As they continued: 
 
The reasonable person must thus be deemed to be cognizant of the existence of racism in 
Halifax, Nova Scotia. It follows that judges may take notice of actual racism known to 
exist in a particular society. Judges have done so with respect to racism in Nova Scotia.975 
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This landmark decision thus established the rules for determining reasonable 
apprehension of bias in the court system by judges, and was the first to develop a framework for 
the application of social context in judging. In a published discussion that followed the ruling, 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé said, in specific reference to the judgment: “Judges should not aspire to 
neutrality. When Judges have the opportunity to recognise inequalities in society, and then to 
make those inequalities legally relevant to the disputes before them in order to achieve a just 
result, then they should do so.”976 Thus, ethical judiciaries have a responsibility to recognize 
inequalities in society, understand how these inequalities may play out in the disputes before 
them, and apply their understanding of structural and systemic injustice to the facts of the 
case.977 They may bring their own lived experience to the matter, as with Judge Sparks and her 
presumably first-hand experience with racism and sexism in Nova Scotia; or they may educate 
themselves on pervasive forms of social discrimination and seek to apply a context-specific 
analysis that takes into account the barriers faced by different socio-cultural groups. This ruling 
thereby provides at least partial grounds for the subjective and ethical judgment necessary to 
allow courts to adjudicate claims of contextual purposive intent. Unfortunately, the legacy of the 
decision has not made a deep impact upon the Canadian legal landscape.  
To mark the 15th anniversary of the R. v. R.D.S. decision, McGill University convened an 
interactive seminar in late 2012, hosted by Esmeralda M.A. Thornhill, Professor at the Schulich 
School of Law at Dalhousie University.978 In a radio interview with a McGill student radio show 
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following the seminar, Thornhill criticized the ways in which the ruling has failed to shift the 
practice of Canadian law despite its initial promise. While the judgment had been highly 
significant at the time, and generated a flurry of scholarship in the first few years after coming 
down,979 Thornhill felt that its promise had been “far from being fulfilled.”980 As she explained, 
as the first Canadian case to usher in social context education for judges on the basis of lived 
race and gender identity, it was important “not only for all people of African descent, but for all 
women.”981 However as Richard Devlin has reported in relation to R. v. Hamilton,982 a 2004 case 
from Ontario that involved a context-specific analysis of social injustice and racialized 
oppression, when trial judges have tried “to tailor their responsibilities to the realities of systemic 
and intersectional inequality” the results have not been promising.983 
The case Devlin describes was a criminal issue, as was the original matter in R. v. R.D.S. 
And indeed it may be that the institutional norms of criminal courts lend themselves toward more 
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impartial forms of justice due to factors such as sentencing principles and floodgate concerns.984 
Might the latitude for subjective adjudication be different in a non-criminal context? It is 
important to note that family courts are already attuned to context-specific adjudication and 
more likely to readily manage the issues of subordinated cultural and social communities. By the 
same token, contract law is already a wing of jurisprudence built upon context-specific inquiry. 
Thus, the disposition of domestic contracts may offer a ripe nexus to reinvigorate the principles 
of social context education, and encourage renewed judicial sensitivity to issues of race, gender, 
class and sexuality as laid down with so much promise in R. v. R.D.S. I believe the paradigm of 
contextual purposive intent, and its parallel decree for attention to subordinated cultural and 
social factors, may provide a helpful platform to explore issues of substantive justice that would 
otherwise remain buried within contractual dispute adjudication. It would allow an analysis of 
the best interests of the child not grounded upon abstracted notions of wellbeing, but – as with 
A.A. v. B.B. – a context-sensitive determination that sought to respond to the queer relations 
already in existence.  
What might the institutionalization of a judicial treatment of contextual purposive intent 
look like in relation to synfertility? The resolution of (for example) contractual disputes over 
parentage in regard to two lesbian parents and their known sperm donor, would first suggest a 
deep and careful analysis of the conditions under which the donor agreement was made.985 It 
would seek to determine why all parties intended to enter a contract – examining their reasons or 
motives – as well as the relevant circumstances both at the time the contract was made as well as 
those arising after contract formation. These relevant circumstances might include the 
ideological dominance of the two-parent family in Canada, the cost and difficulty of obtaining 
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368 
anonymous donor sperm through a clinical encounter, a tradition of informal parenting 
arrangements within queer communities, the vulnerability of lesbian co-mothers given the 
heterosexual imaginary and its affective attachments to the biological tie, the vulnerability of 
single men as fathers, and the different standards and expectations of care commonly applied to 
fathers versus mothers.986  
It would also include a temporal analysis, seeking to understand how conditions have 
changed since the contract was formed. Was the child already born? If so, what was her relation 
to the multiple caregivers and what kinds of community was she nurtured by? Did the lesbian 
couple have a contextual purposive intent to create an exclusive two-parent family given the 
forces of structural homophobia and the uncertainty of fertility law? What was the contextual 
purposive intent of the known donor and has this intent shifted? If so, why?  Such a perspective 
would explicitly account for race, class, sexuality, gender and other social factors, and place the 
domestic contract within a socio-cultural context that considers the individual motives of the 
disputants, as well as the systemic factors and – importantly - the institutional legal environment 
within which such decisions are being made.  
.	
:

In this last chapter I have circled back to the start of the dissertation, unpacking the legal 
construction of ‘family’ in Canadian law, and arguing for a model of contextual purposive intent 
that can take into account the fractured and the conventional modes through which synfertile 
families are being created. Although the recent revisions to British Columbia’s Family Law Act 
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offer a promising foundation for queer family structures outside the dyad, the ongoing and 
mutable nature of family forms created through AHR suggests that flexible solutions may give 
the greatest latitude – and protection – to non-traditional families.  
Even within the LGBTQ rubric are many potential forms of family requiring many 
different forms of reproductive intervention: a contractual legal order that allows for 
sociocultural variance and intention appears to offer the strongest encouragement. This is at odds 
with the model of LGBTQ liberation followed by, for example, the same-sex marriage 
movement, which has sought inscription in the federal legal regime and validation by the 
symbolic weight of the marriage institution.  
The contractual mode I envision draws from private law for the variation of intent, but 
relies upon a public model of state funding in order to actualize such intent. In an era of austerity 
and neoliberal retraction, such demands on the state may seem overbroad. However I believe that 
a Quebec-style model of universal access is possible, once the critiques of the infertility trap and 
the clinical push toward parafertility are modulated. When intra-reproductive models are not 
privileged as the ideal modality, it is possible that some heterosexual couples may opt for less 
expensive and invasive procedures, such as, for example, choosing donor insemination through 
IUI rather than the difficult process of ICSI. However given the power of orthofertility as a 
normative modality, it is also possible that a moderate user fee program may need to be 
instituted, involving a graduated system of payment based on income. To avoid a stratified 
system of reproductive hierarchy it is critical that poor people and, especially, poor and 
racialized queer people be able to access reproductive assistance if desired. By setting a payment 
threshold of (for example) $200,000 in combined household monthly income, after which a 
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marginal fee would apply, wealthier families can help to subsidize the cost of treatment for 
poorer households.  
The framework I have developed rejects the medical model of infertility to launch 
disability claims, and instead looks to the embedded ontology of queer lives. It offers room for 
constitutional protections grounded on sex and sexual orientation, while remaining vigilant 
against the individualized character of liberal rights claims. It also seeks to understand the 
relationality of reproductive bodies and intentions. As Roxanne Mykitiuk has argued, it is 
important to keep an account of the embodied, integrated subject tightly on hand: 
In place of the abstracted, disembodied, rational, universal rights bearing, contracting, 
possessive individual at the centre of liberal discourse, I want to know what a social order 
that takes embodiment seriously would look like. If the structures and practices of liberal 
theory have been founded on a conception of person with an absent body, I want to know 
what a social theory centered around embodied persons would look like.987 
 
I have sought to develop a relational engagement with reproductive bodies, creating new 
taxonomies and challenging others. I have framed synfertility in particular as a relational 
concept, and a way to focus on nurturance, need and responsibility as a way to track biological 
and social ties of care as effected through biotechnology. This strategy aims to remain responsive 
to complex sociocultural needs as emerging from queer families, and rejects a static federal 
model as the guardian of reproductive outcomes. Such a contractual model also presents an 
opportunity for queer families to develop, in all manner of forms, around the rearing and care of 
children.  
It is through having children that queer families have become part of the discussion and, 
importantly, case law, with precedents such as Rutherford and A.A.. v. B.B. The many 
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contradictory aspirations of queer family life should not be shoehorned into an orthofertile 
model, but must be allowed sufficient plasticity through room for individual negotiation and the 
prioritization of synfertile pathways. Rather than have each province consolidate family law 
norms through statutory reform that insufficiently reflects queer realities, it is far preferable to 
allow these multiple modes to grow and transform the social landscape upon which they rest. 
Room must be provided for the complex ways in which reproductive technologies and the family 
structures they engender both “trouble the normal” and reinforce the normalization of traditional 
gender, sexuality and family constructs.988 That said, the recent statutory model from British 
Columbia does hold promise, and appears to have been developed with the needs of synfertile 
families explicitly in mind.  
The federal structure of the AHRA emerged from radical feminist concerns around 
reproductive technology and a mode of governance feminism which hinged upon a criminal law 
power and a top-down mode of centralized control. Chapters Five and Six described how queer 
reproductive needs were sidelined or transformed through the process of governmentalization 
and the filtering of the RCNRT report through decades of legislative development. In its final 
form, the AHRA was not only unconstitutional, but woefully inadequate to meet the needs of 
communities on the ground. Virtual silence on the needs of LGBTQ people has continued into 
the present day and debates in Quebec over IVF funding, with the exception of a high-profile 
surrogacy case involving a gay celebrity. Rather than provincial edicts to replace the flawed form 
of the AHRA, which may fail to account for the richness of synfertility, careful attention to the 
contextual purposive intent of queer families themselves appears to offer a helpful way forward. 
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Biotechnologies are no longer science-fiction innovations that beckon from the lurid realm 
of dystopian fantasy. While Margaret Atwood’s cautionary fable ‘The Handmaid’s Tale’ may 
have fanned the flames of apprehension back in the 1980s,989 it is no longer the case that assisted 
reproduction represents an unnatural form of cybernetic baby-making. I argue that in order to 
ensure that proper connections are made in an era of AHR, we must create new maps, 
vocabularies and legal orders. What might appear to be emerging freedoms and choice offered by 
new technological practices are concurrently forged within power relations, not outside them. As 
Mamo has remarked, “[t]his idea marks much of feminist technoscience studies approaches: the 
meeting of bodies with technological and scientific practices are part of culture and power; they 
do not exist outside of culture and power.990  
I have thus devoted a substantial portion of my project toward exploring the relations of 
power and culture created through medical infertility as the dominant clinical model. As I have 
argued, this is no benign conceptualization, but one that structures the entire system of 
reproductive possibility within Canadian law and medicine. This in turn depends on a normative 
vision of the Canadian family that rests at the heart of gendered systems of social reproduction.  
Without new vocabularies and imaginaries to support the creation of queer families, it 
will remain impossible to interrogate the legal and discursive ground upon which such 
reproductive projects are being pursued. These conceptual limits are no trivial matter; if the only 
strategies pursued by queer parents and activists toward legal recognition follow the explicit 
modeling of heterosexual families, options will be restricted. 
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This dissertation has therefore sought to bring aspects of AHR into relief that have 
remained undertheorized and empirically bereft. My project takes up queer uses of AHR as a 
fresh lens through which to view the complex kinships, legal relations and biosocial assemblages 
generated by reproductive technology. Twenty years ago, Marilyn Strathern’s work used the 
scrim of AHR to pry apart the ways in which culture and nature are connected in Euro-American 
understandings of (heterosexual) kinship. This analytical approach – questioning suppositions 
about the connection between natural facts and social constructions – has inspired the analysis of 
law, biotechnology and kinship taken up by this dissertation.  
I have applied the central insights of queer theory’s critique of heteronormativity to 
constructionist concerns about family law, reproductive technologies and the role played by 
contemporary forms of kinship in Canada. In the process, I have brought a multidisciplinary 
theoretical approach into conversation, reading it through queerly theoretical traditions, while 
drawing upon empirical research and critical legal studies to survey the queer landscapes of 
assisted reproduction. 
!&&%
Reproductive technologies will only grow more common, and synfertility in particular, 
requiring a paradigmatic shift of both vocabulary and understanding. By refusing the infertility 
trap of the clinic, it becomes possible to open legislative and adjudicative processes to a much 
wider range of options. For as has been thoroughly discussed, current clinical discourse relies 
upon the binary of infertility to create ‘normal’ and ‘failed’ modes of reproduction. It is only by 
understanding how infertility works to stigmatize and obscure the workings of the clinic that one 
may see how these aberrations are produced. And in a move that I think will reduce stigma for 
all, we can then demonstrate how infertility operates to privilege certain parafertile bodies with a 
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recognizable family form (heterosexual, partnered) even as it seeks to obscure the reproductive 
failing of those very same bodies.  
This elaborate operation for the benefit of grieving heterosexual couples effectively 
denies the ontological experience of prospective queer parents, as this dissertation has explored 
through empirical data. Gay and lesbian bodies, and trans bodies in particular, must face not only 
the stigma of wounded heterosexuality, but also their dislocation as sexual and gender minorities 
who do not conform to a rigid parafertility. Even when small concessions are made within the 
clinic, such as trans-sensitive training or the inclusion of LGBT-friendly brochures or 
information, this fails to shift the overall institutional culture. For example despite the increasing 
use by many clinics of abstract terms like “spouse” and “parent” on their intake forms, such 
apparently neutral modes remain bracketed within the framework of the dyadic orthofertile 
family.  
Clinical interventions will continue to create offspring that baffle legal norms of parentage 
and affiliation unless we revise our approach to the ways these technologies are being utilized and, 
by extension, the legal effects being created. More nuance is required to disaggregate the 
application of fertility technologies and think through the ramifications of the narrow categories of 
infertility we have, frankly, quite exhausted over the past thirty-odd years. As long as we continue 
to proceed down the same worn path we will be unable to account for the complexity of these 
kinship formations. It has been difficult to develop legislation around reproductive technology in 
Canada, largely because of uncertainty about what may result. Decades after the formation of the 
RCNRT we are still hardly closer to a functional regulatory solution for all Canadians. By re-
examining the language being used to name these issues, and the conceptual frameworks being 
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applied both before conception and in determining parentage, we may avoid the circular logic that 
has continued to get us nowhere.  
In thinking more critically about the structure of 'infertility' and seeking to challenge its 
monolithic form, the hope is to begin to more adequately recognize the variable needs of all 
parafertile and synfertile families seeking AHR. Once this quantitatively different model is 
understood, we can perhaps begin to think through the whole regulatory and clinical apparatus that 
supports the infertility industry, and question those choices made in the name of preserving the 
sanctity of heterosexual reproduction. I believe this process will help to remove some of the 
stigma of AHR, open the discussion, and allow a transparency into the conduct of assisted 
reproduction. It also makes it possible to lodge a claim for queer reproductive justice against the 
ruthless certainties of biological determinism. 
New family forms have posed a difficult challenge for Canadian law and resultant issues 
of parental presumption, custodial rights and biological relation have been a site of uncertain 
outcome for queer families. I have instead sought to propose a conceptual refinement that will 
move us closer to allowing fertility clinics, individuals, families, legislators and judicial 
authorities alike to reconceptualize the issues at stake when families are built through assisted 
reproduction. 
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Variable N = 66 (%) Notes 
Gender Identification 
Female (cisgender) 
Male (cisgender) 
Trans man/FTM spectrum 
Trans woman/MTF spectrum 
 
48 (72.7) 
9 (13.6) 
7 (10.6) 
2 (3.0) 
 
Sexual Orientation 
Lesbian 
Queer 
Gay 
Bisexual 
Two-Spirit 
Straight 
Other 
 
21 (31.8) 
18 (27.3) 
11 (16.7) 
11 (16.7) 
1 (1.5) 
2 (3.0) 
2 (3.0) 
 
-1 also identified as queer 
 
- 2 also identified as queer 
-1 also identified as queer/pansexual 
- also identified as bisexual 
- both identified as trans 
- included: homoandrophilic, fluid/no label  
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Cultural/Racial Background 
 
 
White 
Mixed 
Black/African/Caribbean 
Aboriginal 
South Asian 
Other 
 
 
 
48 (72.7) 
8 (12.1) 
6 (9.1) 
3 (4.5) 
2 (3.0) 
3 (4.5) 
- 1 missing  
- Participants could select more than one so 
frequencies do not total 100% 
 
Relationship Status 
Legally married 
Common-law 
Partnered 
Multiple partners 
Single  
Divorced 
 
37 (56.1) 
20 (30.3) 
2 (3.0) 
1 (1.5) 
6 (9.1) 
1 (1.5) 
- 2 missing 
- Participants could select more than one so 
frequencies do not total 100% 
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Region in Ontario 
Toronto region 
Southwest 
Eastern 
North Eastern 
Hamilton/Niagara 
Central East 
Central West 
Northwest 
 
34 (51.5) 
10 (15.1) 
  9 (13.6) 
  4 (6.1) 
  3 (4.5) 
  2 (3.0) 
  2 (3.0) 
  2 (3.0) 
-Subregions of Ontario as per the Ontario Ministry 
of Community and Social Services (2011) 
Highest Level of Education  
High school 
College 
University 
Postgraduate 
 
1 (1.5) 
7 (10.6) 
24 (36.4) 
31 (47.0) 
- 3 missing 
Household Income (CAD) 
Under $20,000 
$21,000-$35,000 
 
1 (1.5) 
2 (3.0) 
- 3 missing 
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 
$36,000-$50,000 
$51,000-$65,000 
$66,000-$80,000 
$81,000-$100,000 
Over $100,000 
4 (6.1) 
6 (9.1) 
15 (22.7) 
8 (12.1) 
27 (40.9) 
Age  
26-30 
31-35 
36-40 
41-45 
45-50 
 
7 (10.6) 
22 (33.3) 
21 (31.8) 
15 (22.7) 
1 (1.5) 
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Creating Our Families (COF): A Pilot Study of the Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
and Trans People Accessing Assisted Human Reproduction Services in Ontario  
 
1.We recognize that LGBTQ people have a tradition of creating a “chosen” family, which is 
different from the standard notion of heterosexual families. Could you describe what your family 
looks like now? 
2.Tell me about how you (you and your partner, your co-parent) came to the decision to have 
kids.  
In this study, we’re interested in hearing about peoples’ experiences with assisted human 
reproduction, or AHR, services. AHR services include things like donor insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, egg donation, and other services that are typically offered through fertility clinics, 
doctor’s offices and sperm banks. 
3. How did you come to consider AHR services as a possibility in building your family? 
a. Did you consider or try any other options for having children? 
 
b. When you were making your decision to use AHR services, where did you go for information 
about AHR? (How did you find out where to go for information? Was there any particular 
information you couldn’t find or had difficulty finding? Did you come across any specific 
information for LGBT people about AHR?) 
 
c. (If used services) What services, processes or programs did you make use of? 
(Who used them? You, your partner, your co-parent, a donor, a surrogate, someone else?) 
 
4. What did you imagine [the service] would be like? 
 
a. Were you looking forward to your first visit? Feeling apprehensive? Did you have any specific 
worries or concerns? 
 
5. (If they accessed any services, otherwise skip to question 10): Tell me about the first steps you 
took when you decided to access AHR services. 
 
a. How did you get a referral? 
 
b. How did you decide which AHR clinic to work with? (Did you have a choice?) 
 
6. Tell me about your first interactions with [the service]. 
 
a. Did you feel welcomed, uncomfortable, etc.? 
 
b. Did they have any LGBT-specific resources? 
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7. Tell us about the process after that. 
 
a. What providers were involved in your care? 
 
b. Who went with you to your appointments? 
 
c. Can you remember a particularly good or bad experience with your provider or clinic that you 
would like to share with us? 
 
d. Thinking back on your experiences, would you say you faced any particular challenges or 
difficulties in accessing AHR services? (Were these barriers related to your sexual orientation or 
gender identity? How?) 
 
e. Was there anything that happened during the process that was really helpful to you? 
 
f. [If applicable-FERTILITY INTERVENTIONS] Was it ever recommended that you take 
fertility drugs, or have any other interventions related to your fertility? How did you feel about 
that? (Did you feel like you were given a choice whether or not to have these interventions? Did 
you have all of the information you needed to make a decision? Did you feel like you were in 
control of your care? 
 
g. [If applicable-COMING OUT] How did you decide whether or not to out yourself to your 
AHR service providers? (At what stage did you decide to come out? Did you come out to 
everyone or only to some providers? What kind of reactions did you get when you came out? 
Did you ever feel you had to conceal your sexual orientation, gender identity or family 
configuration? Why did you feel that way? What was that like for you?) 
 
h. [If applicable—LEGAL ISSUES] Were there any legal issues that arose? 
 
i. How were you able to manage the costs you incurred? 
 
8. Were you offered or required to have a counseling visit prior to receiving AHR services? (If 
yes, did you have one?) 
 
a. What was your experience with the counseling process? 
 
b. What did you talk about? 
 
c. Was there anything about the counseling session that was particularly helpful? 
 
d. Anything that seemed unhelpful or inappropriate to you? 
 
e. [If applicable] Was there any concern expressed about having different-sex role models for 
your children? 
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9. (For those who did not use services, otherwise skip to question 12): So I understand from the 
information you gave us over the phone that you ultimately did not use AHR services. Can you 
talk about the factors that led to that? 
 
a. Did you choose not to use services, or was that decision made for you by someone else? 
(Who? Why?) 
 
b. Were there any issues specifically related to your sexual orientation or gender identity? 
 
c. Were there any issues related to cost of services? Other practical issues? 
 
10. Did you continue to try to build a family after AHR services were no longer a possibility for 
you? 
 
a. (If yes) How did you go about doing that? 
 
b. (If no) Why did you decide to stop? 
 
11. Thinking back on your experience, do you feel that you had any unique experiences or needs 
related to your identity as a insert relevant identity/ identities (lesbian, gay man, bisexual person 
and/or trans person)? 
 
a. What about other identities that are important to you? (probe: age, race/ethnicity, social class, 
disability) 
 
b. (If participant lives outside of the GTA/Ottawa): Do you think there is anything unique about 
your experiences with AHR services because you live here? (Did you have to travel to access 
services? How far? What was that like for you?) 
 
12. Based on your experiences, if you had five minutes with someone who could really make 
change in the AHR system, what would you recommend to them? 
 
13. Is there anything we haven’t covered that you feel is important for us to know about? 
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The following questions will ask you about your age, education, employment, relationship status, 
etc. This information will be used to get a big-picture idea of the people who participated in this 
study. All information provided by you will remain confidential.  
 
1. How old are you?  
 16 – 25  
 26 – 30  
 31 – 35  
 36 – 40  
 41 – 45  
 45 – 50  
 50 – 60  
 Over 60  
 
2. What is your current relationship status? Please select all that apply.  
 Legally married  
 Common law/living with a partner  
 Partnered / not living together  
 Multiple partners  
 Single  
 Separated  
 Divorced  
 Widowed  
 You don’t have an option that applies to me  
 
3. How do you describe your sexual orientation?  
 
4. How do you describe your gender identity?  
 
5. Do you identify as a person living with  
a) a disability  
 Yes  
 No  
and/or b) a chronic illness?  
 Yes  
 No  
IF Yes a) What is the nature of your disability? _________________________  
b) What is the nature of your health condition? ____________________  
 
6. Have you tested positive for HIV?  
IF Yes Did you learn of your status before or after considering AHR?  
 
7. Do you currently have children?  
 Yes  
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 No  
IF Yes a) How many in total?  
b) How many are living with you?  
c) How old are they?  
 
8. Where were you born?  
 Canada  
 Outside Canada  
 
9. If you were born in Canada, please skip to question 11. If you were born outside Canada, 
in which country were you born?  
 
10. How many years have you lived in Canada?  
 
11. How do you define your cultural and/or racial background?  
 
12. What is your current employment status?  
 Full-time employed  
 Part-time employed  
 Student  
 Not employed  
 Retired  
 On disability  
 On maternity/parental leave  
You don’t have an option that applies to me  
  
13. How would you describe your highest level of education?  
 Less than high school  
 High school some or completed  
 College some or completed  
 University (e.g. BA, BSc) some or completed  
 Post Graduation (e.g. MA, MSc) some or completed  
 
14. What is your approximate household income?  
 under $20,000  
 $21,000–$35,000  
 $36,000–$50,000  
 $51,000–$65,000  
 $66,000–$80,000  
 $81,000–$100,000  
 over $100,000  
 
Thank you for your participation 
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Introduction  
You are being invited to participate in a research project. This consent form provides all of the 
information about this research project in order to assist you in deciding whether or not you wish 
to participate.  
Before agreeing to participate in this research study, it is very important that you read and 
understand all of the information on this form. If you have any questions after you have read the 
form, you will be given as much time as you like to discuss them with the study investigator. 
You should not sign this form until you are sure that you understand and agree to all of the 
information about the research it provides.  
 
Purpose of this Research  
 Research on families formed through Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR) services (e.g., 
cycle monitoring, donor insemination, egg retrieval, sperm collection, in vitro fertilization, 
surrogacy) has focused on heterosexual relationships. However, there has been little research on 
the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT, please see Glossary at the end of this 
form) people who use AHR services, or who have considered using these services, but have 
decided not to. The few available data suggest that LGBT people may face significant barriers to 
AHR services.  
 The goal of this research is to understand the experiences of LGBT people who access, 
attempt to access, or have considered accessing AHR services in Ontario since January 1st, 2007.  
 Part of this goal will be to explore the impact of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
(AHRA) on LGBT people in Ontario.  
 
Description of the Research  
Who will be participating in this study?  
People who identify as LGBT and have used, considered using, or tried to use AHR services in 
Ontario since January 1, 2007.  
If I choose to participate, what will I be asked to do?  
1. Carefully read, consider, and sign this consent form. Once you have read and signed the 
consent form, you can return it to the interviewer. You will be given a copy to keep.  
2. Take part in a one hour interview in which you will be asked to tell your story of using or 
attempting to use AHR services, or of considering but choosing not to use these services.  
 We will make an audio recording of the interview. However, if you do not wish to be audio 
recorded, please let the interviewer know and he/she will take written notes of the interview.  
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 During the interview you will be asked to provide details about your decision to use or not to 
use AHR services, and your related and/or resulting experiences.  
 The total interview will not take more than 1 hour. You can take a break from the interview 
any time you like, and if you are unable to finish the interview at the scheduled time, your 
interviewer will offer to schedule another time to finish the interview with you.  
 
3. Fill out a short, demographic questionnaire.  
 
Potential Harms (Injury, Discomforts or Inconvenience)  
 There are no known harms associated with participation in this study.  
 It is possible that some of the questions you are asked may cause you to feel upset. If you feel 
upset, the interviewer can provide you with contact information for community support and/or 
mental health agencies that may be able to help you. You will also be encouraged to discuss any 
concerns you have with your family doctor. If you are uncomfortable with any of the questions 
or want to stop at any time during the interview, let the interviewer know.  
 
Potential Benefits  
You will not directly benefit from participating in this research study.  
 
Confidentiality and Privacy  
Your participation in this research is confidential. Your responses to the questions in the 
interview will be available only to the study investigators listed at the top of this consent form, 
and specific trained research staff who are bound to our research protocol and confidentiality 
agreement.  
 
 Study investigators are required to report to the authorities if it is clear that you or someone 
else is at risk of immediate danger, or if they have any reasonable suspicions of neglect and/or 
physical or sexual abuse of a person less than 18 years of age. Other than these legal exceptions, 
your responses to the interview will not be available to any individuals or organizations outside 
of the research team.  
 No information that reveals your identity will be released or published without your consent. 
Your responses and information will be held in strict confidentiality, and will be protected to the 
limits of the law.  
 All data will be safely stored in a locked facility and only research staff will have access to 
this information.  
 If you wish to participate in this study, but require anonymity of your records, you may select 
the option for anonymity on the signature page of this document (page 6). If you select this 
option, we will ensure the following:  
o Once the interview is completed, we will remove from all transcripts and notes any information 
that may identify you and your family.  
o We will remove and/or delete all reference to your participation in this project so that none of 
your identifying data remain on record with us.  
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Compensation  
You will be compensated $25.00 for your participation. Even if you choose to withdraw from the 
study before the end of the interview, you will still be compensated.  
 
Participation and Withdrawal  
 You can choose not to participate in any part of this research study, and you can choose not to 
answer any questions you are asked as part of the interview.  
 If you choose to participate in this study, you can stop your participation (i.e., withdraw from 
the study) at any time without any effect on the care you receive. In addition, you do not lose any 
of your legal rights by signing this consent form. Your decision not participate, or to withdraw 
your participation, will not influence the nature of your relationship with the researchers, 
Sherbourne Health Centre, CAMH, York University or any other group associated with this 
project, either now, or in the future.  
 If you decide to withdraw from the study before the end, the investigators will ask you if they 
can still use the data you have provided to them to whatever extent possible. Should you say no, 
we will destroy your data.  
 
Contact Information  
 If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant in this study, you may 
contact Dr. Padraig Darby, Chair, Research Ethics Board, Centre for Addiction and Mental 
Health, at 416-535-8501 ext. 6876, or Ms. Alison Collins-Mrakas, Senior Manager and Policy 
Advisor, Office of Research Ethics, York Research Tower, York University at 416-736-5914.  
 If you have any questions about this research or your participation in this study, please contact 
the Principal Investigator, Dr. Lori Ross, at (416) 535-8501 ext. 7383, or Secondary Investigator, 
Stewart Marvel, at (647) 669-4144.  
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ATTACHMENT ONE 
Listening to LGBTQ People on Assisted Human Reproduction: 
Access to Reproductive Material, Services and Facilities 
Introduction 
In the wake of the December 2010 Supreme Court decision on the constitutional 
legitimacy of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act [AHRA],1 Canada finds itself facing 
continued regulatory uncertainty in the area of reproductive technology. While next steps have  
yet to be defined by both provincial and federal authorities, this lacuna is of particular 
importance to lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, two-spirit and queer (LGBTQ) people in Canada.2 
                                                 
1
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457 [AHRA Reference].Also see In 
the matter of a Reference by the Government of Quebec pursuant to the Court of Appeal Reference Act, R.S.Q., c. R-
23, concerning the constitutional validity of sections 8 to 19, 40 to 53, 60, 61 and 68 of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, 2008 QCCA 1167, 298 DLR (4th) 712 [Quebec Reference]. 
2
Lesbian is a term for a female whose primary sexual orientation is to other women. Gay is a term for a male whose 
primarily sexual orientation is to other men. This term is sometimes used by lesbians (i.e., gay woman). Bisexual is a 
term for a person whose sexual orientation is directed towards individuals of more than one sex or gender, though 
not necessarily at the same time.Trans is an umbrella term referring to people who do not embrace traditional binary 
gender norms of masculine and feminine and/or whose gender identity or expression does not fit with the one they 
were assigned at birth; it can refer to transgender, transitioned, transsexual, and genderqueer people, as well as some 
two-spirit people. Transgender is a term used by individuals who falls outside of traditional gender categories or 
norms. It literally means “across gender,” and conveys the idea of transcending the boundaries of the gender binary 
system. It however is not necessarily a desire to be of the “opposite” sex. A transsexual is someone who feels their 
gender identity does not match the sex that they were assigned at birth. Many transsexual people choose to go 
through sex reassignment, including hormone treatment and surgeries, so that their sex and gender identity match. 
Transition refers to the process of changing from the sex one was assigned at birth to one’s self-perceived gender. It 
may involve dressing in the manner of the self-perceived gender, changing one’s name and identification, and 
undergoing hormone therapy and/or sex reassignment surgeries to change one’s secondary sex characteristics to 
reflect the self-perceived gender. Two-Spirit is an English language term used to reflect specific cultural words used 
by First Nations people who have both a masculine and a feminine spirit or to describe their sexual, gender and/or 
spiritual identity. Queer is a term that has traditionally been used as a derogatory and offensive word for LGBTQ 
people. Many have reclaimed this word and use it proudly to describe their identity and/or as an umbrella term for 
LGBTQ people or communities. Some people use ‘queer’ as a way of identifying their non-heterosexual orientation 
yet avoiding the sometimes strict boundaries that surround lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans identities. ‘Queer’ can 
also signify one’s rejection of heteronormative sexual identities, normative gender constructions, or essentialist 
identity politics. Please note that because ideas and attitudes are constantly changing within LGBTQ communities 
and among society at-large, these definitions may be used differently by different people and in different regions. 
Many of these terms have been adapted from the following sources: Barbara AM, Doctor F, Chaim G. Glossary. In: 
Asking the Right Questions 2: Talking about sexual orientation and gender identity in mental health, counselling 
and addiction settings. rev. ed. Toronto, ON: Centre for Addiction & Mental Health, 2007:55-60; Bauer GR, 
Hammond R, Travers R, Kaay M, Hohenadel KM, Boyce M. “I Don’t Think This Is Theoretical; This Is Our Lives”: 
How Erasure Impacts Health Care for Transgender People. J Assoc Nurses AIDS C 2009;20(5): 348-361; Green E, 
Peterson EN. LGBTQI Terminology. Available at: http://www.lgbt.ucla.edu/documents/LGBTTerminology.pdf 
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LGBTQ people are uniquely dependent on assisted human reproduction [AHR] services to create 
biologically-related children, with estimates suggesting that LGBTQ people represent 15-30% of 
clientele at some urban fertility clinics.3 Yet in a lengthy 167-page decision, the Supreme Court 
justices make only a single mention of LGBTQ users of AHR services. The reasons written by 
Chief Justice McLachlin failed to discuss LGBTQ people at all, while the judgment written by 
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. paused briefly to note that AHR “represents the only option for 
homosexuals who wish to reproduce.”4 
In this chapter, I argue that the present legal regime has been crafted with scarce 
consideration of the reproductive needs of ‘homosexuals,’ let alone other members of the 
LGBTQ spectrum.  Despite this omission, LGBTQ people in Canada who wish to become 
parents remain heavily dependent upon both adoption and AHR services.5 These are 
bureaucratically onerous and/or expensive options, leaving LGBTQ communities vulnerable to 
legislative gaps and judicial decisions which do not account for their unique realities.6 The 
                                                                                                                                                             
Accessed January 8, 2012. 
3 Epstein R, The AHRA/LGBTQ Working Group. The Assisted Human Reproduction Act and LGBTQ 
Communities.Toronto, Ontario; 2008. 
4 Decision of LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ, written by Lebel and Deschamps: “Rather, both those 
who testified before the Baird Commission and those who participated in the parliamentary debates acknowledged 
that the development of assisted human reproduction amounts to a step forward for the constantly growing number 
of people dealing with infertility. Moreover, it represents the only option for homosexuals who wish to reproduce. 
The risks for the health and safety of people who resort to these technologies do not distinguish the field of assisted 
human reproduction from other fields of medical practice that have evolved after a period of experimentation, such 
as that of organ transplants or grafts.” Italics added. Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, 
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 at para. 254. 
5For more information about LGBTQ people’s experiences with adoption, see: Ross, L.E., Epstein, R., Anderson, S., 
Eady, A. (2009). Policy, practice and personal narratives: Experiences of LGBTQ people with adoption in Ontario, 
Canada. Adoption Quarterly, 12(3/4), 272-293; Ross, L.E., Epstein, R., Goldfinger, C., Yager, C. (2009). Policy and 
Practice regarding lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transsexual and Two-Spirit adoption in Ontario. Canadian 
Public Policy, 35(4), 451-467; Ross, L.E., Epstein, R., Goldfinger, C., Steele, L.S., Anderson, S., Strike, C. (2008). 
Lesbian and queer mothers navigating the adoption system: the impacts on mental health. Health Sociology Review, 
17(3): 254-266. For a discussion of how lesbian and bisexual women are navigating the provision of AHR services, 
see: Lesbian and bisexual women’s recommendations for improving the provision of assisted reproductive 
technology services. Fertility and Sterility, 86(3), 735-8; Ross, L.E., Steele, L., & Epstein, R. (2006). Service use 
and gaps in services for lesbian and bisexual women during donor insemination, pregnancy and the postpartum 
period. Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada, 28(5), 505-11. 
6 As an example, trans people have only recently gained recognition of their gender identity as an enumerated 
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AHRA Reference case once again emphasizes this gap,7 leaving increased legal uncertainty 
alongside the virtual erasure of LGBTQ people in Canada from the discussion of how and why 
AHR technologies are to be used in the future.  
Legal uncertainty unduly impacts those with already precarious claims on the state, not 
least because the construction of dominant legal categories as neutral and universal actually 
obscures their historical particularism. When litigants challenge this abstracted form of legal 
rights and advance contextual narratives based on culture, race, or sexuality, Canadian courts 
have historically found such claims difficult to manage.8 As Hester Lessard explains, the 
supposed formal equality of access to rights “has no content other than the highly abstract 
content of entitlement to respect by the state for one’s status as a rights holder, and it 
contemplates an individual who is simply and fundamentally a rights-holding self, with no 
                                                                                                                                                             
grounds for discrimination in provincial and territorial human rights legislation. The Northwest Territories was the 
first jurisdiction to add “gender identity” to its human rights legislation in 2002 (Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c 
18, s 5(1)). Manitoba added “gender identity” to its Human Rights Code in June 2012 as did Ontario, which also 
added “gender expression.” Human Rights Code, CCSMcH175, s 9(2)(g), as amended by Human Rights Code 
Amendment Act, SM 2012, c 38, s 5(2); Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H. 19, s1, as amended by Toby's Act 
(Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment Because of Gender Identity or Gender Expression), 2012, 
SO 2012, c 7, s 1. Prior to these amendments, the grounds of “gender” under the Ontario Code in particular had been 
held to include “gender identity”, but recent developments now make the legislation explicit. The term “gender 
identity” refers to a person’s own identification of being masculine, feminine, male, female, or trans. Gender identity 
is unrelated to sexual orientation; not all trans people identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or queer. Gender expression 
is the public expression of gender identity; actions, dress, hairstyles, etc., performed to demonstrate one’s gender 
identity. 
7
Supra note 3. 
8 In regard to LGBTQ rights, Mossop v. Canada (A.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 demonstrated the limited success of 
litigants’ arguments which intentionally sought to avoid the normalizing weight of Canadian family law. As Brenda 
Cossman writes, “the [Mossop] case represented an interesting attempt by the litigants to frame the issue in the 
discourse of equality, while consciously trying to mitigate the sameness argument. In a conscious attempt to disrupt 
the heteronormativity of law, Mossop and the intervenors supporting his claim tried to limit their reliance on 
sameness arguments and the heterosexual equivalency of same-sex relationships. Even in arguing for a functional 
equivalency approach, Mossop himself refused to make arguments on the basis of sexual monogamy...Functional 
approaches to the family are invariably measured against a set of norms about what families do or ought to do.” In 
Brenda Cossman, Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 40 Osgoode Hall L. J. 223 
(2002) at 226-227. This ‘set of norms’ is thereby rooted upon the heteronormativity of law - the assumption, in 
individuals or in institutions, that everyone is heterosexual, and that heterosexuality is superior to homosexuality and 
bisexuality. “Heteronormativity refers to the privileging of heterosexual relationships and identities through the 
establishment of said relationships and identities as the norm by which all others are evaluated.” Hylton, M.E. 
(2005). Heteronormativity and the experiences of lesbian and bisexual women as social work students. Journal of 
Social Work Education, 41(1), 67-82 at 69. 
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defining attributes, history, economic status, or social location.”9 
In the case of AHR, these abstracted forms of entitlement are embedded deeply within the 
normative presumptions of heterosexual coupling.10As was clear in the AHRA Reference, the 
infertile heterosexual couple is contemplated as the exemplary user of AHR services. Other 
dependent populations, including non-partnered men or women, are either ignored (as in the 
McLachlin C.J. decision), or marked only in passing (as in the LeBel and Deschamps JJ. ruling). 
This judgment, like so many others, is based upon the assumption that cisgender,11 heterosexual 
couples constitute the norm, with all other demands for reproductive technology to be understood 
within this guiding frame. The SCC ruling assumes that LGBTQ people’s needs are similar in 
kind to those of cisgender, heterosexual couples, if perhaps more starkly rendered. Reproductive 
assistance may thereby constitute a necessary rather than occasional requirement for 
“homosexuals who wish to reproduce,” but the mechanics and legal considerations are basically 
the same. Thus, LGBTQ people’s concerns warrant no more than a passing acknowledgement, as 
the universality of the heterosexually reproductive family can accommodate all forms of socio-
biological kinship – scientifically-aided or otherwise.12 
This chapter aims to challenge such a perspective and demonstrate the specific character 
                                                 
9 Hester Lessard, “Mothers, Fathers, and Naming: Reflections on the Law Equality Framework and Trociuk v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General)
” (2004) 16(1) Can. J. Women & the Law 165-211 at 176. In discussing the 
usage of abstract terms like “spouse” and “parent” within liberal legal discourse, Lessard notes that such apparently 
neutral categories participate in “eliding actual systemic differences in the positioning of social groups” despite a 
promise of theoretical inclusiveness. Such legal categories are an ideological reflection of dominant social norms 
and therefore implicitly privilege those individuals with a convergent understanding of historically specific family 
forms. See also Shelley Gavigan, “Legal Forms, Family Forms, Gendered Norms: What Is a Spouse?” (1999) 14 
Canadian Journal of Law and Society 127. 
10For a more substantive discussion of this point, contact Lori E. Ross (l.ross@utoronto.ca), who together with the 
Creating Our Families research team (see note 14) is preparing a manuscript for publication entitled “Reframing 
assisted human reproduction: Reflections of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and queer people in Ontario, Canada.” 
11Cisgender refers toa person whose gender identity matches the gender they were assigned at birth; someone who is 
not trans.  
12 For a philosophical meditation on the psychic lives of those who live outside of normative kinship, with specific 
reference to children born through donor insemination, see  Judith Butler (2002) ‘Is Kinship Always Already 
Heterosexual?’ Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 13(1): 14-44.  
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of LGBTQ parenthood realized through AHR services. I argue that LGBTQ people are involved 
in a particular kind of reproductive project, and one that has been misread under the common 
banner of ‘infertility’ which currently drives the law and science of AHR.13 I write as a member 
of a qualitative, community-based study that has aimed to shed light on the experiences of 
LGBTQ people in Ontario who have used or considered using AHR services to have 
biologically-related children. Representing to our team’s knowledge the largest project of its 
kind, this pilot study was conducted collaboratively by researchers at the Centre for Addiction 
and Mental Health, the Sherbourne Health Centre and Osgoode Hall Law School.14 
Although there are other areas of law that impact how LGBTQ people access and use 
AHR services, this chapter will take up the pressing consideration of access to reproductive 
material, services and facilities.15 Our team’s research shows that questions of access hold unique 
challenges for LGBTQ people accessing AHR, few of which are settled within Canadian case 
law or legislation. These are areas characterized both by restrictive law crafted without LGBTQ 
                                                 
13While this chapter will apply a specifically queer lens to analyze the weakness of infertility as a diagnostic, we are 
not the first to question the utility of the term. For a discussion on the shortcomings of ‘infertility’ as a conceptual 
rubric for both demographers and reproductive endocrinologists, see: Gurunath S, Pandian Z, Anderson RA & 
Bhattacharya S. (2011). Defining infertility-a systematic review of prevalence studies. Human Reprod Update 17(5): 
575-588. 
14This chapter was developed based on a Canadian Institutes of Health Research-funded study “Creating Our 
Families: A pilot study of the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans people accessing assisted human 
reproduction services in Ontario” (FRN-103595). The study was developed in 2009 by Lori E. Ross (Re:searching 
for LGBTQ Health, Centre for Addiction & Mental Health), Leah S. Steele (St. Michael’s Hospital), and Rachel 
Epstein (LGBTQ Parenting Network, Sherbourne Health Centre). Stu Marvel joined the project in 2010 as a Co-
Investigator and contributed to data collection. Lesley A. Tarasoff, MA, led participant recruitment and screening 
and completed the analysis of participant demographic data. Scott Anderson, MHSc, assisted in the development of 
the study, and datejie green, BA(Hons.), led data collection.  Other staff and students from the Re:searching for 
LGBTQ Health team also contributed to this project (see www.lgbtqhealth.ca). In line with community-based 
research principles, this study was guided by an advisory committee of AHR service providers and service users. Cf: 
Israel BA, Schulz AJ, Parker EA, & Becker AB. (1998). Review of Community-Based Research: Assessing 
Partnership Approaches to Improve Public Health. Annual Review of Public Health, 19, 173-202In total, 66 LGBTQ 
people from across Ontario were interviewed about their experiences with AHR services. I would like to thank the 
Creating Our Families (COF) research team for their comments on this piece, and the COF study participants for 
sharing their stories with us.  
15 The other three areas of law which exert a differential impact on LGBTQ people are: access to reproductive 
funding; determinations over the legal parentage of donor-conceived offspring; and the rights of donor-conceived 
offspring to knowledge of their birth. 
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people’s needs in mind, as well as unclear or vague jurisprudence that presents particular 
jeopardy for LGBTQ couples and individuals.  
Indeed the Canadian Bar Association [CBA] has explicitly recognized the special 
requirements of LGBTQ people in relation to AHR. In a submission to Health Canada, the CBA 
noted that while the availability of fertility services impacts all segments of the population, 
“limits to that availability are likely to systemically discriminate against single people, and the 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered communities, who more often rely on assisted 
reproductive technologies to have children.”16 
It is particularly distressing to witness the virtual elision of LGBTQ people from 
judgments such as the Supreme Court decision, as the statement of principles laid out in the 
AHRA explicitly aims to prevent discrimination against persons who seek to undergo AHR 
procedures, “including on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status.”17 This provision 
flows directly from the concern of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
[the Baird Commission] on prevailing discrimination against lesbians and single women in 
Canadian society. In its 1993 report, the Baird Commission expressed the strong view that: 
it is wrong to forbid some people access to medical services on the basis of social 
factors while others are permitted to use them; using criteria such as a woman's 
marital status or sexual orientation to determine access to donor insemination, 
based on historical prejudices and stereotypes, amounts to discrimination as 
defined under human rights law and contravenes the Commission's guiding 
principle of equality.18 
 
It is the contention of this chapter that such a Charter-backed guarantee must remain at the fore 
as federal and provincial jurisdictions alike now move to draft new legislation concerning 
                                                 
16 Canadian Bar Association, Reimbursement of Expenditures under the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Ottawa: 
2007. The CBA policy position paper makes a series of recommendations to Health Canada, urging for greater 
flexibility and the avoidance of narrow definitions for the reimbursement of gamete donors or surrogates. At 2. 
17
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA], s. 2(e). 
18 Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: Final Report. Ottawa, 1993 at 278. 
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AHR.19 This position is bolstered by the Canadian Human Rights Act, which was amended in 
1996 to explicitly enumerate sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination, 
following the declaration by Parliament that gay and lesbian Canadians are entitled to “an 
opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives they are able and wish 
to have...”20 
Thus, in this chapter, I aim to outline gaps and limitations of the current regulatory 
framework and offer suggestions to ensure more equitable access and utilization of AHR services 
by LGBTQ people in Canada. The arguments are bolstered by empirical research that speaks to 
the lived realities of this legal uncertainty, and draws upon data from the ‘Creating Our Families’ 
study to demonstrate how reproductive law impacts LGBTQ people in distinctive ways.21 The 
chapter details the valences of fertility law as applied to LGBTQ families and concludes by 
suggesting possible areas of policy development and judicial analysis. By highlighting these 
areas of inequality and differential access to reproductive justice, the hope is that next steps 
concerning AHR legislation will proceed by taking into account the specific concerns of LGBTQ 
parents and parents-to-be. 
 
LGBTQ access to reproductive material, services and facilities 
This area of law may be characterized in terms of access to reproductive material, 
services and facilities. This includes access to human gametes such as sperm and ova, as well as 
the access of commissioning or intended parents to reproductive surrogates, either traditional or 
                                                 
19
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11[Charter]. 
20
Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC, 1985, c H-6, s. 2, as amended by SC 1996, c 14, s 1. 
21 While the points made herein are broadly applicable for LGBTQ people in Canada, it is important to note that the 
majority of participants in our qualitative study were aged 31-40 years, married or in a common-law relationship, 
white, university educated, and had an annual household income of greater than $66,000 CAD (i.e., they are not 
necessarily representative of the larger LGBTQ population). 
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gestational.22 It also includes access to fertility clinics and gamete banks, which draw upon 
reserves both domestic and imported, as well as assisting individuals to freeze and store their 
own gametes (eggs, sperm, and embryos). 
Access to third-party reproductive material is a crucial issue for LGBTQ people who 
wish to have biological children. Lesbians require sperm donation, gay men require ova donation 
(as well as a reproductive surrogate), bisexuals may require sperm or ova, and trans people may 
require sperm, ova and/or a surrogate, depending on the particulars of their situation.23 While 
some lesbians, bisexuals and trans people may avoid the clinical system entirely and pursue 
home-based solutions with known donors (the infamous ‘turkey-baster’ method), this is not an 
option for many cisgender gay men.24 When creating children with third-party gametes, LGBTQ 
parents-to-be must first determine whether they will select known or unknown gamete donors—
each choice leads to very different legal pathways.  
In this section, I outline five mechanisms of existing legal doctrine which infringe upon 
                                                 
22A note on definitions: A gestational surrogate is a person who volunteers to have an embryo implanted in the 
uterus and carry the pregnancy on behalf of the intended parent or parents. A gestational surrogate is not genetically 
related to the resultant baby. A traditional surrogate on the other hand is someone who volunteers to conceive 
through insemination and carry the pregnancy on behalf of the intended parent or parents. A traditional surrogate 
contributes half the genetic complement of the resultant baby. 
23 Of course these situations may prove more complex, with lesbian and bisexual couples or individuals also 
requiring an egg as well as a surrogate, and gay men also requiring a sperm donor.  The scenarios listed above 
represent the minimum of third-party gametes required by LGBTQ parents-to-be. 
24 For example, a 2011 study of thirty gay men who used AHR services concluded that, “gay men increasingly seek 
parenthood through assisted reproduction using an oocyte donor and a gestational carrier.” Dorothy A. Greenfeld, 
EmreSeli, 2011 ‘Gay men choosing parenthood through assisted reproduction: medical and psychosocial 
considerations’ Fertility and Sterility 95(1): 225-229 at 226. A preference for gestational surrogates – not least 
because of uncertainty over maternal parentage – means that gay men may find themselves completely reliant upon 
AHR services and the legal uncertainty this entails. For example, a U.S. study of gay fathers included a couple who 
were obliged, due to legal barriers to surrogacy in their state of residence, to hire “an egg donor from one state, a 
surrogate mother from another state, a surrogate agency in another state, the paternity clinic in a fourth state, [while 
they] were in a fifth state.” Dana Berkowitz and William Marsiglio, ‘Gay Men Negotiating Procreative Identities’, 
Journal of Marriage and Family 69 (May 2007): 366–381 at 377.Another gay father in the U.S., who had opted for 
a traditional surrogate because of the difficulty of accessing gestational services, mused that, “We were lucky that 
there was never a question for our surrogate of her role in the children’s lives, but as I look back, we were taking 
quite a risk. If she had changed her mind, or fought for custody, I suspect that our stable home life would’ve been 
disrupted in a homophobic system that would not have recognised my partner and I as the real parents.’ Quoted in 
Arlene Istar Lev,2006, ‘Gay dads: Choosing surrogacy’, Lesbian& Gay Psychology Review7(1),at 73. 
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or negatively impact the access of LGBTQ people to reproductive material, service and facilities. 
 
One: Restricted access to legal means of gamete acquisition 
The acquisition of ova and gametes is strictly regulated in Canada, and under the AHRA it 
remains a criminal act to privately purchase human reproductive materials.25 Section 7 remained 
unchallenged in the reference case, and continues to prohibit the purchase of sperm or ova from 
Canadian donors. This legislation works in concert with Health Canada regulations around the 
transport, freezing, handling, purchase, and cross-border traffic of human gametes, most notably 
the Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations [Semen 
Regulations].26 Together, the Semen Regulations and Section 7 of the AHRA constitute the legal 
terrain for all Canadians seeking to gain access to third-party semen and ova.27 
Canada’s legislation concerning gamete donation is currently among the strictest in the 
world.28This has limited the available supply of Canadian-donated sperm both anonymous and 
known.29 The supply of anonymous semen is throttled by an onerous threshold for donation that 
                                                 
25 While there have so far been no prosecutions under the prohibited sections of the AHRA, the Act prescribes a 
maximum penalty of $500,000 and ten years imprisonment. Supra note 17. 
26The Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations SOR/96-254was enacted under the 
Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. c. F-27 [Semen Regulations]. The Semen Regulations came into force in June 1996, and 
are aimed at reducing the likelihood of infectious disease transmission. They set up a range of stringent health and 
safety requirements for the semen used in assisted reproduction.  
27 Although amendments to s.10 of the new AHRA have been made under s. 716 of the Jobs, Growth and Long-term 
Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c. 19, such provisions are not yet in force.  
28Canada’s sperm regulations are stricter than those enacted within many US jurisdictions, which makes it difficult 
for Canadians to import sperm from other countries. As reported by the Sperm Bank of California, a large semen 
distributor located in Berkeley, California: “Shipping semen samples to Canada is restricted because Health Canada 
has instituted strict regulations on donor testing that are not tenable for most US sperm banks to follow. However, 
we are able to sell sperm to recipients in Canada if they register with a US medical professional, cross the border to 
receive shipments and inseminate in the US.” Promotional material, Sperm Bank of California. Italics in original. 
29 While Canadians are able to import sperm from other countries the regulations on allowable imports are strict, as 
indicated in the footnote above. This combination of restrictive domestic legislation and high international standards 
may collude to unduly impact certain people, and in particular those seeking sperm from a specific non-White racial 
background. For example, our interview participants included an interracial lesbian couple who were unable to find 
Filipino sperm within the limited Canadian stock. They selected a Filipino donor from U.S. sperm bank reserves, but 
encountered significant barriers when attempting to import the specimens due to its partial non-compliance with 
Health Canada regulations. Despite repeated attempts to import an available Filipino donor, the couple was 
Stu Marvel – Attachment One - Chapter for Publication in University of Toronto Anthology 
 
397 
 
prevents gay and bisexual men from donating, while all known donors who are not also sexual 
partners, as we will see below, must navigate the secondary directives of the Semen Regulations. 
Canada’s restrictive donor legislation has an accentuated impact on LGBTQ people. It 
was estimated in 2011 that there are only approximately 35 active sperm donors in the entire 
country; numbers are even more uncertain regarding ova donors.30 In order to meet demand, 
sperm is being imported from abroad, with some commentators estimating that 95% of Canadian 
needs for donor sperm are being met by sperm banks located outside of the country.31  Evidence 
suggests that LGBTQ people are drawing upon a relatively small pool of available anonymous 
donors, making it possible for related donor sibs32 to be concentrated within urban LGBTQ 
communities.33 Our team’s research suggests that LGBTQ people are far more likely to be 
utilizing the same donor and learning of the shared biology of their children through queer 
community ties. For example, one lesbian couple from our study attended a queer prenatal yoga 
class in Toronto, where they met another set of lesbian parents who had conceived with the same 
anonymous sperm donor. The women subsequently connected with fifteen more donor sib 
                                                                                                                                                             
ultimately prevented from bringing the desired samples into Canada and were obliged to physically drive across the 
border into the U.S. for insemination. 
30 Note that this number emerges largely from popular media not scientific sources, and a May 2011 article written 
by Toronto journalist Danielle Groen who investigated the status of ReproMed as Canada’s last domestic sperm 
bank. Groen interviewed a number of clinical practitioners including the medical director of ReproMed, Dr. Alfonso 
Del Valle, who offered the following statement: “Before these laws came into place, we would have 100 donors at 
any given time...As it stands now, we must scramble to have 30 or 35 donors active.” Groen also interviewed 
Samantha Yee, a social worker at Mount Sinai’s Centre for Fertility and Reproductive Health, who corroborated this 
scarcity by remarking: “People are very surprised at how few donors there are in the Canadian catalogue.” As of the 
time of writing, Groen’s article is hosted on the ReproMed website. See: Groen, Danielle, Down for the Count: 
There are only 35 sperm donors left in all of Canada. Holy mama, we’ve got a problem, The Grid, May 2011. 
http://www.thegridto.com/city/local-news/down-for-the-count/ 
31 Tom Blackwell, Limit pregnancies by same sperm donor: fertility experts, September 8, 2011, National Post. 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/09/08/limit-pregnancies-by-same-sperm-donor-fertility-experts/ 
32
Donor sibs is a colloquial term used to discuss the other children who are the offspring of one’s sperm donor. It is 
not universally applied, but those that utilize it seek to describe the genetic relationship between their children and 
other offspring of the same donor, which may not translate into a social relationship. Hertz, R. and Mattes, J. (2011). 
Donor-Shared Siblings or Genetic Strangers: New Families, Clans, and the Internet. Journal of Family Issues, 
32(90):1129-1155 at 1136. 
33 For an in-depth analysis of this looming impact upon queer people in Canada, please see Stu Marvel, Tony 
Danzais My Sperm Donor?: Queer Kinship in Canadian Fertility Law, Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
(2013). 
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parents through online media and Facebook, most of whom were other lesbian couples. 
These tight networks pose particular problems for lesbians, trans men and queer people of 
colour, who have limited options in terms of semen donors:34 
“…the sperm supply is quite limited in Canada. There’s not tons of it … 
[especially] for people from other um like ethnic minorities ….  If you’re not 
looking for a white donor you have to look a little bit harder” (Carol,35 a bisexual 
woman who conceived a child with her lesbian partner using anonymous donor 
insemination; in their case, they had to go to the U.S. to find a donor who 
matched their ethnic background). 
 
Gay and bisexual men are also restricted by the ban on commercial transactions of donor ova, 
and, if pursuing gestational surrogacy, must first locate an altruistic donor willing to undergo the 
invasive process of egg extraction.36 While there are options for purchasing donor ova from the 
United States and elsewhere, these are expensive avenues that channel legal uncertainty around 
the permissibility of cross-border gamete purchase.37 Most of the gay men we interviewed felt 
that payments to egg donors and surrogates should be legal, though regulated, with additional 
legislation required to protect both ova donors and commissioning parents. 
 
Two: Known semen donors who are not sexual partners are viewed as anonymous third-
party donors 
Due to reasons such as cost, convenience, shared parenting arrangements and intentional 
kinship creation, some people prefer to carry out assisted conception with a known donor rather 
                                                 
34
Ibid.Also see: Ross, L.E., Steele, L., Epstein, R. (2006). Lesbian and bisexual women’s recommendations for 
improving the provision of assisted reproductive technology services. Fertility and Sterility, 86(3), 735-738. 
35All names have been changed.  
36 For an investigation of how Canadians are accessing donor ova and the attendant medical risks to donors, see 
Motluk A. (April 2010).The human egg trade. How Canada’s fertility laws are failing donors, doctors, and parents. 
TheWalrus,30-37. 
37 Susan Drummond (2013) “Fruitful Diversity: Revisiting the Enforceability of Gestational Carriage Contracts” 
Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 25. 
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than purchasing anonymous sperm from a sperm bank.38 For the purposes of the Semen 
Regulations, “assisted conception” refers to “a reproductive technique performed on a woman 
for the purpose of conception, using semen from a donor who is not her spouse or sexual 
partner.”39 This definition places all donor semen in the same category, meaning that an 
anonymous vial ordered online will be treated with the same dispassionate rigor as a donation 
from a brother-in-law, a childhood friend, or an intended father in a multi-parent arrangement.  
In practice, this means that known donor semen is subject to the same testing and 
quarantine requirements as anonymous donations. Even if a known donor has a clean bill of 
health and all parties agree to use a fresh specimen that has been tested and washed in the 
laboratory prior to insemination, the Semen Regulations prohibit the use of fresh sperm unless 
there has been a sexual relationship between the donor and the person being inseminated. 
Instead, the sperm sample must be frozen for a minimum of 180 days for infectious disease 
screening, with the donor’s blood extracted and tested both at the time of sample provision, and 
six months later when the semen is thawed and finally inseminated. This same routine must be 
replicated for any subsequent specimens the donor may produce.40 This is a costly and time-
consuming process that treats a known donor, who is often a close friend or member of a 
partner’s family, with the same epidemiological suspicion as an anonymous stranger.  
For example, I interviewed a female couple, Tonya and Jacqueline, who had decided to 
                                                 
38While Canadians cannot privately transact the purchase of human sperm under criminal penalty, they may 
purchase donor semen from licensed sperm banks. While this article will not explore the ethical hypocrisy of 
allowing payment for commercially-traded gametes from other legal jurisdictions, it does call into question the 
AHRA’s interdictions against payment for human reproductive material. This ban originates in the wording of the 
Baird Report, which stated:  “To allow commercial exchanges of this type [buying and selling embryos, use of 
financial incentives, etc.] would undermine respect for human life and dignity and lead to the commodification of 
women and children” supra note 18 at 718. 
39
Supra note 26, at s.1. Emphasis added. 
40Health Canada, Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate, Guidance on the Processing and Distribution of 
Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations (GUIDE-0041) (September 1, 2004). 
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avoid the clinic altogether after being faced with these protocols.41 Tonya was planning to be 
inseminated with Jacqueline’s brother’s sperm, in order to foster genetic alignment in their 
family and create a child that would resemble both of its mothers. The couple sought out the 
assistance of a local fertility clinic to help with the process and carry out standard testing for both 
Tonya and Jacqueline’s brother. However, once they encountered the six-month quarantine 
period and associated costs mandated by the Semen Regulations, they decided to carry out the 
whole process at home. As they described, while their initial preference was for the clinic to 
manage the collection of Jacqueline’s brother’s semen, the known donor fees and procedural 
hurdles proved a frustrating barrier: 
Jacqueline: I’m serious, like I’m still angry to this day about, about that clinic 
experience. Cause I think that a lot of people that are going in with known donors 
or friends, they virtually put a barrier up and it makes so that if you want an 
anonymous donor it’s already out of the price range but if you have a known 
donor or you want to co-parent or anything like this, it just makes the cost even 
more and for the average family it’s already expensive, so can you imagine what 
it does if they’re going to store this stuff for six months and do these extra 
procedures… financially [it] can be impossible for some families. 
 
Another female couple interviewed had also opted to use home insemination with a known 
donor. They explained that “a big part” of their decision to avoid the clinical system was due to 
the required freezing of third-party donor sperm. They were both in their mid-thirties and did not 
feel that they could afford the additional delay in moving forward with insemination. Instead, 
they wanted to begin trying for a child as soon as possible to fit their biological and professional 
timelines. Bev, one of the women, had the following to say about the Semen Regulations and its 
restrictions on third-party donors: “Trust women. Let them make decisions about their own 
bodies and their own safety rather than trying to impose safety standards that assume that women 
who are trying to get pregnant are incapable of rational decision-making.”  
                                                 
41 All participant names have been changed. 
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It is important to note that these regulations do allow women seeking insemination by a 
male sexual partner to bypass quarantine requirements. Women in opposite-sex relationships 
may use fresh semen from a conjugal partner without delay, thereby avoiding the six-month 
waiting period as well as fees associated with the storage of donated semen. Indeed, should a 
lesbian or bisexual woman walk into a fertility clinic and falsify a sexual relationship with her 
male companion, she can also request immediate insemination without the requirements of 
freezing or quarantine.42 Rachel Epstein, writing on behalf of the LGBTQ/AHRA Working 
Group, a collective of Toronto-based service providers and researchers concerned with issues of 
access to AHR services, put the matter of harm as follows:  
While we understand that the intent of this practice is to protect people from 
undetected risks, in fact there are no fewer risks in being inseminated with the 
sperm of someone one is having sex with, than there is being inseminated with the 
sperm of a known donor one has been inseminating with. The risks are the same. 
If one is willing to assume the risk of insemination from a sexual partner, one 
should also be able to assume the risks of insemination from a known donor. The 
situation outlined above has put people who are using known sperm donors in the 
position of lying when they approach fertility clinics. If they present their donors 
as sexual partners, they can access the services they require. If they tell the truth, 
they are denied. As well this means that in the case of a lesbian couple, the non-
birth parent is left out of the process, which results in undue hardship to her. She 
is left out of the very personal and significant process of her child’s conception.43 
 
In other words, a woman may assume the ‘risk’ of being inseminated by her sexual partner, but 
not the ‘risk’ of being inseminated by a loved one with whom she is not having intercourse. The 
Semen Regulations presume an anonymity and mistrust of the ‘stranger danger’ of contamination 
that is simply not the case with a known sperm donor. This is a definition crafted with cisgender, 
heterosexual couples firmly in mind, and one which is unable to account for the complex realities 
                                                 
42 Epstein, AHRA/LGBTQ Working Group supra note 3 at 6. 
43
Ibid at 7. There is also the related issue of custody, should a known donor choose to later claim legal parentage of 
the child. The documentation from a fertility clinic in which a known donor was masquerading as a sexual partner 
would have the known donor registered as “partner.” This may make it more difficult for the mother to prove intent 
in case of custodial challenge.   
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of LGBTQ kinship arrangements.  
Three: Gay men and HIV-positive men require Special Dispensation to be known donors 
and are barred entirely from anonymous semen donation 
The Semen Regulations also incorporate a document entitled the Technical Requirements 
for Therapeutic Donor Insemination [Directive],44 which excludes a comprehensive range of 
prospective donors determined to be in the ‘high-risk’ category or considered genetically unfit. 
These exclusions include men over 40 years of age and “men who have had sex with another 
man, even once, since 1977.”45  Thus, even when presenting with a known third-party donor and 
attempting in good faith to follow the dictates of the Semen Regulations, a lesbian will find her 
donor in the ‘high risk’ category and be prevented from readily using sperm if it is from a gay or 
bisexual friend. Yet our interviews indicate that many lesbians, bisexuals and trans men would 
like to use sperm from a cisgender male or trans woman46 friend, and in some cases this may 
even lay the groundwork for an intentional multi-parenting arrangement.47 
One lesbian couple we interviewed was prevented from using a known donor on the 
grounds that he was gay, and found themselves presented with confusing and contradictory 
information. At the clinic they were told that, as a gay man, their chosen donor would not be 
                                                 
44Health Canada, Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor Insemination (Ottawa: Canada, July 2000). 
45
Ibid. at ss. 2(1)(c). A challenge to the constitutionality of this policy in specific relation to blood donations by men 
who have since 1977 had sexual relations with other men was dismissed by an Ontario court in 2010, determining 
that the Charter did not apply as the respondent was a private rather than a governmental entity.  See Canadian 
Blood Services v. Freeman, 2010 ONSC 4885, 217 CRR (2d) 153. See also: infra note 54 on the latest position of 
Canadian Blood Services. 
46Trans woman: a male to female transsexual (MTF); someone who was assigned as male at birth and identifies as 
female. Trans man; a female to male transsexual (FTM); someone who was assigned as female at birth and identifies 
as male. While hormone replacement therapy and surgical treatments will lead to loss of reproductive potential in 
male to female transsexuals, if they have stored spermatozoa before starting hormonal therapy these gametes may be 
used in the future. See also: De Sutter, P. (2001). Gender reassignment and assisted reproduction: Present and future 
reproductive options for transsexual people. Human Reproduction, 16(4), 612-614. 
47
AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2, 83 OR (3d) 561is perhaps the most well-known Canadian example of a case in which a 
man was actively co-parenting with two lesbian women, wherein the court awarded joint parental rights to all three 
parties. See also: C.(M.A.) v. K.(M.), 2009 ONCJ 18, 94 OR (3d) 756 for a more contentious example, in which the 
parental rights of a lesbian couple were challenged by the gay man who was also the sperm donor.  
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eligible to donate: 
Justine: They [said we] would have to do a year quarantine, then that would include 
several samples throughout that year to be tested ....We actually had confided in one of 
the nurses that Rob [our known donor] was gay and they said that he they wouldn’t even 
been able [to do it]... His donation would not be taken at all. 
 
 
Frustrated by the extended quarantine period and complex regulations regarding gay men as 
donors, this couple eventually used an anonymous donor. Justine described their exasperation at 
the situation:  
Justine: I mean we wanted to use Rob. I mean that was our first choice and we weren’t 
able to… 
Interviewer: But the nurse was discouraging. 
Justine: Yeah, very discouraging in that sense. She said that they probably wouldn’t even 
test him ....  If they know. And it’s like, well what does it matter? What, I mean what does 
it? You’re testing for HIV anyway. Is it just a given because he’s gay he’s gonna have it? 
No. It’s I mean it’s a given that he’s gonna have sex with men, yes. … If you answer 
honestly as a gay man, yeah, you’re basically excluding yourself. Do you lie? I mean is 
that what we’ve come to now is that for Rob to be able to, you know, to donate he has to 
lie about who he is? I don’t think that’s right.  
 
As Epstein suggests, this equivocation between gay men and risky sexual practice is inaccurate, 
not to mention, “steeped in the homophobic and discriminatory view that ‘gay’ men are 
synonymous with HIV/AIDS.”48 
For a gay man who is excluded under the Directive’s criteria but wishes to donate there is 
recourse. After first testing negative for infectious diseases such as HIV and hepatitis, he may 
apply for special authorization from his doctor under the Donor Semen Special Access Program 
(DSSAP). If the DSSAP is granted, he may then undergo the six-month semen testing and 
quarantine period.  
In 2007, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruled on a challenge to the constitutionality 
                                                 
48 See  Epstein, AHRA/LGBTQ Working Group supra note 3 at 7. Sexual orientation is a term for the emotional, 
physical, romantic, sexual and spiritual attraction, desire or affection for another person (e.g., gay, straight, bisexual, 
lesbian), whereas sexual identity refers to one’s identification to self (and others) of one’s sexual orientation. Sexual 
identity is not always the same as sexual orientation and/or sexual behaviour (what people do sexually). 
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of the Semen Regulations. The lesbian applicants in Susan Doe v. Canada49 had argued that 
considerations such as conceptions of autonomy and community values played an important part 
in determining their reproductive choices, and the donor exclusion list posed a discriminatory 
barrier not experienced by heterosexual couples or donors. In the judgment, Dambrot J. 
maintained that the donor exclusions as listed did not discriminate against lesbian women or gay 
men. According to the Court, the scheme was based on differential treatment not sustained on 
prejudice, stereotyping or historical disadvantage. Using a classical liberal approach to the rights 
set forth in the Charter, Justice Dambrot concluded that any differential treatment was justified 
by the original intention of the regulations.50 As these regulations were predicated upon a 
protectionist health approach to reproductive matters, by which there is a necessity to protect the 
public from acquiring infectious diseases, the health protectionist argument overrules other 
considerations. This is despite the fact that health approaches to reproductive matters and HIV 
transmission have changed dramatically since the U.S. Centers for Disease Control first 
developed these guidelines in 1994.  
At time of writing, HIV-positive men are banned from anonymous third-party sperm 
donation. Surrogacy is also not currently an option in Canada for HIV-positive single men or 
HIV-positive men in a same-sex couple, despite a large body of evidence suggesting that 
reproductive technologies can allow HIV-affected men to safely conceive.51 Indeed, a 2007 
multicentre study on inseminations of women with HIV-positive semen reported that when using 
                                                 
49
Susan Doe v. Canada(Attorney General) (2006), 79 OR (3d) 586, 25 RFL (6th) 384 (SCJ), aff’d 2007 ONCA 11, 
84 OR (3d) 81. 
50 For an extended treatment of the case, see the unpublished LLM thesis ‘Doe v. Canada: Lesbian women, assisted 
conception, and a relational approach to rights’ by Sandra Dughman (University of Toronto, 2009). 
51According to recently-approved Canadian HIV Pregnancy Planning Guidelines, “as all fertility clinics should be 
operating using Canadian Standards Association procedures for universal precautions and infection control, there 
are no scientific grounds on which to refuse services to people living with HIV” Emphasis in original, Mona R. 
Loutfy et al., Canadian HIV Planning Pregnancy Guidelines, J Obstet Gynaecol Can, June 2012; 34(6):575-590 at 
587. 
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current sperm-washing technologies, “the calculated probability of HIV contamination is equal 
to zero.”52 The recommendation of the research team, based on this and other correlate studies, is 
that, “it is neither ethically nor legally justifiable to exclude individuals from infertility services 
on the basis of male HIV-infection.”53 
Advances in technology have minimized the risk of infectious disease transmission and 
ask that we revise the terms of protectionist arguments like Susan Doe v. Canada. In light of the 
onerous burden the Directive places upon gay and bisexual men and HIV-positive men, as well 
as the recipients of their donor sperm, we may ask what public interest is truly being served by 
continuing to uphold these outdated standards.54 
 
Four: The criminalization of commercial surrogacy 
While some heterosexual couples may seek out surrogacy options, gay men who desire to 
create a genetically-related family without the involvement of a female co-parent, will require 
the services of a reproductive surrogate, as may some bisexual and trans-identified couples and 
individuals.55 This places gay men in a situation of complex dependency and engagement with 
the bodies willing to bear their children. Our team’s research makes clear that Canada’s 
                                                 
52This was the first multicentre study of the use of sperm washing in HIV-1-serodiscordant couples, the largest 
series published to date, and the first with sufficient case numbers to confirm the safety and efficacy of assisted 
reproduction where sperm washing was used as the primary means of avoiding HIV infection in the female partner. 
Bujan L, Hollander L, Coudert M et al. Safety and efficacy of sperm washing in HIV-1-serodiscordant couples 
where the male is infected: results from the European CREATE Network. AIDS 2007; 21: 1909–1914 at 1909. Also 
see: James D.M. Nicopoullos, Paula Almeida, Maria Vourliotis, Rebecca Goulding, and Carole Gilling-Smith, A 
decade of sperm washing: clinical correlates of successful insemination outcome. Hum. Reprod. (2010) 25(8): 1869-
1876; Lynn T. Matthews and Joia S. Mukherjee. Strategies for Harm Reduction Among HIV-Affected Couples Who 
Want to Conceive. AIDS Behav. 2009;13:S5-S11.   
53
Ibid at 1913. 
54Canadian Blood Services has publicly acknowledged that these criteria may be outdated in regard to blood 
donation, and in a 2009 media statement on their website declared: “We openly recognize and empathize with those 
for whom the MSM [men who have sex with men] deferral policy has a negative impact… Canadian Blood Services 
has the will to work towards change to the MSM deferral policy.” Canadian Blood Services reaches out to affected 
MSM policy communities, July 30, 2009. <Accessed at http://www.bloodservices.ca> 
55 See supra note 23 on the multiplicities of embodiment and kinship formation within LGBTQ communities. 
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criminalization of commercial surrogacy has exerted a powerful impact on gay men hoping to 
create biologically-related children, as legislative hesitancy to address the bioethics of surrogacy 
has created uncertainty around allowable reimbursement for surrogate expenses.56 
Surrogacy refers to the practice whereby, through prior arrangement, a woman carries and 
gives birth to a child that she does not intend to parent.57 Instead, parenting responsibilities are 
assumed by the intended or ‘commissioning’ adults. Surrogacy may be either traditional, 
wherein a surrogate uses their own egg as fertilized by donor sperm, or gestational, in which the 
surrogate is implanted with an egg and sperm to which they have no genetic ties.58 
Two sections of the AHRA come to bear on surrogate transactions. Section 6 prohibits the 
payment or advertisement of payment to surrogate mothers or intermediaries, and places a 
minimum age restriction of 21 years on potential surrogates. The maximum criminal penalty for 
transgressing Section 6 is $500,000 and ten years imprisonment.59 Section 12 recognizes, 
however, that some reimbursement of expenditures is necessary on the part of surrogates (and 
gamete donors), and makes allowance for their limited compensation.60 This was one of the few 
sections of the AHRA to withstand constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court, and was 
                                                 
56 Eight years after the AHRA received Royal Assent, key sections of the Act that survived the constitutional 
challenge and remain intra vires are still not in force. See infra note 60 for Health Canada’s position on allowable 
expenses under s. 12. See also infra note 69 for a position that challenges the presumed exploitation and corrosive 
power dynamic of paid surrogacy arrangements. 
57Trans men may of course also act as surrogates, however we know of no such cases to-date. 
58 See supra note 22for a detailed description of different types of surrogacy. 
59To-date, no charges have been laid under Section 6 since it came into force in 2004. However a recent 
investigation of Leia Picard, CEO of Canadian Fertility Consultants, may indicate a renewed interest in 
enforcement. RCMP officers raided Picard’s offices in February 2012 and seized computer equipment and files, 
investigating alleged violations of Section 6’s prohibition against commercial payment for eggs, sperm and the 
services of a surrogate. See: Tom Blackwell, ‘Ontario fertility raid linked to U.S. ‘baby-selling’ scandal’, National 
Post, March 5, 2012. Accessed online August 3, 2012 < http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/03/05/ontario-fertility-
raid-linked-to-u-s-baby-selling-scandal>. 
60 Section 12 is not yet in force and Health Canada has not yet issued regulations. They have provided the following 
clarification into this regulatory vacuum: “Regulations regarding reimbursement are currently being developed to 
clarify what types of expenditures will be allowed and how the activity will be licensed. Until the licensing scheme 
and regulations are in place, donors may be reimbursed up to the actual amount of their legitimate expenditures 
without a licence.” Health Canada, Frequently Asked Questions, Accessed online August 3, 2012 <http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/reprod/hc-sc/faq/index-eng.php>. 
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deemed an important safeguard to public morality in the reasons of McLachlin C.J.; its 
constitutionality was subsequently affirmed by the swing vote of Cromwell J.61 
As Health Canada has not yet promulgated regulations for Section 12 the details of 
allowable compensation are uncertain. At this point, all that commissioning parents know is that 
receipts must be kept, and that a surrogate must not be reimbursed for the loss of work-related 
income incurred during her pregnancy unless “a qualified medical practitioner certifies, in 
writing, that continuing to work may pose a risk to her health or that of the embryo or foetus.”62 
Thus, a strictly altruistic system is being enforced in Canada, as surrogates are not legally 
entitled to claim remuneration beyond out-of-pocket expenses and may only be compensated for 
missing work if their health is at risk. 
But what kinds of expenses for reproductive labour may be compensated? Prenatal yoga 
classes? Childcare? Vitamins? Health Canada has taken the position that all ‘reasonable’ 
expenses incurred in the course of donation or surrogacy may be reimbursed, without actually 
defining what reasonable entails.63 This remains a confounding area of law, as indicated by our 
research participants: 
Interviewer: When you say mandating of payment, what do you mean? 
James: I think it should be better worded ‘cause ‘reimbursement for expenses’ for 
me was never very clear and I don’t think anybody really understands it. If it’s 
sort of the middle of the road before you say “Yes you can pay” or “No you can’t 
pay” if that’s the way it’s gonna have to be, it’s okay I guess but I-I don’t 
understand why they can’t make it clearer (A gay man, who with his partner, now 
                                                 
61In regard to the validity of impugned provisions of the AHRA in upholding the criminal law power and protecting 
public morality, McLachlin C.J. reasoned as follows: “In summary, morality constitutes a valid criminal law 
purpose.  The role of the courts is to ensure that such a criminal law in pith and substance relates to conduct that 
Parliament views as contrary to our central moral precepts, and that there is a consensus in society that the regulated 
activity engages a moral concern of fundamental importance.” (supra note 1 at para 51). The Chief Justice also drew 
specific attention to the role of s.12 in preventing Canadian morality from ‘crossing the line’ into commercialized 
reproductive activities: “This [s.12] is the line that prohibits that which is considered inappropriate commodification, 
and permits that which is considered acceptable reimbursement. Threat of drawing this line raises fundamental 
moral questions.” [emphasis added] (supra note 1 at para 111.)  
62
AHRA s.12, ss. 1-3, quoting s. 12(3)(b). 
63Sherry Levitan, ‘Surrogacy in Canada’, Accessed June 23, 2012 <http://www.fertilitylaw.ca/surrogacy.shtml>. 
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has two children via anonymous egg donor and gestational surrogate). 
 
At present, only the intended parents may reimburse a surrogate for expenses. They are left to 
their own devices in determining the ‘reasonableness’ of expenditures in accordance with 
contracts between the parties. In practice, this is generally done in consultation with a lawyer, 
who is an intermediary third party that may be paid for their services in helping negotiate the 
surrogate contract, despite regulatory uncertainty around acceptable contractual boundaries.64 
Other third parties who may receive compensation currently include fertility physicians, gamete 
banks and pharmaceutical companies, although none are allowed to help connect potential 
surrogates and parents. Sally Rhodes-Heinrich, who helms the popular website Surrogacy in 
Canada, warns about this ban on intermediaries: “I think you will see more disasters and 
tragedies in surrogacy if you don’t have people who do some preliminary screening, people who 
are educating and providing support.”65 
This selective approach to compensated support and professional advice is not only 
paternalistic, but privileges an educated class of practitioners – doctors, lawyers and 
pharmaceutical firms – over the actual surrogates being commissioned. One’s legal counsel may 
be remunerated for their labour, but not the surrogate at the center of the transaction. Concerns 
over the commercialization of trade in reproductive labour have represented a central thrust of 
the AHRA since its inception in the Baird Report.66 Arguments over the moral validity of 
                                                 
64 With regard to the promulgation of regulations under Section 12, Toronto lawyer Sherry Levitan writes, “It’s been 
eight years, and I don’t expect to see them in my lifetime…All I can do is lay it out for a client, and they can tell me 
where their comfort level is.” In Michael McKiernan, ‘Fertility lawyers press ahead despite legal vacuum’, July 09, 
2012,Law Times,http://lawtimesnews.com/Focus-On/Focus-On-Fertility-lawyers-press-ahead-despite-legal-vacuum 
65Tom Blackwell, ‘Canada’s murky legal world of surrogate-consultants and human-egg buyers’, March 9, 2012, 
National Post. Accessed August 3, 2012 online:http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/03/09/canadas-murky-legal-
world-of-surrogate-consultants-and-human-egg-buyers/   
66 As Maneesha Deckha argues convincingly, anxiety over a potential marketplace of human commodities is one of 
the two central factors that have propelled the AHRA. The other is what she terms “species anxiety”, or “the phobia 
that individuals manifest at the thought of the human body intermingling with another species at the reproductive, 
genetic, cellular, or other body part level.” In Deckha, M. (2009).Holding Onto Humanity: Commodification and 
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commercial surrogacy have raged for decades, only growing more complicated in recent years 
with the globalization of reproductive surrogate markets into locations such as India, Thailand 
and Eastern Europe.67 
While some feminist commentators have argued that practices such as commercial 
surrogacy serve to embody and institutionalize the patriarchal domination of women, others have 
sought to understand surrogacy within terms of women’s agency and the difficulties of 
contractual decision-making.68  These are complex issues as surrogacy arrangements differ 
significantly depending on geographic, economic and social conditions.  
Drawing from a meta-analysis of research on surrogacy in Canada, the United States and 
the United Kingdom, a 2010 study by Karen Busby and Delaney Vun interrogates the assumed 
power differentials of surrogacy and presumptions of exploitation.69 As they report, “empirical 
research concerning women who become surrogate mothers in Britain and the United States does 
not support concerns that they are being exploited by these arrangements, that they cannot give 
                                                                                                                                                             
Species Anxiety in Canada's Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Unbound: Harvard Journal of the Legal Left, 5(1), 
21-54 at 22.  
67 For discussions of reproductive tourism and the bioethical and feminist issues at play within the globalization of 
commercial surrogacy, see: Blyth E, Farrand A. 2005. Reproductive tourism—a price worth paying for reproductive 
autonomy? Crit. Soc. Policy 25:91–114; Jones CA, Keith LG. 2006. Medical tourism and reproductive outsourcing: 
the dawning of a new paradigm for healthcare. Int. J. Fertil. 51:1-5; Storrow RF. 2005. Quest for conception: 
fertility tourists, globalization and feminist legal theory. Hastings Law J. 57:295–330; Storrow RF. 2005. The 
Handmaid’s Tale of fertility tourism: passports and third parties in the religious regulation of assisted conception. 
Tex. Wesleyan Law Rev. 12:189-211.  
68 For examples of the radical feminist view, see: Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies 
from Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs (New York: Harper & Row, 1985); Janice Raymond, Women as 
Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle over Women's Freedom (New York: Harper, 1993); Jocelyn Scutt, 
ed., The Baby Machine: Reproductive Technology and the Commercialisation of Motherhood (London: Merlin, 
1990). For commentators that argue for more nuanced views of women’s autonomy and choice, see: Rosalind 
Petchesky, “Reproductive Freedom: Beyond ‘A Woman's Right to Choose’,” Signs 5.4 (1980): 661-685; Judith 
Lorber, “Choice, Gift, or Patriarchal Bargain? Women's Consent to in vitro Fertilization in Male Infertility,” Hypatia 
4.3 (1989): 23-36; Marilyn Strathern, Reproducing the Future: Anthropology, Kinship and the New Reproductive 
Technologies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992);Sarah Franklin, Embodied Progress: A Cultural 
Account of Assisted Conception (London: Routledge, 1997). 
69Busby, Karen & Delaney Vun, “Revisiting the Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on 
Surrogate Mothers, 26 Can. J. Fam. L. 13 (2010). 
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meaningful consent to participating, or that the arrangements commodify women or children.”70 
Instead, Busby and Vun call for a more nuanced legal regime to ensure that women who enter 
into altruistic or paid surrogacy contracts will receive the full protection of the law.71 
By the same token, Toronto lawyer Sara Cohen poses the following question on her 
website: “If women obtain medical advice, independent legal advice and psychological 
counselling and choose to engage in surrogacy or egg donation, why should the state protect 
them from themselves when they do not need or want protecting?”72 Indeed, a number of the gay 
male couples we interviewed commented on the perceived independence of their surrogates, 
while also lamenting the lack of guidance around how to navigate this complex social 
experience. 
“‘Should we buy her something nice?’ You know what I mean? You don’t know 
what to do; it’s like unchartered territory” (Paul, a gay man, who with his male 
partner, are in the process of having a child via anonymous egg donor and 
gestational surrogate).  
 
What is clear is that Canadian laws prohibiting commercial surrogacy are having a real and 
disproportionate effect on LGBTQ people, and are developing without consideration of the 
reproductive dilemma faced by gay men in particular. The indeterminacy of guidelines for 
reimbursement has not halted the practice, but has piled on greater anxiety to an already fraught 
and emotional process.  
Brad: “…I think the whole ambiguity of the process scares people. I think even 
being in the process you kind of feel like you’re doing something wrong …. I 
think if it’s very clear then people will know that it is legal and you’re paying 
someone to, you know, help you with your… 
James: Have your child.  
                                                 
70
Ibid at 46.This is substantiated by other studies carried out in English-speaking countries, including Bree Kessler’s 
estimation that military wives accounted for 50% of gestational surrogate carriers at clinics in Texas and California 
in 2008. Kessler, Bree. “Recruiting Wombs: Surrogates as the New Security Moms.” Women’s Studies Quarterly. 
2009 (37: 1&2): 167-182 
71
Ibid. at 55. 
72 Sara Cohen, ‘Dear Margaret, it’s me, Sara’, Fertility Law Canada, April 5, 2012, 
<http://www.fertilitylawcanada.com/1/post/2012/04/dear-margaret-its-me-sara.html> 
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Brad: Because I still have people saying to me: ‘Ooh isn’t that illegal?’” (A gay 
man, who with his male partner, has two children via anonymous egg donor and 
gestational surrogate). 
 
Recent research indicates that paid surrogacy is still occurring; it has merely been driven 
underground.73 While broad empirical data is scarce, it appears that after the AHRA criminalized 
the domestic practice of commercial surrogacy, people simply turned online to locate surrogates 
– many of whom are located in the U.S., where paid surrogacy is legal.74 
“… people were putting up information—‘I’m ready to be a surrogate’ or ‘I’d 
like to be a surrogate’ or ‘Are you looking for eggs?’ or whatever. So there were 
certain sites that I would go and visit and click on certain areas and email people 
and have information. The majority of them were in America though…” (Brad, a 
gay man, who with his male partner, now has two children via anonymous egg 
donor and gestational surrogate). 
 
For the time being, the uncertainty of Section 12 may actually be of benefit as it allows 
surrogates to be compensated within a broadly defined ‘gray area.’ However this indeterminacy 
also contains its own stresses, and relies upon the hypocrisy of allowing some industries and 
professionals to benefit financially from surrogate arrangements, while others can not. If and 
when Section 12 regulations are promulgated, I believe it is of paramount importance that 
LGBTQ people’s concerns and the voices of actual Canadian surrogates be taken directly into 
account.75 
 
                                                 
73 CBC News Online – ‘Paid surrogacy driven underground in Canada: CBC report.’ Wednesday, May 2, 2007 | 
Accessed at http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2007/05/01/surrogates-pay.html; Shireen Kashmeri, Unraveling 
Surrogacy in Ontario, Canada: An Ethnographic Inquiry on the Influence of Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act (2004), Surrogacy Contracts, Parentage Laws, and Gay Fatherhood. Unpublished MA thesis (Concordia 
University, 2008).  
74 There are a large number of online resources designed to connect surrogates with intended parents, many of which 
specifically target Canadians. While none of the following websites explicitly detail the illegal fees one may be 
expected to pay when hiring a surrogate, many of the forums and classified ads do discuss the transfer of payment. 
To list just a few: Surrogate Mother (http://www.surrogatemother.com/), Surromoms Online Classifieds 
(http://www.surromomsonline.com/classifieds/index.htm), Canadian Surrogacy Options 
(http://www.canadiansurrogacyoptions.com/), Invitro Fertilization New Jersey (http://www.ivfnj.com/html/can-
patients.html), Circle Surrogacy Online (http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/index.php/en?lang=gb-en), Surrogacy in 
Canada Online (http://surrogacy.ca/). See also Motluk supra note 36. 
75 Cf. the AHRA/LGBTQ Working Group submission to Health Canada at supra note 3. 
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Five: Legislative uncertainty impacts access to service at fertility clinics 
At present, there is no consistency of formal qualifications for health professionals 
performing controlled AHR activities as laid out in the AHRA.76 Nor is there a consistent 
standard of practice to which clinics are held – either federally or provincially. There is no 
mandatory license or accreditation required for private fertility clinics, and in the absence of 
binding clinical practice guidelines for the provision of reproductive care, it is left to individual 
clinics or practitioners to set their own fees and standards.77 As the Ontario Expert Panel on 
Infertility and Adoption concluded in 2009, “Without mandatory provincial accreditation, there 
are no common provincial standards for clinic operations, the services they should offer nor the 
prices that clinics should charge for their services.”78 
However while fertility clinics are largely self-regulated, medical practitioners such as 
reproductive endocrinologists, nurses, and other health professionals are members of regulated 
professions and required to meet the standards of practice set out by their regulatory colleges. 
Fertility counselors represent an important exception to this rule, as there is no agreement among 
those in the field concerning the minimum qualifications necessary to provide appropriate AHR 
counseling services.79 
While there have been attempts made to develop national standards for fertility practice, 
                                                 
76As detailed in the Guidelines for Qualification and Responsibilities for Each Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Laboratory Professional Position in Canada, prepared by a committee of the Canadian Fertility and Andrology 
Society [CFAS]. While organizations like CFAS are working to develop standardized guidelines for mandatory 
application across Canada, this has not yet been implemented.  
77 While national accreditation for assisted reproductive technology does exist in Canada (see infra note 82), it is not 
mandatory. Suggested clinical practice guidelines for reproductive endocrinology and infertility have been advanced 
by the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada, but as of writing these are not binding in any 
province or territory. See: http://www.sogc.org/guidelines/index_e.asp#REI 
78
Raising Expectations: Recommendations of the Expert Panel on Infertility and Adoption, Ontario Ministry of 
Children and Youth Services, (Toronto, Ontario: Summer 2009) at 100. 
79Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society, Assisted Human Reproduction Counselling Practice Guidelines, 
December 2009. Accessed online: 
http://www.cfas.ca/images/stories/pdf/csig_counselling_practiceguidelines__december_2009_.pdf 
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the AHRA ruling has made it virtually impossible for binding regulations to be promulgated at a 
national level.80 The bulk of controlled activities regulated under the AHRA are now contained 
under the provincial power in matters of health, although provisions outlining consent to use and 
allowable compensation for gamete donors and surrogates are still validly enacted at the national 
level.81 Clinics may choose to be accredited by Accreditation Canada,82 but “the clinics and 
physicians’ offices that provide assisted reproduction services are not required to be accredited 
and information about their practices and success rates is not easily available.”83 
In the absence of definitive standards for fertility clinics, the Canadian Fertility and 
Andrology Society [CFAS] has developed clinical practice guidelines for physicians as well as 
guidelines and standards for certification for other fertility-related service providers such as 
counselors. While LGBTQ people’s perspectives are beginning to find small purchase in CFAS, 
their draft clinical practice guidelines do not account for any breadth of experience or 
embodiment; instead lesbian couples (the only mention of LGBTQ people), when present, are 
compared solely against a heterosexual norm. For example, while the CFAS guidelines on 
Assisted Human Reproduction Counselling Practice do refer specifically to lesbians and single 
women, the text quickly reassures that lesbians “do not differ from heterosexuals in their 
                                                 
80Constitutional expert Peter Hogg made this remark during a conference held at the University of Toronto, 
“Reference Re Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision,” November 4-5, 
2011, University of Toronto. 
81 Under Section 92(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867 the provincial level of government is granted exclusive 
authority over the “establishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals, asylums, charities, and eleemosynary 
institutions in and for the province, other than marine hospitals”. In practical terms, the awards the majority of 
legislative power in the area of health care to the provinces. The AHRA Reference decision has maintained Section 8 
and s. 12 intra vires the federal government. 
82 Accreditation Canada is a national organization that helps health service organizations to improve the quality of 
care and service they provide to their clients. They have developed ‘Qmentum’ standards at a system-wide level for 
Leadership for Assisted Reproductive Technology, and service excellence standards in the following three areas: 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Standards for Clinical Services; Assisted Reproductive Technology Standards for 
Laboratory Services and Assisted Reproductive Technology Standards for Working with Third Party Donors. None 
of these standards are publically available without fee. 
83
Supra note 78at 96. This is not to suggest that no standards are in place. Health Canada regularly inspects the 
offices and clinics of all physicians who are distributors of semen. Physicians are required to meet certain minimum 
requirements in terms of documentation of compliance with the technical specifications. 
Stu Marvel – Attachment One - Chapter for Publication in University of Toronto Anthology 
 
414 
 
parenting skills.”84 While the intention is surely one of comfort to the (presumptively) 
heterosexual reader, once again this discourse revolves around a conceptual model that presumes 
a heterosexual couple as the exemplary AHR clientele. The CFAS guidelines also fail to include 
any discussion of gay men, bisexuals or trans people. 
Although I do not intend to stake a claim here for the exceptional character of lesbian 
parenting, it is important to note that even well-meaning reassurances serve to mask substantial 
differences between heterosexual and LGBTQ AHR clients. These differences begin at the 
clinic’s front door. In contrast to cisgender, heterosexual couples, who tend not to solicit fertility 
services until a problem is discovered, LGBTQ prospective parents generally seek out clinical 
advice quite early in their journey to conceive. Yet despite the large numbers of LGBTQ people 
now utilizing fertility clinics, the overwhelming presumption for new clients is that a 
reproductive pathology is present. Clinics structured around the heterosexual model of fertility 
are geared at alleviating ‘infertility’85 in conjugal partners, and often mandate a series of 
intrusive, sometimes painful and laborious diagnostic testing before service provision can even 
begin.86 One of our research participants put it this way: 
I think not having access to sperm is a really different thing than trying to get 
pregnant with sperm and having trouble, right … the idea that queerness in and of 
itself, like being a lesbian in and of itself is a fertility problem is ridiculous and 
the fact that people are kind of going through the same measures as folks who 
have tried less in invasive ways to get pregnant… I think it needs a whole re-think 
in order for it to really make sense to everybody who is accessing it [AHR 
                                                 
84Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society, Counselling Special Interest Group, Assisted Human Reproduction 
Counselling Practice Guidelines, (December 2009) at 11. 
85 In a recently published glossary of AHR terms, Zegers-Hochschild et al. define “infertility (clinical definition) [as] 
a disease of the reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 months or more 
of regular unprotected sexual intercourse”. In ‘The International Committee for Monitoring Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ICMART) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Revised Glossary on ART Terminology’. 
Fertility and Sterility, 92(5), November 2009 1520 at 1522.This standard, heterosexist definition cannot account for 
many forms of sexual behaviour among LGBTQ people, which may be regular and unprotected but will never result 
in a pregnancy. When this model of infertility is in play, LGBTQ people fall out of the diagnostic system. 
86As there are no standard practices across fertility clinics in Canada (or even across a single province) each clinic 
will differ on what it determines to be mandatory testing.  
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services]” (Miriam, a single queer woman who ultimately avoided AHR services 
and conceived outside of the clinic with known donor sperm, emphasis added). 
 
There are also gate-keeping and bureaucratic elements that hamper LGBTQ people from 
carrying out their reproductive intentions. For instance, Epstein and colleagues note that: 
In very recent history some Canadian fertility clinics required psychiatric 
assessment of lesbians before they were granted access to donor insemination 
services. We also know of at least one Toronto physician who required lesbians 
requesting access to donor insemination to write a “letter to the doctor” in order to 
convince him that they should be granted access to services. Other clinics and 
physicians simply denied access to lesbians and single women.87 
 
Sadly, trans people are now, in some instances, facing similar gatekeeping decisions with regards 
to their access to AHR services, and are having to debunk arguments about their rights and 
abilities to parent.88 
  Further, many of the ‘Creating Our Families’ study participants noted that fertility clinic 
intake forms did not account for their particular identities and family configurations, nor did the 
clinic environment include representations of their identities and families. The presumptions of 
heterosexuality and infertility saturate the clinic, placing cultural as well as substantive barriers 
in the path of LGBTQ people seeking AHR services.89As national guidelines for AHR clinicians, 
nurses and counselors are being produced, it is vital that LGBTQ voices are part of the 
discussion. Increased cultural competency and sharpened awareness of the specificity of LGBTQ 
people’s needs are badly needed at this critical juncture of legislative development. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
87Epstein, supra note 3 at 3. 
88 See for example William Buckett, Infertility Treatment for Non-Traditional Families, Fall 2011, Infertility 
Awareness Association of Canada. Acessed at: http://www.iaac.ca/content/infertility-treatment-non-traditional-
families-william-buckett-md-mrcog-fall-2011 
89For a more detailed discussion of the barriers that LGBTQ people commonly experience when accessing AHR 
services, as well as recommendations to counter such barriers, cf.: L.E., Steele, L., Epstein, R. (2006). Lesbian and 
bisexual women’s recommendations for improving the provision of assisted reproductive technology services. 
Fertility and Sterility, 86(3), 735-738; Also see supra note 3. 
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The AHRA Reference decision has left Canadians with more uncertainty than clarity. 
What has not changed, however, is the sidelining of LGBTQ people in how AHR services are 
being legislated and regulated. LGBTQ people now comprise a significant proportion of fertility 
clinic client traffic, and the numbers are only poised to grow. Outdated understandings of 
‘infertility,’ discriminatory treatment of known sperm donors, limited sperm reserves, 
misinformation about the ‘risk’ of HIV-positive sperm donors, and vague and poorly-defined 
commodification concerns in relation to surrogacy must be revised to conform with 
contemporary realities. These are dusty approaches based on outdated science, limited empirical 
data and discriminatory assumptions. 
This chapter has explored the many ‘grey areas’ that plague Canadian legislation 
concerning access to reproductive material, services and facilities. The standards of clinical 
practice that exist are based on the dyadic cisgender, heterosexual family norm. As queer 
intentional parenting arrangements move farther from the normative ideal, they find themselves 
in ever more precarious and uncertain territory.  
Despite explicit reference in the preamble of the AHRA to the importance of preventing 
discrimination “including on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status” our team’s 
research has shown that LGBTQ people seeking AHR services are not being adequately served 
by the present legal regime. This chapter has highlighted five areas of law that require immediate 
and comprehensive attention in order to guarantee equitable access to AHR services for LGBTQ 
people. While our team’s research has begun to explore these issues and is the first study of its 
kind to include the voices of GBQ men and trans people, this analysis will be broadened and 
enriched by accounts from of a greater number of gay men and trans people, as well as by those 
from low-income and racialized people, single parents, surrogates, donors and their families, 
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people living with disabilities and First Nations people seeking AHR. Until these voices are 
heard, many residents of Canada who rely on AHR will continue to wade through a regulatory 
regime inappropriately designed for the normative white, cisgender, financially-resourced 
heterosexual couple. Despite Charter-backed guarantees of equality and access, judicial 
decisions such as the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act have been unable to 
account for the cultural specificity and community values of LGBTQ people in Canada. A re-
evaluation of reproductive values is required as we move forward to ensure equitable access to 
AHR services for all those in Canada who wish to become parents.  
Stu Marvel – Attachment Two - Chapter Published in Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
418 
 
ATTACHMENT TWO 
Semen Donation and Lesbian Motherhood 
Introduction 
This paper expands on Attachment One with a focus on the Canadian legal regime of 
anonymous sperm donation for the purposes of assisted human reproduction. It remains 
attentive to the impact of this regime on LGBTQ people, as a population uniquely reliant upon 
reproductive technologies to have biologically-related children. This paper also utilizes 
empirical data to track multiple gaps in Canada’s current legal structure, and explores how the 
use of donor gametes is impacting fundamental notions of kinship, community and lateral 
relation.  
As I will argue, pressing regulatory issues exist regarding access to donor sperm, many 
of which exert a pronounced impact on LGBTQ families. I will provide a brief background to 
current law and policy, building off the accompanying dissertation, and use empirical data to 
flesh out a series of interlocking concerns. Attention will be paid to the question of setting 
enforceable limits on the number of children which may be produced from any single donor, and 
the need to track donor information through both federal and international registries. I will then 
use the central thread of a case study from the Creating Our Families research project to 
illustrate the ways in which a lesbian couple has navigated these regulatory gaps. The 
experience of these women – who used a donor they jokingly chose because of his resemblance 
to 1980s television star Tony Danza1 - will help to clarify some of the specific concerns 
affecting queer parenting communities across North America. I will situate these findings within 
                                            
1 In keeping with the privacy protection of all participants in the study, I have also changed the name of the actor to 
whom the women referred.  
Stu Marvel – Attachment Two - Chapter Published in Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
419 
 
the framework of Canadian AHR law and current clinical practice. Finally, I will highlight the 
new kinship potentials which may emerge for LGBTQ and heterosexual families alike, and 
suggest a variety of recommendations for future policy development. 
Background to Canadian Law on Assisted Reproduction  
The Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
The history of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act is covered in Chapters Five and Six 
of my dissertation, as well as the confusion caused by s. 12. As may be recalled, this was one of 
the few parts of the AHRA to withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court reference decision, as 
the section which controls the reimbursement of expenditures incurred by donors and surrogate 
mothers based on the criminal prohibitions laid out in ss.6 and 7 of the Act.2 While section 12 
mandates a tough criminal penalty for the payment of human eggs or sperm and commercial 
surrogate arrangements, including a maximum fine of up to $500,000 and ten years in jail, this 
section has never been proclaimed into force nor have any regulations been promulgated.  
Although the federal agency charged with enforcing the AHRA's provisions long 
wallowed in a state of bureaucratic inertia, and has now been abolished altogether, the severity 
of the punishment has been sufficient to exert a dampening effect on Canada's domestic supply 
of third-party gametes.3 While this paper will focus on the impact of federal regulations on 
donor sperm, it is important to keep in mind that payment for ova donors and surrogacy 
arrangements also face criminalization in Canada.4 
                                            
2 Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA]. 
3 The fear of criminal penalty has been enough to bring clinics across the country into line with the new guidelines. I 
will explore in detail the waning supply for domestic sperm in Canada and the multiple pieces of Health Canada 
legislation that have discouraged local donors and banks. For the impact on egg donors in particular see: Alison 
Motluk, “The Human Egg Trade: How Canada's fertility laws are failing donors, doctors, and parents”, The Walrus 
(April 2010) 30. 
4 See for example the 2013 conviction of Leia Picard for arranging surrogacy contracts and payment to Canadian 
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Semen Regulations and Directives 
Federal legislation around sperm donation involves a high standard of testing. Potential 
sperm donors must satisfy stringent screening criteria, and semen samples are subject to strict 
serological and microbiological testing.5 This began in 1996, when Health Canada issued 
regulations mandating a range of standard health requirements for the processing and 
distributing of semen used in assisted conception [Semen Regulations].6 Four years later, the 
Semen Regulations were tightened after a woman undergoing donor sperm insemination became 
infected with Chlamydia trachomatis.7 The revised policy, however, proved too onerous for 
most clinics to manage: Before 2000, Canada had more than one hundred clinics across the 
country distributing or collecting sperm; once the stricter regulations were advanced, most 
clinics found it impossible to comply and simply dropped out of sperm collection. Those that 
did remain soon struggled to recruit altruistic donors in the wake of the criminal penalties 
outlined by s.7 in 2004, and the number of domestic sperm banks flatlined.8 
At the time of research, Canadians had access to just three Health Canada accredited 
sperm banks. Of these, two import sperm from abroad and only one collects sperm from 
Canadian men for national distribution.9 The combined force of the Semen Regulations, 
Directive and AHRA has throttled the supply of domestic sperm for AHR, and obliged most 
                                                                                                                                             
surrogates. 
5 Haimant Bissessar, Altruism By Law, Infertility Awareness Association of Canada, Summer 2005. 
<http://www.iaac.ca/en/117-835-altruism-by-law> 
6As was argued in Chapter Five, the strict processing requirements may be seen as a result of recommendations 
made by the RCNRT after speaking with grassroots women’s networks providing access to fresh sperm, as well as 
the HIV crisis and concerns for its impact within (in particular) lesbian communities. 
7 Health Canada, Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor Insemination (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2000) 
[Directive]. 
8 Infra note 14. 
9 While there are two Canadian sperm banks that collect semen domestically, only ReproMed provides commercial 
access to donor sperm on a national level. The other bank, Procrea, is located in Montréal and has a limited number 
of donors available locally. Infra note 23.  
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Canadians to look abroad for donors. Yet even this is not always straightforward. As Canada's 
sperm regulations are stricter than those enacted within many other jurisdictions, limits are 
placed upon the specimens Canadians may import across the border.10 (This issue will be 
discussed below in reference to the scarcity of donors of colour.) As of the writing of this piece, 
there were 53 available Canadian donors from a population of approximately 34 million people, 
up slightly from 35 donors at approximately the time of research.11  
Simply put, the unpaid rigour of screening and specimen banking has presented a barrier 
to most prospective donors. The following describes the donor screening process at the nation’s 
lone remaining sperm bank, ReproMed. Housed in a fertility clinic near Toronto, ReproMed is 
carefully compliant with the AHRA, Semen Regulations and the Directive, meaning that all 
potential donors must undergo the following: 
On their first visit to the clinic, men must provide detailed answers about their lifestyle, 
sexual behaviour and family history reaching back three generations. They must sign a release 
of information form to their personal medical files, and a consent form releasing all rights 
regarding the disposal and results of insemination. They must then pass a personal interview to 
                                            
10 As reported by the Sperm Bank of California, a large semen distributor located in Berkeley, California: “Shipping 
semen samples to Canada is restricted because Health Canada has instituted strict regulations on donor testing that 
are not tenable for most US sperm banks to follow. However, we are able to sell sperm to recipients in Canada if 
they register with a US medical professional, cross the border to receive shipments and inseminate in the US.” 
“Shipments and Pick Ups” The Sperm Bank of California, Reproductive Technologies, Inc. 
<http://www.thespermbankofca.org/content/shipments-and-pick-ups>. 
11 Note that this number emerges from popular not scientific media. The article was written by Toronto journalist 
Danielle Groen who investigated the status of ReproMed as Canada's last domestic sperm bank. Groen interviewed a 
number of clinical practitioners including the medical director of ReproMed, Dr. Alfonso Del Valle, who offered the 
following statement: “Before these laws came into place, we would have 100 donors at any given time...As it stands 
now, we must scramble to have 30 or 35 donors active.” Groen also interviewed Samantha Yee, a social worker at 
Mount Sinai’s Centre for Fertility and Reproductive Health, who corroborated this scarcity by remarking: “People 
are very surprised at how few donors there are in the Canadian catalogue.” As of the time of writing this article is 
hosted on the ReproMed website, offering strength to the quotations and data gathered therein. See: Danielle Groen, 
“Down for the Count: There are Only 35 Sperm Donors Left in all of Canada. Holy Mama, We’ve Got a Problem”, 
The Grid (19 May 2011) <http://www.thegridto.com/city/local-news/down-for-the-count/>. 
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determine motivations for donation and provide a semen specimen. They must not have 
ejaculated for a minimum of three days and maximum of five days before providing this sample, 
marking a mandatory abstinence period that will be standard for all collections. A week later the 
men must return to the clinic to provide a second specimen and have blood drawn to conduct 
serology/virology screening. The third weekly appointment involves the provision of another 
semen specimen. During the fourth appointment, after providing the requisite specimen, the 
donor must undergo extensive physical exams with the Medical Director, who will also review 
the previous blood and semen samples for infectious and genetic disease.12 Only at this point 
does a donor learn if he is actually eligible to participate in the program, on the merit of an 
appropriately risk-free medical, social and genetic history. 
Those men who are accepted must agree to provide a weekly semen specimen at 
ReproMed's Mississauga premises on the western edge of Toronto, always maintaining 
abstinence for at least three days before the appointment and for no more than five days. They 
must have a blood specimen drawn every thirty days, and are asked to complete a Kiersey 
Temperament Report and provide social data about hobbies, skills, education, and interests, as 
well as providing childhood photographs. In some cases they may be asked to write essays and 
record sound files about themselves, with the intent of providing consumers with information 
about their physical features, family history, educational history, skills & abilities, preferences, 
personality traits, anatomical features, and medical history.13 A laudable goal, yet all 
                                            
12
Ibid. 
13 ReproMed does not use a staggered pricing scheme or minimum height and education, but this is not the case with 
most U.S. sperm banks. For example Fairfax Cryobank, headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia, has offered a "doctorate 
program" which provides sperm from donors who have doctoral degrees or are pursuing them. Medicine, dentistry, 
pharmacy, optometry, law, and chiropractic all count as premium “doctorate” sperm, with an appropriately high 
price tag. David Plotz, “The Genius Factory”, Slate (7 June 2005) 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/life/seed/2005/06/the_genius_factory.html>. See also: Haimant Bissessar, Donor 
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requirements must be fulfilled altruistically under present Canadian law. Donors may only be 
reimbursed a small fee for their trouble. ReproMed, however, applies a price tag of nearly $700 
per vial of washed sperm. Perhaps unsurprisingly, donor recruitment numbers are low. 
In a 2008 study, ReproMed confirmed that of 301 men who contacted the bank in 
response to an advertisement seeking donors, only three were determined to be eligible 
according to medical, social and genetic standards (set by the Semen Regulations and Directive); 
and of those only one man was willing to donate without compensation (as dictated by ss. 7 and 
12).14 This represents a fractional 0.3% recruitment rate, as compared to recruitment rates 
between 60% and 70% in France over a 15-year period (1980–1995) and 20% to 30% in the 
UK.15 The confluence of Health Canada regulations, extensive social data collection and the 
criminalization of compensation for gamete donation has had a chilling effect on Canadian 
sperm donation, resulting in a contracted local market that depends heavily upon the import of 
sperm from abroad.16 It has been estimated that a full 95% of the donor semen now being used 
in Canada is international, shipped in either through national distributors or by ReproMed 
itself.17 While this phenomenon affects all Canadians seeking donor sperm it is exerting a 
disproportionate effect on LGBTQ prospective parents. 
                                                                                                                                             
Sperm: Why the High Cost and Low Supply?, Infertility Awareness Association of Canada, Fall 2010 
http://www.iaac.ca/en/515-405-donor-sperm-why-the-high-cost-and-low-supply-by-haimant-bissessar-fall-2010> 
14 Alfonso P. Del Valle et al., “Anonymous semen donor recruitment without reimbursement in Canada” (2008) 17 
Supplement 1 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 15. 
15 Ibid. 
16 To clarify this point: Canadians may go abroad to utilize donor sperm outside the reach of Health Canada 
regulations, but when importing sperm into Canada all domestic standards must be met.  
17
 Rosanna Hertz and Jane Mattes, “Donor-Shared Siblings or Genetic Strangers: New Families, Clans, and the 
Internet” (2011) 32:9 Journal of Family Issues 1129. Note this number was produced in popular not scientific media. 
I have seen estimates ranging from 80-95%, although those articles which come in on the lower end tend to be 
riddled with factual errors. Given its national publication I have opted to go with Blackwell's estimate, supra note 
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Case Study: Tony Danza and the Lesbian Mothers of Facebook 
To understand how this legislative tangle impacts queer parents, it will be helpful to turn 
to a case study from the Creating Our Families project, and the story of a pregnant lesbian 
couple who responded to the research call. During our interview, Paula and Nicole18 candidly 
discussed the factors at play in their choice of donor sperm. A vital consideration highlighted by 
dozens of participants in the study was the uncertainty of Canadian family law in regard to 
known donor arrangements, obliging many to opt for the anonymity of the sperm bank in order 
to avoid potential custody battles down the road.19  
When asked to describe how they eventually settled on an anonymous donor, Paula and 
Nicole were forthright about their concerns with asking friends and family, and the uncertainty 
this might bring: 
Paula: We talked about friends. 
Nicole: Yeah. There were one or two friends that we thought about using…but they both 
kind of wanted to be…they would have wanted more of a co-parenting relationship. 
Which seems really nice but I don’t think either of us were really interested in that.  
Paula: Yeah. And when we were concerned about money, we thought about maybe using 
my biological family member’s sperm. He and I were quite close, we actually do kind of 
look alike. But he’s kind of changed along the years and now he is a lawyer and um we, 
just because there’s not a lot of precedent, like legal precedent, about the rights of queer 
parents. If it ever happened that he decided that he wanted to have more of a relationship 
with his child…it was scary.  
                                            
18 Not their real names. Paula and Nicole were both cisgendered white women who identified variously as queer and 
lesbian. They have generously given consent to have their story drawn out from the interviews and highlighted. 
19 Although the jurisprudence is scarce, Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben, and Fiona Kelly have written about four 
Canadian cases that address the legal status of known donors in queer families, all of which involved a contestation 
of parentage between the sperm donor and lesbian parents. Of these cases, three awarded some degree of parental or 
visitation rights to the sperm donor against the wishes of the intended lesbian parents. As the authors note, these 
cases “support the false notion that a known sperm donor in a parenting role, or contact by a donor, can only be a 
welcome addition, not an intrusion into a lesbian family.” Angela Cameron et al, "De-Anonymising Sperm Donors 
in Canada: Some Doubts and Directions" (2010) 26 Canadian Journal of Family Law 95 at 124. See also the case: 
W.W. v. X.X. and Y.Y., 2013 ONSC 1509 
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Nicole: Some judge looking at it seeing this guy that is a successful lawyer versus… 
Paula: Two queer women. 
Nicole: Us. 
Paula: You know just fear of that. 
Once Paula and Nicole had decided upon a sperm bank, they narrowed their options to 
three anonymous candidates and eventually selected a man resembling a popular actor from 
American television: the hunky sperm of “Tony Danza” as they jokingly referred to him. After a 
successful conception, they grew curious about the possibility of other children conceived 
through the same donor. Like most Canadians, they had chosen to import sperm from the U.S., 
and they began to try and find out more about other families who had used the same donor.  
At present neither Canada nor the U.S. has an official national donor registry, and thus 
no way to determine where sperm ends up or how many children might be created from a single 
donor. However in May 2012, ReproMed instituted a private, pay-access site for parents who 
had conceived children from the pool of Canadian donors offered through their facilities. As the 
site describes, for the cost of $135: “Users may voluntarily register their children in a database 
that other users (who have also conceived children from the same donor) can access.  If a user 
wishes to make their contact information public, mutual communication may commence 
amongst families.” 20 ReproMed has launched access to this voluntary registry in two phases – 
the first for children conceived after January 1st, 2005; the second phase for children conceived 
after January 1st, 2002.  
                                            
20 “Frequently Asked Questions” ReproMed Sibling Registry, <http://www.repromedsiblingregistry.ca/home.html>. 
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The Donor Sibling Registry 
While the makings of a Canada-wide registry operated under federal authority were 
outlined in the impugned provisions of the AHRA, this was never enacted due to Quebec's 
constitutional challenge.21 The desire for information about donor sperm users and providers 
continues, and ReproMed’s recent initiative presumably aims to help fill this gap – at least for 
the 5% of Canadians that actually use Canadian sperm. For everyone else, including for Paula 
and Nicole, ReproMed’s registry appears to have been modeled upon a for-profit organization 
that emerged in the United States in September 2000 to address the same failure of health 
information tracking. The Donor Sibling Registry [DSR] is a privately-run and membership fee-
supported international network that aims to educate, support and connect donor families.22  The 
DSR invites users to look up a sperm donor by using the donor register number provided by the 
sperm bank or clinic, in order to pull up a page where other users, offspring and even donors 
themselves are posting and seeking to connect.  
Through the DSR, Paula and Nicole were able to connect with a variety of people both 
                                            
21 Section 17 of the AHRA would have established a national health information registry under the management of a 
federal agency, Assisted Human Reproduction Canada, to record information relating to donors, patients using 
donated gametes and donor-conceived offspring. Section 17 was one of several declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in December 2010. Supra note 8 at s 17.  
22 The DSR was created by a biological mother named Wendy Kramer and her donor-conceived son Ryan.  As no 
public outlet existed for contact between people born from anonymous sperm donation, the site was started to help 
facilitate such connections. According to the site: “The DSR averages more than 10,000 unique visitors to the site 
each month and is a worldwide organization, matching people in the US, Austria, Denmark, England, Canada, 
Australia, Cayman Islands, Bolivia, Brazil, Finland, France, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, 
Luxembourg, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Korea, Malta, Philippines, Spain, Turkey, Greece, New Zealand, 
Norway, S. Africa, Sweden, Ireland, Columbia and Switzerland.” The site proudly announces that it has helped to 
connect more than 8902 half-siblings (and/or donors) with each other, with a total number of registrants, including 
donors, parents and donor-conceived people, at 34640. The membership fee is $75 dollars per year or $175 for 
permanent membership, allowing the user to add a posting and/or to contact others. As to the 2.6 million dollars 
already generated by this site, Kramer lists a variety of expenses as rationales why this is 'not simply a website'. This 
includes various banking fees, website managers, graphic design, mental health counselors, office support, attorney 
fees, travel, rent, etc. The Donor Sibling Registry (2013) <https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/about-
dsr/membership-details >. 
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in the US and Canada, and as Paula confirmed: “The majority of it is single women and queer 
couples.” Her observation is consistent with a 2010 Canadian study, which estimated that same-
sex couples represent 55% of demand for donor insemination, with a further 23% coming from 
single women and just 22% on the part of heterosexual couples.23 While the study offered no 
details on how many of the single women may also be lesbian or bisexual, nor on how many of 
the participants were trans-identified, it is evident that queer people represent the majority users 
of donor sperm in Canada. Indeed this number may be even higher, as the report encompassed 
only those people who inseminated through formal channels; it did not seek to estimate home 
insemination with known donors outside the clinical system.24 Even using conservative data, it 
is clear that queer couples like Paula and Nicole find themselves at the forefront of anonymous 
sperm-donor use, as they explore how networks like the DSR are changing familial connectivity 
and awareness of other children born from the same donor sperm.  
After Paula and Nicole had been emailing through the DSR for some time, one of the 
other parents suggested they create a Facebook group for the children conceived by ‘Danza 
sperm’ where they could post pictures and information. At the time of our interview this 
Facebook page had a membership of sixteen people. Nicole estimated that about ten children 
were either born or about to be born, and of that number there were three others in Toronto 
alone. It wasn't only through the Internet that connections were made, however. Paula and 
Nicole shared a remarkable story about meeting one of the other Toronto couples in their queer 
                                            
23 JM Bowen et al, “Altruistic Sperm Donation in Canada:  an Iterative Population-based Analysis” Submitted to 
Assisted Human Reproduction Canada (AHRC). Programs for Assessment of Technology in Health (PATH) 
Research Institute. Hamilton, ON. [20 May 2010]. 
24 There is a rich tradition of the ‘turkey baster’ method of low-tech home insemination in the lesbian community. 
See how-to guides such as: Stephanie Brill, The New Essential Guide to Lesbian Conception, Pregnancy and Birth 
(New York: Alyson Books, 2006); Marie Mohler and Lacy Frazer, A Donor Insemination Guide: Written by and for 
Lesbian Women (New York: Alice Street Editions/Harrington Park Press, 2002).  
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prenatal class. As Paula related: “We were just talking and realized that we used the same donor 
and...their friends actually were the other couple that we connected to [on Facebook].” Through 
a chance encounter in a queer parenting program, and an online social networking site, Paula 
and Nicole stumbled upon three donor sib25 families living in the same city.  
As they described these connections, the women were visibly excited about the idea of 
“recreating family” and developing a “new version of extended family” that their child could 
choose to access. The biological connection with donor sibs represented an extended network 
the women imagined would only be there if their daughter so desired. As Nicole said, 
“obviously...it’s for our child. If they don’t want to be friends with any of these people anymore 
then okay, then we’re not going to force anything on them.” 
 Importantly, these lateral relations were not seen as supplanting existing ties with Nicole 
and Paula’s families of origins. Indeed, the women noted with wry humour that their daughter 
would have no choice when it came to “holidays with grandma and grandpa.” The tension 
between biological and social kinship is one familiar to adoptive parents, as well as step-siblings 
and half-siblings related through divorce, remarriage, infidelity, or any number of configurations 
of intimacy. Similarly, donor sibs also exist outside conventional reproduction narratives, and as 
sociologists Rosanna Hertz and Jane Mattes assert, they are thereby adding “a new contour to 
                                            
25 Rosanna Hertz and Jane Mattes discussed the language used by parenting communities emerging around donor 
sibling networks, based on a survey of 587 single mothers who had used donor sperm. As Hertz and Mattes report: 
“Since there is no separate nomenclature for discussing the other children who are the offspring of one’s sperm 
donor, donor sibs is a colloquial term. Not everyone uses this term. Sibling presumes a relationship that in the case 
of donor siblings is problematic. In genetic terms, children who share the same donor are half-siblings; yet in this 
case half-sibling is a blood relationship that may or may not become a social one as well.” Supra note 17at 1138. 
In recognition that “sibling” implies primarily a social grouping and often an expectation of childhood co-habitation, 
this article uses the term donor sibs to differentiate from siblings understood in the more conventional sense. As 
relations mediated through biotechnology the donor sibs radiating from a single point will be enmeshed within a 
shared genetic hub, but this blood tie may have little relation to the affective bonds of family and intimacy which 
actually figure within a child's life.  
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the definition of kinship.”26 
And Baby Makes Three...Hundred? 
Despite the careful distinction made by Nicole and Paula between families of care (non-
optional) and families of incidental genetic connection (optional), it remains to be seen how 
extricable these categories will be in practice. In their research on donor sibs, Hertz and Mattes 
tracked parents who connected online to other parents who had used the same donor. As they 
explain, there are “a growing number of unrelated parents who share biogenetically related 
children who have begun to organize into more or less durable clans…large groups composed of 
several smaller families.”27 It is my contention that queer communities are positioned at the core 
of these new clan structures.28 Paula and Nicole described the happenstance of connecting with 
three other Toronto families parenting the donor sibs of their own child. But how many more 
might there be? 
Despite strict regulations about how sperm is to be processed, Canada has no binding 
regulations to cap the number of inseminations from a single donor. Nor are there independent 
watchdogs to ensure compliance even if such regulations existed. ReproMed is instead self-
regulating, although it promises to attempt to set allowable family limits according to the 
following internal guidelines: “ReproMed attempts to limit Donors to three live births per region 
                                            
26 Hertz and Mattes, ibid at 1130. 
27 Ibid. 
28 This contention also echoes works of queer anthropology such as Kath Weston’s Families We Choose, a landmark 
text which traced the networks of community and family-making among San Francisco gay men and lesbians people 
in the 1980s. Kath Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991). See also complementary and contemporary texts by Ellen Lewin and Margaret Sullivan, among others. Cf: 
Maureen Sullivan, The Family of Woman: Lesbian Mothers, Their Children, and the Undoing of Gender (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004); Laura Benkov, Reinventing the Family: The Emerging Story of Lesbian and 
Gay Parents (New York: Crown Publishers, 1994); Ellen Lewin, Lesbian Mothers: Accounts of Gender in American 
Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Amy Agigian, Baby Steps: How Lesbian Insemination is 
Changing the World (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2004). 
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of 100,000 populations. Siblings of the same patient using the same Donor are considered one 
live birth.”29 It has been pointed out by an article in the Canadian press that this could entail as 
many as many 75 consanguineous offspring in a city the size of Toronto.30 
Yet given the negligible supply of Canadian donors, the mechanisms through which 
ReproMed attempts to limit births in local markets is not really the issue. Even if there were 
domestic legislation around allowable family limits, it is not clear how such laws would impact 
cross-border donor sperm traffic, given the enormous quantity shipped in from abroad. The 
majority of the sperm currently being used by Canadians originates in the United States, where 
donors are compensated around $100 per specimen and the supply has historically been much 
more robust.31 Allowable family limits are similarly unregulated and left to the discretion of 
each clinic.  
The next section aims to answer the question of how many families might be in Paula 
and Nicole’s ‘clan’. By analyzing current sperm bank policy and best-practice guidelines, as 
well as anecdotal information that pivots around the DSR, a picture will be drawn of the 
potential for lateral donor sib relations. The policy of Fairfax Cryobank is taken to be instructive 
in this regard. 
Analyzing Sperm Bank Limits on Successful Births from a Single Donor 
Virginia-based sperm bank Fairfax Cryobank boasts on their blog that they have been 
                                            
29 “Donor FAQ”, ReproMed <http://www.repromed.ca/donor_faq>. 
30 Tom Blackwell, “Limit Pregnancies by Same Sperm Donor: Fertility Experts”, National Post (8 September 2011) 
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/09/08/limit-pregnancies-by-same-sperm-donor-fertility-experts/>. 
31 As reported by journalist Danielle Groen: “The majority of the sperm comes from America and, to a lesser extent, 
Denmark—both countries have a bounty of donors, likely because they compensate those donors for their samples, 
at about 100 bucks a pop. But we’re shelling out for their largesse, as imported sperm costs patients up to 35 per 
cent more than the homegrown stuff.” Supra note 20. 
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“covering over 80% of the Canadian sperm market for a decade”.32 While this number is 
unverified there is no doubt that Fairfax represents a major international player in the export of 
donor sperm. On the Fairfax website under a heading that says 'Read Before You Buy', the 
following limitations are advertised as being placed on donor births: 
“Fairfax Cryobank limits the total number of births for any donor based on the 
application of several criteria. Specifically, a donor's sales will cease when either 
of the following criteria is reached: 
1. When 25 family units (children from the same donor living in one home) have 
been reported in the US.33 International distribution stops when 15 family units 
have been reported. After the family unit limits have been met, vials will only be 
distributed for sibling pregnancies.  
2. Total number of units sold reaches our designated limit (actual numbers are not 
disclosed)”34 
  
Here, “family unit” refers to a family with one or more children conceived by sperm from 
the same donor. (Thus Nicole could give birth to eight children conceived by their ‘Danza 
sperm’ and still count as one unit for the purposes of donor limits.) Disregarding the occasional 
set of octuplets, the promise of a maximum of 25 family units appears to place a reassuring limit 
upon the number of children produced by a single donor.35 Certainly it is higher than in the 
United Kingdom, where the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority regulates and 
inspects clinics to ensure that sperm or eggs from a single donor are used to create no more than 
ten families.36 Just across the English Channel, the governments of Sweden and Spain have set a 
                                            
32 Irena, Laboratory Staff “International Role of Fairfax Cryobank” Cryo Blog, (16 February 2011), Fairfax 
Cryobank <http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/blog/?p=110>. 
33 This number was adjusted from 30 to a lower limit of 25 during the course of this chapter’s writing and editing. 
34 This is an exact quote from the Fairfax website, parenthetical clause and all. “Limitations on Donor Births” Let Us 
Help You Get Started (2013), Fairfax Cryobank <http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/ReadFirst.shtml>. 
35 Thus, eight children born to the same mother from a particular sperm donor would constitute one family unit. By 
the same token, one child born to a single mother from a particular sperm donor would also constitute a family unit.   
36 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Family Limit for Donated Sperm and Eggs (11 February 2011)  
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Factsheet-Family_limit_2011_02_11.pdf>. 
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maximum limit of six families per donor, while France caps at five and the Netherlands extends 
to twenty-five.37  
What is astonishing is the vast population disparity among countries with relatively 
similar limits. For example, the population of Germany (82.6 million) is approximately ten times 
the population of Austria (8.1 million), yet they both cap at 10 families.38 Were the Austrian 
population-to-donor-families ratio to be taken as baseline, this would raise the German cap to 
100 families. Even more puzzling is the disparity across continents, where India, with a 
population of more than 1 billion people has also set its national donor limit at 10 families. The 
seemingly arbitrary nature of these guidelines is partially because they are arbitrary, with limits 
set in an era before widespread access to donor semen was common. As Neroli Sawyer and John 
McDonald report, the data used to inform the numbers “range from 1956 to the late 1970s, with 
many of the values having changed or become obsolete.”39 Given the US population of 
approximately 294 million, therefore, a cap of 25 family units may actually seem relatively 
reasonable. 
Unfortunately there are at least four problems with this policy. The most obvious is that 
this limit applies only within the US. In the same section, however, Fairfax does specify its 
international regulations on donor limits, promising that caps are in place to a total of 15 
additional family units worldwide. Thus a single donor may produce children within 25 U.S. 
families and 15 families located in other countries (for our purposes we will assume they are all 
                                            
37 Neroli Sawyer and John McDonald, “A review of mathematical models used to determine sperm donor limits for 
infertility treatment” (2008) 90:2 Fertility and sterility 265-271 at 266. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. at 275. 
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in Canada) to a total of 40 family units, which again might appear quite modest considering the 
global scale. 
There is, however, a critical flaw in this accounting: the means by which sperm banks 
track such information. The monitoring of donor-conceived births at Fairfax is dependent upon – 
as it is at all sperm banks – the goodwill of former clients. The families and doctors themselves 
must access the reporting page on the Fairfax website or call in to an operator to report a birth. 
The tracking of 40 family units is carried out not by the clinic performing due diligence, but by 
families who have conscientiously filled out an online questionnaire.  
The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) recently addressed a survey of 
more than 5000 sperm bank users which highlighted the difficulty of ensuring reporting 
compliance. As the ASRM confirmed, 35-40% of respondents indicated they had not or did not 
plan to report their pregnancy back to the sperm bank.40 The survey authors concluded that this 
lack of reporting “poses a significant challenge to sperm banks” and “does not allow for accurate 
pregnancy tracking to limit the number of family units per donor.”41 If we take the low range of 
these numbers, and assume that 35% of families do not intend to report their pregnancy, that 
ramps up the numbers for potential offspring considerably. Given the maximum of 40 North 
American family units, and the current average U.S. birth rate of 2.01, one might reasonably 
estimate that each of those families will have two children from a single donor.42 This would 
produce a grand total of 80 children conceived from the same donor, assuming full reporting. 
                                            
40 M A Ottey and S Seitz, “Trends in Donor Sperm Purchasing, Disclosure of Donor Origins to Offspring, and the 
Effects of Sexual Orientation and Relationship Status on Choice of Donor Category: a Three Year Study” (2011) 
96:3 Supplement Fertility and Sterility S268. 
41
 Ibid. 
42 In fact this number may be higher due to the common incidence of multiple births with AHR and the fact that 
sperm bank tabulations only account for successful live births. 
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However as not all families report their births, when we take the 80 children that are reported (by 
65% of families) and account for the children that we know remain unreported (by 35% of 
families), we end with a total of 123 children potentially created from a single donor. 
Enter the American Reality Show 
Based on the anecdotal information that exists, such a number seems probable, if not 
likely. In late 2011 the Boston Globe ran an article on an attorney named Ben Seisler who had 
donated steadily to a sperm bank for three years during law school. Seisler eventually registered 
on the DSR and found 70 children that had been created with his sperm.43 Through his 
calculations (although this logic is never explained), Seisler estimates that “I have reason to 
expect between 120 and 140 [children].”44 This estimate is very much in alignment with the 
numbers produced by the thought experiment above. 
A total of 123 donor sibs spread across the world may represent a large number, 
certainly, but perhaps not staggering in its ramifications. But recall this is only a clarification of 
the first part of Fairfax's policy. In the absence of self-reporting on the part of individual 
families, Fairfax then pledges to limit the sales of a single donor's sperm once the “[t]otal 
number of units sold reaches our designated limit (actual numbers are not disclosed)”45. Here 
lies the third problem with present standards: a failure of transparency and accountability. While 
all North American sperm banks profess adherence to guidelines limiting the number of births 
from a single donor, there is neither binding regulation nor government oversight to ensure 
                                            
43 Linda Matchan, “Who’s Your Daddy? As Kids Conceived with Donated Sperm Grow Up, Life May Get 
Complicated for Donors”, The Boston Globe (15 September 2011) <http://articles.boston.com/2011-09-
15/community/30161121_1_donor-sibling-registry-sperm-donor-donor-conceived>. 
44
 Ibid. Seisler's story, and others like it, are the fuel for a new reality documentary special called “Style Exposed: 
Sperm Donor’’ which aired Sept. 27, 2011 on the Style network. The show engineers encounters between Seisler and 
selected offspring conceived through his sperm. 
45 This “actual numbers not disclosed” qualification exists in the original text on the Fairfax website. Emphasis 
mine. Supra note 34. 
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compliance in either country. On the contrary, there is a powerful financial incentive for sperm 
banks to draw maximum profit from each donor. Potentially, the bank is limited only by the 
physical volume of sample collected from any given donor. 
Serial Donors at Multiple Clinics 
The fourth problem is the most speculative, even as it poses the most exponential 
challenge to these figures. For even if one imagines a best-case scenario in which clinics, sperm 
banks and clients alike are rigorous about reporting and enforcing family caps to a federally 
mandated limit, a critical issue remains: There is no guarantee the donor will restrict his 
activities to a single clinic. Because donors are paid in the U.S., there is greater incentive for the 
same man to donate multiple times, and the large number of clinics collecting donor sperm 
makes serial donation accessible. 
As with the case of Ben Seisler, a man donating over the course of only three years to a 
single clinic can feasibly produce 123 offspring. Now imagine that Ben moves around, decides 
to visit different clinics, maximizes his return on donation for commercial or narcissistic or 
altruistic motivation (or a mix of all three), and generally becomes something of a 'career' donor. 
Over the course of two decades Ben may end up donating to five or six clinics before he is forty 
– only a slightly far-fetched scenario given the span of time under discussion.46 Assuming it is 
only five clinics, and that each clinic utilizes his sperm to maximum limits, based on the 
previous calculations a single man could father up to 615 offspring. Six hundred and fifteen 
                                            
46 The recent media attention paid to Trent Arsenault, a self-professed 'donorsexual' is indicative of how serial sperm 
donation can actually drive one's sexual animus. A 36-year-old Silicon Valley computer security specialist, Arsenault 
asserts both his virginity and his single-minded attention to providing sperm: "I've committed 100 percent of my 
sexual energy for producing sperm for childless couples to have babies. So I don't have other activity outside of 
that." While certainly an extreme case, Arsenault's story highlights the ways in which sperm donation can become an 
all-consuming task. David Moye, “‘Donorsexual’ Virgin Father of 14 Kids, Answers Your Questions”, The 
Huffington Post (3 February 2012) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/03/trent-arsenault-donorsexual-sperm-
donor-video_n_1251595.html>. 
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children! In the wildest of these scenarios, Paula and Nicole may expect to help their eighteen-
year-old daughter navigate the complex consanguinity of 614 donor sibs in the social media 
connectivity of 2029.  
The intent is not to conjure up a nightmarish scene of cloned child armies at the gate, but 
merely to demonstrate that the present legal regime is poised to have unintended 
consequences.47 And as has been discussed, lesbian and bisexual women represent the majority 
users of anonymous donor sperm in Canada. When these families are feeling pressured to select 
anonymous donors for fear of contested parentage, and their access to available donors is 
slimmed to a bare handful, they become subject to the vagaries of a market with unclear 
outcomes. What seems likely, however, is that a confluence of demand, scarcity, legislation 
(both stringent and absent), uncertain parentage under family law, international borders, kinship, 
technology and sexual identity is poised to hold a concentrated impact on queer communities. 
These are lateral blood relations imbricated by connections of queer family, infertility and 
community practice, none of which are traceable under current federal policy in the U.S. or 
Canada. These developments are likely to be even more pronounced for LGBTQ people of 
colour, due in part to the limited reserves of semen from non-European donors. 
Exacerbated Impact on Queers of Colour 
As the Creating Our Families project made clear through interviews with queers of 
colour seeking donor semen, many people found their options acutely narrowed in regard to 
                                            
47 I realize that these are sensational numbers at the outer limits of statistical probability, but they are not impossible. 
For example Toronto-area filmmaker Barry Stevens has claimed to have up to 1,000 donor sibs through a donor who 
provided specimens to a sperm bank for three decades. His donor sibs are spread across the U.S., Canada, Europe 
and beyond and Stevens' work to locate these relations has formed the basis of his two documentary films on the 
subject. 
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potential race-matched donors.48 For example, one couple I interviewed was seeking a Filipino 
donor, for which their nurse helpfully offered a mixed “Korean/Turkish” specimen as the closest 
they had to offer(!). The women ended up selecting a Filipino donor from a California clinic, but 
were eventually obliged to drive to New York state for insemination after the samples were 
barred from import for failing to meet all Health Canada requirements.  
Once again, an examination of Fairfax's policy proves instructive. A January 2012 search 
of their databases for sperm available for import into Canada shows a stock of 39 donors total. 
This number is comprised of 24 donors of various European heritages and 15 of either non-
European and/or multiracial backgrounds. Seven donors were categorized as broadly “Asian”, 
including two men of self-identified Chinese heritage, as well as one Korean, one Persian, one 
Taiwanese, one Sri Lankan and one Iranian donor.49 Thus a lesbian couple of South-East Asian 
origin might find themselves uncomfortably restricted to the single available Sri Lankan donor. 
A search under the “Black” category locates just one donor of African-American origin, while 
“Latino” also offers up one donor, of Ecuadorian/Spanish ancestry. There are six men identified 
as “Mixed”, and as it happens on the site every multiracial donor counted one half of their 
ancestry as European. The other half was listed as variously Israeli, Mexican, Black, First 
Nations and Bengali, all categorized as “Ethnic” factors. Such ratios were typical across all 
three accredited sperm banks available to the prospective Canadian family.50 
Options are further narrowed if the parents wish to select an Open-ID donor – meaning 
that any children conceived through that donor will have to the option of learning the donor’s 
identity when they reach 18 years old. In every Creating Our Families interview I conducted 
                                            
48 The issue of “race-matching” and its location within the nature/culture binary will be discussed in Chapter Nine. 
49 All described racial and national categories are as indicated on the website. 
50 While there is more volume available to Canadians across the span of the Fairfax, Can-Am Cryobank and 
ReproMed donor catalogues, the racialized proportions remain constant.  
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where we discussed the topic, respondents had intentionally selected an Open-ID donor. 
However within donor catalogues such men represent, at most, a third of available options. For 
example at the time of writing, just ten of ReproMed’s 53 Canadian donors are Open-ID – a bit 
less than 19%. All of them are white.  
Thus when queer folks of colour do wish to have an Open-ID donor reflect their racial 
background or the racial background of their partner, they will likely need to look outside 
Canadian borders. As with the couple seeking a Filipino donor, they will encounter the rigorous 
protocols of the Semen Regulations and may find their chosen samples are barred from 
importation. Additional barriers may then be faced in the form of precarious visa status, the U.S. 
health care system, expenses and requests for time off from employers with whom one does not 
wish to share an intended pregnancy plan.51  
Queer Communities of Blood and Affiliation 
The children of queer parents are more likely than other donor-conceived offspring to 
cross paths with their donor sib biological relations, either knowingly or unknowingly. The 
intersections of community and queer maternity were seen in Toronto with donor sib parents 
meeting by chance at a queer yoga class. Queers of colour may well belong to specific parenting 
communities situated at the intersections between race and sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity, such as the series of groups that spun out of the Asian Pacific Islander Lesbian Bisexual 
Queer women and Transgender Coalition (APIQWTC) in San Francisco.  One of these, called 
Queer Parents for the Love and Advocacy for our Youth (QPLAY), was co-founded in 2008 by a 
Filipina lesbian and mother named Joy Caneda to create a support network for LGBTQ families 
living in San Mateo County, California. QPLAY seeks to offer children an opportunity to meet 
                                            
51 These were all reported as concerns by Carol and Maricel, the couple seeking Filipino donor sperm. Please see 
further discussion of their case in Section Three. 
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other children growing up within queer families. As Caneda puts it: 
 
Many of our children are kids of color, mixed descent or racially mixed families 
and may face racial/ethnic discrimination in addition to homophobia and 
heterosexism. However, we are working to overcome these challenges for our 
families and children. We are forming a collaborative network of groups to 
address the needs of our families throughout the Peninsula. We will continue our 
fun social activities. This has been important way for many of our families to 
have our kids meet others with similar family backgrounds and to have support as 
queer parents.52 
 
When children are created from limited non-white semen reserves and raised in 
concentrated urban areas within groups of racial affinity, it is likely that at least some will share 
a donor sib relation. Even more so when Open-ID requirements are layered atop already scarce 
options for ‘ethnic’ semen donors. 
Not all queer parents reply upon anonymous sperm donors, of course. Nor are all 
children of LGBTQ parents created through reproductive technology. However when queer 
couples and individuals do find themselves seeking non-white donor sperm, the 
overrepresentation of lesbians as users of third-party semen deepens the likelihood of queer 
enclaves relying upon the same sources to conceive their children. This magnifies the possibility 
of consanguinity among queer families of colour and the potential for a wholly new set of 
donor-conceived taboos around queer intergenerationality.53 As the children and parents of 
groups like QPLAY meet and share spaces to support each other, they will be among the first to 
grapple with this new set of challenges. When donors are uncertain, and semen can be 
                                            
52Joy Caneda, “Where Are We in the Peninsula?” (2010) 15:4 Our Family Coalition Newsletter at 11 
<http://www.ourfamily.org/sites/ourfamily.org/files/sitefiles/OFCNewsletter10Fall.pdf>. 
53 By which I mean the vertical child-adult-elder structures of biological reproduction which have long typified 
heterosexual kinship. This emphasis on intergenerationality is in contrast to queer affective communities based not 
upon children or elders, but on peer-group relations considered to be ‘chosen family’. These may also represent vital 
sources of support and friendship, but my interest here is in drawing attention to multiple generations of queer 
family created through biological reproduction and the ramifications for these emerging forms of genealogical 
family-making. 
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indefinitely frozen, potentially any other queer spawn54 could be a biological relation. Without a 
way to track the genetic backgrounds of these children, the intergenerational impact on queer 
communities and likelihood of accidental consanguineous reproduction is positioned at a high 
order of magnitude. 
Yet while such projections may readily conjure the specter of incest - and perhaps it is 
this taboo which will eventually goad regulatory agencies into action – it represents one of many 
potentially shifting notions of kinship.55 Even non-amorous relationships may pose a 
confounding matter for donor sibs, as one may encounter hundreds of genetic relations through 
clan networks of parents and children. Certainly there is no reason to presume this will be a 
necessarily bad thing. On the contrary, it may offer exciting and powerful connections; it may 
recreate many of the ways we conceive of biological identity; it may shift our present focus on 
vertical kinships to more lateral frameworks and it may fundamentally challenge what it means 
to ‘father’ a child. It may also end up having little effect at all. However it is clear that queer 
people, and in particular those who rely upon donor sperm to create their families, will be at the 
vanguard of whatever is coming. 
                                            
54 One of the challenges of working with new paradigms involves creating and adopting new vocabularies. To add to 
the recent definitions of fertility law and donor sibs, we have queer spawn (also spelled queerspawn). This is an 
increasingly popular term to describe the children produced through queer kinships, and is often adopted by the 
children themselves. See for example the documentary film 'Queer Spawn' by Anna Boluda as well as the radio 
project and sound archive 'Queer Spawn Diaries' about adults with queer and trans parents by Nava EtShalom and 
Chana Joffe-Walt. See also: Jamie K. Evans, 'A Queer Spawn Manifesto: Empowerment and Recognition' in Rachel 
Epstein, ed, Who's Your Daddy? And Other Writings on Queer Parenting (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2009). 
55 The fright around accidental consanguinity is a cultural formation that finds its exaltation in the incest taboo. This 
norm has not remained stable across time or culture. In ancient Greece, for example, marriages were allowed 
between a brother and sister if they had different mothers, while half-sibling marriages were also found in ancient 
Japan. Contemporary Swedish law, on the other hand, allows marriage between two consenting adults even if they 
are siblings. The taboo against incest is steeped in heterosexual and Oedipal fears, with actual genetic impact on 
offspring up for debate. In particular, Judith Butler's work to redefine Antigone as the "postoedipal" subject has 
helpfully argued for forms of sexual alliance and political agency beyond the incest taboo. Cf: Judith Butler, 
Antigone's Claim: Kinship between Life & Death (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
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Discussion 
This chapter has sought to lay out some of the particularized concerns affecting LGBTQ 
people using third-party donor sperm in Canada. It has been interested in tracking how lateral 
kinships may form through multiple donor sibs, and the ways in which this exerts a 
differentiated impact on LGBTQ communities and especially on queers of colour. It has 
explained how the entwined regulatory force of the AHRA, Semen Regulations and the Directive 
have restricted the available supply of Canadian sperm donors, to the point that an estimated 
95% of the semen used for AHR is now sourced from outside the country. Among other 
concerns, including the strictness of protocols around importing sperm into Canada, recent 
empirical research has indicated a narrowing of available selections for people seeking a non-
white donor.56 At the same time, uncertain laws around parentage and the custodial rights of 
known donors have inclined many families to choose anonymous donors rather than 
inseminating with a friend or partner’s family member. This is a particularly precarious decision 
for queer couples, who have traditionally fallen outside of normative models of childrearing. As 
same-sex couples and single women are estimated to constitute the largest demographic of users 
of third-party sperm donation for use in AHR, this places them disproportionately at the fore of 
any legal gaps that may exist. And gaps there are.  
The lack of a formal national donor registry to track health information of donors, 
families and the donor offspring produced constitutes a serious lacuna. The gutting of the AHRA 
means that such a registry is no longer in the works, while the shuttering of Assisted Human 
Reproduction Canada has closed the doors on Canada’s only federal voice on reproductive 
issues (as muted as that voice may have been). While Toronto’s ReproMed sperm bank has 
                                            
56 See in particular the experience of the lesbian couple seeking a Filipino donor, discussed above, who were 
recommended a “Korean/Turkish” donor as the closest the clinic had to offer. 
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attempted to compensate for this shortfall in health reporting information by instituting a 
voluntary pay-access sibling donor registry, it only covers those select donors who originated in 
Canada. As this represents less than 5% of all Canadians using donor semen, this cannot present 
a satisfactory solution to the problem of donor tracking. The for-profit Donor Sibling Registry in 
the U.S. aims at providing an international forum for donor sibs, donors and parents to connect 
online, but it is also voluntary, for-profit and operating outside of government regulation.  
The failure to institute a national tracking mechanism for donor health information 
constitutes a serious omission, even as the utility of such a registry is limited by the fact that 
Canada sources the majority of sperm from abroad. Health Canada regulations around altruistic 
sperm donation have throttled domestic supply, forcing reliance upon commercially-sourced 
sperm reserves from countries like the U.S. and Denmark. This prevents local capacity to track 
the donors and donor sibs of Canadian families, even as the government professes a moral ideal 
that eschews the exchange of payment for human reproductive material. This is a foundational 
hypocrisy that is harming Canadians seeking health reporting information on their donors and 
children, and one which unduly impacts LGBTQ people using donor gametes.  
Recommendations for Legal and Policy Development 
The first step in addressing this hypocrisy should be to examine the Semen Regulations 
and Directive. Policymakers must aim to remove barriers to donation on the part of known 
donors and HIV donors, and remove the criminal penalties to match paid donation regimes as in 
the semen-exporting countries from which Canada receives its stock. Canada currently has one 
of the lowest donor recruitment success rates in the world, and a domestic pool of 53 active 
donors for a population of approximately 34 million people. The regulations affecting known 
donors must also be overhauled to allow for less stringent quarantine and processing procedures. 
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When couples and single people elect to inseminate with known donors, they should be afforded 
the same streamlined process available to women inseminating with sexual partners. Each 
province must clarify the parentage rights of known donors, allowing for the intention of the 
social parents to prevail. This may include non-exclusive parenting arrangements that 
incorporate more than two legal parents if desired by the intended caregivers.57  
As ReproMed is currently the only national distributor for Canadian sperm, its online 
donor registration system should be expanded and made available to donors as well. The 
stripping of the AHRA and close of the AHRC has made the development of a federal health 
registry on donors unlikely, rendering private models currently in operation the most practical 
outlet for consolidation and expansion. Health Canada must support ReproMed to work in 
concert with the fertility clinics of other donor-export nations, and particularly the U.S., to 
institute an international database of gamete donors and health reporting information. At the 
same time, it is also critical to develop federally-mandated guidelines for donor limits on family 
units. These must not be steeped in heterosexual presumptions, but should remain responsive to 
the requirements and compositions of LGBTQ communities and their reproductive needs. 
Issue with Donor Limits on Family Units 
At present, all North American sperm banks promise compliance with some form of 
regulation on donor limits, most commonly the ASRM allowable birth/donor distribution rate. 
This calculus sets family limits as standing at 25 births/donor per 800,000 in a circumscribed 
population, i.e., the population surrounding the location where donor inseminated births are 
reported as occurring.58 A “circumscribed population” is here defined as a limited geographic 
                                            
57 The discussion of multiple-parent arrangements and parenting formations through AHR is discussed in Chapter 
10. 
58 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine, “Guidelines for Sperm Donation” (2002) 77:6 Supplement 5 
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area as drawn from the field of clinical research. Unfortunately there is a problem with utilizing 
geography as the key demographic indicator. In the Handbook of Research Methods in Clinical 
Psychology, authors George C. Tremblay and Barbara Landon discuss the definition and clinical 
assumptions underlying the “circumscribed population” framework. They offer instead the 
concept of “community” as a corollary in relation to harm reduction and prevention: 
First, [we discuss] the concept of community – some circumscribed population of 
individuals who share certain characteristics...the very act of defining 
communities is a necessary step in developing an understanding of risks faced by 
their inhabitants. Definitions of community usually imply a geographic boundary, 
but may, for some purposes, derive from other shared characteristics such as 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, or the experience of a traumatic event.59 
 
This perspective helps to uncover the range of assumptions bundled into the apparently 
benign association of “population” with “geographic location.” Such a definition assumes that 
each individual: A) will maintain a static location, B) will find their primary social allegiance 
through spatial relationships such as neighbours, C) are not pulled by vectors of identity along 
race, sexual orientation or (the obvious) materialities of assisted reproduction, and D) do not 
have access to non-physical communities such as those offered by the Internet. Yet as has 
already been seen with Paula and Nicole and their startling proximity to donor sibs of their 
child, both online communities and local geographies provide categories of belonging. The 
example of QPLAY in San Mateo county demonstrated even more complex intersectional 
allegiances upon lines of race, sexuality, parenting and location. The failure of ASRM's 
imaginary “circumscribed population” of ostensible (white) strangers is inescapable in light of 
                                                                                                                                             
Fertility and Sterility 2. See also: Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine and 
Practice Committee of the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, “2008 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo 
Donation: a Practice Committee Report” (2008) 90:5 Supplement Fertility and Sterility S30 at S36. 
59
 George C Tremblay and Barbara Landon, “Research in Prevention and Promotion” in Michael C Roberts and 
Stephen S Ilardi, eds Handbook of Research Methods in Clinical Psychology (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2003) 354 at 
362-3. 
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the complex formation of actual social communities. 
Sexual orientation and communities of practice around queer parenting are drawing 
people together in more concentrated streams than presumed by the anonymity of geographic 
population. This means that the donor sibs of queer parents are far more likely to encounter each 
other than in the objectively envisioned “circumscribed population” of a geographic radius. This 
is to say nothing of the online communities being created around donor insemination and the 
role of new media in connecting geographically disparate groups. In developing new regulations 
it is critical to discard the idea of a “circumscribed population” based purely on geography. This 
is a dated model that relies on an understanding of geographic proximity to the exclusion of 
other crucial social vectors, including ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, the trauma of infertility 
or social media as vehicles through which people develop communities of connection and 
belonging.  
New criteria to determine appropriate donor insemination limits in light of queer family-
making is required, with emphasis on racial diversity, sexual orientation and demand for Open-
ID donor options. As these regulations are being developed, however, it is imperative that 
Canada not mandate a blanket restriction requiring all families to select Open-ID donors. The 
Pratten case argued in British Columbia would have required that provincial legislation provide 
mechanisms by which adult donor-conceived children can locate identifying information on 
their anonymous donors.60 It also was widely expected to institute a mandatory Open-ID policy 
in Canada, potentially limiting not only domestic donors but also that large pool of gametes 
imported into Canada from other nations. Yet as discussed above, at time of writing just ten of 
ReproMed’s 53 Canadian donors are Open-ID, and all of them are white. For prospective 
                                            
60 Pratten v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 656; Pratten v British Columbia (Attorney General) 
et al. 2012 BCCA 480. 
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parents already facing narrow options, a policy of mandatory Open-ID would create 
unacceptable limitations. In the absence of other revisions to existing jurisprudence, not least a 
clarification of the parental rights of known donors, Pratten would merely have compounded 
existing legal precarity; once again this would have been most keenly felt by LGBTQ people 
and queers of colour.61 
Finally, an enhanced regulatory enforcement regime is necessary to ensure that 
reproductive technologies are being appropriately provided and accessed. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, there is no consistent set of formal qualifications or standard of practice to which 
fertility clinics are held, as well as no licensing or accreditation required. Mandatory provincial 
accreditation is necessary to standardize clinical services, protocols, operations and prices.  
Every province and territory in Canada has its own rules, requirements and processes for 
medical licensure; in Ontario, for example, all doctors must receive their certificates of 
registration from the provincial College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario [the College]. 
The College is charged with investigating complaints about doctors on behalf of the public and is 
also responsible for conducting disciplinary hearings when doctors may have committed an act 
of professional misconduct or incompetence. To date, the College has held only two disciplinary 
hearing to review the conduct of a fertility specialist operating at a private fertility clinic.62 One 
doctor in question was suspended for professional misconduct for three months and levied a fine 
                                            
61 Pratten was denied leave to appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
62 In this case, a doctor had a sexual relationship with his receptionist, and after the relationship was terminated, the 
woman became an anonymous ovum donor in his fertility practice for two separate families. The receptionist was 
able to gain access to the recipient’s files and learn the identity of at least one ova recipient. The doctor in question 
was found to have taken insufficient care to conceal patient identities, constituting a violation of their guaranteed 
anonymity.In: Auyeung (Re) The Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario in the 
Matter of a Hearing directed by the Complaints Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. 
Release of Written Decisions Date: August 10, 2006. 
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of $2,500.63 The other case involved a doctor in London, Ontario who was investigated in regard 
to professional conduct and banned indefinitely from practicing fertility medicine in May 2014.64 
No other fertility specialist has received formal reprimand from the College.65 
Professional boards such as the provincial Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons must 
collaborate with bodies such as the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society to develop and 
enforce donor cap regulations at each individual clinic, and work with the newly-created 
international donor registry to ensure that successful births are enumerated. This important 
responsibility can no longer be left to the self-reporting goodwill of families and their 
physicians. Effective regulatory oversight must take into account the specific needs of LGBTQ 
people, as major consumers of reproductive technology, and work with grassroots organizations, 
donor-conceived family organizations and community-based advocacy groups to ensure 
inclusive and fair policy that meets the requirements of all families across Canada. 
Conclusion: Queer Families on the Frontlines 
In concluding this chapter I would like to return to the story of Paula and Nicole. As the 
lived lives at the heart of this paper, I believe they demonstrate the importance of creating a 
policy regime that can account for queer subjects in both law and conception. Their limited 
                                            
63 Ibid. 
64 A recent investigation of a fertility doctor in London, Ontario found evidence of professional misconduct in regard 
to repeated low-tech options. Dr. James Martin admitted to performing repeated intra-uterine insemination (IUI) 
treatments and prescribing high doses of ovarian-stimulation drugs, putting some patients in danger of serious 
complications.  
65 There were two other hearings that involved an obstetrician-gynecologist and therefore indirectly impacted female 
fertility, but these both concerned community practitioners who did not specialize in assisted reproduction. In the 
first, an obstetrician-gynecologist pled no contest to the charge of incompetence incompetent in his management of 
47 patients between 1992 and 2001. The Committee revoked his license to practice. Wai-Ping (Re) The Discipline 
Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario in the Matter of a Hearing directed by the 
Complaints Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. Release of Written Decisions Date: 
March 11, 2004. In the second, an obstetrician-gynecologist faced complaints about his treatment of 37 women and 
was found to have failed to meet the standard of practice in his care of six of the women. Vaidyanathan (Re) The 
Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario in the Matter of a Hearing directed by 
the Complaints Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. Release of Written Decisions 
Date: July 7, 2006. 
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options as Canadians using federally-regulated donor sperm obliged them to select a U.S. 
candidate who may be utilized by dozens, if not hundreds of other families across the globe. As 
white women they had access to the largest pool of potential donors, yet as lesbians they were 
also the largest client base of third-party donor semen; as queer folks they exist in a community 
of sexual practice in which lateral kinships between half-siblings are far more likely; and as 
Torontonians they are members of Canada's largest LGBTQ population.  
The complex web of legal regulation that ensnares their experience with assisted human 
reproduction has not been able to offer Paula and Nicole any certainty about how many other 
families may be giving birth to donor sibs of their child, nor has it been able to provide a 
legislative mechanism to track these children as they grow into adults. In our interview, Nicole 
told me how the fertility clinics are not impressed by such independent initiatives as the Donor 
Sperm Registry “because they want everything...wrapped up and tight” until the child is 18 
years old. Nevertheless, access to the online communities of the DSR has placed them in contact 
with other donor sib families, and based on their experience Paula could confidently assert that 
this method of tracking “is changing everything.” 
LGBTQ parents are seeking reproductive support at clinics across Canada and 
confronting a legal regime that is poorly attuned to their needs. In many ways, queer people may 
be uniquely adapted to handle these challenges. As families already based on inherently non-
reproductive sexuality, there is no expectation that a child will biological affiliation with both or 
all parents. Queer people have also prided ourselves upon the ability to create “families of 
choice” and develop new communities when our biological networks of family failed.66 Indeed 
these new affiliations may prove sources of great community and alliance…at the very least, 
                                            
66 Weston, supra note 28. 
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they could make for some epic family reunions. What is clear, however, is that an 
intergenerational effect is brewing with an impact that remains uncertain, and LGBTQ families 
stand at the fore as new family modes and lateral kinships are being produced through AHR. 
The queer experience may thereby provide a useful prism for all manner of families seeking 
reproductive assistance through donor gametes, gay and straight alike.67  
Postscript 
As I was readying this chapter for publication in the Canadian Journal of Women and 
the Law, I checked in with Paula and Nicole to share the final draft and see how they were 
progressing with the Facebook group. Paula sent an update on their daughter Johanna that 
speaks precisely to the new forms of family being created, and she has generously allowed me 
to reproduce the letter here in its entirety. I am delighted to give her the last word on these 
lateral kinships and the potential they hold for new forms of family and queer community. 
Hi Stu, 
I'd be more than happy to catch you up on our little Sibs community. I am always happy to talk 
about this stuff - I think if we are going to be redefining family like we are, we need to talk more 
about it so others aren't so freaked out about donor siblings. Johanna being connected to her 
donor sibs surprisingly gets many people labeling what we are experiencing as weird and crazy. 
Even some of the most politicized folks who claim to be totally non-judgmental have had a hard 
time not finding it strange and having a hard time wrapping their heads around our families. 
Our group has grown immensely over the past couple years. At last count there are 37 children 
born into our sibs group that we know of and we are getting bigger and bigger with second 
children being born. We have nine families in Ontario, there are two families in Israel and the 
remainder in the US. So far we have met five families and get together with them two to three 
times a year. We have grown a little closer to two of these families who we often see out amongst 
the queer community and we have just started to attend one other's kids birthday parties. We are 
getting together with the five families in a couple weeks at one of the sib families homes. We may 
                                            
67 Please note that while this chapter has only been able to explore the lesbian experience of anonymous third-party 
donor sperm, there are also urgent problems with how ova are sourced, how known donors are treated, as well as 
how surrogacy arrangements are structured under the AHRA. These issues will be discussed through reference to 
empirical data in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
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also book a camping trip this summer. Some of the families in the US have also met one another 
and have been talking about doing a bigger vacation like a Disney cruise or beach vacation.  
I really like the folks we have connected with so far up here in Toronto. Johanna seems to enjoy 
her time spent with her donor sibs. This may change and we will be there to support however she 
decides to move forward with these relationships in the future. I don't know, but I imagine it just 
may be her 'normal' experience. Both Nicole and I come from non-traditional family structures 
and for us it's just been how it is.  
You see many different levels of participation from folks on our Facebook group. Some people 
will always be posting photos and comments to the group, others comment from time to time, 
some people just lurk and don't say anything and we have had a couple people appear and soon 
disappear without us finding much out about them. I imagine it can be a little overwhelming for 
folks who are first learning about the donor sibling registry and this new Sibs culture we are all 
now a part of. When Nicole and I first signed up we only had a handful of families and now it's 
quite hard for even me to keep up with what kid goes with which family. As of now we are still 
only a group of single women and queer women. Not sure where the hetero couples are? We 
know they're out there! 
Take good care, 
Paula 
  
 
